125-135, and in Chapter VII., M.F.E., 1911. The duties required of
the company commander and his subordinates are briefly defined by
I.T., 132, to be similar to those they carry out in the attack. The
whole spirit of the regulations is that the active Defence is merely
a means to an end, viz., the ultimate assumption of the offensive,
which may be carried out either by the same troops which have acted
on the defensive or by fresh troops detailed for the purpose. In both
cases the troops that have acted on the defensive must be ready to
become the aggressors. Therefore, in training your men, you should
keep this constantly in view and conserve a spirit of aggressive
mobility. Men must not be allowed to think that once a position
has been taken up and entrenched it is to be their location till
fighting ceases; on the contrary, they should be encouraged to look
for opportunities while still on the defensive, to occupy alternative
positions which will make the task of the attacking enemy more
difficult. Quickness in seizing and strengthening a position must be
combined with mobility in leaving it to take up and strengthen a new
one. Of course, the time available regulates the work that can be
undertaken (M.F.E., VII. (2)); deep trenches and concealed head cover
cannot be made with an enemy pressing in to assault, but the first
requirement is the ability to choose positions that give a good field
of fire and to strengthen them as thoroughly as the time available
and the proximity of the enemy admit.
In dealing with a company, the onus of choosing what localities it is
tactically necessary to occupy and strengthen rests with the company
commander, subject to the orders of his battalion commander. In the
same way as on outpost, you will be given a bit of ground to defend,
either acting with the battalion or as an isolated company, and the
rest will be on your head. I do not propose to deliver a treatise
on the tactical occupation of ground, but instead I will ask you to
procure and read two books. The first is “The Defence of Duffer’s
Drift,” by Backsight Forethought (W. Clowes and Sons), the second
is “A Staff Officer’s Scrap Book,” by Sir Ian Hamilton (Edward
Arnold). They are both most readable books, and are quite free of
soporific effects. The first is small, and deals with the efforts
of a half-company, under Lieutenant B. F., to defend a drift over a
South African river. In the second the author takes you along with
him through the Russo-Japanese War, of which he was a privileged
spectator, and in your journeyings you look on at victories and
defeats in the making, while the causes that led to them, great and
small, are set forth, along with many shrewd comments on human nature
and how it translates itself in the day of battle. Every fight bears
its own lesson of what to do and what not to do in defence, and this
told in no pedantic strain, but with the saving grace of humour, to
mitigate the darker side of human carnage. Read them both, get to
yourself the wisdom and understanding with which they are filled, and
you will know how to take up a position for defence.
Having educated yourself to choose the points of a defensive position
that must be occupied if the position is to be effectively held,
you have still to train your men to the work of defending them, and
they must learn to be able to do without the help of a supervising
officer, as will often be the case on service.
Daylight defence is almost entirely a matter of fire, the immediate
object being to make it impossible for the enemy to come to close
quarters. Platoon and section commanders then must be able to dispose
their men with this in view to the best advantage within the limits
of the ground allotted to their units, and the men must be able to
site their trenches or whatever form of cover has to be constructed
so as to use their rifles to the best effect. It is no good to teach
men to dig trenches and make loop-holes unless they know the proper
places for them. (M.F.E., 18 (7)).
At the same time, practice in digging and the use of tools is very
necessary for men who are not accustomed to such work. The hands of
the untrained man blister and his muscles tire under the unusual
effort, while he expends much energy with results small in comparison
with what he can accomplish once he has learnt to use his strength
well. Moreover, a certain amount of technical skill is required in
making any but the most simple cover.
To practise the execution of work, you _must_ have ground which you
are at liberty to turn up, as well as some materials for loop-holes
and obstacles. These may not be obtainable at any and every parade,
but you can give practice in the selection and siting of trenches
on any bit of country without causing damage, the men merely
spitlocking or marking with stones or anything else the position of
the trenches on the surface of the ground, and describing what they
propose doing.
I would, therefore, advise that you make your training consist of
two parts, firstly the siting of trenches and the planning by unit
commanders and men of defensive work, the choice and occupation of
alternative positions, and the assumption of the offensive from the
defensive, all this without actually breaking ground, and, secondly,
ground and tools being then available, the performance of a course of
making real cover and obstacles.
But the first part cannot be carried out unless the men have a
knowledge of what trenches, loop-holes and so on are like, and the
objects with which they are made. In a company of raw recruits taken
from the populace at large, there will be plenty who have no ideas
on the subject at all. You must then precede your exercises either
by a short lecture, materials for which you will find in plenty in
the “Defence of Duffer’s Drift,” and the manuals of training, or,
better than a lecture, by showing them specimens of entrenchments
made by regular troops. The main points to insist on are the securing
of a field of fire, the necessity of concealment of the defences,
the importance of head cover as a help to the delivery of an
accurate fire by letting men keep the enemy in view without showing
up themselves, the avoidance of enfilade fire by making traverses,
or by taking advantage of intervening high ground, the provision
of cover from downward shell fire by making the trenches deep and
steep enough to let men stand close up to the edges, and, in the
case of isolated posts and points held as pivots of a position, the
necessity of preparing an all-round defence so that these pivots will
be able to continue fighting whatever happens on the intervening
ground. The course of work actually performed for the second part
should include digging all kinds of trenches, by which the men will
learn to use their tools to the best advantage, and their hands and
muscles will become hardened, the use of the excavated earth to form
parapets and parados (cover from fire from the rear of the trench;
forty inches of earth are needed to keep out a bullet), the drainage
of trenches, the making of traverses against enfilade fire, the
making of loop-holes and head-cover with the aid of all sorts of
materials, sand bags, brushwood and heather, straw and twigs, stones
and bricks (which must be covered with earth to deaden the effects of
splinters), packing boards, and so on, the concealment of trenches
and loop-holes so as to be invisible to the enemy (this is of great
importance), the masking of loop-holes when not in use to prevent
light showing through, the making of dummy trenches and loop-holes to
draw the enemy’s fire away, the improvement of existing cover, such
as loop-holing walls and the use of hedges with or without ditches,
making sangars, if stones are available, the making of obstacles of
barbed and plain wire, and measuring and marking of ranges round
a position, which should be done by some means not obvious to the
enemy, and clearing the field of fire. It will seldom be practicable
to obtain subjects for practical demonstration of some of the latter
in peace time; people will object to their walls being experimented
on or their shrubberies laid low, and so even here a description of
the method will have to be substituted for actual performance. For
night defence the construction of night rests for rifles is needed.
The best I know is a packing case, filled with earth, with the front
and rear edges notched to hold the rifle stock. The magazine is laid
hard up against the outside of the rear edge and the notches, front
or rear, slowly deepened with a penknife till the sights bear on the
target; afterwards earth is banked up outside the box and head-cover
made above. The foregoing may seem a formidable list, but they are
things that will undoubtedly be required as soon as you get on
shooting terms with an enemy; while if you exhaust this list and feel
the want of further occupation, the Engineering Manual will supply
you with further subjects for your activities.
Pending your getting facilities of ground, tools, and materials
to execute work, you can proceed with the first part of training
outlined above. If your non-commissioned officers have not had
experience, take them out as an instructional section in the same way
as when teaching outpost work, and put them through the exercises
which follow. But if they are already fairly competent, take the men
on parade, forming them, if possible, into not less than two sections.
_Instruction in Siting Trenches._
Choose any position on undulating ground, form the men in extended
order in one line in rear of it, and order them to move up, and
mark where each would place his trench in order to fire on an enemy
advancing from the front. In doing this it should be an invariable
rule that men must lie down, bring the rifle into the firing
position, look along the sights, and move forward or back till they
see that they have got the best position to sweep the ground in their
immediate front (see M.F.E., 31 (3)). Dead ground close to the trench
gives the enemy a place in which to collect and organise an assault.
Take the men in the same way on to other positions and repeat the
lesson till they all understand that the _first thing to be done is
this aiming with the rifle to secure a good field of fire_. At first
halt them close to what you see is the best line, and afterwards halt
them thirty or forty yards from it, and then give the order to choose
sites. For instance, halt them on the top of a convex slope and let
them find out that the best place to bring fire on to flat ground at
its base is somewhere on the enemy’s side of the convexity, for if
the trench were made on the top of the slope the ground immediately
in front would be hidden by the convexity. The section commanders
must help the men in choosing sites.
After the men have fixed and marked the proposed sites, let them lay
down their rifles three paces in rear and kneel or lie down at the
rear edge of the site as if waiting to commence work while you and
section and platoon commanders go round and examine the line. Ask
details from the men—how high they would make the parapet, how thick
it should be, how they would make head-cover, how they would conceal
the work, and so on.
_Traverses and broken lines of Trenches._
Repeat the exercise as above, but this time have the men in sections
or small groups, and the trenches made not in one line, but in
short lengths, separated by traverses. You will have to explain
the construction and use of these to prevent enfilade fire (if not
from long range), and to localise shell bursts. Again, have lines
of trenches mapped out in short lengths on an irregular front, some
a little forward, some a little back, with the earth at each end,
banked up on the flanks with the same object (M.F.E., 33).
_Short Trenches for Two Men._
Bring the men extended to six or eight paces on to a position, and
let the men of each file close to two paces from each other. Each
file is then to choose and mark a site for a short trench to hold
both of them, or, as it would formerly have been called, a rifle pit,
marking where they would make loop-holes to fire both to the front,
and obliquely towards the right and left, so as to rake the ground
in front of the line of the other men’s pits. This arrangement is
not officially recognised, and it does not give the closest possible
firing line, but it is an excellent way of making men think for
themselves.
When the men have got their bearings in the matter of taking up a
line for entrenchment, make them get into the way of changing from
defence into attack. Take up a position as before, and as soon as
the trenches are marked out, indicate a position at some distance as
an objective for attack and start an advance against it, as done in
the attack practices, forming a firing line rapidly of some named
platoons and the support of the others. A skeleton enemy kept hidden
till needed adds much to the realism.
_Defence of Pivots (M.F.E., 50 (3), and I.T., 129)._
Find a position in which there are some points separated from each
other which command the ground between, and also form such pivots
for defence of the position as are described in the paras. above.
According to the nature of the ground, such pivots might be, for
platoons, as much as four hundred yards apart, i.e., attackers coming
between them would be under fire at not more than two hundred yards.
Send a platoon under a commander to each pivot, and let him plan and
mark out his defensive measures, which must include:—
1. An arrangement for all-round defence, so that the pivot may be
self-contained and capable of continuing the fight, although
others may have been captured.
2. The siting accordingly of trenches and loop-holes to fire all
round and especially to sweep the front and rear of adjoining
pivots.
3. The adaptation of existing cover to save labour.
4. The provision of protection against enfilade and reverse fire,
and the _recognition of distant localities_ from which such
fire, whether of artillery or rifle, might be brought to bear
on the post.
5. The marking of ranges in each direction.
6. The provision of obstacles.
7. Any feasible scheme for alternative positions which his men
could reach and occupy under fire.
8. The concealment of the defences, provision of dummy trenches,
and loop-holes and any other shifts.
9. The telling off and posting of look-out men and fixing and
occupying of alarm posts when work has been completed.
10. Drainage and sanitation.
The concealment of defences from aerial reconnaissance will, perhaps,
soon claim more attention than it gets at present.
Practise an attack after defence, starting off one platoon under your
own orders to “go for” an indicated enemy, and sending word either
by messenger or by semaphore to the others, either to join you and
form a firing line, or to move out in support, but, if the latter,
do not fail to finally call them up to reinforce the firing line;
counter-attacks must usually be made with a relatively strong firing
line and small support.
_The Company in Defence Acting Alone._
When you have put non-commissioned officers and men through the
preceding course, plan some scheme on the lines of the defence of
Duffer’s Drift, to deal with a company isolated and beyond reach of
immediate reinforcement. Any bridge over a railway line, a group of
buildings supposed to contain stores, or a ford or bridge over a
river, will provide you with an object to defend. Choose a line of
defence round it and determine what are the essential pivots to be
held. To do this, so as to furnish an instructive lesson, it will
usually be necessary for you to pay a visit to the place by yourself
and formulate your proposed defence before bringing the company on
to the ground. Pay great attention to crossing and supporting fire
from the pivots, and look at the surrounding country with a view to
meeting attack from any direction, for in this case the company, as
well as the pivots in its line of defence, must be self-contained.
Also have regard to the certainty that you will have artillery
fire against you, to which you will not be able to reply, and in
consequence your proposed defences must include deep trenches or
recesses to shelter the men from shell. Your defences will take the
form of a chain of isolated groups about the point to be defended
and separated from each other by possibly several hundred yards. It
is no use simply to go and sit inside a group of buildings which
the guns would knock about your ears and against which the enemy
can concentrate. The better plan is to break up his attack and hide
your weakness by occupying well-strengthened pivots, behind whose
protection you may have some freedom of movement, and so be able,
if the weakness or rashness of the enemy gives opportunity, to
inaugurate local counter-attacks. These, if successful in inflicting
a sharp and sudden loss, will make him hesitate to deliver a decisive
attack till he has found out all about you. With one company you
cannot expect to achieve decisive results against any considerable
body of the enemy, but must be content with keeping him in play for
as long a time as possible, and an attitude of active bluff is the
best means of doing so.
When you have got your plans completed, take out the company
as strong as possible and complete in its proper platoons and
sections—if there are too few men let one man count for two or three.
Send off platoons to occupy and plan the defence of the pivots as
done when practising it before. Do the same scheme on two separate
occasions. The first time do not send out a skeleton enemy, so that
the men may have time to look round, but for the second time send out
some scouts under a subaltern, and let the platoons fall out on their
positions with patrols out in front. Fix a certain hour by which you
expect the arrangements to be all ready, and arrange for the enemy to
advance at that time, and open fire on the patrols if they are met.
When the patrols have fallen back the enemy closes in and starts
sniping at the position. Then bring off a counter-attack, withdrawing
some men for the purpose from pivots that are not threatened, and
coming in on the flank of the attackers. In theory, of course, you
should have a support or reserve available for this, but it does no
harm to move men out of their trenches with the object of assuming
the offensive, while the men learn the essential part of their work
by all being employed on the perimeter.
Have out the company yet a third time on the same or a similar
scheme, pivots and skeleton enemy as before. On this occasion, if the
scheme is the same, change round the platoons to different pivots
from what they occupied before, and when the arrangements for defence
have been settled, leave only sentries and their groups on the pivots
as look-outs, but have patrols in front. Form the remainder of the
men into a support in some central position, and tell them off to
occupy as alarm posts the pivots from which they were withdrawn. When
the skeleton enemy attacks, reinforce the threatened part of the line
by the men of the units told off for its defence, and with part, or
even the whole of the rest, make a counter-attack.
It is very desirable, though unfortunately not often possible, to
perform these last three practices on ground where you are at
liberty to dig, and with an enemy of three or four companies instead
of a few snipers.
_Night Defence._
A night attack may be delivered as a sequence to fighting by
daylight, in the course of which the enemy has established himself
sufficiently close to the defences held by his opponent to see
clearly the way to reach the point against which he intends to lead
his force. Or he may deliver an attack without previous fighting,
hoping to get the better of the defenders by surprise, and basing
his plans solely on the results of reconnaissance. In the latter
case the attack must be preceded by a night advance, long or
short, according as the defenders’ outposts and their patrols have
succeeded in keeping the hostile troops at a distance or not, unless,
indeed, the troops or their scouts or spies have not been in touch
at all during the day in which case an attack would not be a wise
proceeding, because the needful information about the ground and
your forces is lacking. Such attacks as require a night advance as a
preliminary are likely to be made either over open ground or along
roads, for the difficulties and delays occasioned by moving troops
over broken ground which is not thoroughly known are very great.
But in the first case, when fighting has been going on by day, and
the two forces are in close contact at nightfall, separated perhaps
by only a few hundred yards, the presence of broken ground in front
of the defences is no guarantee that the enemy may not consider an
attack by night to have a reasonable chance of succeeding against
any of the points which he has been trying to carry by daylight. It
follows then that in preparing a position for defence the pivots must
be ready to withstand attack by night as well as by day, and also
that roads or paths leading into the position from the surrounding
country should be held and defended by night, in spite of their being
innocuous by daylight owing to being swept effectively by fire from
the adjacent pivots. It will be admitted, I think, that fire by night
is ineffectual unless at very short ranges, or when delivered by men
of extraordinary skill such as the up-country Boer and the American
backwoods-men were pictured to be. A European enemy will seek to
bring off his attack with the bayonet. The defenders will try to foil
this attack, firstly, by the use of fire at the close range, which
allows it to be effective, and, secondly, by the use of the bayonet.
This plainly translates itself into obstacles to keep the enemy under
fire, obstacles to hamper him when at bayonet distance, and night
rests to help the accuracy of the fire in certain desired directions.
I have told you one good form of night rest, and there are several
others, but all require some material if they are to be even
approximately accurate. Failing material of any sort, tie white rags
round the muzzles of the men’s rifles if you can get them. After a
week in the field your men will have nothing that is not very dirty,
but in a civilised country some member of the population may perhaps
be found ready to oblige a soldier.
Working still on your daylight scheme show your non-commissioned
officers and men how to make night obstacles in addition to those
meant for daylight defence, which latter may be any distance up to
one hundred yards in front of the trenches. The night obstacles, on
the other hand, should be quite close, the fire obstacles as close
as ten yards, the bayonet obstacles, say a narrow ditch and a wire,
close under the trenches so as to make a man stumble when trying to
reach the defender with his bayonet. Make or plan these arrangements
round the pivots, and then practise blocking and defending paths or
roads by the same methods as for pivots, but with this variation,
that a parapet which can only be used for defence at night may
be as high as you consider needful without paying regard to its
invisibility, while those to be used by day are kept as low as
possible. In a practical exercise the men to hold these night posts
would have to be furnished either from your support or by thinning
some of the pivots.
Yet the most carefully arranged trenches and obstacles will be of
no value unless the men occupy them in time to avail themselves of
their advantages. Time sufficient to allow of this, must be got by
patrolling in front as for outposts, by making automatic alarms in
front of the obstacles (M.F.E., 55 (12)), by having alert sentries
on the defence line, and by having a good and well understood
arrangement of alarm posts by which each man shall be ready to occupy
at once, in silence, and without confusion, the place which has been
assigned to him. Patrolling has been dealt with under “Outposts,”
the alertness of your sentries will depend largely on the state
of discipline to which you have brought your company, and on the
commonsenseness, to coin a word, of their training. Alarm posts
are practised in the same way as on outpost. In many corps it is a
standing order that when in camp or bivouac, on manœuvre as well as
on service, men are to fall in on their alarm posts once a day, the
usual times being at retreat or on arrival in camp (F.S.R., 48 (2)),
and this is done whether in Brigade (F.S.R., 47 (2)) or not. If such
is the order in your battalion, adhere to it within your company when
detached, if not, do it off your own bat. It does not fatigue the men
and ensures attention being paid on all occasions to this important
duty.
EXERCISE XVI.
HASTY EXPEDIENTS.