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THE TRAINING
OF AN
INFANTRY COMPANY.
=CATECHISM ON FIELD TRAINING=
(=INFANTRY=).
A series of Questions and Answers on all subjects of field training,
extracted from the latest official TRAINING MANUALS, together
with miscellaneous information, practical exercises and examples
progressively arranged.
_Revised and brought up to date by_
=COL. H. O’DONNELL, p.s.c.=
(WEST YORKSHIRE REGIMENT).
_SIXTH EDITION._
CONTENTS.
Elementary—General Principles of Attack and Defence—Miscellaneous
Tactical Operations—Warfare in uncivilised Countries—Protection
on the Line of March—Protection when at Rest—Methods of obtaining
Information—Quarters, Camps, and Bivouacs—Field Engineering—Diary of
Training.
_Fully illustrated with 30 pages of Plates and Diagrams._
=One of the numerous Press Opinions.=
“The book is most comprehensive, for every branch of the soldier’s
life is touched upon, and every situation or emergency seems to be
anticipated. Colonel O’Donnell’s publication is quite a military
encyclopædia.”—_Empress_, Calcutta.
=PRICE 3/- NET.=
_From the Printers and Publishers_,
GALE & POLDEN LTD.,
WELLINGTON WORKS, ALDERSHOT,
And at London and Portsmouth.
= _The_ TRAINING=
OF AN
=INFANTRY COMPANY=
_By_
Major E. KIRKPATRICK, I.A.
—————:O:—————
2ND EDITION.
_London_: GALE & POLDEN, LTD.,
2, AMEN CORNER, PATERNOSTER ROW, E.C.
Nelson House, PORTSMOUTH &
Wellington Works, ALDERSHOT.
Obtainable from all Booksellers.
_TWO SHILLINGS & SIXPENCE_ (_Net_)
(_Copyright under Act of 1911._)
ALDERSHOT:
PRINTED BY GALE & POLDEN, LTD.,
WELLINGTON WORKS.
1914
PREFACE
This booklet has not been written for the use and benefit of officers
and non-commissioned officers of long experience and proved skill
in the profession of training men for battle. To such as these it
may only provide an object of criticism, for in the course of years
spent in turning recruits into trained soldiers they will have
formulated to themselves, and adopted, some system of training which
they found productive of the best results under their own guidance.
But there are many at present, and at a future time, should certain
circumstances arise in the life of the nation, there may be very many
more who may not have such stores of experience to draw on, and yet
may be faced with the problem of rapidly converting an untrained or
only partially trained body of men into a force capable of acting
successfully in real war, both in attack and defence against trained
and disciplined troops. Again, it is written, not for officers
commanding battalions, nor for officers of cavalry and artillery,
but only for officers commanding companies or other similar units
of infantry, though it may, perhaps, be of use in training mounted
troops for dismounted action.
Meantime, while the pipes of peace are still smoking, it is hoped it
may be of some use to officers and non-commissioned officers when the
time comes to prepare schemes of company training and put them into
execution.
E. K.
_September, 1913._
PREFACE TO SECOND EDITION.
Since the above was written, the issue of new or amended Manuals
of Training has necessitated a revision of the book, which is now
presented in a form agreeable to the four-company organisation.
The Empire is now confronted by those circumstances to which allusion
was made in the Preface.
E. K.
_September, 1914._
CONTENTS
PAGE
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ix
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS—
I.—The Intention of the Book 1
II.—Making the Best of their Companies
to Train the Modern
Man for the Modern Battle 4
III.—The Standard of Training
assumed to have already
been acquired and its application
to further Exercises 9
IV.—Ground for Training—Its Use
and Influence—Palliation of
the Lack of a Training
Ground 11
V.—Company Organisation—Moral
and the Personality
of the Commander 16
VI.—Discipline—Moral and Means
of Supervision 22
VII.—Organisation by Files and its
Effect on Moral—Cohesion 27
VIII.—Method of Training 31
IX.—As to Scouts and Working
Dress 37
EXERCISES
I.—Individual Advance in Extended
Order 38
II.—Retirement by Pairs 48
III.—Individual Training in Use of
Fire and Fire Discipline 52
IV.—The Assault 60
V.—The Section and Platoon in
Attack 64
VI.—The Section and Platoon in
Retirement 74
VII.—The Section and Platoon in
Independent Attack 78
VIII.—The Platoon as Advanced and
Flank Guard 84
IX.—Preliminary for the Attack by
the Company in Battalion 89
X.—The Company in Attack with
the Battalion under Artillery
Fire 93
XI.—The Company in Attack with
the Battalion under Rifle
Fire 97
XII.—The Company in Attack Acting
Alone 105
XIII.—The Company in Retirement 107
XIV.—Outposts 112
XV.—Defence 142
XVI.—Hasty Expedients 163
XVII.—Night Operations 171
————
A SCHEME OF COMPANY TRAINING 181
REFERENCES AND ABBREVIATIONS.
I.T., 128 (3) = Infantry Training, 1914,
Section 128, para. 3.
F.S.R. = Field Service Regulations,
Part I. Operations, 1909
(Reprint 1912).
T. & M.R. = Training and Manœuvre
Regulations, 1913.
M.F.E. = Manual of Field Engineering,
1911.
A FEW PRESS OPINIONS.
“UNITED SERVICE MAGAZINE.”
Major E. Kirkpatrick is the author of a small book on “The Training
of an Infantry Company.” There have been so many books and pamphlets
of this kind—short cuts to knowledge—that one is apt to regard
each fresh one with suspicion and even with aversion, but Major
Kirkpatrick has much that is helpful to say, he says it well, and
he shows how much good work may be done even in the training of the
emasculated companies such as our military system so often leaves us.
His instructions cover a wide field, and there must be few company
officers who will not be grateful to the author for many valuable
hints.
“UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION OF INDIA.”
There are few junior officers of infantry who will not benefit by a
study of this book. The thorough system of training elaborated in the
seventeen exercises, which form the major portion of the book, is
worthy of the attention of Regular as well as Territorial Officers.
These elementary exercises deal with the essentials in the war
training of the Infantry soldier, from the work of the individual
in advance and retirement, and of the section in action and on
protection duties, to the training of the company in attack and
defence, and outpost.
As an example of a system of training illustrating the necessity of
attention to detail in the early instruction of the soldier, this
series of exercises is valuable, and their value is increased by the
constant reference to training manuals. The author wisely recommends
the study of all the official books referred to as he recognises
that his exercises and comments are only of value in so far as they
illustrate and explain the principles laid down in training manuals.
THE TRAINING
OF AN
INFANTRY COMPANY.
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS.
The authorised handbooks of training rightly confine themselves to
broad principles, and do not attempt to give detailed examples of
their application, the idea being that officers should study these
regulations and apply the principles by the light of local conditions
and their own experience. Infantry Training and the Field Service
Regulations are, however, very pregnant little books, containing,
as they do, a summary of the whole of Modern Tactics, as far as
they concern infantry and the combined action of all arms. Time
and thought are necessary, if the principles contained in them are
to be translated into such intelligent action that the men trained
on the lines laid down may be capable of doing their duty in real
warfare, without first undergoing a bitter and costly schooling of
useless casualties or, perhaps, even of defeat. But if an officer
is called on to achieve this result, being himself without much
previous experience in training, he will find himself faced with a
task of great difficulty, and, with the best intentions, he may waste
precious time, as well as his own and his men’s patience and energy,
in doing parades and exercises, which are either not indispensable,
or of minor importance for the main object. As an extreme example,
it would be better, in a hastily raised corps, to combine the
disciplinary training of obedience to the word of command, with
instruction in the use of their arms, by practice in smart work in
aiming and firing, than merely to study precision in “sloping” and
“presenting arms,” which look well, but do not immediately affect
fighting efficiency.
For these reasons, it has occurred to me that I might do some of my
brother officers _in esse_ or _in posse_ a service by setting out
certain elementary exercises in training infantry soldiers, which
I have found of value in bringing them up to a standard of battle
training sufficiently high to need only battalion training and a
baptism of fire to turn them into steady and reliable troops. It is
not contended that these few examples are anything but concrete
instances of the application of the principles of the Training
Manuals. They are intended, as has been stated, merely for those
who are short of time and experience, and, therefore, references to
the manuals are given when the exercise illustrates some particular
section of those works, and it is recommended that officers who
intend to use these examples should look up and read the sections
referred to before going on to the parade.
Though this book is not meant for officers commanding battalions,
I have one word to say to them, and it is this, that if they wish
to have an efficient battalion they must let the company officers
have proper opportunities of training their companies, apart from
the time of company training, when the whole company is struck off
duty. If there are six parades a week, let three or four of them be
company parades, ordered and carried out by the company commanders;
the balance will be quite enough to secure combination between the
companies in battalion. On company parades, the battalion commander
should supervise, but never interfere, unless things are being
manifestly mismanaged. (See T. & M.R., 2 (2 and 3)). The days of
the one man battalion are gone for ever. The company is the thing
that matters; a good battalion can only be composed of well-trained
companies. It is the work of the battalion commander to propound
the general lines of training and to use the companies to the best
advantage in combination, but the training of the individual soldier
must be in the hands of the man who is to lead him in war.
II.
On ordinary parades, the captain of an infantry company is seldom
able to get together more than a fraction of his men. The calls on
the company for men for duties and odd jobs, leave and furlough,
and, in the Territorial Force, the private occupations of the men,
allow of only a few being assembled on any one parade. This being
so, there is a temptation—sometimes yielded to by officers who have
not much experience, to say to themselves: “This is rot; what can
I do without any men?” Such a question is the result of confusing
the individual instruction of the men with the tactical practice of
the leader in handling his company as a whole. The answer too often
takes the form of an hour’s close order drill or something similar,
which may do some good, but not nearly as much as if the officer
stoutly made up his mind to make the best of a bad job and took out
those few men and did some practical training in field operations.
The fewer men there are on parade, the more individual attention
will the company commander be able to give them. He will be able
to look at each man’s work more carefully, talk to the men and get
to know their characters as soldiers, spot who are likely to make
good non-commissioned officers, and coach them far more than if the
whole company were on hand at once. So do not turn up your nose at a
company only twenty strong, but make up a scheme of exercises to be
gone through, and, since the men who are not on parade to-day will be
so to-morrow, arrange to do the same exercise on two, or, if needed,
three, consecutive days, so as to catch all, or, at least, most of
the men, and your non-commissioned officers, who are not usually so
drawn on for off-parade duties, will become well acquainted with each
exercise, learn what to do and how to run things, and so become both
a help to you as instructors, and themselves gain authority and power
of command from the knowledge of their own competency.
It is quite likely that these exercises and the explanations given,
may seem to some readers to be absurdly simple and needlessly
long-winded, while there is also a good deal of repetition. To this
I will make early reply that they are written for officers who are
not too proud to accept other people’s advice in training a company
of young soldiers of the stamp which would be forthcoming if some
cause[1] or other tempted or constrained into military service that
great proportion of our male population who are at present quite
ignorant of a soldier’s work, and who, from apathy, or a hundred
other causes, do not join the Territorial Force. Such men probably
have never in their lives given a thought to soldiering. The majority
of them are town born and bred, and have passed most of their lives
among bricks and mortar. If they have ever looked carefully at the
large or small features of a bit of country, it has been from an
industrial, sporting, or, perhaps, sentimental, but never from a
tactical, point of view. They have everything to learn in making use
of ground for fighting. Their ideas of using modern arms are equally
crude; the primitive fighting instinct will be uppermost in their
minds, and would express itself in an incontinent desire to get to
close quarters with their enemy, when bayonet, butt or hand grips
would seem the proper way to settle the matter. A very laudable
desire it is—this of wanting to close in—and one to be encouraged by
every means, but however brave troops may be, they cannot in general
indulge their desire to attain close quarters and the resulting
facilities of fighting by the light of their natural instincts unless
they have first been successful in the fire fight—the strife of the
arms of artifice—which is waged by bullet and shell at distances
which Nature never contemplated.
It is the artificiality of the fire fight which makes the task of
turning town-bred men into skilful soldiers such a difficult and
lengthy process. They must be led to look at ground in relation to
its capabilities of increasing the effectiveness of their own fire
and also of diminishing the result of that of the enemy, i.e., they
must learn to select good fire positions and good cover. The problem
of finding the latter for himself against a civilized foe begins, for
the individual soldier, as soon as the enemy’s rifle fire becomes
effective and compels the use by his side of extended order; this
is held to be on open ground about fourteen hundred yards from the
enemy’s infantry (I.T., 118 (4)). Prior to this the responsibility
for cover rests with his leaders, as he will then be in some close
formation. Fire positions he must choose for himself as soon as
his section commander ceases to be able to indicate his wishes, or
to secure combined action by the whole unit. This will probably
happen at about six hundred yards from the enemy, when individual
fire is expected to replace controlled fire by sections. These two
aspects of fighting—the use of ground, and the use of the rifle as a
far-reaching weapon of almost absolute precision, if truly sighted
and aimed—are foreign to our instincts, and the average man has to
be trained till he is able to override his instinct and fight an
artificial war, so as to work his way to charging distance. Some men
need less training than others; a stalker in a deer forest is an
adept in the use of cover, and in general, country-bred men should
be easier to train than town-bred, but the majority of our men
being the latter, we must lay ourselves out to teach them from the
beginning this business of the fire fight, since success in this is
usually necessary before the assault can succeed (I.T., 121 (7)).
This can only be done by training them in extended order and putting
them through various exercises chosen for the purpose. Any exercise
which does not in some way tend to fit men for battle is mere waste
of time; aimless perambulations of an extended line fall under this
category, but are quite often to be seen on parade grounds. No amount
of smartness in close order drill will compensate for a deficiency of
field training.
III.
The exercises which I have drawn up, simple though they are, are of
the nature of “Instructional Operations,” as defined by T. & M.R.,
40 (12), and it is presupposed that the men have received, or are
in course of receiving, sufficient instruction in the use of the
rifle (musketry in all its branches), and of the bayonet (bayonet
fighting), in drill in close order, and the drill grounding of
extended order work, including signals (I.T., 90-96). We are then to
consider ourselves to be at the stage in which the soldier is to be
taught to work over broken country as directed in the latter part
of para. 90, above quoted. But do not think the lessons learned at
musketry instruction are to be forgotten and left behind by the men
when they begin to work in extended order across country. Demand
from your men that the rifle shall be deadly, and, by unceasing
supervision, breed a habit among them of aiming and firing in
extended order, whether with or without blank cartridge, with the
same exactitude as when firing their course of musketry on the range.
Take the high standard—a hundred men’s lives in one man’s bandolier,
instead of a hundred bandoliers for one man’s life. The higher
standard of the two is at least possible, though not common, but why
not try and work towards it, so that when bullets are flying within
decisive range of the enemy, it will be your men’s fire, that is the
deadly close-hitting kind, that makes afraid, and not the haphazard
jet of bullets whose inefficacy lets unhurt familiarity breed
tolerant contempt?
In the same way, when men are in close order at any time during a
field parade, keep up the same smartness, and quick obedience to
orders which are exacted in close order drills, in order that the
men may become truly disciplined, and not merely so in appearance,
so when they come under fire without being extended, as may happen
in the early and distant stages of a fight, they will, as a matter
of course, submit themselves to their commander’s wishes, and ignore
their own inclinations, which, just at the first experience, even
with very brave men, might be for an immediate and independent rush
in some direction—perhaps forward, perhaps in another direction—they
will be “in hand,” and free of the liability of raw troops to suffer
from sudden panic or to become a mob, full of fight, perhaps, but
still a mob, and as such, a force which cannot be controlled or used
in furtherance of any general plan.
IV.
The want of a suitable and accessible bit of ground on which to train
our men is one of the chief difficulties we have to meet in the
United Kingdom, and, of course, it is greatest in the case of town
corps, varying with the size of towns, while in large cities ground
is not to be had at all, save at a distance of several miles from the
men’s dwelling places. Unfortunately, there is little doubt that the
possession or lack of suitable training grounds has a great effect
on the readiness, or otherwise, of troops to give a good account of
themselves when they come under fire for the first time in their
lives. The lack of it takes away reality from the work of the men
in the ranks and cramps the initiative of their officers, who are
given no opportunity to exercise their wits in figuring out practical
situations which might occur on service.
I can give no recipe for obtaining the use of ground, but from what
I have just said I hope it is clear that the officer commanding a
battalion or company should use every blandishment or art of which he
is capable to get the use of a stretch of ground, and also, if it is
at a distance, and the attendance of the men at parades voluntary,
he should try to provide facilities for getting them to and from the
ground. The worst bit of country is better than the barrack square.
The ideal ground is that which gives conditions suited to each phase
of the training, the principal requirements being fire positions
and cover, and these should occur so as to provide illustrations
of the use to be made of them in individual training, and in the
collective training of sections, platoons, and the larger units.
Thus, for training individual men, good ground would be that with
an irregular surface, giving many places twenty to fifty yards
apart, which each man could use in firing and taking cover. The
usual seaside golf course of hummocks, furze bushes, and occasional
watercourses, is good to teach individual men over—I say teach,
for we must not imagine that an enemy will be so kind as to leave
easy ground like that in his front, if he can help it. For section
or platoon training, the surface should be similar, so that the
individuals should still be called on to look out for their own
halting places, but, in addition, there should be a certain number
of small features, hillocks, banks, and so on, one to four hundred
yards apart, which will serve as fire positions and cover for the
whole unit, and provide the commanders with successive objectives,
to which it will be their duty to bring their men in good order,
and without needless exposure to the enemy’s fire. When the company
is training together, the ground should be similar, but of greater
extent, both broader and larger, so that sections and platoons may be
practised in supporting each other, some being halted in these fire
positions, and covering by their fire the movements of the others who
are in process of gaining fresh vantage points. And so on for larger
units and the combined action of all arms; good ground for early
instruction is that whose features, from their nature and distance
from each other, lend themselves to illustrate conditions under which
the power of each unit and arm may be most profitably employed in
conjunction with others. Troops trained over ground that gives the
above advantages will acquire an eye for country. A knowledge of the
uses to be made of ground will be common to all ranks, so that when
they find themselves fighting on bad ground, which does not give much
cover or good fire positions, they will be the more apt to search for
such cover and fire positions as are obtainable, while troops trained
on flat and open ground would be much slower in making the best of
a bad job. We are not concerned with anything more than a company;
therefore, get for your own use, if you can manage it—failing help
from higher powers—a bit of ground of some sort, golf course, common,
city park, or what not. It need not be very extensive. Even if it
gives only three or four positions suitable for occupation by a
section working in conjunction with another, say, six hundred by
three hundred yards, it will give room for useful instruction; but,
of course, a larger extent is preferable, as giving room for more
extended and varied exercises. If your training ground is of limited
extent, it should, nevertheless, if possible, have a wide field of
view on all sides beyond its own confines, and leave you the right
to send a few men to take positions on the adjoining country, even
if not allowed to manœuvre about it, so that when carrying out your
exercises you may be able to use men with blank cartridge to act as
a skeleton enemy, when such is needed. But if you are not allowed
to send men on to the neighbouring ground, the wide field of view
will still enable you to indicate certain distant positions as
_supposed_ to be held by the enemy. By this means you will be able
to use the whole area of your permissible ground to represent a bit
of the battlefield, and escape having to place the supposed enemy
absurdly close to your manœuvring troops, e.g., at the edge of the
training ground, or in some other position which makes heavy calls
on the imagination. Britishers are not imaginative. Lastly, if all
else fails, and you have nowhere to go except the flat parade ground,
or even the drill hall, which in large towns is often very spacious,
do not, I beg you, become discouraged and throw up all effort to get
your men ready for field work. Do the exercises on the flat, limiting
the extent of movements, if there is little room, and use flags or
anything else to represent fire positions for sections and platoons,
and let the men kneel or lie down between advances, if there is no
cover. A great deal may be done in this way to lay a good foundation
for extended order work. Your men will know the mechanism of it, and
you will save much time when you do manage to have them out on a
proper training ground. I.T., 107 (2), requires company commanders,
in preparing their schemes of training, to have regard to the ground
at their disposal; do so, therefore, even if the ground aforesaid
is only a parade ground, and make the most of it; it is better than
sitting still and either doing nothing, or only a weary round of
company drill in close order. Of course, you must let the men know
what you are driving at, or they will get bored and lose interest.
V.
Having got a company of men and ground to train them on, the first
step is to organise that company for its battle training. A company
is organised into four platoons, each under a subaltern, with a
sergeant as his second-in-command (platoon sergeant). Each platoon
has four sections, and the sixteen sections of the company are
numbered one to sixteen. The men of each of the above units remain
permanently in that unit. _If possible_, maintain this organisation
on duties and fatigues, though this is often a counsel of perfection,
but quarter the men together, and insist on the maintenance of the
organisation, _without deviation_, on parades. Have lists made up of
the men of each platoon and section, and let men who so wish, belong
to the same unit. Once these lists are made up, see to it by means of
the section commanders that these men fall in on parade together in
the place in the company where their section is standing, no matter
how few there are; if there are but two men of one section on parade,
they should fall in as front and rear rank men of one file. Avoid
disseminating the men of a platoon or section among other units in
order to raise the latter to a sizeable strength. Instead of this:
supposing you have three weak platoons and one strong one on parade;
of the four sections of one of the weak platoons, send two to each of
the other two weak platoons. This will give you three platoons of,
perhaps, unequal strength, but sufficient for work—and this without
taking the responsibility of section commanders off their shoulders,
and the cohesion of each unit is preserved. Some further suggestions
on the subject of organisation will be put forward when speaking of
_moral_.
The officer who aspires to develop whatever capabilities his men
possess of becoming individually and collectively formidable
in battle, must pay attention to much more than mere physical
considerations. Napoleon’s dictum, that the moral is to the physical
as three to one is early dinned into the ears of the officer of
Regulars, but may stand repetition in pages meant for the perusal
of others. No officer can expect to get the most out of his men
unless he directs his attention to the study of the psychical side
of the training. There are two fields in which the study must be
pursued. One is the officer’s own personality, the other that of
his non-commissioned officers and men. T. & M.R., 8, deals with the
former, and should be read and pondered over.
In battle good men have sometimes achieved victory in spite of the
shortcomings of their officers, but good officers, as well as men,
are necessary for consistent success in the series of battles which
make a campaign. Now, good officers, given time for training, will
infallibly produce good men, provided the latter are of the average
physique and courage. Therefore, study thyself, and try to see
what you lack, in order to become a good officer. Cultivate your
skill in handling your men by reading any books you can get; there
are, unfortunately, not very many that deal with the work of such
small units as companies or even single battalions. Go out into the
country, or, if you have not time, recall to yourself some bit of
country you know, and import an enemy into the landscape. Perhaps a
few riflemen are holding ground on the flank of a road along which
your battalion wants to march, but cannot, without undue loss, until
these riflemen are driven off; and your commanding officer tells
you to do the driving. In imagination, or on the ground, decide
what position you would hold, if you were the enemy, in order to
make yourself as nasty as possible—though having no hope of being
reinforced—to the battalion trying to come along the road. Then
settle in your mind what you, as commanding your company, would do to
get rid of the annoyance. Be quite clear, what would you do? Go at
them bald-headed? There are times and enemies when this is the best
way; you would have to be fairly close, and the enemy not shooting
very straight, and rather careful of his skin; or will you march a
long way round till the enemy sees you are getting behind him, and so
manœuvre him out? Then your battalion will be a long time waiting.
Or will you look at the ground and find, let us suppose, a spot to
which you will send a section or platoon to open a fire on the enemy,
while another works its way to a point you have noted from which
fire can be brought to sweep crossways a little knoll, or some such
supposititious feature which seems to form the enemy’s left flank,
and to be occupied by ten or twelve men, and which gives command
over the rest of his position? Then, while the second lot is on its
way, you plan to lead the remainder a little way round, under cover,
in order to get to fairly close range of the knoll, so that when the
second party opens fire on it, and its defenders are hampered both
by this fire and by that of those you first posted, you may surprise
them by an outburst of fire from your reserve, and either drive
them off their perch by cross-fire from three directions, or, if
they do not shift, run in at them with the bayonet, trusting to get
across the intervening space at the cost of a few casualties, when
your superior numbers at that point should ensure your success even
if they actually await the bayonet. Learn to consider quickly how
many ways there are of doing such a job as the above, and to decide
quickly and rationally which is the best.
These schemes, involving only a company or two, will not be presented
for your solution by your battalion commander; you must set them
yourself, and their solution, and the thinking necessary thereto
are the best methods an officer can get of training himself without
having his men on the ground. In your mind’s eye, put your company
into every situation you can think of, and get it out again, and you
will have acquired an enormous reserve of capacity for acting quickly
and rightly when your men and your enemy are both on the ground. But
beware of dealing in too short distances, or you may produce unreal
pictures of war. Do not imagine manœuvres at four hundred yards from
the enemy when every man exposed would be hit in a few minutes. The
clearness and decision of thought you acquire will be reflected in
the orders you give. Your men will give you their confidence when
they see, as they are quick to do, that you know your job. There
is nothing more disheartening for a subordinate, be he private or
colonel, than to feel he is under control of a duffer, whose mistakes
he will have to correct. This feeling saps discipline, and quickly
destroys the fighting value of a body of men. In peace training, the
men become sulky at being “bothered about,” lose interest in their
work, and wish themselves done with parade. In war, their personal
characters usurp the control of their actions, and they become a mob
in uniform.
* * * * *
But in addition to possessing the confidence of the men in your
tactical ability, you should seek all other means to increase your
influence over them. Gain their respect in other ways, by honesty
of purpose, by example, tact, devotion to duty, and so on. Gain
their goodwill by watching over their individual and collective
interests, though in this you must play to the gallery sufficiently
to let them identify you as the source of benefits received. Keep
an even temper, and do not show anger without good cause. Personal
attachment to their officer shows itself most when men’s powers are
taxed by hardship, fatigue, and danger; it is then a great auxiliary
in maintaining discipline among the mass.
VI.
As regards the _moral_ of the men, I.T., 1 (4 to 10) must be referred
to. You _must_ introduce discipline—the habit of subordinating
personal inclination to the orders of the superior promptly and
without cavil. If your men are raw, you have to go slow just at first
till they all know what is expected of them. Let them understand that
orders are not given haphazard, but are invariably based on some good
reason, which, being so, there is no need for reasons to be always
stated, nor for recipients of orders to feel unhappy for want of
them. If you can induce a feeling among the men that slackness on
parade, slowness in obeying orders, and so on, are bad form, and
tend to disgrace the company, you will do well, and this good spirit
will enable you to enforce discipline without having recourse to
punishment, if you are vested with the power of inflicting it.
I have already said that when in close order during tactical
exercises, you should maintain discipline in the ranks. I now go
further and say that you should maintain it when the men are extended
or detached from the company singly or in small groups. Evidently
the discipline here needed is something more than mere mechanical
obedience. What it is, is to be found in T. & M.R., 39 (4), and
F.S.R. 12 (13), and I.T., 116 and 117. Make the men understand that
when they are extended they must obey their unit commander’s orders
and signals as to fire and movement at once, and without hesitation,
and must be always on the look-out for them. Allow no talking, except
what relates to the business in hand, such as passing of orders or
information, results of fire, and so on. Hold the men responsible
that if they are out of reach of the control of their leader, it is
their duty to carry out the spirit of the orders under which they
set out. To bring their responsibility home to them, you must make a
point of calling men occasionally to give an account of what they
did when detached, and why they did it, so that they may pause for a
moment if they are of the sort that take advantage of opportunity to
sit behind a hedge and smoke a cigarette when they ought to be up and
doing.
Here you will naturally say that this is all very well, but how is
one to look after men scattered here and there over several hundred
yards of rough country? Here come in the non-commissioned officers,
of whom, so far, no mention has been made, and also your subaltern
officers. Since success in battle will depend largely on the
efficiency of fire unit commanders, and the normal fire unit is the
section (I.T., 6 (4)), it is evident that the section commander is a
very responsible person, and much must be expected from him.
Your subalterns and platoon sergeants you must use as your delegates
in supervising and leading the platoons to which they belong, except
when they are needed to act specifically as platoon commanders,
keeping themselves constantly on the move among the men, looking
at the details of the work, sighting of rifles, aiming, use of
cover, choice of lines of movement, not lying down themselves nor
participating in the operation as combatants. When you wish to give
them practice in setting exercises themselves, turn the whole company
over to one of them and act yourself as critic, or act as subaltern
under his orders. This is one means of supervision.
The next is your non-commissioned officers. They are in direct
command, and you must hold them responsible for their sections,
but when their units are acting in conjunction with others, it is
evident they cannot act both as commanders and instructors unless
certain concessions are made, for if the non-commissioned officers
as well as the men of a section were to act as they would have to do
under real fire, each non-commissioned officer might be able only to
supervise a man or two on his right and left, the rest being too far
off. Therefore, at the beginning of an exercise, you should tell the
non-commissioned officers whether, in addition to giving executive
commands, they are to be at liberty to move about freely and act as
instructors also. Needless to say, in instructional exercises, and
until the men are quite seasoned, you should let them do this, but,
on the other hand, in exercises meant to illustrate actual conflict
and the limitations imposed by the presence of an enemy, they should
pay attention to those limitations so that they, as well as the
men, may be prepared to endure the disabilities imposed by Service
conditions.
Next comes yourself. Once you have given your subordinates your
orders for any exercise, leave them to carry it through, and make
yourself as ubiquitous as may be in supervision. Keep criticism for
the end, and interference only for the prevention of absurdities. To
make yourself ubiquitous, the best way is to use your horse, and make
the noble animal do the running about with you on his back. You can
then get through about six times what you can on your own feet, by
cantering from one section to another, and you get a better view of
the whole performance, but you must remember when correcting anything
the men are doing that you are mounted, while they are probably
kneeling or lying, and much that you see is invisible to them. Equip
yourself with a pair of field glasses, and also with a megaphone,
which latter should be about fourteen inches long, and carried by a
strap over the shoulder, the strap punched so as to be capable of
being made long or buckled up close under the arm, according as you
need to use the megaphone, or wish to get it out of your way. Use
your glasses to look at what sections and individual men in them are
doing. They will reveal to you small mistakes that escape notice at
some distance with the unaided eye. The megaphone saves you a lot of
small excursions to get to earshot of men, and also a lot of shouting
at a distance, which is fatiguing, and is apt to lead to exacerbation
of tempers, both of the shouter and the listener. Moreover, it
enables you to hear as well as speak from a distance. This is done
simply by holding it aimed at the other man with your ear instead of
your mouth at the mouthpiece. Use your whistle to call attention to
orders or signals, carry it in your hand, not in your pocket, and
put a loop in the cord and pass the loop over your middle finger,
or you will be always dropping it. Instead of a cane, carry a small
semaphore flag, and give your signals with it. This saves a good deal
of arm-waving, and tends to smarten up movement, as it is more easily
seen than the arm. By bringing all these aids into your service,
you will find that you can make your influence felt, although the
sections are separated by the greatest distances which they are ever
likely to be called on to take up in battle.
VII.
Besides discipline, there are certain other moral influences which
give strength to an Army. These are indicated in I.T., 1 (4 and 5).
The two mighty forces of religion and patriotism are not treated
of here, as they have their roots not in any system of training,
but in the upbringing of the youth of the nation, but there is one
force which you, as a humble commander, can call into play, and that
is shame—the dread of losing the respect of oneself and of one’s
comrades. During peace training you may make men dread the public
shame of misbehaviour by the aid of those means of supervision which
I have suggested, but in war the power to supervise is greatly
curtailed, and it is very desirable to find something to replace it,
and, at the same time, to supplement a too absolute reliance on the
stoutness of men’s hearts, for this may prove a broken reed when the
troops are largely composed of unseasoned soldiers.
* * * * *
To a certain extent, the organisation of the company into permanent
sections provides us with the substitute we desire, as the men of
sections are likely to be cognisant of how their comrades behave
when out of view of the rest of the company as long as the whole
of the men of the section are in view of each other; but this will
not always be the case: for example, in wood fighting or in house
fighting, both of which would assuredly occur if our men have to
fight in Europe. In such fighting everything comes down to the
pushfulness of the individual soldiers, for even sections will lose
their leaders. Therefore let us carry the principle of the company
organisation logically one step further, and make the men of a file
as they fall in on parade in the section act in conjunction for the
remainder of that parade. This arrangement is recognised in the last
edition of the Musketry Regulations, and has, at various times, been
adopted in former drill books of our Army, and has given excellent
results, while, if the present book does not prescribe it, at least
it countenances it (I.T., 123 (12)), and I strongly recommend your
introducing it into your company. It is likely to produce emulation
in the fire fight among men whose hearts are in the right place, and
in the assault it must produce the advantages of combination, for two
men coming on with the bayonet in conjunction are far more likely to
do someone an injury than if they each came on independently, since
in the latter case a cool and skilful antagonist might dispose of one
and then the other, even as the Japanese are said to have stepped
aside when charged by the Russians, who, running forward blindly and
head down, fell an easy prey to their alert little enemies, and were
bayoneted in succession as they arrived. The proof of this pudding is
the eating thereof, and if your company ever happens to be alongside
a company told off daily into haphazard sections, as is sometimes
done, in spite of rules, you will then see the difference, even if it
is only at manœuvres. In close order they may still look alike, but
let them be extended in rough country, and you will see that yours
is the blade of steel; the particles of its metal are coherent; it
will bend, but not break. The other is of wrought iron, polished on
the surface but of brittle material, and sure to fly to pieces in any
rough usage. By this file organisation you will produce in the men
in the ranks the highest degree of cohesion—the habit of regulating
their own actions in accordance with the actions and needs of others
in furtherance of one general aim.
Having secured this cohesion among the men, you have still to
produce it within the company as between platoons and sections.
For cohesion is the coping stone of the edifice of efficiency,
and rests on a basis of discipline, moral and training. It makes
possible the application of the principle of mutual support
which is indispensable in the attack (F.S.R., 105 (4)), and it
enables retirements and defensive action to be carried out without
disorganisation, and with the minimum of loss. Whenever sections act
together, see to it that the non-commissioned officers keep an eye
on the movements of the others, and question them as to the extent
their orders to their sections should be influenced by the needs and
movements of the others. By this means they will be induced to check
the inclination to play only for their own hands, and to remember
always that their unit is part of a combination which can best attain
success by acting accordingly.
VIII.
Training is the preparation of officers and men for the duties which
they will carry out in war. These duties consist in the application
of the principles contained in the training manuals, and it is your
business to provide concrete examples. But in these days of long
range arms combats take a very long time, and you cannot expect in
a parade of perhaps one or at most two hours, and with a limited
extent of ground, to carry out all the varied phases of an operation
which, in warfare, would take anything from six to eighteen hours to
complete, and would extend over perhaps five or six miles of country,
even if we limit ourselves to the extreme ranges of heavy artillery,
and take no account of movements not within the range of possible
fire. Therefore, in your training, you must be analytical, choosing
for one parade such phase or phases as you have time and ground for,
and doing the others later on. When your company knows all it can be
taught thus piecemeal, it will be early enough to try to get time and
ground to perform continuous operations.
* * * * *
For instance, infantry in the attack will usually have to go through
three phases: first, the advance to fire positions; second, the fire
fight (I.T., 121 (6)); and, third, the assault, which latter must be
divided into the charge and the steps which follow it according as it
is successful or not. You will have to train for these three phases.
The first, against an enemy armed with guns and rifles, would consist
in opening out from column of route into little columns—sections or
platoons—and moving forward in this formation, the main object being
to escape being smashed to pieces by his artillery fire before being
able to do him any damage (I.T., 118 (3)). Later, you would come
under his rifle fire, and your little columns must scatter out into
lines of men in extended order (I.T., 118 (5)). These movements seem,
and are, very easy, but still they must be practised in peace if they
are to be done coolly and without confusion in time of war when the
first intimation of the necessity for opening out may be the shriek
and crash of what will be to most of the men the first shrapnel they
have ever seen, and withal aimed at themselves. This phase requires
the presence of all four platoons of the company, and so may be kept
over till the men have been trained in the phase which it precedes,
namely, that of the fire fight.
* * * * *
The fire fight begins when the attacking infantry have got as far
forward as they can without having to reply to the enemy’s fire, and
it is quite distinct from the preceding phase of passive endurance.
Success in the fire fight is an absolute necessity for a successful
assault. Possibly your enemy has prepared your success before war
broke out by abstaining from training his men in musketry, but even
if his shooting is inferior, the fire fight will call into play
all the qualities and skill of which your men are possessed, both
individually and collectively. Accordingly you should practise them
in the fire fight from the opening of their fire up to the assault,
first individually and then collectively.
The assault can be dissected into the fixing of bayonets with
as little cessation of fire as possible, the charge itself,
followed, according as it is held to have been successful or not,
by the rallying of the troops, pursuit of the enemy by fire and
strengthening of the captured position, or the withdrawal or such
mitigation of the results of failure as may fairly be attempted.
Thus, by considering the attack as made up of phases as above, it
is, I think, possible and instructive to practise each one of them
separately, on a short parade, and on limited ground, by placing
the men in the order in which they would be at beginning of any one
phase, and carrying on from there.