A NEW ACQUISITION
1469-1473
This successful expedition against Liege carried Charles of Burgundy
to the very crest of his prosperity. His self-esteem was moreover
gratified by the regard shown to him at home and abroad. A man who
could force a royal neighbour into playing the pitiful rôle enacted by
Louis XI. at Peronne was assuredly a man to be respected if not loved.
And messages of admiration and respect couched in various terms
were despatched from many quarters to the duke as soon as he was at
Brussels to receive them.
Ghent had long since made apologies for the sorry reception accorded
to their incoming Count of Flanders in 1467, but Charles had postponed
the formal _amende_ until a convenient moment of leisure. January 15,
1469, was finally appointed for this ceremony and the occasion was
utilised to show the duke's grandeur, the city's humiliation, to as
many people as possible who might spread the report far and wide.
It was a Sunday. Out in the courtyard of the palace the snow was thick
on the ground where a group of Ghent burghers cooled their heels for
an hour and a half, awaiting a summons to the ducal presence. There,
too, where every one could see those emblems of the artisans'
corporate strength, fluttered fifty-two banners unfurled before the
deans of the Ghentish _métiers_.[1]
Within, the great hall of the palace showed a splendid setting for a
brilliant assembly. The most famous Burgundian tapestries hung on the
walls. Episodes from the careers of Alexander, of Hannibal, and of
other notable ancients formed the background for the duke and his
nobles, knights of the Golden Fleece, in festal array. As spectators,
too, there were all the envoys and ambassadors then present in
Brussels from "France, England, Hungary, Bohemia, Naples, Aragon,
Sicily, Cyprus, Norway, Poland, Denmark, Russia, Livornia, Prussia,
Austria, Milan, Lombardy, and other places."
Charles himself was installed grandly on a kind of throne, and to his
feet Olivier de la Marche conducted the civic procession of penitents.
Before this pompous gathering, after a statement of the city's sin and
sorrow, the precious charter called the Grand Privilege of Ghent
was solemnly read aloud, and then cut up into little pieces with a
pen-knife. Next followed a recitation of the penalties imposed upon,
and accepted by, the citizens (closing of the gates, etc)., and then
the paternal Count of Flanders, duly mollified, pronounced the fault
forgiven with the benediction, "By virtue of this submission and by
keeping your promises and being good children, you shall enjoy our
grace and we will be a good prince." "May our Saviour Jesus Christ
confirm and preserve this peace to the end of this century," is the
pious ejaculation with which the _Relation_ closes.
Among the witnesses of the above scene, when the independent citizens
of Ghent meekly posed as the duke's children, were envoys from George
Podiebrad, ex-king of Bohemia. Lately deposed by the pope, he was
seeking some favourable ally who might help him to recover his realm.
He had conceived a plan for a coalition between Bohemia, Poland,
Austria, and Hungary to present a solid rampart against the Turks,
and strong enough to dictate to emperor and pope. He was ready for
intrigue with any power and had approached Louis XI. and Matthias
Corvinus, King of Hungary, before turning to Charles of Burgundy.[2]
Meantime, the Emperor Frederic tried to knit links with this same
Matthias by suggesting that he might be the next emperor, assuring
him that he could count on the support of the electors of Mayence, of
Trèves, and of Saxony. He himself was world-weary and was anxious to
exchange his imperial cares for the repose of the Church could he
only find a safe guardian for his son, Maximilian, and a desirable
successor for himself. Would not Matthias consider the two offices?
Potent arguments like these induced Matthias not only to turn his back
on Podiebrad, but to accept that deposed monarch's crown which the
Bohemian nobles offered him May 3, 1469. Then he proceeded to ally
himself with Frederic, elector palatine, and with the elector of
Bavaria. This was the moment when the ex-king of Bohemia made renewed
offers of friendly alliance to Charles of Burgundy. In his name the
Sire de Stein brought the draft of a treaty of amity to Charles which
contained the provision that Podiebrad should support the election
of Charles as King of the Romans, in consideration of the sum of two
hundred thousand florins (Rhenish).[2]
This modest sum was to secure not only Podiebrad's own vote but his
"influence" with the Archbishop of Mayence, the Elector of Saxony
and the Margrave of Brandenburg.[4] While Podiebrad thus dangled
the ultimate hopes of the imperial crown before the duke's eyes, he
over-estimated his credulity. As a matter of fact the royal exile had
no "influence" at all with the first named elector, and the last, too,
showed no disposition whatsoever to serve his unstable policy. Both
were content to advise Emperor Frederic. The sole result of the empty
overtures was to increase Charles's own sense of importance.
Another negotiation which sought him unasked had, however, a material
influence on the course of events, and must be touched on in some
detail. Sigismund of Austria--first duke then archduke,--Count of
Tyrol, cousin of the Emperor Frederic, was a member of the House of
Habsburg. In 1449, he had married Eleanor of Scotland, and became
brother-in-law of Louis during the term of the dauphin's first
marriage. An indolent, extravagant prince, he was greatly dominated
by his courtiers. His heritage as Count of Tyrol included certain
territories lying far from his capital, Innsbruck. Certain portions
of Upper Alsace, lands on both sides of the Rhine, Thurgau, Argau in
Switzerland, Breisgau, and some other seigniories in the Black Forest
were under his sway.
These particular domains were so remote from Innsbruck that the
authority of the hereditary overlord had long been eluded. The nobles
pillaged the land near their castles very much at their own sweet
will. The harassed burghers appealed to the Alsatian Décapole,[5] and
again to the free Swiss cantons for protection, and sometimes obtained
more than they wanted.
Mulhouse was seriously affected by these lawless depredations. To her,
Berne promised aid in a twenty-five years' alliance signed in 1466,
and at Berne's insistance the cowardly nobles restrained their
license. But when the city attempted to extend its authority Sigismund
interfered. Having no army, however, he could not recover Waldshut,
which the Swiss claimed a right to annex, except by offering ten
thousand florins for the town's ransom. Poor in cash as he was in men,
he had, however, no means to pay this ransom and begged aid in every
direction. Moreover, he feared further aggressions from the cantons,
which were growing more daring. What man in Europe was better able to
teach them a lesson than Charles, the destroyer of Liege, the stern
curber of undue liberty in Flanders? Was he not the very person to
tame insolent Swiss cowherds?
In the course of the year 1468, Sigismund made known to Charles his
desire for a bargain, intimating that in case of the duke's refusal,
he would carry his wares to Louis XI. At that moment, Charles was
busied with Liege and showed no interest in Sigismund's proposition.
The latter tried to see Louis XI. personally in accordance with his
imperial cousin's advice that an interview might be more effective
than a letter.
It did not prove a propitious time, however; Louis was deeply engaged
with Burgundy and he was not disposed to take any steps that might
estrange the Swiss--and any espousal of Sigismund's interests might
alienate them. He did not even permit an opening to be made, but
stopped Sigismund's approach to him by a message that he would not for
a moment entertain a suggestion inimical to those dear friends of his
in the cantons--a sentiment that quickly found its way to Switzerland.
Thus stayed in his effort to win Louis's ear, Sigismund decided that
he would make another essay towards a Burgundian alliance, this time
face to face with the duke. On to Flanders he journeyed and found
Charles in the midst of the ostentatious magnificence already
described. Ordinary affairs of life were conducted with a splendour
hardly attained by the emperor in the most pompous functions of his
court. Sigismund was absolutely dazzled by the evidence of easy
prosperity. The fact that a maiden was the duke's sole heiress led
the Austrian to conceive the not unnatural idea that this attractive
Burgundian wealth might be turned into the impoverished imperial
coffers by a marriage between Mary of Burgundy and Maximilian, the
emperor's son.
[Illustration: MARY OF BURGUNDY FROM CONTEMPORANEOUS MINIATURE
REPRODUCED IN BARANTE, "LES DUCS DE BOURGOGNE"]
The visitor not only thought of this possibility, but he immediately
broached it to Charles. The bait was swallowed. As to the main
proposition which Sigismund had come expressly to make, that, too,
was not rejected. The duke perceived that the transfer of the Rhenish
lands to his jurisdiction might militate to his advantage. A passage
would be opened towards the south for his troops without the need of
demanding permission from any reluctant neighbour. The risk of trouble
with the Swiss did not affect him when weighing the advantages of
Sigismund's proffer, a proffer which he finally decided to accept.
Probably he found his guest a pleasant party to a bargain, for not
only did he broach the tempting alliance between Mary and Maximilian,
but he, too, seems to have hinted that the title of "King of the
Romans" might be added to the long list of appellations already signed
by Charles.[6] As Sigismund was richer in kin, if not in coin, than
the feeble Podiebrad, Charles gave serious heed to the suggestion
which fell incidentally from his guest's lips, in the course of the
long conversations held at Bruges.
Certain precautions were taken to protect Charles from being dragged
into Swiss complications against his will, and then in May, 1469,
the treaty of St. Omer was signed,[7] wherein the Duke of Burgundy
accorded his protection to Sigismund of Austria and received from him
all his seigniorial rights within certain specified territories.
The most important part of this cession comprised Upper Alsace and
the county of Ferrette, but there were also many other fragments of
territory and rights of seigniory involved, besides lordship over
various Rhenish cities, such as Rheinfelden, Saeckingen, Lauffenburg,
Waldshut and Brisac. This last named town commanded the route
eastward, as Waldshut that to the southeast, and Thann the highway
through the Vosges region.
Fifty thousand florins was the price for the property and the claims
transferred from Sigismund to Charles. Ten thousand were to be paid at
once, in order to ransom Waldshut from the Swiss. The remainder was
due on September 24th. On his part, Sigismund specifically recognised
the duke's right to redeem all domains nominally his but mortgaged for
the time being, certain estates or seignorial rights having been thus
alienated for 150 years.
This territorial transfer was not a sale. It was a mortgage, but a
mortgage with possession to the mortgagee and further restricted by
the provision that there could be no redemption unless the mortgager
could repay at Besançon the whole loan plus all the outlay made by the
mortgagee up to that date. Instalment payments were expressly ruled
out. The entire sum intact was made obligatory. Therefore the danger
of speedy redemption did not disquiet Charles. He knew the man he had
to deal with. Sigismund's lack of foresight and his prodigality were
notorious. There was faint chance that he could ever command the
amount in question. Accordingly, Charles was fairly justified in
counting the mortgaged territory as annexed to Burgundy in perpetuity.
Sigismund pocketed his florins eagerly. Nothing could have been more
welcome to him. But this relief from the pressure of his pecuniary
embarrassment did not inspire him with love for the man who held his
lost lands. His sentiments towards Charles were very similar to those
of an heir towards a usurer who has helped him in a temporary strait
by mulcting him of his natural rights.
As for the emperor, when this transfer of territory was an
accomplished fact, he began to take fright at the consequences. He did
not like this intrusion of a powerful French peer into the imperial
circle.[8] At the same time he was ready to make him share
responsibility in any further difficulties that might arise between
Sigismund and the Swiss.
The least skilful of prophets could have foreseen difficulties for
Charles on his own account, both foreign and domestic. His own
relations with the Swiss had always been friendly enough, but he had
never before been so near a neighbour, while, within the Rhine lands,
it was an open question whether the bartered inhabitants were to
enjoy or regret their new tie with Burgundy. The importance of their
sentiments was a matter of as supreme indifference to Charles as was
danger from the Confederation. Neither conciliation nor diplomacy
was in his thoughts. He had no conception of the intricacies of the
situation. He counted the landgraviate as definitely his by the treaty
of St. Omer as Brabant by heritage or Liege by conquest.
The need of a kindly policy towards the little valley towns--a policy
that might have won their allegiance--never occurred to him. They were
his property and Peter von Hagenbach was, in course of time, made
lieutenant-governor in his behalf.
Apart from all personal considerations of enmity and amity of natives
and neighbours, the territory of Upper Alsace and the county of
Ferrette, delivered from needy Austria to rich Burgundy, like a coat
pawned by a poor student, was held under very complex and singular
conditions.[9] The status of the bargain between Sigismund and Charles
was in point of fact something between pawn and sale, according to the
point of view. Sigismund fully intended to redeem it, while Charles
did not admit that possibility as remotely contingent. Nor was that
the only peculiarity. The itemised list of the ceded territories as
given in the treaty was far from telling the facts of the possessions
passing to Sigismund's proxy.
In the first place the Austrian seigniories were not compact. They
were scattered here and there in the midst of lands ruled by others,
as the Bishop of Strasburg, the Abbé of St. Blaise in the Black
Forest, the count Palatine, the citizens of Basel and of Mulhouse, and
others.
The existent variety in the extent and nature of Austrian title was
extraordinary. Nearly every possible combination of dismembered
prerogative and actual tenure had resulted from the long series of
ducal compositions. In some localities a toll or a quit-rent was the
sole cession, and again a toll or a prerogative was almost the only
residue remaining to the ostensible overlord, while all his former
property or transferable birthright privileges were lodged in
various hands on divers tenures. There were cases in which the
mortgagee--noble, burgher, or municipal corporation--had taken the
exact place of the Austrian duke and in so doing had become the vassal
of his debtor, stripped of all vested interest but his sovereignty.
For in these bargains wherein elements of the Roman contract and
feudal customs were curiously blended, two classes of rights had been
invariably reserved by the ducal mortgagers:
(1) Monopolies, regal in nature, such as assured free circulation on
the highways, the old Roman roads, all jurisdiction of passports and
travellers' protection.
(2) The suzerainty. This comprised the power to confer fiefs, of
requisition of military service, of requesting _aids_ and admission to
strongholds, cities, or castles, _le droit de forteresse jurable et
rendable_.
In these regards the compact between Charles and Sigismund differed
from all previous covenants not only in degree, but in kind. The Duke
of Burgundy entered into the _sovereign_ as well as into the mangled,
maimed, and curtailed proprietary rights of the hereditary over-lord.
In his assumption of this involved and doubtful property, Charles laid
heavy responsibilities on his shoulders. The actual price of fifty
thousand gold florins paid to Sigismund was a mere fraction of the
pecuniary obligations incurred, while the weight of care was difficult
to gauge. He succeeded to princes weak, frivolous, prodigal, whose
misrule had long been a curse to the land. The incursions of
the Swiss, the repeated descents of the Rhine nobles from their
crag-lodged strongholds to pillage and destroy, terrified merchants
and plunged peaceful labourers into misery.
Through hatred of the absentee Austrians, the neighbouring cities
repeatedly became the accomplices of these brigands, affording them
asylums for refitting and free passage when they were laden with
evident booty.
In all departments of finance and administration disorder prevailed.
The chief officials, castellans and councillors, enjoyed high salaries
for neglected duties. The castles were in wretched repair and there
were insufficient troops to guard the roads. There was no dependence
upon the receipts nominally to be expected. In the sub-mortgaged
lands, the lords simply levied what they could, without the slightest
responsibility for the order of the domain; they did not hesitate to
charge their suzerain for repairs never made, confident that no one
would verify their declaration.
In the territories of the immediate domain, the Austrian dukes and
their officials had no notion of the rigid system maintained in
Burgundy. Only here and there can little memoranda be found and these
are confused and obscure. There is a dearth of accurate records like
those voluminous registers of outlays kept by Burgundian receivers,
registers so rich in detail that they are more valuable for the
historian than any chronicle.
Exact appraisal of the resources of these _pays de par de là_ was very
difficult. Between 1469 and 1473 there were three efforts to obtain
reliable information by means of as many successive commissions
despatched to the Rhine valley by the Duke of Burgundy.
Envoys drew up minutes of their observations in addition to their
official reports and all were preserved in the archives. As these were
written from testimony gathered on the spot, such as the accounts of
the receivers now lost, etc., there is real value in the documents.
The first commission in behalf of Burgundy was composed of two Germans
and three Walloons. One of the former was Peter von Hagenbach, who
won no enviable reputation in the later exercise of his office as
lieutenant-governor of the annexed region, to which he was shortly
afterwards appointed. This first commission entered into formal
possession in Charles's name and instituted some desired reforms
immediately, such as policing the highways, etc.
The second commission made its visit in 1471. It consisted of Jean
Pellet, treasurer of Vesoul, and Jean Poinsot, procureur-general of
Amont.
The third commission (1473) was under the auspices of Monseigneur
Coutault, master of accounts at Dijon. He carried with him the report
of his predecessors and made his additions thereto.
Charles's directions to Poinsot and Pellet (June 13, 1471) were vague
and general. They were "to see the conduct of his affairs" _(voir la
conduite de ses affaires_). The important point was to find out how
much revenue could be obtained. As the duke's plan of expansion grew
larger he had need of all his resources.
The reports were eminently discouraging. Outlay was needed
everywhere--income was small. As the chances of peculation diminished,
the castellans deserted their posts and left the castles to decay.
The Burgundian commission of 1471 found the difficulties of their
exploration increased by two items. Charles had not advanced an
allowance for their expenses and they were anxious to be back at
Vesoul by Michaelmas, the date of the change in municipal offices and
of appropriations for the year. It was in hopes of receiving advance
moneys that they delayed in starting, but the approaching election and
coming winter finally decided them to set out, pay their own expenses,
and complete the business as rapidly as they could in a fortnight.
The summary of this report of 1471 was that there was little present
prospect that Charles would be able to reimburse himself for his
necessary expenses. An undue portion of authority and of revenue was
legally lodged in alien hands. Charles was possessed of germs of
rights rather than of actual rights. The earlier creditors of Austria
held all the best mortgages with their attendant emoluments. The
immediate profits accruing to the Duke of Burgundy fell far short
of the minimum necessary to disburse to keep his government, his
strongholds, his highways in repair. Very disturbed were the good
treasurer of Vesoul and the procureur-general of Amont at this state
of affairs, and distressed at the prospect of the ampler receipts from
Burgundy being required to relieve the pressing necessities of the
poor territories _de par de là_.
To avoid this contingency, the commissioners recommended the duke
to redeem all the existing mortgages great and small. It would cost
140,000 florins, but the revenue would at once increase with the new
security which would immediately follow under firm Burgundian rule.
Sole master, Charles could then enforce obedience from nobles and
cities and better conditions would be inaugurated.
Evidently this rational advice was not taken, for it is repeated by
Coutault in 1473. Redemption of the mortgages, "if your affairs can
afford it," is the counsel given by the chamber of accounts at Dijon,
though this sage board adds that they were well aware that in the
previous month Monseigneur could not put his hands on a hundred
florins to redeem one wretched little _gagerie._ The native coffers of
the region did not suffice to settle the salaries of the officers in
charge.
Such then was the new acquisition of Charles after four years of his
administration. Peter von Hagenbach, his deputy in charge of this
unremunerative territory, is a character painted in the darkest
colours by all historians. It is more than probable that his unpopular
efforts to make bricks without straw were largely responsible for his
unenviable reputation. Ground between the upper and lower millstones
of Charles's clamours for revenues and popular clamours that the
people had nothing wherewith to pay, Hagenbach developed into a
taskmaster of the hardest and most unpitying type, who made himself
thoroughly hated by the people he was set to rule.
It must be remembered that there was no cleft in nationality or in
language between governor and governed. He was not a foreigner set
over them. He was one of them raised to a high position. There was
then no French element in Lower Alsace. It was then German pure and
simple.
[Illustration: UPPER ALSACE AND ADJACENT TERRITORY BY PERMISSION OF
HACHETTE, 1902]
[Footnote 1: Gachard, _Doc. inéd_., i., 204-209. "Relation de
l'assemblée solennelle tenue à Bruxelles le 15 Jan., 1469."]
[Footnote 2: See Toutey, _Charles le Téméraire et la ligue de
Constance_, p. 7.]
[Footnote 3: See the text given in Comines-Lenglet, iii., 116. Charles
is characterised as _ducem strenuum in armis ac justitiæ præcipium
zelatorem_.]
[Footnote 4: See Toutey, p. 8; also Lavisse, iv^{ii}., 371.]
[Footnote 5: Thus was named the assembly of ten Alsatian towns from
Strasburg to Basel, organised into a half independent confederation by
the Emperor Charles IV.]
[Footnote 6: Toutey, p. 11.]
[Footnote 7: See "Fontes Rerum Austriacarum" Chmel, J., _Urkunden zur
Geschichte von Osterreich_, etc., II^2, 223 _et passim_. One document,
p. 229, has _Marz_ as a misprint for _Mai_.]
[Footnote 8: Charles was, to be sure, already within that circle for
some of his Netherland provinces, but his feudal obligations there
were very shadowy.]
[Footnote 9: See Toutey, Lavisse, etc., and above all a valuable
article by L. Stouff, entitled "Les Possessions Bourguignonnes dans la
vallée du Rhin sous Charles le Téméraire," _Annales de l'Est,_ vol.
18. This article, is the result of a careful examination of the
reports made by Poinsot and Pellet, Charles's commissioners.]