after its establishment, ignorance is most hostile to its
establishment. _Prima facie_, people must possess a certain degree of
capacity, mental and moral, to understand what civilization is and
what representative government is. The Batta of Sumatra may have their
own alphabet, and the Fans of the West Coast may excel in iron
work,[8] but even these fall short of the pre-requisites, not
intellectually only, but morally also. We cannot conceive of them,
seated around a camp-fire, discussing the merits of two chambers
system, or defining the rights and duties of a citizen, while their
vile lips are stained with the blood of their fellow-man, whose flesh
they have just devoured. Not to expatiate further on this self-evident
fact, it is certain that the Japanese people were sufficiently
intelligent to understand and appreciate the Western ideas, when they
were thrust to their notice. Certain, too, that in some branches of
aesthetic art, they were somewhat superior to the neighboring nations.
But beyond this, thirty years ago, a careful observer could have
detected in the Japanese people no conspicuous intellectual
attainment, except, of course, such points of dissimilarity as exist
between any two nations equally civilized. Japan, Korea, and China had
the same system of education and the same "classics," and each was
composed of followers of Confucius and believers in Buddhism. True,
Japan was then under the feudal system, and China and Korea were and
still are under monarchy, but in point of absolutism, their
governments were all alike. The greater differentiations were the
facts that the Japanese had their own system of religious belief
besides, called Shintoism, that the Japanese and the Koreans each had,
in addition to the Chinese characters, their own syllables, and that
the styles of their dress were different in no small degree. But the
former, being a belief, principally concerned with the hereafter, has
no more connection than the latter two with the subject of our
inquiry, which relates to the intellectual phases of these people only
in so far as they influence their political ideas.
[8] Peschel's, "The Races of Man," p. 163.
2. Nor can we find any peculiar characteristic in the Japanese people,
to which we may ascribe their progressive tendency. The only
predominant characteristic that we know is their imitative power. This
they have remarkably exhibited in their adoption of the Chinese
civilization, which they modified and made their own, and more
remarkably in their recent adoption of the Western civilization. Let
us examine what relation this bears to the conservative and the
progressive spirit of the people. Mr. Herbert Spencer attributes two
motives to imitation, either reverential or competitive.[9] It is with
the latter that we are concerned. This, coming as it does from a
desire of an imitator to assert his equality with the one imitated,
implies the recognition of superiority of the latter, and the
acknowledgment of inferiority of the former. Conservatism, in the
sense we have been using the term, defies any recognition and
acknowledgment of this sort; therefore it defies imitation. In other
words, a man does not imitate what he dislikes or scorns, and since
conservatism is aversion to, or contempt for, say a new political
institution, the imitative trait has no part to play, while that
aversion or contempt continues. Evidently, then, the imitative power
of the Japanese was not the force which served to make the
conservative people progressive; only when conservatism gives way, and
admiration for what is new is awakened, can this power assume its full
activity.
[9] "His Principle of Sociology," Vol. II., p. 209.
Were we to admit for the sake of argument that the Japanese people
were far superior in intelligence to the other people of Asia, or that
they possessed a peculiar characteristic which impelled them to the
adoption of the Western civilization, or even both, our position will
not be altered, for the progressive idea of Japan has already reached
across the sea to the continent of Asia, giving rise to an event in
Korea. In December, 1884, the two political factions of that country,
one of which was liberal and the other conservative, respectively,
representing the Japanese and the Chinese principles, disputed for
supremacy. The positive and negative currents, as of electricity, met
at the peninsula, and produced a spark of revolution.[10]
[10] There was another agitation in Korea in 1882, but this was
a mere uprising of the mob against the Japanese staying in
that country, and not of grave political importance. For
the details of both these events, the reader is referred to
"A Korean _Coup D' Etat_," an entertaining article by
Perceval Lowell, _Atlantic Monthly_, November, 1886. This
poverty-stricken country, with an imbecile sovereign at the
helm of state, and with no organized array, is practically
under the control of the Chinese government, though
nominally she is independent. Some European powers, who seem
to consider that the greatness of a nation is commensurate
with its success in its territorial aggrandizement are
casting eyes at her, in vain let us hope, for the sake of
Korea. While the influence of China is so predominant, she
cannot accomplish much. A _coup d' etat_ might be needed a
few times more, before she can become an independent nation
in the fullest sense of the words. At any rate, her prospect
is dubious enough at present.
Although, unfortunately for Korea, the liberals were vanquished, and
its chief leaders were banished from their native country, the
significance of the phenomenon does not lose its weight on that
account. The tidal wave of progress, once repulsed, is not likely to
subside forever. Meantime, it is worth while to notice, that even
under the undisputed administration of the victorious conservatives,
the nation could not remain aloof from the rest of the world. Besides
entering into treaties with some western and eastern nations, Korea is
availing herself of the services of European abilities, for the
purpose of internal improvement.
3. "But," some one may ask, "if the establishment of constitutional
government in Japan is due principally to the inherent excellence of
the institution itself, and not to the superior intelligence of the
Japanese people, nor yet to their peculiar characteristic, how can the
non-progressive tendency of China be accounted for?" The vast extent
of her dominion,[11] the immense number of her population,[12] and her
almost inexhaustible national resources, all combine to make the
question in regard to her future policy a momentous one. With the best
form of government, and under the guidance of an able statesman, it is
within her power to promote the advancement of whole Asia, and mould
the destiny of the world. Yet, to all practical intents and purposes,
she is evidently indifferent to the possibility of such a noble
mission. Nay, more; she ignores it. She reminds us of an opium smoker.
The world is awake, but she reposes in profound slumber, and little
does she care what others are doing. The doctrine of _Laissez-Faire_
is the sinew of her policy toward the European states. She lets them
alone so long as they let her alone, leaving them to wonder for what
she was born. When some one comes and strikes her on the face, she
stands up, still half asleep, slowly gathers whatever strength is in
her, returns blow for blow, but the moment her enemy disappears
torpidity again overtakes her, she relapses into dreamy indifference.
Of what is this opium composed that she smokes?
[11] About 4,179,559 sq. miles.--_The Statesman's Yearbook_, 1891.
[12] About 404,180,000.--_Ibid._
I must not be understood to mean _absolute_ irresistibility of
constitutional government. Already I have touched upon one exception,
viz: inadequate capacity, mental and moral, of people. Instead of
excepting Japan from the pervading conservatism of Asia, I am inclined
to make causes resisting or retarding the establishment of
constitutional government in China exceptions to its irresistibility,
side by side with ignorance. Such causes are, doubtless,
multitudinous. Nevertheless, a careful observer will be able to single
out two principal ones among many others: territorial and
intellectual.
We have seen that the average intelligence of the Chinese people is
not much inferior, if at all, to that of the Japanese, previous to the
revolution. Even those Chinese who come to this country for manual
labor, can read and write to some extent. Undoubtedly there is a large
number of illiterate and brutal outcasts, who are a standing disgrace
to humanity at large, but they can be found in every nation at
present. The average intelligence of the middle class in China is,
next to Japan, perhaps, the highest among the Asiatic nations. But the
greatest evil from which Chinese intellect is suffering is its
bombastic antiquarianism. This differs from conservatism, in that it
is not the cautious distrust of new institutions for the improvement
of the existing ones, but an effort to move backward, and to revive
the ancient order of things, which crumbled into dust a thousand years
before, from its inadaptability. The goal toward which modern
civilization is striving, is the attainment of justice, the security
of property and of the lives of individuals. The ideal society of the
Chinese is one in which the simplicity of primitive tribes makes the
administration of justice unnecessary, in which the possession of
property and the protection of lives are unknown. Eulogies are
lavished throughout their literature to the peaceful reigns of the
primitive kings, when no one locked his house at night, or touched
another's article which he happened to find on his way. To them
antiquity is adorable instead of venerable. They consider themselves
insignificant by the side of their godly ancestors. No doubt the
doctrine of Confucius, which the Chinese people endeavor to carry out
to a letter, has played a large part in producing this effect. Instead
of unfolding the possibilities of the future, he recapitulated the
virtues and achievements of the past. I am not attempting to
depreciate the inestimable service, which his system of philosophy has
rendered toward enhancing the standard of rectitude among his
disciples. But for him Asia might have sunk into the depths of moral
chaos. This much at least must be said in justification of his
doctrine, that evidently it was not his intention to reproduce an
exact duplicate of the primitive Chinese civilization. "Let each day
bring a new order of things," and "A sage's principles change as
time," are among the precepts he enunciated. But these aphorisms, upon
which the Anglo-Saxons would have laid a great stress, have been set
at naught by his followers to the detriment of their own welfare.
This antiquarianism also existed in Japan, before the introduction of
the European civilization, but here it had lacked much of its
intensity, through its non-originality. The Japanese had no inventive
pride, and it was with little reluctance that they abandoned their old
theories which they borrowed from China, and adopted new civilization
of the West. The Chinese cannot forget that whatever civilization they
possess is their own, and that, at one time, theirs was the "Celestial
Empire," which gave law, literature, and art to the neighboring
nations. Every one knows that all the people still believe their
civilization far superior to that of Europe. And since they do not
care to compete with the civilization which they regard as inferior,
they are striving to model themselves after the features of their own
ancient civilization, which, for aught we know, might have been purer
because younger, but which, existing in the less developed stage of
society, must have been necessarily cruder. They are not aware that a
society developed to any extent is a composite organism; that an
originally simple cluster of people had grown into a complex
community, through double methods, the multiplication of its own
offsprings, and its union with another cluster or clusters of
people.[13] This gradual growth of a society is followed by a
corresponding diversity in the division of labor, thus making the
social structure also complex.[14] Whatever else they can do, the
Chinese will never realize their ideal of ancient simplicity, with
their present complex social structure and system. A human society can
either fall backward or progress forward, but it cannot _progress
backward_. In China the active movement for social and political
amelioration is restrained by the erroneous idea that they will
aggravate evils and increase the distance between the present and the
past. The unemployed energy of the nation, like an unemployed human
muscle, is losing its vitality. Unable to go backward, unwilling to go
forward, the nation is at standstill, and its civilization is stagnant
with vices of the worst sort, the growth of which is checked by no
iron hands of heroic reformers.
[13] Spencer's "Principle of Sociology," Vol. II., pp. 436-458.
[14] Ibid, pp. 459-472.
Another cause acting against the susceptibility of China to the
European civilization is the vastness of her territory. The power of
resistance being equal, a force requires longer time to travel larger
distance, but when the power of resistance against the force of
civilization is much stronger, as in the case of China, in comparison
with Japan, the required length of time becomes still greater. The
vast and thickly populated Empire of China naturally contains the
various aggregates of people, with diverse inclinations and
antagonistic interests, which makes their joint effort for any
achievement extremely difficult, especially when the central authority
is weak. The disadvantages are further multiplied by the difficulty of
travelling and communication. On account of these hindrances, the
Western civilization has not as yet time to permeate the whole Empire
of China, and give the people an impetus for progressive movement. It
may be well questioned whether "the fathers" could have succeeded in
organizing the federal government, if the colonies were as large, and
contained as great a population as the present United States. As it
was, several States refused to enter into the confederation at
first.[15] Taking into consideration her better facility for
communication, and her proximity to the other European powers, perhaps
Russia owes to the size of her territory, the successful maintenance
of her absolute monarchy as much as China. But here the decisive
battle is already impending. At this moment she is trembling with
apprehension lest the palace of the Czar be at any moment levelled to
its foundation by the terrible explosion of a nihilist's bomb. The
more the employment of force is resorted to as the means of
suppression, the greater the violence of resistance. It may take the
Chinese people generations before they are seized with such political
fanaticism, but judging from precedents, it is a rational probability
that the absolute monarchy of China may yet become the object of
furious attack by her now inert and abject populace, apparently in
happy ignorance of the nature of sovereign authority, the free and
unrestrained exercise of which they may learn to covet too soon.
[15] New York, Virginia, North Carolina, and Rhode Island.
Bryce's The American Commonwealth, Vol. I., p. 32.
Ignorance, antiquarianism, and large territory, then, are some
principal causes which retard the march of progress. There remains
only the third and last objection to be met--the adaptability of the
Asiatic people to the representative form of government.
III. If two thousand years of Asiatic despotism has given her people
one lesson, that lesson is obedience, and obedience is, according to
John Stuart Mill, a quality essential to the people under
constitutional government.[16] Not only they must be obeyed, but also
they must obey. Law, which is constitutional, commands their
obedience, so long as it is not repealed, whether it promotes, or is
detrimental to, their welfare. This is especially the case in England,
where parliament is supreme and not the constitution, as in the United
States, though in both countries _vox populi_ will tell in the end. On
the other hand it may be disputed that if long despotism taught the
Asiatic people to be subservient to public authorities, it also made
them meek and slavish, entirely eradicating the spirit of
independence, indispensable to self-governing people. Granted, but how
shall this defect be remedied? Because they are too slavish and not
sufficiently independent, are they to crawl under absolute despotism
for another two thousand years, which would make them all the more
slavish, and all the less independent? Slavishness is obedience plus
something more. If political liberty were given the Asiatic people,
when they had just learned to obey, slavishness would never have
become their fault. The very fact of their being slavish proves that
despotism should have ceased to exist long before, and should cease
now, in order to cure them of this despicable disease. As far as this
question is concerned, then, the slavishness of the Asiatic people,
instead of being against their adaptability to constitutional
government, is for it. In the words of Macaulay, "If men are to wait
for liberty until they become wise and good in slavery, they may
indeed wait forever."[17]
[16] His Representative Government, pp. 85, 86.
[17] His Essay on Milton.
There may be a thousand other infirmities among these people, but most
of them doubtless are, or were, found among the highly civilized
people of to-day. Every nation can point with pride to some men of
admirable achievement, of brilliant genius, of saintly virtues, but
that same nation also contains the countless number of inebriates,
robbers, and murderers. Differences in environments and in the stage
of civilization have contributed much in differentiating the
inhabitants of the globe, but we must bear in mind that they are all
made by the same hand of the Creator, and are, in general, striving to
do good according to the dictates of their conscience. What
characterizes civilization is not so much the quality of goodness
revealed, as its quantity. Between aborigines and highly advanced
people, there exists a wide gulf, but that gulf becomes perceptibly
narrower between the so-called semi-civilized and the civilized, much
narrower than the word "semi" indicates with the force of scientific
exactness. But behind all these arguments, there lays the most
fundamental condition of the adaptability, namely: that the people
should be desirous of establishing it. No other Asiatic nations beside
Japan have expressed their desire to this end, either by words or by
action, and therefore they are incapacitated.
This objection would be fatal, if we were advocating that the Asiatic
people ought to have constitutional government. But we have not been.
We have been arguing that since constitutional government has
irresistible attraction to those who can understand what it is, and
since it has already been established in Japan, the other Asiatic
nations will begin to desire it, notwithstanding their seeming
ignorance and conservatism; and because they are adapted for it in all
the respects but one, the want of desire to establish it, when that
desire is enkindled within their breasts, then a "great democratic
revolution," which De Tocqueville said was going on in Europe,[18] and
which is still going on there, will also go on in Asia. We may observe
in passing, that Sir Henry Maine's arguments against the
irresistibility of popular government[19] have no connection with our
position, being directed against the ultra-democratic tendency of
modern times which is beyond the scope of our present discussion.
[18] His Democracy in America, Vol. I., p. 2.
[19] His Popular Government, pp. 70-74.
But will this new institution of Japan possess permanency?
Constitutional government has shown in many cases the lack of
stability. In France and Spain especially it has been established and
overthrown again and again.[20] Can _Tei Koku Gi Kai_[21] prove itself
above such frailty and stand for ages a majestic monument of the
people capable of self-government? Or must it pass away in ignominy
and gloom through its own weakness, or of the constitution, or of the
people, or of all these combined? Hitherto we have been discussing the
extrinsic significance of constitutional government in Japan, but this
important question introduces us into the field of its intrinsic
excellence. To answer the question we must examine the constitution
itself in its details, besides tracing the steps which led to its
promulgation. Perhaps a volume may be necessary for this most
interesting and profitable study. At any rate, the space which we have
already occupied renders a further discussion of the subject
impossible for the present. But we cannot lay aside our pen without
expressing our fondest anticipation, and most earnest desire, that
guided by statesmen of genius, and supported by the prudent and
patriotic people, this first institution ever founded on the Asiatic
soil for the development of political liberty, may be crowned with
brilliant success, not only for the sake of Japan, but for the sake of
all Asia, whose myriad sons it is her noble duty, as well as
privilege, to rescue from the yoke of ever-detestable bondage.
[20] Ibid, pp. 17, 18.
[21] Literally, "The Deliverative Assembly of the Empire," being
the comprehensive name for the two legislative chambers of
Japan, corresponding to Parliament of England or Congress of
the United States.
UNIVERSITY EXTENSION.
BY PROF. WILLIS BOUGHTON, OF OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY.
University extension is a movement intended to bring the people at
large into closer communion with the college and the university.
Though it had a lowly birth in England, it has become a great
institution permanently wedded to Oxford and Cambridge. For some years
the idea has been growing that our American colleges ought to be doing
something in this same line. The world is full of students who are
unable to attend the university; some are prevented by family ties,
and some by business relations; but mature though they be, there are
everywhere real students who are lamenting the fact that they seem
forever shut out from the light of knowledge as it is shed abroad from
our higher educational institutions. To such are added those young
people who have been by circumstances early forced into industrial
pursuits, but who are hungry after such training as will enable them
to command better situations and better salaries. The success of the
Chautauqua movement indicates how many there are that are bent upon
improving themselves.
This Chautauqua movement is only an attempt to Americanize university
extension. In various ways, however, it fails to perform the full
function of the latter institution. While Chautauqua work is carefully
planned, it is elementary; the student is left almost entirely to his
own, often misdirected, efforts; and there is little or no chance of
his coming into personal contact with the experienced educator and
specialists. Though the circles have, through lack of direction,
sometimes neglected education for entertainment, the organization as a
whole has accomplished a wonderful work in the elevation and the
instruction of great numbers of people.
University extension, on the other hand, profiting by the experience
of Chautauqua, proposes not only to plan courses of study, but to
direct, supervise, and test the work of its students as well. In doing
all this, it employs the lecturer, the syllabus, the class, the
travelling library, and the examination. It has adopted methods
whereby it can reach people of as varied occupations as those reached
by Chautauqua, and it can thus furnish them with information having a
positive educational value.