Church of England assert that the Scripture is the sole authority in
matters of faith, we by no means mean to exclude the office of the
Church, nor to assert any thing so extravagant, as that it is the duty
of every person to sit down with the volume of the Scriptures in his
hand, and to make out from that alone, without listening to any human
authority, what is the revelation made by God to man. But I know that
many are led to adopt notions no less extravagant of the authority of
the Church and of tradition,--even to the full extent maintained by the
Church of Rome,--because they see no other refuge from what appears to
them, and not unreasonably, so miserable and so extreme a folly; for an
extreme and a most miserable folly doubtless it would be, in any one, to
throw aside all human aid except his own; to disregard alike the wisdom
of individuals, and the agreeing decisions of bodies of men; to act as
if none but himself had ever loved truth, or had been able to discover
it; and as if he himself did possess both the will and the power to
do so.
This is so foolish, that I doubt whether any one ever held such
notions, and, much more, whether be acted upon them. But is it more wise
to run from one form of error into its opposite, which, generally
speaking, is no less foolish and extravagant? What should we say of a
man who could see no middle course between never asking for advice, and
always blindly following it; between never accepting instruction upon
any subject, and believing his instructors infallible? And this last
comparison, with our particular situation here, will enable us, I think,
by referring to our own daily experience, to understand the present
question sufficiently. The whole system of education supposes,
undoubtedly, that the teacher, in those matters which he teaches, should
be an authority to the taught: a learner in any matter must rely on the
books, and on the living instructors, out of which and from whom he is
to learn. There are difficulties, certainly, in all learning; but we do
not commonly see them increased by a disposition on the part of the
learner to question and dispute every thing that is told him. There is a
feeling rather of receiving what he is told implicitly; and, by so
doing, he learns: but does it ever enter into his head that his teacher
is infallible? or does any teacher of sane mind wish him to think so?
And observe, now, what is the actual process: the mind of the learner is
generally docile, trustful, respectful towards his teacher; aware, also,
of his own comparative ignorance. It is certainly most right that it
should be so. But this really teachable and humble learner finds a false
spelling in one of his books; or hears his teacher, from oversight, say
one word in his explanation instead of another: does he cease to be
teachable and humble,--is it really a want of childlike faith, and an
indulgence of the pride of reason, if he decides that the false spelling
was an error of the press; that the word which his teacher used was a
mistake? Yet errors, mistakes, of how trifling a kind soever, are
inconsistent with infallibility; and the perceiving that they are errors
is an exercise of our individual judgment upon our instructors. To hear
some men talk, we should think that no boy could do so without losing
all humility and all teachableness; without forthwith supposing that he
was able to be his own instructor.
I have begun on purpose with an elementary case, in which a very young
boy might perceive an error in his books, or in his instructors,
without, in any degree, forfeiting his true humility. But we will now go
somewhat farther: we will take a more advanced student, such as the
oldest of those among you, who are still learners, and who know that
they have much to learn, but who, having been learners for some time
past, have also acquired some knowledge. In the books which they refer
to, and from which they are constantly deriving assistance, do they
never observe any errors in the printing? do they never find
explanations given, which they perceive to be imperfect, nay, which they
often feel to be actually wrong? And, passing from books to living
instructors, should we blame a thoughtful, attentive, and well-informed
pupil, because his mind did not at once acquiesce in our interpretation
of some difficult passage; because he consulted other authorities on the
subject, and was unsatisfied in his judgment; the reason of his
hesitation being, that our interpretation appeared to him to give an
unsatisfactory sense, or to be obtained by violating the rules of
language? Is he proud, rebellious, puffed up, wanting in a teachable
spirit, without faith, without humility, because he so ventures to judge
for himself of what his teacher tells him? Does such a judging for
himself interfere, in the slightest degree, with the relation between us
and him? Does it make him really cease to respect us? or dispose him to
believe that he is altogether beyond the reach of our instruction? Or
are we so mad as to regard our authority as wholly set at nought,
because it is not allowed to be infallible? Doubtless, it would be
wholly set at nought, if we had presumed to be infallible. Then it would
not be merely that, in some one particular point, our decision had been
doubted, but that one point would involve our authority in all; because
it would prove, that we had set up beforehand a false claim: and he who
does so is either foolish, or a deceiver; there is apparent a flaw
either in his understanding, or in his principles, which undoubtedly
does repel respect.
Let me go on a step farther still. It has been my happiness to retain,
in after years, my intercourse with many of those who were formerly my
pupils; to know them when their minds have been matured, and their
education, in the ordinary sense of the term, completed. Is not the
relation between us altered then still more? Is it incompatible with
true respect and regard, that they should now judge still more freely,
in those very points, I mean, in which heretofore they had received my
instructions all but implicitly? that on points of scholarship and
criticism, they should entirely think for themselves? Or does this
thinking for themselve mean, that they will begin to question all they
had ever learnt? or sit down to forget purposely all their school
instructions, and make out a new knowledge of the ancient languages for
themselves? Who does not know, that they whose minds are most eager to
discern truth, are the very persons who prize their early instruction
most, and confess how much they are indebted to it; and that the
exercise of their judgments loads them to go on freely in the same path
in which they have walked so long, here and there it may be departing
from it where they find a better line, but going on towards the same
object, and generally in the same direction?
What has been the experience of my life,--the constantly observing the
natural union between sense and modesty; the perfect compatibility of
respect for instruction with freedom of judgment; the seeing how Nature
herself teaches us to proportion the implicitness of our belief to our
consciousness of ignorance: to rise gradually and gently from a state of
passively leaning, as it were, on the arm of another, to resting more
and more of our weight on our own limbs, and, at last, to standing
alone, this has perpetually exemplified our relations, as individuals,
to the Church. Taught by her, in our childhood and youth, under all
circumstances; taught by her, in the great majority of instances,
through our whole lives; never, in any case, becoming so independent of
her as we do in riper years, of the individual instructor of our youth;
she has an abiding claim on our respect, on our deference, on our
regard: but if it should be, that her teaching contained any thing at
variance with God's word, we should perceive it more or less clearly,
according to our degrees of knowledge; we should trust or mistrust our
judgment, according to our degree of knowledge; but in the last resort,
as we suppose that even a young boy might be sure that his book was in
error, in the case of a manifest false print, so there may be things so
certainly inconsistent with Scripture, that a common Christian may be
able to judge of them, and to say that they are like false prints in his
lesson, they are manifest errors, not to be followed, but avoided. So
far he may be said to judge of his teacher; but not the less will he
respect and listen to her authority in general, unless she has herself
made the slightest error ruinous to her authority by claiming to be in
all points, great or small, alike infallible.
Men crave a general rule for their guidance at all times, and under all
circumstances; whereas life is a constant call upon us to consider how
far one general rule, in the particular case before us, is modified by
another, or where one rule should be applied, and where another. To
separate humility from idolatry, conscience from presumption, is often
an arduous task: to different persons there is a different besetting
danger; so it is under different circumstances, and at different times.
Every day does the seaman, on a voyage, take his observations, to know
whereabouts he is; he compares his position with his charts; he
considers the direction of the wind, and the set of the current, or
tide; and from all these together, he judges on which side his danger
lies, on what course he should steer, or how much sail he may venture to
carry. This is an image of our own condition: we cannot have a general
rule to tell us where we should follow others, and where we must differ
from them; to say what is modesty, and what is indolence; what is a
proper deference to others, and what is a trusting in man so far, that
it becomes a want of trust in God. Only, we are sure that these are
points which we must decide for ourselves; the human will must be free,
so far as other men are concerned. If we say, that we will implicitly
trust others, then there is our decision, which no one could have made
for us, and which is our own choice as to the principle of our lives;
for which choice, we each of us, and no one else in all the world, must
answer at the judgment-seat of God. Only, in that word there is our
comfort, that, for our conduct in so doubtful a voyage as that of life,
amidst so many conflicting opinions, each courting our adherence to
it,--amidst such a variety of circumstances without, and of feelings
within, and on which, notwithstanding, our condition for all eternity
must depend,--we shall be judged, not by erring man, not by our own
fallible conscience, but by the all-wise, and all-righteous God. With
him, after all, even in the very courts of his holy Church, we yet, in
one sense, must each of us live alone. On his gracious aid, given to our
own individual souls, and determining our own individual wills, depends
the character of our life here and for ever. Trusting to him, praying to
him, we shall then make use of all the means that his goodness has
provided for us; we shall ask counsel of friends; we shall listen to
teachers; we shall delight to be in the company of God's people, of one
mind, and of one voice, with the good and wise of every generation; we
shall be afraid of leaning too much to our own understanding, knowing
how it is encompassed with error; but knowing that other men are
encompassed with error also, and that we, and not they, must answer for
our choice before Christ's judgment, we must, in the last resort, if our
conscience and sense of truth cannot be persuaded that other men speak
according to God's will,--we must follow our own inward convictions,
though all the world were to follow the contrary.
LECTURE XXXIII.
* * * * *
JOHN ix. 29.
_We know that God spake unto Moses; as for this fellow, we know not from
whence he is_.
The questions involved in the conversations recorded in this chapter,
are of great practical importance. Not perhaps of immediate practical
importance to all in this present congregation; but yet sure to be of
importance to all hereafter, and of importance to many at this actual
moment. Nay, they are of importance to those who, from their youth,
might be thought to have little to do with them, either where the mind
is already anxious and inquiring beyond its years, or where it happens
to be exposed to strong party influences, or that its passions are
likely to be engaged on a particular side, however little the
understanding may be interested in the matter. In fact, in religious
knowledge, as in other things, the omissions of youth are hard to make
up in manhood; they who grow up with a very small knowledge of the
Scriptures, and with no understanding of any of the questions connected
with them, can with difficulty make up for this defect in after years;
they become, according to the influences to which, they may happen to be
subjected, either unbelieving or fanatical.
If we were to question the youngest boy about the language held in this
chapter by the Pharisees, and by the man who had been born blind, we
should, no doubt, be answered, that what the Pharisees said, was wrong;
and what the man born blind said, was right. This would be the answer
which it would be thought proper to give; because it would be perceived
that the Pharisees' language expressed unbelief in Christ; and that the
man born blind was expressing gratitude and faith towards him. Nor,
indeed, should we expect a young boy to go much farther than this; for
such general impressions are, at his age, as much many times as can be
looked for. But it is strange to observe how much this want of
understanding outlasts the age of boyhood; how apt men are to judge
according to names, and to see no farther: to say, that the language of
the Pharisees was wrong, because they find it employed against Christ;
but yet to use the very same language themselves, whilst they think that
they are all the while speaking for Christ.
But in this conversation between the Pharisees and the blind man, there
are, indeed, as I said, points involved of very great importance; it
contains the question as to the degree of weight to be attached to
miracles; and the question, no less grave, with what degree of tenacity
we should reject what claims to be a new truth, because it seems to be
at a variance with supposed old truths to which we have been long
accustomed to cling with undoubting affection.
The question as to the weight of miracles is contained in the sixteenth
verse. Some of the Pharisees said, This man is not of God, because he
keepeth not the Sabbath day. Others said, How can a man that is a sinner
do such miracles? That is to say, the first party rejected the miracles
because they seemed to be wrought in favour of a supposed false
doctrine; the other accepted the doctrine, because it seemed warranted
to their belief by the miracles.
The second question is contained in the words of the text, "We know
that God spake to Moses; as for this fellow, we know not from whence he
is." We have been taught from our childhood, and have the belief
associated with every good and pious thought in us, that God spake to
Moses, and gave him the law as our rule of life; but as for this fellow,
we know not from whence he is. His works may be wonderful, his words may
be specious; but we never heard of him before, and we cannot tear up all
the holiest feelings of our nature to receive a new doctrine. We will
hold to the old way in which, we were taught by our fathers to walk, and
in which they walked before us.
This last question is one which, as we well know, is continually
presented to our minds. No one says, that the Pharisees were right, any
more than those very Pharisees thought that their fathers were right who
had killed the prophets. But as our Lord told them, that they were in
truth the children in spirit of those who had killed the prophets;
because, although they had been taught to condemn the outward form of
their fathers' action, they were repeating it themselves in its
principles and spirit; so many of those who condemn the Pharisees are
really their exact image, repeating now against the truths of their own
days the very same arguments which the Pharisees used against the truths
of theirs.
For the arguments of these Pharisees, both as regards miracles, and as
regards the suspicion with which we should look on a doctrine opposed to
the settled opinions of our lives, have in fact, in both cases, a great
mixture of justice in them; and it is this very mixture which we may
hope beguiled them; and also beguiles those, who in our own days repeat
their language.
For most certain it is that the Scripture itself supposes the
possibility of false miracles. The case is especially provided against
in Deuteronomy. It there says, "If there arise among you a prophet or a
dreamer of dreams, and giveth thee a sign or a wonder, and the sign or
the wonder come to pass whereof he spake unto thee, saying, Let us go
after other gods which thou hast not known, and let us serve them: thou
shalt not hearken unto the words of that prophet or that dreamer of
dreams, for the Lord your God proveth you, to know whether ye love the
Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul." Observe how
nearly this comes to the language of the Pharisees, "This man is not of
God, because he keepeth not the Sabbath day." "Here," they might have
said, "is the very case foreseen in the Scriptures: a prophet has
wrought a sign and a wonder, which is at the same time a breach of God's
commandments. God has told us that such signs are not to be heeded, that
he does but prove us with them to see whether we love him truly: knowing
that where there is a love of him, the heart will heed no sign or
wonder, how great soever, which would tempt it to think lightly of his
commandments." Shall we say that this is not a just interpretation of
the passage in Deuteronomy? shall we say that this is the language of
unbelief or of sin? or, rather, shall we not confess that it is in
accordance with God's word, and holy, and faithful, and true? And yet
this most just language led those who used it to reject one of Christ's
greatest miracles, and to refuse the salvation of the Holy One of God.
Can God's truth be contrary to itself? or can truth and goodness lead so
directly to error and to evil?
Now, then, where is the solution to be found? for some solution there
must be, unless we will either condemn a most true principle, or defend
a most false conclusion. The error lies in confounding God's moral law
with his law of ordinances; precisely the same error which led the Jews
to stone Stephen. The law had undoubtedly commanded that he who
blasphemed God should be stoned; the Jews called Stephen's speaking
against the holy place and against the law blasphemy against God, and
they murdered God's faithful servant and Christ's blessed martyr. Even
so the law had said, Let no miracle be so great as to tempt you to
forsake God: the Jews considered the forsaking the law of the Sabbath to
be a forsaking of God, and they said that Christ's miracle was a work of
Satan. There is no blasphemy into which we may not fall, no crime from
which we shall be safe, if we do not separate in our minds most clearly
such laws as relate to moral and eternal duties, and such as relate to
outward or positive ordinances, even when commanded or instituted by God
himself. It is most false to say that the fact of their being commanded
sets them on a level with each other. So long as they are commanded to
us, it is no doubt our duty to obey them equally: but the difference
between them is this, that whereas the first are commanded to us and to
our children for ever, and no possible evidence can be so great as to
persuade us that God has repealed them; (for the utmost conceivable
amount of external testimony, such as that of miracles, could only lead
to madness;--the human mind might, conceivably, be overwhelmed by the
conflict, but should never and could never be tempted to renounce its
very being, and lie against its Maker;) the others, that is, the
commands to observe certain forms and ordinances, are in their nature
essentially temporary and changeable: we have no right to assume that
they will be continued, and therefore a miracle at any time might justly
require us to forsake them; and not only an outward miracle, but the
changed circumstances of the times may speak God's will no less clearly
than a miracle, and may absolutely make it our duty to lay aside those
ordinances, which to us hitherto, and to our fathers before us, were
indeed the commands of God.
Now let us take the other question,--which may indeed be called a
question as to the allowableness of resting confidently in truth already
gained, without consenting to examine the claims of something asserting
itself to be a new truth, yet which seems to interfere with the old. Is
nothing within us to be safe from possible doubt, or is everything? Or
is it here, as in the former case, that there are truths so tried and so
sacred that it were blasphemy to question them; while there are others,
often closely intermixed with these, which are not so sacred, because
they are not eternal; which may and ought to be examined when occasion
requires; and which may be laid aside, or exchanged rather, for some
higher truth, if it shall reasonably appear that their work is done, and
that if we retain them longer they will change their character, and
become no longer true but false. "David having served his own generation
by the will of God, fell asleep, and was gathered unto his fathers, and
saw corruption; but He whom God raised again saw no corruption." This is
the difference between positive ordinances and moral: the first serve
their appointed number of generations by the will of God, and then are
gathered to their fathers, and perish; the latter are by the right hand
of God exalted, the same yesterday, to-day, and forever.
"We know," said the Jews, "that God spake to Moses; but for this fellow,
we know not from whence he is." There was a time when their fathers had
held almost the very same language to Moses: "they refused him, saying
Who made thee a ruler and a judge over us?" But now they knew that God
had spoken to Moses, but were refusing Him who was sent unto them after
Moses. God had spoken unto Moses, it was most true: he had spoken to him
and given him commandments which were to last for ever; and which
Christ, so far from undoing, was sent to confirm and to perfect; he had
spoken to him other things, which were not to last for ever, but yet
which were not to be cast away with dishonour; but having, in the
fulness of time, done their work, were then, like David, to fall asleep.
All that was required of the Jews, was not to reject as blasphemy a
doctrine which should distinguish between these two sorts of truths:
which in no way requires to believe that God had not spoken to
Moses,--which, on the contrary, maintained that he had so spoken,--but
only contended that he has also, in these last days, spoken unto us by
his Son; and that his Son, bearing the full image of Divine authority,
might well be believed if he spoke of some parts of Moses's law as
having now fulfilled their work, seeing that they were such parts only
as, by their very nature, were not eternal: they had not been from the
beginning, and therefore they would not live on to the end.