ON PRUDENCE AND ECONOMY.
Voltaire says, that the king of Prussia always wrote with one kind of
enthusiasm, and acted with another. It often happens, that men judge
with one degree of understanding, and conduct themselves with
another;[96] hence the common-place remarks on the difference between
theory and practice; hence the observation, that it is easy to be
prudent for other people, but extremely difficult to be prudent for
ourselves. Prudence is a virtue compounded of judgment and resolution:
we do not here speak of that narrow species of prudence, which is more
properly called worldly wisdom; but we mean that enlarged,
comprehensive wisdom, which, after taking a calm view of the objects
of happiness, steadily prefers the greatest portion of felicity. This
is not a selfish virtue; for, according to our definition,
benevolence, as one of the greatest sources of our pleasures, must be
included in the truly prudent man's estimate. Two things are necessary
to make any person prudent, the power to judge, and the habit of
acting in consequence of his conviction. We have, in the preceding
chapter, as far as we were able, suggested the best methods of
cultivating the powers of reasoning in our pupils; we must consider
now how these can be applied immediately to their conduct, and
associated with habits of action.
Instead of deciding always for our young pupils, we should early
accustom them to choose for themselves about every trifle which is
interesting to childhood: if they choose wisely, they should enjoy the
natural reward of their prudence; and if they decide rashly, they
should be suffered to feel the consequence of their own errour.
Experience, it is said, makes even fools wise; and the sooner we can
give experience, the sooner we shall teach wisdom. But we must not
substitute belief upon trust for belief upon conviction. When a little
boy says, "I did not eat any more custard, because mamma told me that
the custard would make me sick," he is only obedient, he is not
prudent; he submits to his mother's judgment, he does not use his own.
When obedience is out of the question, children sometimes follow the
opinions of others; of this we formerly gave an instance (v. Toys) in
the poor boy, who chose a gilt coach, because his mamma "_and every
body said it was the prettiest_," whilst he really preferred the
useful cart: we should never prejudice them either by our _wisdom_ or
our folly.
A sensible little boy of four years old had seen somebody _telling
fortunes_ in the grounds of coffee; but when he had a cup of coffee
given to him, he drank it all, saying, "Coffee is better than
fortune!"
When their attention is not turned to divine what the spectators think
and feel, children will have leisure to consult their own minds, and
to compare their own feelings. As this has been already spoken of,[97]
we shall not dwell upon it; we only mention it as a necessary
precaution in teaching prudence.
Some parents may perhaps fear, that, if they were to allow children to
choose upon every trifling occasion for themselves, they would become
wilful and troublesome: this certainly will be the effect, if we make
them think that there is a pleasure in the exercise of free-will,
independently of any good that may be obtained by judicious choice.
"Now, my dear, you shall have _your_ choice! You shall choose for
_yourself_! You shall have your _free_ choice!" are expressions that
may be pronounced in such a tone, and with such an emphasis to a
child, as immediately to excite a species of triumphant ecstasy from
the mere idea of having his _own_ free choice. By a different accent
and emphasis we may repress the ideas of triumph, and, without
intimidating the pupil, we may turn his mind to the difficulties,
rather than the glory of being in a situation to decide for himself.
We must not be surprised at the early imprudence of children; their
mistakes, when they first are allowed to make a choice, are
inevitable; all their sensations are new to them, consequently they
cannot judge of what they shall like or dislike. If some of Lord
Macartney's suite had, on his return from the late embassy to China,
brought home some plant whose smell was perfectly unknown to
Europeans, would it have been possible for the greatest philosopher in
England to have decided, if he had been asked, whether he should like
the unknown perfume? Children, for the first five or six years of
their lives, are in the situation of this philosopher, relatively to
external objects. We should never reproachfully say to a child, "You
asked to smell such a thing; you asked to see such a thing; and now
you have had your wish, you don't like them!" How can the child
possibly judge of what he shall like or dislike, before he has tried?
Let him try experiments upon his own feelings; the more accurate
knowledge he acquires, the sooner he will be enabled to choose
_prudently_. You may expedite his progress by exciting him to compare
each new sensation with those to which he is already familiarized;
this will counteract that love of novelty which is often found
dangerous to prudence; if the mind is employed in comparing, it cannot
be dazzled by new objects.
Children often imagine, that what they like for the present minute,
they shall continue to like for ever; they have not learnt from
experiment, that the most agreeable sensations fatigue, if they are
prolonged or frequently repeated; they have not learnt, that all
violent stimuli are followed by weariness or ennui. The sensible
preceptor will not insist upon his pupil's knowing these things by
inspiration, nor will he expect that his assertions or prophecies
should be implicitly believed; he will wait till the child _feels_,
and at that moment he will excite his pupil to observe his own
feelings. "You thought that you should never be tired of smelling that
rose, or of looking at that picture; now you perceive that you _are_
tired: remember this; it may be of use to you another time." If this
be said in a friendly manner, it will not pique the child to defend
his past choice, but it will direct his future judgment.
Young people are often reproached for their imprudence in preferring a
small present pleasure to a large distant advantage: this errour also
arises from inexperience, not from want of judgment, or deficiency in
strength of mind. When that which has been the future, has in its turn
become present, children begin to have some idea of the nature of
time, and they can then form some comparisons between the value of
present and future pleasures. This is a very slow process; old people
calculate and depend upon the distant future more than the young, not
always from their increased wisdom or prudence, but merely from their
increased experience, and consequent belief that the future will in
time arrive. It is imprudent in old people to depend upon the future;
if they were to reason upon the chance of their lives, they ought not
to be secure of its arrival; yet habit in this instance, as in many
others, is more powerful than reason: in all the plans of elderly
people, there is seldom any errour from impatience as to the future;
there often appear gross errours in their security as to its arrival.
If these opposite habits could be mixed in the minds of the old and of
the young, it would be for their mutual advantage.
It is not possible to _infuse_ experience into the mind; our pupils
must feel for themselves: but, by teaching them to observe their own
feelings, we may abridge their labour; a few lessons will teach a
great deal when they are properly applied. To teach children to
calculate and compare their present and future pleasures, we may begin
by fixing short intervals of time for our experiments; an hour, a day,
a week, perhaps, are periods of time to which their imagination will
easily extend; they can measure and compare their feelings within
these spaces of time, and we may lead them to observe their own
errours in not providing for the future. "Now Friday is come; last
Monday you thought Friday would never come. If you had not cut away
all your pencil last week, you would have had some left to draw with
to-day. Another time you will manage better."
We should also lead them to compare their ideas of any given pleasure,
before and after the period of its arrival. "You thought last summer
that you should like making snow balls in winter, better than making
hay in summer. Now you have made snow-balls to-day; and you remember
what you felt when you were making hay last summer; do you like the
snow-ball pleasure, or the hay-making pleasure the best?" V. Berquin's
Quatre saisons.
If our pupils, when they have any choice to make, prefer a small
present gratification to a great future pleasure, we should not, at
the moment of their decision, reproach their imprudence, but we should
_steadily make them abide by their choice_; and when the time arrives
at which the greater pleasure might have been enjoyed, we should
remark the circumstance, but not with a tone of reproach, for it is
their affair, not ours. "You preferred having a sheet of paper the
moment you wanted it last week, to the having a quire of paper this
week." "Oh, but," says the child, "I wanted a sheet of paper very much
then, but I did not consider how soon this week would come--I wish I
had chosen the quire." "Then remember what you feel now, and you will
be able to choose better upon another occasion." We should always
refer to the pupils' own feelings, and look forward to their future
advantage. The reason why so few young people attend to advice, is,
that their preceptors do not bring it actually home to their feelings:
it is useless to reproach for past imprudence; the child sees the
errour as plainly as we do; all that can be done, is to make it a
lesson for the future.
To a geometrician, the words _by proposition 1st._ stand for a whole
demonstration: if he recollects that he has once gone over the
demonstration, he is satisfied of its truth; and, without verifying it
again, he makes use of it in making out the demonstration of a new
proposition. In moral reasoning, we proceed in the same manner; we
recollect the result of our past experiments, and we refer to this
moral demonstration in solving a new problem. In time, by frequent
practice, this operation is performed so rapidly by the mind, that we
scarcely perceive it, and yet it guides our actions. A man, in walking
across the room, keeps out of the way of the tables and chairs,
without perceiving that he reasons about the matter; a sober man
avoids hard drinking, because he knows it to be hurtful to his health;
but he does not, every time he refuses to drink, go over the whole
train of reasoning which first decided his determination. A modern
philosopher,[98] calls this rapid species of reasoning "intuitive
analogy;" applied to the business of life, the French call it tact.
Sensible people have this tact in higher perfection than others; and
prudent people govern themselves by it more regularly than others. By
the methods which we have recommended, we hope it may be successfully
cultivated in early education.
Rousseau, in expressing his contempt for those who make _habit_ their
only guide of action, goes, as he is apt to do in the heat of
declamation, into the errour opposite to that which he ridicules. "The
only habit," cries he, "that I wish my Emilius to have, is the habit
of having no habits." Emilius would have been a strange being, had he
literally accomplished his preceptor's wish. To go up stairs, would
have been a most operose, and to go down stairs, a most tremendous,
affair to Emilius, for he was to have no habits: between every step of
the stairs, new deliberations must take place, and fresh decisions of
the judgment and will ensue. In his moral judgments, Emilius would
have had as much useless labour. Habit surely is necessary, even to
those who make reason the ultimate judge of their affairs. Reason is
not to be appealed to upon every trivial occasion, to rejudge the same
cause a million of times. Must a man, every time he draws a straight
line, repeat to himself, "a right line is that which lieth evenly
between its points?" Must he rehearse the propositions of Euclid,
instead of availing himself of their practical use?
"Christian, can'st thou raise a perpendicular upon a straight line?"
is the apostrophe with which the cross-legged emperor of Barbary,
seated on his throne of rough deal boards, accosts every _learned_
stranger who frequents his court. In the course of his reign,
probably, his Barbaric majesty may have reiterated the demonstration
of this favourite proposition, which he learned from a French surgeon
about five hundred times; but his majesty's understanding is not
materially improved by these recitals; his geometrical learning is
confined, we are told, to this single proposition.
It would have been scarcely worth while to have singled out for combat
this paradox of Rousseau's, concerning habit, if it had not presented
itself in the formidable form of an antithesis. A false maxim,
conveyed in an antithesis, is dangerous, because it is easily
remembered and repeated, and it quickly passes current in
conversation.
But to return to our subject, of which we have _imprudently_ lost
sight. Imprudence does not always arise from our neglect of our past
experience, or from our forgetting to take the future into our
calculations, but from false associations, or from passion. Objects
often appear different to one man, from what they do to the rest of
the world: this man may reason well upon what the majority of
reasonable people agree to call false appearances; he may follow
strictly the conviction of his own understanding, and yet the world
will say that he acts very imprudently. To the taste or smell of those
who are in a fever, objects not only appear, but really are, to the
patients different from what they appear to persons in sound health:
in the same manner to the imagination, objects have really a different
value in moments of enthusiasm, from what they have in our cooler
hours, and we scarcely can believe that our view of objects will ever
vary. It is in vain to oppose reason to false associations; we must
endeavour to combat one set of associations by another, and to alter
the situation, and consequently, the views,[99] of the mistaken
person. Suppose, for instance, that a child had been in a coach and
six upon some _pleasant_ excursion (it is an improbable thing, but we
may suppose any thing:) suppose a child had enjoyed, from some
accidental circumstances, an extraordinary degree of pleasure in a
coach and six, he might afterwards long to be in a similar vehicle,
from a mistaken notion, that it could confer happiness. Here we should
not oppose the force of reasoning to a false association, but we
should counteract the former association. Give the child an equal
quantity of amusement when he is not in a coach and six, and then he
will form fresh pleasurable associations with other objects which may
balance his first prepossession. If you oppose reason ineffectually to
passion or taste, you bring the voice and power of reason into
discredit with your pupil. When you have changed his view of things,
you may then reason with him, and show him the cause of his former
mistake.
In the excellent fable of the shield that was gold on one side and
silver on the other, the two disputants never could have agreed until
they changed places.--When you have, in several instances, proved by
experiment, that you judge more prudently than your pupil, he will be
strongly inclined to listen to your counsels, and then your experience
will be of real use to him; he will argue from it with safety and
satisfaction. When, after recovering from fits of passion or
enthusiasm, you have, upon several occasions, convinced him that your
admonitions would have prevented him from the pain of repentance, he
will recollect this when he again feels the first rise of passion in
his mind; and he may, in that lucid moment, avail himself of your calm
reason, and thus avoid the excesses of extravagant passions. That
unfortunate French monarch,[100] who was liable to temporary fits of
frenzy, learned to foresee his approaching malady, and often requested
his friends to disarm him, lest he should injure any of his
attendants.
In a malady which precludes the use of reason, it was possible for
this humane patient to foresee the probable mischief he might do to
his fellow-creatures, and to take prudent measures against his own
violence; and may not we expect, that those who are early accustomed
to attend to their own feelings, may prepare against the extravagance
of their own passions, and avail themselves of the regulating advice
of their temperate friends?
In the education of girls, we must teach them much more caution than
is necessary to boys: their prudence must be more the result of
reasoning than of experiment; they _must_ trust to the experience of
others; they cannot always have recourse to what _ought to be_; they
must adapt themselves to what is. They cannot rectify the material
mistakes in their conduct,[101] Timidity, a certain tardiness of
decision, and reluctance to act in public situations, are not
considered as defects in a woman's character: her pausing prudence
does not, to a man of discernment, denote imbecility; but appears to
him the graceful, auspicious characteristic of female virtue. There is
always more probability that women should endanger their own happiness
by precipitation, than by forbearance.--Promptitude of choice, is
seldom expected from the female sex; they should avail themselves of
the leisure that is permitted to them for reflection. "Begin nothing
of which you have not well considered the end," was the piece of
advice for which the Eastern Sultan[102] paid a purse of gold, the
price set upon it by a sage. The monarch did not repent of his
purchase. This maxim should be engraved upon the memory of our female
pupils, by the repeated lessons of education. We should, even in
trifles, avoid every circumstance which can tend to make girls
venturesome; which can encourage them to trust their good fortune,
instead of relying on their own prudence. Marmontel's tale, entitled
"_Heureusement_," is a witty, but surely not a _moral_, tale. Girls
should be discouraged from hazarding opinions in general conversation;
but amongst their friends, they should be excited to reason with
accuracy and with temper.[103] It is really a part of a woman's
prudence to have command of temper; if she has it not, her wit and
sense will not have their just value in domestic life. Calphurnia, a
Roman lady, used to plead her own causes before the senate, and we are
informed, that she became "so troublesome and confident, that the
judges decreed that thenceforward no woman should be suffered to
plead." Did not this lady make an imprudent use of her talents?
In the choice of friends, and on all matters of taste, young women
should be excited to reason about their own feelings. "There is no
reasoning about taste," is a pernicious maxim: if there were more
reasoning, there would be less disputation upon this subject. If women
questioned their own minds, or allowed their friends to question
them, concerning the reasons of their "preferences and aversions,"
there would not, probably, be so many love matches, and so few love
marriages. It is in vain to expect, that young women should begin to
reason miraculously at the very moment that reason is wanted in the
guidance of their conduct. We should also observe, that women are
called upon for the exertion of their prudence at an age when young
men are scarcely supposed to possess that virtue; therefore, women
should be more early, and more carefully, educated for the purpose.
The important decisions of woman's life, are often made before she is
twenty: a man does not come upon the theatre of public life, where
most of his prudence is shown, till he is much older.
Economy is, in women, an essential domestic virtue. Some women have a
foolish love of expensive baubles; a taste which a very little care,
probably, in their early education, might have prevented. We are told,
that when a collection of three hundred and fifty pounds was made for
the celebrated Cuzzona, to save her from absolute want, she
immediately laid out two hundred pounds of the money in the purchase
of a _shell cap_, which was then in fashion.[104] Prudent mothers,
will avoid showing any admiration of pretty trinkets before their
young daughters; and they will oppose the ideas of utility and
durability to the mere caprice of fashion, which creates a taste for
beauty, as it were, by proclamation. "Such a thing is pretty, but it
is of no use. Such a thing is pretty, but it will soon wear out"--a
mother may say; and she should prove the truth of her assertions to
her pupils.
Economy is usually confined to the management of money, but it may be
shown on many other occasions: economy may be exercised in taking care
of whatever belongs to us; children should have the care of their own
clothes, and if they are negligent of what is in their charge, this
negligence should not be repaired by servants or friends, they should
feel the real natural consequences of their own neglect, but no other
punishment should be inflicted; and they should be left to make their
own reflections upon their errours and misfortunes, undisturbed by the
reproaches of their friends, or by the prosing moral of a governess or
preceptor. We recommend, for we must descend to these trifles, that
girls should be supplied with an independent stock of all the little
things which are in daily use; housewives, and pocket books well
stored with useful implements; and there should be no lending[105] and
borrowing amongst children. It will be but just to provide our pupils
with convenient places for the preservation and arrangement of their
little goods. Order is necessary to economy; and we cannot more
certainly create a taste for order, than by showing early its
advantages in practice as well as in theory. The aversion to _old_
things, should, if possible, be prevented in children: we should not
express contempt for _old_ things, but we should treat them with
increased reverence, and exult in their having arrived under our
protection to such a creditable age. "I have had such a hat so long,
therefore it does not signify what becomes of it!" is the speech of a
_promising_ little spendthrift. "I have taken care of my hat, it has
lasted so long; and I hope I shall make it last longer," is the
exultation of a young economist, in which his prudent friends should
sympathize.
"Waste not, want not," is an excellent motto in an English nobleman's
kitchen.[106] The most opulent parents ought not to be ashamed to
adopt it in the economic education of their children: early habits of
care, and an early aversion and contempt for the selfish spirit of
wasteful extravagance, may preserve the fortunes, and, what is of far
more importance, the integrity and peace of mind of noble families.
We have said, that economy cannot be exercised without children's
having the management of money. Whilst our pupils are young, if they
are educated at home, they cannot have much real occasion for money;
all the necessaries of life are provided for them; and if they have
money to spend, it must be probably laid out on superfluities. This is
a bad beginning. Money should be represented to our pupils as what it
really is, the conventional sign of the value of commodities: before
children are acquainted with the real and comparative value of any of
these commodities, it is surely imprudent to trust them with money. As
to the idea that children may be charitable and generous in the
disposal of money, we have expressed our sentiments fully upon this
subject already.[107] We are, however, sensible that when children are
sent to any school, it is advisable to supply them with pocket-money
enough to put them upon an equal footing with their companions;
otherwise, we might run the hazard of inducing worse faults than
extravagance--meanness, or envy.
Young people who are educated at home should, as much as possible, be
educated to take a family interest in all the domestic expenses.
Parental reserve in money matters is extremely impolitic; as Mr. Locke
judiciously observes, that a father, who wraps his affairs up in
mystery, and who "views his son with jealous eyes," as a person who is
to begin _to live_ when he dies, _must_ make him an enemy by treating
him as such. A frank simplicity and cordial dependence upon the
integrity and upon the sympathy of their children, will ensure to
parents their disinterested friendship. Ignorance is always more to be
dreaded than knowledge. Young people, who are absolutely ignorant of
affairs, who have no idea of the relative expense of different modes
of living, and of the various wants of a family, are apt to be
extremely unreasonable in the imaginary disposal of their parent's
fortune; they confine their view merely to their own expenses. "I
_only_ spend such a sum," they say, "and surely that is nothing to my
father's income." They consider only the absolute amount of what they
spend; they cannot compare it with the number of other expenses which
are necessary for the rest of the family: they do not know these,
therefore they cannot perceive the proportion which it is reasonable
that their expenditure should bear to the whole. Mrs. D'Arblay, in one
of her excellent novels, has given a striking picture of the ignorance
in which young women sometimes leave their father's house, and begin
to manage in life for themselves, without knowing any thing of the
_powers_ of money. Camilla's imprudence must chiefly be ascribed to
her ignorance. Young women should be accustomed to keep the family
accounts, and their arithmetic should not be merely a speculative
science; they should learn the price of all necessaries, and of all
luxuries; they should learn what luxuries are suited to their fortune
and rank, what degree of expense in dress is essential to a regularly
neat appearance, and what must be the increased expense and
temptations of fashion in different situations; they should not be
suffered to imagine that they can resist these temptations more than
others, if they get into company above their rank, nor should they
have any indistinct idea, that by some wonderful economical operations
they can make a given sum of money go further than others can do. The
steadiness of calculation will prevent all these vain notions; and
young women, when they see in stubborn figures what must be the
consequence of getting into situations where they must be tempted to
exceed their means, will probably begin by avoiding, instead of
braving, the danger.
Most parents think that their sons are more disposed to extravagance
than their daughters; the sons are usually exposed to greater
temptations. Young men excite one another to expense, and to a certain
carelessness of economy, which assumes the name of spirit, while it
often forfeits all pretensions to justice. A prudent father will
never, from any false notions of forming his son early to _good_
company, introduce him to associates whose only merit is their rank
or their fortune. Such companions will lead a weak young man into
every species of extravagance, and then desert and ridicule him in the
hour of distress. If a young man has a taste for literature, and for
rational society, his economy will be secured, simply because his
pleasures will not be expensive, nor will they be dependent upon the
caprice of fashionable associates. The intermediate state between that
of a school-boy and a man, is the dangerous period in which taste for
expense is often acquired, before the means of gratifying it are
obtained. Boys listen with anxiety to the conversation of those who
are a few years older than themselves. From this conversation they
gather _information_ respecting the ways of the world, which, though
often erroneous, they tenaciously believe to be accurate: it is in
vain that their older friends may assure them that such and such
frivolous expenses are not necessary to the well-being of a man in
society; they adhere to the opinion of the younger counsel; they
conclude that every thing has changed since their parents were young,
that they must not govern themselves by antiquated notions, but by the
scheme of economy which happens to be the fashion of the day. During
this boyish state, parents should be particularly attentive to the
company which their sons keep; and they should frequently in
conversation with sensible, but not with morose or old fashioned
people, lead to the subject of economy, and openly discuss and settle
the most essential points. At the same time a father should not
intimidate his son with the idea that nothing but rigid economy can
win his parental favour; his parental favour should not be a mercenary
object; he should rather show his son, that he is aware of the great
temptations to which a young man is exposed in going first into the
world: he should show him, both that he is disposed to place
confidence in him, and that he yet knows the fallibility of youthful
prudence. If he expect from his son unerring prudence, he expects too
much, and he will, perhaps, create an apprehension of his displeasure,
which may chill and repress all ingenuous confidence. In all his
childish, and in all his youthful distresses, a son should be
habitually inclined to turn to his father as to his most indulgent
friend. "Apply to me if ever you get into any difficulties, and you
will always find me your _most indulgent friend_," were the words of a
father to a child of twelve years old, pronounced with such
encouraging benevolence, that they were never forgotten by the person
to whom they were addressed.
Before a young man goes into the world, it will be a great advantage
to him to have some share in the management of his father's affairs;
by laying out money for another person, he will acquire habits of
care, which will be useful to him afterwards in his own affairs. A
father, who is building, or improving grounds, who is carrying on
works of any sort, can easily allot some portion of the business to
his son, as an exercise for his judgment and prudence. He should hear
and see the estimates of workmen, and he should, as soon as he has
collected the necessary facts, form estimates of his own, before he
hears the calculation of others: this power of estimating will be of
great advantage to gentlemen: it will circumscribe their wishes, and
it will protect them against the low frauds of designing workmen.
It may seem trivial, but we cannot forbear to advise young people to
read the news-papers of the day regularly: they will keep up by these
means with the current of affairs, and they will exercise their
judgment upon interesting business, and large objects. The sooner boys
acquire the sort of knowledge necessary for the conversation of
sensible men, the better; they will be the less exposed to feel false
shame. False shame, the constant attendant upon ignorance, often leads
young men into imprudent expenses; when, upon any occasion, they do
not know by any certain calculation to what any expense may amount,
they are ashamed to inquire minutely. From another sort of weakness,
they are ashamed to resist the example or importunity of numbers;
against this weakness, the strong desire of preserving the good
opinion of estimable friends, is the best preservative. The taste for
the esteem of superior characters, cures the mind of fondness for
vulgar applause.
We have, in the very first chapter of this book, spoken of the danger
of the passion for gaming, and the precautions that we have
recommended in early education will, it is hoped, prevent the disorder
from appearing in our pupils as they grow up. Occupations for the
understanding, and objects for the affections, will preclude all
desire for the violent stimulus of the gaming table. It may be said,
that many men of superior abilities, and of generous social tempers,
become gamesters. They do so, because they have exhausted other
pleasures, and they have been accustomed to strong excitements. Such
excitements do not become necessary to happiness, till they have been
made habitual.
There was an excellent Essay on Projects, published some years ago by
an anonymous writer, which we think would make a great impression upon
any young persons of good sense. We do not wish to repress the
generous enterprising ardour of youth, or to confine the ideas to the
narrow circle of which self must be the centre. Calculation will show
what can be done, and how it can be done; and thus the individual,
without injury to himself, may, if he wish it, speculate extensively
for the good of his fellow creatures.
It is scarcely possible, that the mean passion of avarice should exist
in the mind of any young person who has been tolerably well educated;
but too much pains cannot be taken to preserve that domestic felicity,
which arises from entire confidence and satisfaction amongst the
individuals of a family with regard to property. Exactness in accounts
and in business relative to property, far from being unnecessary
amongst friends and relations, are, we think, peculiarly agreeable,
and essential to the continuance of frank intimacy. We should, whilst
our pupils are young, teach them a love for exactness about property;
a respect for the rights of others, rather than a tenacious anxiety
about their own. When young people are of a proper age to manage money
and property of their own, let them know precisely what they can
annually spend; in whatever form they receive an income, let that
income be certain: if presents of pocket money or of dress are from
time to time made to them, this creates expectation and uncertainty in
their minds. All persons who have a fluctuating revenue, are disposed
to be imprudent and extravagant. It is remarkable, that the
West-Indian planters, whose property is a kind of lottery, are
extravagantly disposed to speculation; in the hopes of a favourable
season, they live from year to year in unbounded profusion. It is
curious to observe, that the propensity to extravagance exists in
those who enjoy the greatest affluence, and in those who have felt the
greatest distress. Those who have little to lose, are reckless about
that little; and any uncertainty as to the tenure of property, or as
to the rewards of industry, immediately operates, not only to depress
activity, but to destroy prudence. "Prudence," says Mr. Edwards, "is a
term that has no place in the negro vocabulary; instead of trusting to
what are called the _ground provisions_, which are safe from the
hurricanes, the negroes, in the cultivation of their _own_ lands,
trust more to plantain-groves, corn, and other vegetables that are
liable to be destroyed by storms. When they earn a little money, they
immediately gratify their palate with salted meats and other
provisions, which are to them delicacies. The idea of accumulating,
and of being economic in order to accumulate, is unknown to these poor
slaves, who hold their lands by the most uncertain of all
tenures,"[108] We are told, that the _provision ground_, the creation
of the negro's industry, and the hope of his life, is sold by public
auction to pay his master's debts. Is it wonderful that the term
prudence should be unknown in the negro vocabulary?
The very poorest class of people in London, who feel despair, and who
merely live to bear the evil of the day, are, it is said, very little
disposed to be prudent. In a late publication, Mr. Colquhoun's
"Treatise on the Police of the Metropolis," he tells us, that the
"chief consumption of oysters, crabs, lobsters, pickled salmon, &c.
when first in season, and when the prices are high, is by the _lowest_
classes of the people. The middle ranks, and those immediately under
them, abstain generally from such indulgences until the prices are
moderate."[109]
Perhaps it may be thought, that the consumption of oysters, crabs, and
pickled salmon, in London, or the management of the negro's _provision
ground_ in Jamaica, has little to do with a practical essay upon
economy and prudence; but we hope, that we may be permitted to use
these far fetched illustrations, to show that the same causes act upon
the mind independently of climate: they are mentioned here to show,
that the little _revenue_ of young people ought to be fixed and
certain.
When we recommend economy and prudence to our pupils, we must, at the
same time, keep their hearts open to the pleasures of generosity;
economy and prudence will put it in the power of the generous to give.
"The worth of everything
Is as much money as 'twill bring,"
will never be the venal maxim of those who understand the nature of
philosophic prudence. The worth of money is to be estimated by the
number of real pleasures which it can procure: there are many which
are not to be bought by gold;[110] these will never lose their
pre-eminent value with persons who have been educated both to reason
and to feel.
FOOTNOTES:
[96]
Here lies the mutton eating king; Whose promise none relied on; Who
never _said_ a foolish thing, And never did a wise one.
_Epitaph on Charles 2d._
[97] V. Taste and Imagination.
[98] Darwin's Zoonomia.
[99] Chapter on Imagination.
[100] Charles VI.
[101]
"No penance can absolve their guilty fame, Nor tears, that wash out
sin, can wash out shame."
[102] V. Persian Tales.
[103] V. Chapter on Temper.
[104] Mrs. Piozzi's English Synonymy, vol. i. p. 359.
[105] V. Toys.
[106] Lord Scarsdale's. Keddleston.
[107] V. Chapter on Sympathy and Sensibility.
[108] V. Edwards' History of the West Indies.
[109] V. a note in page 32 of the Treatise on the Police of the
Metropolis.