By Edward W. Thomson, F.R.S.L., F.R.S.C.
[From THE NEW YORK TIMES, April, 1915.]
Canada's political relation to Great Britain, and, indeed, to all other
countries, has been essentially altered by Canada's quite voluntary
engagement in the war. Were feudal terms not largely inapplicable, one
might aver that the vassal has become the suzerain's ally, political
equality connoted.
But, indeed, Canadians were never vassals. They have ever been Britons,
whatever their individual origins, retaining the liberties of their
political birthright. While in a certain tutelage to their own monarchs'
immediate Ministries, they have continually, slowly, consciously,
expanded their freedom from such tutelage, substituting for it
self-government or rule by their own representatives, without forsaking
but rather enhancing their allegiance to the common Crown. This has long
been the symbol of their self-government, even as it is to old country
kinsmen the symbol of rule by themselves.
The alteration manifested by Canada's active, voluntary engagement in
the European war is the change from Canadians holding, as they formerly
did, that Great Britain was bound to defend Canada, while Canadians were
not bound to defend Great Britain outside Canada. The "dependency" has
not been now dragged in; it acted as an independency; it recognized its
participation with Great Britain in a common danger; it proceeded quite
voluntarily, quite independently, to recruit, organize, dispatch, and
maintain large forces for the common cause. Canada's course has become
that of a partner in respect of acceptance of risks and of contribution
to expenses.
This partner has no formally specified share in gains, or in authority,
or in future policy of the concern. Canada has no obvious, distinct,
admitted way or voice as to the conduct of war or making of peace. She
appears, with the other self-governing Dominions of the Crown, as an
ally having no vote in settlements, none of the prerogatives of an ally.
Hence some observers in Great Britain, in Canada, in other realms of the
Crown contend that the old, expressed relations between Great Britain,
Canada, and the other Dominions must inevitably be extensively changed
formally as well as actually in consequence of the war.
Some say imperial federation cannot but ensue. Others argue that formal
independence must arrive if such federation come not speedily. Others
contend for an Empire League of sister States. Nobody ventures to
mention what was often talked publicly by Canadians from thirty to fifty
years ago, and later by Goldwin Smith, viz., Canada's entrance to the
United States as a new tier of sovereign States. The idea of severance
from Great Britain has vanished. Discussion of the other alternatives is
not inactive, but it is forced. It engages the quidnuncs. They are
talkers who must say something for the delight of hearing themselves;
or they are writers who live under the exigency of needing to get
"something different" daily into print. They are mostly either
"Jingoes" or Centralizationists, as contra to Nationalists or
Decentralizationists, long-standing opponents.
Each set perceives their notions liable to be profoundly affected by
Canada's fighting in Europe. Each affects belief that their own
political designs cannot but be thereby served; each is afflicted with
qualms of doubt. They alike appreciate the factors that make for their
opponent's cause. Both know the strength of popular attachment to Great
Britain; both know the traditional and inbred loathing of the
industrious masses for the horrible bloodshed and insensate waste of
treasure in war. Both sets balance inwardly the chances that sentiments
seemingly irreconcilable and about equally respectable may, after the
war, urge Canadians either to draw politically closer to their
world-scattered kin, or to cut ligaments that might pull them again and
again, time without end, into the immemorial European shambles.
But is the Canadian public excitedly interested in the discussion? Not
at all. Spokesmen and penmen of the two contentious factions are
victimized by their own perfervid imaginations. The electorate, the
masses, are not so swayed. The Canadian people, essentially British no
matter what their origins, are mainly, like all English-speaking
democracies, of straight, primitive, uncomplicated emotions, and of
essentially conservative mind. They "plug" along. The hour and the day
hold their attention. It is given to the necessary private works of the
moment, as to the necessary public conduct of the time.
They did not, as a public, spin themselves any reasons or excuses for
their hearty approval of Canada's engagement in the war. Her or their
contributions of men and money to its fields of slaughter and waste
appeared and appear to them natural, proper, inevitable. They applauded
seriously the country's being "put in for it" by agreement of the two
sets of party politicians, and without any direct consultation of the
electorate in this, the most important departure Canada ever made,
because prompt action seemed the only way, and time was lacking for
debate about what seemed the next thing that had to be done. In fact,
the Canadian people, regarded collectively, felt and acted in this case
with as much ingenuousness as did those Tyrolese mountaineers, bred,
according to Heine, to know nothing of politics save that they had an
Emperor who wore a white coat and red breeches.
When the patriots climbed up to them, and told them with
oratory that they now had a Prince who wore a blue coat and
white breeches, they grasped their rifles, and kissed wife and
children, and went down the mountain and offered their lives
in defense of the white coat and the dear old red breeches.
But did they forsake their relish of and devotion to their customary,
legendary Tyrolese liberties? No more will the Canadian masses, by
reason of their hearty participation in the war, incline to yield jot or
tittle of their usual, long-struggled-for, gradually acquired, valuable
and valued British self-governing rights. Can the Jingoes or
Centralizationists scare them backward? Or the Decentralizationists or
Separatists hurry them forward? Won't they just continue to "plug along"
as their forefathers did in the old country and in the new, gaining a
bit more freedom to do well or ill at their own collective choice--that
is, if the war result "as usual" in British security, according to
confident British expectation.
Such is the Canadian political situation. It has been essentially
similar any time within living memory. The people approve in politics
what they feel, instinctively, to be the profitable or the decent and
reasonable necessary next thing to do. Which signifies that those
controversialists are probably wrong who conceive that a result of the
war, if it be a win for the Allies, will cause any great formal change
in Canada's political relation to Great Britain.
The truly valuable change in such relations is already secured; it
cannot but become more notably established by future discussion; it is
and will be a change by reason of greatly increased influence on Great
Britain by Canada and the other Dominions. And it appears highly
probable that such inevitable change in influence or weight of the new
countries is sufficient for all sentiments concerned, and for all useful
purposes on behalf of which formal changes are advocated by doctrinaires
and idealists.
The British peoples have acquired by long practice in very various
politics a way of making existing arrangements "do" with some slight
patching. They are instinctively seized of the truth of Edmund Burke's
maxim, "Innovation is not improvement." They have "muddled along" into
precisely the institutions that suit any exigency, their sanest
political philosophers recognizing that the exigency must always be
most amenable to the most flexible system.
It is because the existing arrangements between London and the several
Dominion capitals don't suit logicians that they do suit experienced
statesmen pretty well. Because these institutions can be patched as
occasion may require, they are retained for patching on occasion.
Because the loose, go-as-you-please organization of the so-called
"empire" has revealed almost incredible unity of sentiment and purpose,
practiced statesmen regard it as a prodigious success. They are mighty
shy of affiliating with any of the well-meaning doctrinaires who have
been explaining any time within the last century that the system is
essentially incoherent and absurd and urgently needs profound change
with doctrinaire improvements.
Sir Robert Borden, for instance. Some days ago he most amiably gave me a
little private talk on these matters, of course on the tacit
understanding that he was not to be "interviewed" as for close reporting
of his informal sentences. He was, by the way, apparently in robust
health, as if, like Mr. Asquith, of a temperament to flourish under the
heaviest responsibilities ever laid on a Prime Minister in his own
country. No statesman could be of aspect and utterance less hurried, nor
more pleasant, lucid, cautious, disposed to give a friendly caller large
and accurate information briefly, while disclosing nothing at variance
with or unfindable in his published speeches. Of some of them he
repeated apposite slices; to others he referred for further
enlightenment as to his views on imperial federation. Really he was
neither secretive nor newly informative. The Premier of Canada at any
time is governed, much as I have endeavored to show how the electors
are, by that natural, instinctive course of the general loyal Canadian
mind, which constitutes "the situation" and controls Governmental
proceedings on behalf of the public.
Well meaning persons who allege Sir Robert to have either favored or
disfavored imperial federation have been inaccurate. Precisely what
imperial federation may be nobody knows, for the simple and sufficient
reason that nobody has ever sketched or elaborated a scheme in that
regard which appeared or appears desirable as a change from the
all-compelling situation. What has never been adopted as desirable
cannot be termed practicable in statesmen's language. To declare an
untried scheme impracticable might be an error of rashness.
The idea of federating the empire has long attracted Sir Robert, with
many other admirable Canadians and Britons, since it connotes or
involves the concept of British Union for all worthy and necessary
purposes, including maintenance of local autonomy or self-government,
surely a most praiseworthy design. Discussion of that idea is unlikely
to be harmful; it may be useful; something may come of it that may seem
desirable and practicable to substantially all interests and people
concerned. A consummation devoutly to be wished, but not to be rushed!
One point, frequently specified in Sir Robert's public speeches, was
stated as follows in a recent report, pamphleted for distribution by his
own side:
It is impossible to believe that the existing status, so far
as it concerns the control of foreign policy and
extra-imperial relations, can remain as it is today. All are
conscious of the complexity of the problem thus presented; and
no one need despair of a satisfactory solution, and no one can
doubt the profound influence which the tremendous events of
the past few months and of those in the immediate future must
exercise upon one of the most interesting and far-reaching
questions ever presented for the consideration of statesmen.
There Sir Robert was recommending no particular solution. A little
earlier in the same speech he illustrated the deep sense of all
experienced British statesmen that there never is or can be in the
British system any final solution of any grave problem, the vital
essence of the system being flux and change to suit ever-changing
circumstance.
In so far as this empire may be said to possess a
Constitution, it is of modern growth and is still in the stage
of development. One can hardly conceive that it will ever
distinctly emerge from that state or attain a status in
which constitutional development is no longer to be
anticipated. Indeed, the genius of the British people and all
our past history lead us to believe the contrary. The steps in
advance have been usually gradual and always practical; and
they have been taken on instinct rather than upon any
carefully considered theory.
[Illustration: YUAN SHIH-KAI
President of the Chinese Republic.
_(Photo by Rio V. De Sieux.)_]
[Illustration: PRINCE VON BUELOW