[From THE NEW YORK TIMES, March 28, 1915.]
The letter which follows was sent by Count Albert Apponyi to
Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler, and was written in the latter part
of last month in Budapest. Count Apponyi, who is one of the
most distinguished of contemporary European statesmen, was
President of the Hungarian Parliament from 1872 to 1904. He
was formerly Minister of Public Instruction, Privy Councillor,
Member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague, and
Member of the Interparliamentary Union.
I have been greatly interested in your account of American neutrality
in the present European crisis. I must confess that I had seen it in a
somewhat different light before and that some of the facts under our
notice still appear to me as hardly concordant with the magnificent
attitude of impartiality, nay, not even with the international duties of
neutrality, which intellectual and official America professes to keep.
We cannot explain to ourselves that a neutral power should suffer the
selling of arms and ammunition by its citizens to one of the belligerent
parties, when no such selling to the other party is practically
feasible; we cannot understand why America should meekly submit to the
dictates of England, declaring all foodstuffs and manufacturing
materials contraband of war, with not even a show of right and with the
clear and openly proclaimed intention of starving Germany and
Austria-Hungary; why, on the other hand, America should use an almost
threatening language against Germany, and against Germany alone, when
the latter country announces reprisals against the English trade, which,
under given circumstances, can be considered only as acts of legitimate
self-defense against an enemy who chooses to wage war not on our
soldiers only, but on our women and children, too.
With all the respect we feel for the United States, we cannot find this
attitude of their Government either fair or dignified. I offer these
remarks in no spirit of uncalled-for criticism, but because I see how
much the moral authority of the United States and their splendid
situation as the providential peace makers of some future--alas! still
far off--day has been impaired by the aforementioned proceedings. We
cannot help considering them as so many acts of ill-disguised hostility
against ourselves and of compliance with our foes. How can you expect,
then, to have your good offices accepted with confidence by both
belligerent parties when the times are ripe for them? It seems like the
throwing away of a magnificent opportunity, and I think that those who,
like yourself, cherish for your country the noble ambition of being some
day the restorer of peace, should exert themselves to prevent practices
which, if continued, would disable her to play any such part.
In your letter you strike the keynote of what I cannot help considering
the partiality of Americans for the Entente powers. It is the idea that
"in the western area of conflict, at least, there is an armed clash
between the representatives of dynastic institutions and bureaucratic
rule on the one hand with those of representative government and liberal
institutions on the other." I can understand that it impresses some
people that way, but I beg to enter a protest against this
interpretation of the conflict.
Liberal or less liberal institutions have nothing to do with it in the
west; the progress of democracy in Germany will not be stopped by her
victory, it will rather be promoted by it, because the masses are
conscious of bearing the burden of war and of being the main force of
its vigorous prosecution, and they are enlightened and strong enough to
insist on a proper reward. Rights cannot be denied to those who
fulfilled duties involving self-sacrifice of the sublimest kind with
unflinching devotion. No practical interest of democracy then is
involved in the conflict of the western powers.
As to their representing liberal institutions in a higher or lower
degree, I am perfectly willing to admit England's superior claims in
that respect, but I am not at all inclined to recognize such superiority
in modern France, republic though she calls herself. The omnipresence
and omnipotence of an obtruding bureaucratic officialism is just what it
has been under the old monarchy; religious oppression has only changed
sides, but it still flourishes as before. In former times the Roman
Catholic religion was considered as a State religion and in her name
were dissent and Freemasonry oppressed; today atheism is the official
creed, and on its behalf are Catholic believers oppressed.
Separation of Church and State, honestly planned and loyally fulfilled
in America has been perverted in modern France into a network of
vexations and unfair measures against the Church and her faithful
servants; the same term is used and this misleads you to cover widely
different meanings. In a word, it is a perfect mistake to consider
modern France as the "sweet land of liberty" which America is. A German
citizen, with less show of political rights, enjoys more personal
freedom than is granted to a French one, if he happens to differ from
the ruling mentality.
So stand things in the western area of conflict. But how about the east?
You are kind enough to admit in your letter that "from this (the
aforementioned) standpoint of course the appearance of Russia among the
allies is an anomaly and must be explained on other grounds." Anomaly is
a rather tame word to characterize the meaning of this appearance of
Russia. I should hardly designate it by this term.
She does not "appear among the allies." She is the leading power among
them; it is her war, as Mr. Tsvolski, the Russian Ambassador to Paris,
very properly remarked: "C'est ma guerre." She planned it, she gave
Austria-Hungary no chance to live on peaceful terms with her neighbors,
she forced it upon us, she drew France into it by offering her a bait
which that poor country could not resist, she created the situation
which England considered as her best opportunity for crushing Germany. I
must repeat it over and over again: it is in its origin a Russian war,
with a clearly outlined Russian program of conquest.
Here, then, you have a real clash between two principles; not shades of
principles as these may subsist between Germany and her western foes,
but principles in all their essential features; not between different
tints of gray, but between black and white, between affirmation and
negation; affirmation of the principle of human dignity, liberty,
safety, and negation of the same; western evolution and eastern
reaction.
I wonder why those prominent Americans who are so deeply impressed by
the comparatively slight shades of liberalism differentiating Germany
from England and France are not struck by the absolute contrast existing
between Muscovitism and western civilized rule as represented by
Austria-Hungary and Germany; that they overlook the outstanding fact
that while in the western area the conflict has nothing whatever to do
with the principles embodied in the home policy of the belligerents, in
the east, on the other hand, these principles will in truth be affected
by the results of war, since a Russian victory, followed by a Russian
conquest, would mean the retrogression of western institutions and the
corresponding expansion of eastern ones over a large area and large
numbers of men.
It is the consciousness of fighting in this war which has been forced
upon us, against the direst calamity threatening our kind and on behalf
of the most precious conquests of progress and civilization, which
enhances our moral force so as to make it unconquerable. The hope which
I expressed in my first letter, that Serbia's doom would soon be
fulfilled, has been prostrated by the mistakes of an over-confident
Commander in Chief; but that means postponement only and does not alter
the prospects of war in their essentials.
Good progress is achieved in the campaign against Russia; a chapter of
it may be brought to a happy close before long. The spirit of the
country shows no symptom of weakening; it is really wonderful what a
firm resolve pervades our whole people, though every man between twenty
and forty-two stands in the field, and though the losses are frightful.
Economically we hold out easily; the expenses of war are defrayed by
inner loans, which give unexpected results; every bit of arable land is
tilled as in time of peace, the old, the women and the half-grown youths
doing the work of their absent supporters, neighbors assisting each
other in a spirit of brotherhood truly admirable. In cases of urgent
need we have the prisoners of war, whose number increased to nearly
300,000 (in Austria-Hungary alone) and to whom it is a real boon to find
employment in the sort of work they are accustomed to.
The manufacturing interest, of course, suffers severe losses; but the
number of the unemployed is rather less than usual, since a greater part
of the "hands" is absorbed by the army. In a word, though the sufferings
of war are keenly felt, they are less severe than had been expected, and
there is not the smallest indication of a break-down. The area of
Germany, Austria, and Hungary taken as a whole is self-supporting with
regard to foodstuffs. The English scheme of starving us is quite as
silly as it is abominable. England can, of course, inflict severe losses
on our manufacturers by closing the seas against their imports and
exports; but this is not a matter of life and death, such as the first
reprisals of Germany, if successful, may prove to England.
Generally speaking, it seems likely that England will be caught in the
net of her own intrigue. She did not scruple to enlist the services of
Japan against her white enemies, but this act of treachery will be
revenged upon herself. The latest proceedings of Japan against China can
have one meaning only--the wholesale expulsion of the white man from
Eastern Asia. The Japs do not care one straw who wins in Europe; they
seized upon their own opportunity for their own purposes. England only
gets her deserts; but how do Americans feel about it? Can America be
absolved from a certain amount of responsibility for what may soon prove
imminent danger to herself? Has not her partiality for England given
encouragement to methods of warfare unprecedented in the history of
civilized nations and fruitful of evil consequences to neutral nations?
To us, in our continental position, all this means much less than it
means to you. It does not endanger our prospects. We feel comparatively
stronger every day. Our losses, though enormous, are only one-half of
those of the Entente armies, according to the Geneva Red Cross Bureau's
calculation. The astounding number of unwounded prisoners of war which
Russia loses at every encounter, and even in spaces of time between two
encounters, shows that the moral force of her army is slowly giving way,
while the vigor of our troops is constantly increasing. After six months
of severe fighting our military position is certainly stronger than the
position of the Entente powers, though the latter represent a population
of 250,000,000, (English colonies and Japan not included,) against the
140,000,000 of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Turkey. Who can doubt on
which side superior moral power fights? Who can doubt, therefore, what
the ultimate result promises to be?
If it takes more time to bring matters to a decision--and a decision
must be obtained at any price, if there is to follow a period of
permanent peace--part, at least, of the responsibility for the horrors
of the protracted war, for the slaughter of many hundred thousands more
of human beings, rests on America. But for the American transports of
guns and ammunition, the power of Russia would give way in a shorter
time, considering her enormous losses in that respect and her inability
to supplement them from her own workshops.
It is very edifying that American pacifists are exerting themselves
against the current of militarism which appears to spread in their
country; but wouldn't it be better still, more to the purpose and
certainly practically more urgent, to insist upon a truly neutral
attitude of the great republic, to protest against her feeding the war
by providing one belligerent side with its implements? Do American
pacifists really fail to see that their country by such proceedings
disables herself from being the peacemaker of the future? Do they think
it immaterial from the standpoint of her moral power, as well as of her
material interests, how central Europe, a mass of 120,000,000, think of
her, feel about her?
I hope my readers will not find fault with me for using such plain
language. My well-known enthusiastic regard for the great American
commonwealth makes it unnecessary that I should protest against the
charge of meaning disrespect or anything else whatever but a sincere
desire to state with absolute sincerity how we feel about these matters,
in what light they appear to us. I think America must know this, because
it is part of the general situation she has to reckon with when shaping
her policies. I fervently hope these policies will remain in concordance
with the great principles on which the commonwealth is built and with
the teaching embodied in that farewell address which is read once a year
in Congress and in which the greatest American emphatically warns his
countrymen from becoming entangled in the conflicts of European nations.
A few words more about the future of Europe may be said on this
occasion. I have read with the keenest interest your own and Mr.
Carnegie's statements concerning a future organization of Europe on the
pattern of the United States. My personal views concerning this
magnificent idea have been expressed in anticipation in my America
lectures of the year 1911. Allow me to quote my own words:
Analogies are often misleading, the most obvious ones
especially so. Nothing seems more obvious than to draw
conclusions from the existing union of American States to a
possible union of European nations; but no fancied analogy is
to be applied with greater caution than this one. The American
Union's origin was the common struggle of several English
colonies, now States, for their emancipation; unity of purpose
was the main principle of their growth, union its natural
result.
Europe, on the other hand, is, in her origin and in her
present state, a compound of conflicting interests and
struggling potentialities. Mutual antagonism remained the
principle of growth embodied in the several national lives.
The juridical formula of this system is the principle of
national sovereignty in its most uncompromising interpretation
and most limitless conception. As such it is the natural
result of a historical growth mainly filled with antagonism;
in the consciousness of (European) nations it lives as
synonymous with national honor, as something above doubt and
discussion.
Let me add to this the following remarks:
1. Any sort of union among the nations of Europe appears impossible if
it is meant to include Russia. Russia represents eastern mentality,
which implies an unadmissible spirit of aggression and of conquest. It
seems to be a law of nature on the old Continent that eastern nations
should wish to expand to the west as long as they are powerful. Not to
mention the great migration of nations which gave birth to mediaeval
organizations, you may follow this law in the history of the Tartars, of
the Turks, and of Russia herself. The spirit of aggressiveness vanishes
only when decay sets in, which is still far from being the case of
Russia, or when a nation is gradually converted to Occidental mentality,
which, I hope, will some day be her happy lot. But till then, and that
may mean a century or two, any sort of union including Russia would mean
a herd of sheep including a wolf.
2. What I hope then, for the present, as the most desirable result of
the war, is a thorough understanding between the nations of the Western
European Continent, construction of a powerful political block,
corresponding to the area of western mentality, in close connection with
America; such a block would discourage aggression from the east; it
would urge Russia on the path of reform and home improvement. England
would be welcome to join it, on condition of renouncing those
pretensions to monopolizing the seas which are as constant a menace to
peace as Russian aggressiveness is. So we should have, if not "the
United States of Europe," which at present lies beyond the boundary
lines of possibilities, a strong peace union of the homogeneous western
nations. Alas! this result can be reached only by destroying the present
unnatural connections, which mean the continuance of war till a crushing
decision is obtained.
3. The American colonies of England did not think of union as of a peace
scheme; they had been compelled into it by war, by the necessity of
self-defense. It is only such an overpowering motive which has force
enough to blot out petty rivalries and minor antagonisms. If union
between States belonging to the same race and not divided either by
history or by serious conflicting interests could be effected only under
the pressure of a common peril, we must infer "a minori ad majus" that
such a powerful incentive will be more necessary still to persuade into
union nations of different races, each cherishing memories of mutual
collisions and actually aware of not unimportant clashing interests.
The menace of aggression from the east has been brought home to us by
the present war; gradually it will be understood even by those
Occidentals who at present unhappily lend their support to that
aggression. On this perception of the higher common interests of
self-defense do I build the possibilities of a western coalition. But a
time may come when Russia will be compelled to join it and to complete
thereby the union of the whole of Europe; it may come sooner than the
conversion of Russia to western ideas could be effected by natural
evolution; it may come through the yellow peril, the menace of which has
been brought nearer to us by the accursed policy of England.
Let Japan organize the dormant forces of China, as it seems bent upon
doing, and the same law of eastern aggressiveness which is at the bottom
of the present war will push the yellow mass toward Europe. Russia, as
comparatively western, will have to bear their first onset; for this she
will require Occidental assistance, and in the turmoil of that direful
conflict--or, let us hope, in order to avoid it--she will readily give
up all designs against her western neighbors, and she may become really
western by the necessities which impel her to lean on the west.
But this may or may not happen. What I see before me as a tangible
possibility is the great western block. It is the only principle of
reconstruction after war that contains a guarantee of a permanent peace;
it is the one, therefore, which the pacifists of all nations should
strive for, once they get rid of the passing mentality of conflict that
now obscures the judgment of the best among us.
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