_From the Corriere della Sera, Aug. 2, 1914:_
Italy's decision to remain neutral is based on three causes:
1. The terms of the Triple Alliance call for Italy's participation in
war only if Germany or Austria-Hungary is attacked by another power. The
present war is not a defensive war, but one brought on by
Austria-Hungary and Germany.
2. The spirit of the alliance demands that no warlike action be taken
involving the three countries without full mutual discussion and
agreement. Italy was not even consulted by Austria-Hungary and the
course of events was brought to her knowledge only by news agency
reports.
3. When Italy went to war with Turkey, Austria prevented her from acting
with a free hand in the Adriatic and the Aegean, thereby prolonging the
war at an enormous cost in men and money to Italy. Italy would be
justified in acting in precisely the same manner now toward
Austria-Hungary.
_From Secolo, Sept. 3, 1914:_
During the last few days we have assisted at a deplorable example of our
Latin impressionability. The first German victories have made Italians
waver, and Germany is taking advantage of the popular nervousness, and
is working on public opinion in countless ways. Italy is invaded by
Germans, who assert that Germany will issue victorious, and that her
commercial and industrial activity will not be arrested. We are
inundated with German letters, telegrams, newspapers, and private
communications from German commercial houses, all asserting that Germany
will win, and that Italy should keep neutral, to be on the winning side.
We are not of that opinion. We cannot lose sight of England. Germany
knows that England represents her great final danger, hence the
bitterness with which she speaks of England in all the above
communications. England is not playing a game of bluff. She is not
impotent by land, as Germany says, and may give Germany a mortal blow by
sea. The war may possibly end in a titanic duel between England and
Germany. In this case England will go through with the struggle calmly
and grimly, smiling at difficulties and disregarding losses.
_From the Corriere d'Italia, Sept. 17, 1914:_
We do not know what Italy will do tomorrow, but we are of opinion that,
in face of all eventualities, it is the elementary duty of patriotism
not to trouble the calm expectancy of public opinion and not to mar the
task of the Government, already difficult enough.
_From the Messaggero, Sept. 18, 1914:_
The Italian Nation is beginning to ask itself whether it ought to remain
until the conclusion of peace in an attitude of resignation. It is
necessary for us with clear vision to take our place in the fighting
line. While the destinies of a new Europe are being decided on the
battlefields of Champagne, Belgium, Galicia, and Hungary the Government
is assuming a grave responsibility before the country in deciding to be
disinterested in the struggle. The keen popular awakening which is
manifested in demonstrations, meetings, and public discussions shows
that growing preoccupation and varied uneasiness will not cease so long
as the fate of the country is not decided at the right time by men who
by temperament are best fitted to be interpreters of the soul and the
interests of the nation.
_From the Corriere della Sera, Oct. 4, 1914:_
Many who now invoke a war of liberation complained at the beginning of
August that Italy had not helped her allies. The declaration of
neutrality then seemed the greatest act of wisdom performed by Italy for
many years. Now, however, we must think of the future. Let us remember
that the powers will only support our wishes when they have need of us.
Gratitude and sympathy are mere phrases when the map of Europe is being
redrawn. If Italy desire to safeguard her interests in the Adriatic she
cannot postpone her decision till the last moment. Italy is isolated;
the Triple Alliance treaty cannot defend her even if it be still in
force. Italy and Austria, as Count Nigra and Prince Bülow said, must be
allies or enemies. Can they remain allies after what has happened?