As early as Sept. 11 the Commander in Chief had directed our left army
to have as important forces as possible on the right bank of the Oise.
On Sept. 17 he made that instruction more precise by ordering "a mass to
be constituted on the left wing of our disposition, capable of coping
with the outflanking movement of the enemy." Everything led us to expect
that flanking movement, for the Germans are lacking in invention.
Indeed, their effort at that time tended to a renewal of their manoeuvre
of August. In the parallel race the opponents were bound in the end to
be stopped only by the sea; that is what happened about Oct. 20.
The Germans had an advantage over us, which is obvious from a glance at
the map--the concentric form of their front, which shortened the length
of their transports. In spite of this initial inferiority we arrived in
time. From the middle of September to the last week in October fighting
went on continually to the north of the Oise, but all the time we were
fighting we were slipping northward. On the German side this movement
brought into line more than eighteen new army corps, (twelve active army
corps, six reserve corps, four cavalry corps.) On our side it ended in
the constitution of three fresh armies on our left and in the transport
into the same district of the British Army and the Belgian Army from
Antwerp.
For the conception and realization of this fresh and extended
disposition the French command, in the first place, had to reduce to a
minimum the needs for effectives of our armies to the east of the Oise,
and afterwards to utilize to the utmost our means of transport. It
succeeded in this, and when, at the end of October, the battle of
Flanders opened, when the Germans, having completed the concentration of
their forces, attempted with fierce energy to turn or to pierce our
left, they flung themselves upon a resistance which inflicted upon them
a complete defeat.