_LONDON, April 14.--Field Marshal Sir John French, commander of the
British expeditionary forces on the Continent, reports the British
losses in the three days' fighting at Neuve Chapelle last month, as
follows: Killed, 190 officers, 2,337 men; wounded, 359 officers, 8,174
other ranks; missing, 23 officers, 1,728 men; total casualties, 12,811.
The report continues:_
The enemy left several thousand dead on the field, and we have positive
information that upward of 12,000 wounded were removed by trains. Thirty
officers and 1,657 of other ranks were captured.
_The British commander's dispatch concerning the battle is long, and
says, among other things:_
Considerable delay occurred after the capture of Neuve Chapelle, and the
infantry was greatly disorganized. I am of the opinion that this delay
would not have occurred had the clearly expressed order of the general
officer commanding the First Army been more carefully observed.
_Field Marshal Sir John French's report, which covers the battles of
Neuve Chapelle and St. Eloi under date of April 5, was published in the
official Gazette today. The Commander in Chief writes:_
The event of chief interest and importance which has taken place is the
victory achieved over the enemy in the battle of Neuve Chapelle, which
was fought on March 10, 11, and 12.
The main attack was delivered by the troops of the First Army under
command of General Sir Douglas Haig, supported by a large force of heavy
artillery, a division of cavalry, and some infantry of the General
Reserve. Secondary and holding attacks and demonstrations were made
along the front of the Second Army, under direction of its commander,
Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien.
While the success attained was due to the magnificent bearing and
indomitable courage displayed by the troops of the Fourth and Indian
Corps, I consider that the able and skillful dispositions which were
made by the general officer commanding the First Army contributed
largely to the defeat of the enemy and to the capture of his position.
The energy and vigor with which General Sir Douglas Haig handled his
command show him to be a leader of great ability and power.
Another action of considerable importance was brought about by a
surprise attack made by the Germans on March 14 against the
Twenty-seventh Division holding the trenches east of St. Eloi. A large
force of artillery was concentrated in this area under the cover of a
mist and a heavy volume of fire was suddenly brought to bear on the
trenches.
At 5 o'clock in the afternoon this artillery attack was accompanied by
two mine explosions, and in the confusion caused by these and by the
suddenness of the attack the position of St. Eloi was captured and held
for some hours by the enemy.
Well-directed and vigorous counter-attacks, in which the troops of the
Fifth Army Corps showed great bravery and determination, restored the
situation by the evening of the 15th.
_The dispatch describes further operations, saying:_
On Feb. 6 a brilliant action by the troops of the First Corps materially
improved our position in the area south of La Bassée Canal. During the
previous night parties of the Irish Guards and the Third Battalion of
the Coldstream Guards had succeeded in gaining ground from which a
converging fire could be directed on the flanks and rear of certain
brick stacks occupied by the Germans, which had been for some time a
source of considerable annoyance. At 2 P.M. the affair commenced with a
severe bombardment of the brick stacks and the enemy's trenches.
A brisk attack by the Third Battalion of the Coldstream Guards and Irish
Guards from our trenches west of the brick stacks followed and was
supported by the fire from the flanking position which had been seized
the previous night by the same regiments.
The attack succeeded, the brick stacks were occupied without difficulty,
and a line was established north and south through a point about forty
yards east of the brick stacks.
The casualties suffered by the Fifth Corps throughout the period under
review, and particularly during the month of February, have been
heavier than those on other parts of the line. I regret this, but do not
think, taking all circumstances into consideration, that they were
unduly numerous. The position then occupied by the Fifth Corps had
always been a very vulnerable part of our line. The ground was marshy,
and trenches were most difficult to construct and maintain. The
Twenty-seventh and Twenty-eighth Divisions of the Fifth Corps had no
previous experience in European warfare, and a number of the units
composing the corps had only recently returned from service in tropical
climates. In consequence, the hardships of a rigorous Winter campaign
fell with greater weight upon these divisions than upon any other in the
command.
Chiefly owing to these causes the Fifth Corps, up to the beginning of
March, was constantly engaged in counter-attacks to retake trenches and
ground which had been lost. In their difficult and arduous task,
however, the troops displayed the utmost gallantry and devotion, and it
is most creditable to the skill and energy of their leaders that I am
able to report how well they have surmounted all their difficulties and
that the ground first taken over by them is still intact and held with
little greater loss than is incurred by the troops in all other parts of
the line.
_Describing an attack on the German trenches near St. Eloi on Feb. 28 by
Princess Patricia's Regiment, of the Canadian contingent, under command
of Lieut. C.E. Crabbe, the Commander in Chief says:_
The services performed by this distinguished corps have continued to be
very valuable since I had occasion to refer to them in my last dispatch.
They have been most ably organized and trained and were commanded by
Lieut. Colonel F.D. Farquhar, D.S.O., who I deeply regret to say was
killed while superintending some trench work on March 20. His loss will
be deeply felt.
_Emphasizing the co-operation of the British and French forces and the
new rôle in warfare assumed by the cavalry, the Commander in Chief
writes:_
During the month of February I arranged with General Foch to render the
Ninth French Corps, holding the trenches to my left, some much-needed
rest by sending the three divisions of the British Cavalry Corps to hold
a portion of the French trenches, each division for a period of ten days
alternately.
[Illustration: Map showing the field of the Battle of Neuve Chapelle and
its position in the Allied line.]
It was very gratifying to me to note once again in this campaign the
eager readiness which the cavalry displayed to undertake a rôle which
does not properly belong to them in order to support and assist their
French comrades. In carrying out this work the leader, officers, and men
displayed the same skill and energy which I have had reason to comment
upon in former dispatches.
_Referring to Neuve Chapelle and the considerations leading up to this,
the Field Marshal says:_
About the end of February many vital considerations induced me to
believe that a vigorous offensive movement by the troops under my
command should be planned and carried out at the earliest possible
moment. Among the more important reasons which convinced me of this
necessity were the general aspect of the allied situation throughout
Europe, and particularly the marked success of the Russian Army in
repelling the violent onslaughts of Marshal von Hindenburg; the apparent
weakening of the enemy on my front, and the necessity for assisting our
Russian allies to the utmost by holding as many hostile troops as
possible in the western theatre; the efforts to this end which were
being made by the French forces at Arras and in Champagne, and--perhaps
the most weighty consideration of all--the need of fostering the
offensive spirit in the troops under my command after the trying and
possibly enervating experiences which they had gone through of a severe
Winter in the trenches.
In a former dispatch I commented upon the difficulties and drawbacks
which the Winter weather in this climate imposes upon a vigorous
offensive. Early in March these difficulties became greatly lessened by
the drying up of the country and by spells of brighter weather.
I do not propose in this dispatch to enter at length into the
considerations which actuated me in deciding upon the plan, time, and
place of my attack. As mentioned above, the main attack was carried out
by units of the First Army, supported by troops of the Second Army and
the general reserve. The object of the main attack was to be the capture
of the village of Neuve Chapelle and the enemy's position at that point,
and the establishment of our line as far forward as possible to the east
of that place.
The object, nature, and scope of the attack and the instructions for the
conduct of the operations were communicated by me to Sir Douglas Haig
in a secret memorandum, dated Feb. 19.
_After describing the main topographical features of the battlefield and
showing how the Germans had established a strong post with numerous
machine guns among the big houses, behind walls and in orchards which
flanked the approaches to the village, Sir John proceeds:_
The battle opened at 7:30 o'clock the morning of the 10th of March by a
powerful bombardment of the enemy's position in Neuve Chapelle. The
artillery bombardment had been well prepared and was most effective,
except on the extreme northern portion of the front of attack.
At 8:05 o'clock the Twenty-third and Twenty-fifth Brigades of the Eighth
Division assaulted the German trenches on the northwest of the village.
At the same hour the Garhwal Brigade of the Meerut (British India)
Division, which occupied a position to the south of Neuve Chapelle,
assaulted the German trenches in its front. The Garhwal Brigade and the
Twenty-fifth Brigade carried the enemy's lines of intrenchment, where
the wire entanglements had been almost entirely swept away by our
shrapnel fire.
The Twenty-third Brigade, however, on the northeast, was held up by wire
entanglements which were not sufficiently cut. At 8:05 o'clock the
artillery was turned on Neuve Chapelle, and at 8:35 o'clock the advance
of the infantry was continued. The Twenty-fifth and the Garhwal Brigades
pushed on eastward and northeastward, respectively, and succeeded in
getting a foothold in the village. The Twenty-third Brigade was still
held up in front of the enemy's wire entanglements, and could not
progress. Heavy losses were suffered, especially in the Middlesex
Regiment and the Scottish Rifles.
The progress, however, of the Twenty-fifth Brigade into Neuve Chapelle
immediately to the south of the Twenty-third Brigade had the effect of
turning the southern flank of the enemy's defenses in front of the
Twenty-third Brigade. This fact, combined with powerful artillery
support, enabled the Twenty-third Brigade to get forward between 10 and
11 A.M., and by 11 o'clock the whole of the village of Neuve Chapelle
and the roads leading northward and southwestward from the eastern end
of that village were in our hands.
During this time our artillery completely cut off the village and
surrounding country from any German reinforcements which could be thrown
into the fight to restore the situation, by means of a curtain of
shrapnel fire. Prisoners subsequently reported that all attempts at
reinforcing the front line were checked. Steps were at once taken to
consolidate the positions won.
Considerable delay occurred after the capture of the Neuve Chapelle
position. The infantry was greatly disorganized by the violent nature of
the attack and by its passage through the enemy's trenches and the
buildings of the village. It was necessary to get the units to some
extent together before pushing on. The telephonic communication being
cut by the enemy's fire rendered communication between the front and the
rear most difficult. The fact of the left of the Twenty-third Brigade
having been held up had kept back the Eighth Division and had involved a
portion of the Twenty-fifth Brigade in fighting to the north, out of its
proper direction of advance. All this required adjustment. An orchard
held by the enemy north of Neuve Chapelle also threatened the flank of
an advance toward the Aubers Bridge.
I am of the opinion that this delay would not have occurred had the
clearly expressed order of the general officer commanding the First Army
been carefully observed.
The difficulties above enumerated might have been overcome earlier in
the day if the general officer commanding the Fourth Corps had been able
to bring his reserve brigades more speedily into action. As it was, a
further advance did not commence before 3:30 o'clock. The Twenty-first
Brigade was able to form up in the open on the left without a shot being
fired at it, thus showing that, at the time, the enemy's resistance had
been paralyzed.
The brigade pushed forward in the direction of Moulin-du-Pietre. At
first it made good progress, but was subsequently held up by machine gun
fire from houses and from a defended work in the line of the German
intrenchments opposite the right of the Twenty-second Brigade.
Further to the south the Twenty-fourth Brigade, which had been directed
on Pietre, was similarly held up by machine guns in houses and trenches.
At the road junction, 600 yards to the northwest of Pietre, the
Twenty-fifth Brigade, on the right of the Twenty-fourth, was also held
up by machine guns from a bridge held by the Germans over the River Les
Layes, which is situated to the northwest of the Bois du Biez.
While two brigades of the Meerut Division were establishing themselves
on a new line the Dehra Dun Brigade, supported by the Jullunder Brigade
of the Lahore Division, moved to the attack of the Bois du Biez, but
were held up on the line of the River Les Layes by a German post at the
bridge, which enfiladed them and brought them to a standstill.
The defended bridge over the Les Layes and its neighborhood immediately
assumed considerable importance. While the artillery fire was brought to
bear, as far as circumstances would permit, on this point, General Sir
Douglas Haig directed the First Corps to dispatch one or more battalions
of the First Brigade in support of the troops attacking the bridge.
Three battalions were thus sent to Richebourg St. Vaast.
Darkness coming on and the enemy having brought up reinforcements, no
further progress could be made, and the Indian Corps and the Fourth
Corps proceeded to consolidate the position they had gained.
While the operations, which I have thus briefly reported, were going on,
the First Corps, in accordance with orders, delivered an attack in the
morning from Givenchy simultaneously with that against Neuve Chapelle,
but as the enemy's wire was insufficiently cut very little progress
could be made, and the troops at this point did little more than hold
fast to the Germans in front of them.
On the following day, March 11, the attack was renewed by the Fourth and
Indian Corps, but it was soon seen that further advance would be
impossible until the artillery had dealt effectively with the various
houses and defended localities which had held the troops up along the
entire front.
Efforts were made to direct the artillery fire accordingly, but, owing
to the weather conditions, which did not permit of aerial observations,
and the fact that nearly all the telephone communications between the
artillery observers and their batteries had been cut, it was impossible
to do so with sufficient accuracy. When our troops, who were pressing
forward, occupied a house there, it was not possible to stop our
artillery fire, and the infantry had to be withdrawn.
As most of the objects for which the operations had been undertaken had
been attained, and as there were reasons why I considered it inadvisable
to continue the attack at that time, I directed General Sir Douglas Haig
on the night of the 12th to hold and consolidate the ground which had
been gained by the Fourth and Indian Corps, and suspend further
offensive operations for the present.
The losses during these three days' fighting were, I regret to say, very
severe, numbering 190 officers and 2,337 of other ranks killed, 359
officers and 8,174 of other ranks wounded, and 23 officers and 1,720 of
other ranks missing. But the results attained were, in my opinion, wide
and far-reaching.
_Referring to the severity of the casualties in action, the Commander in
Chief writes:_
I can well understand how deeply these casualties are felt by the nation
at large, but each daily report shows clearly that they are endured on
at least an equal scale by all the combatants engaged throughout Europe,
friends and foe alike.
In war as it is today, between civilized nations armed to the teeth with
the present deadly rifle and machine gun, heavy casualties are
absolutely unavoidable. For the slightest undue exposure the heaviest
toll is exacted. The power of defense conferred by modern weapons is the
main cause for the long duration of the battles of the present day, and
it is this fact which mainly accounts for such loss and waste of life.
Both one and the other can, however, be shortened and lessened if
attacks can be supported by a most efficient and powerful force of
artillery available; but an almost unlimited supply of ammunition is
necessary, and a most liberal discretionary power as to its use must be
given to artillery commanders. I am confident that this is the only
means by which great results can be obtained with a minimum of loss.