CHAPTER XVI.

Wrongdoers.

Another class of our fellow-men whom it is especially hard to love are

those who willfully do wrong. The men who cheat us, and say hateful

things to us; the men who abuse their wives and neglect their families;

the men who grind the faces of the poor, and contrive to live in ease

and luxury on the earnings of the widow and the orphan; the men who

pervert justice and corrupt legislation in order to make money; these

and all wrongdoers exasperate us, and rouse our righteous indignation.

Yet they are our fellow-men. We meet them everywhere. We suffer for

their misdeeds;--and, what is worse, we have to see others, weaker and

more helpless than ourselves, maltreated, plundered, and beaten by these

wretches and villains. Wrongdoing is a great, hard, terrible fact. We

must face it. We must have some clear and consistent principles of

action with reference to these wrongdoers; or else our wrath and

indignation will betray us into the futile attempt to right one wrong by

another wrong; and so drag us down to the level of the wrongdoers

against whom we contend.

THE DUTY.

+The first thing we owe to the wrongdoer is to give him his just

deserts. Wrongdoing always hurts somebody. Justice demands that it shall

hurt the wrongdoer himself.+--The boy who tells a lie treats us as if we

did not belong to the same society, and have the same claim on truth

that he has. We must make him feel that we do not consider him fit to be

on a level with us. We must make him ashamed of himself. The man who

cheats us shows that he is willing to sacrifice our interests to his. We

must show him that we will have no dealings with such a person. The man

who is mean and stingy shows that he cares nothing for us. We must show

him that we despise his miserliness and meanness. The robber and the

murderer show that they are enemies to society. Society must exclude

them from its privileges.

It is the function of punishment to bring the offender to a realizing

sense of the nature of his deed, by making him suffer the natural

consequences of it, or an equivalent amount of privation, in his own

person. Punishment is a favor to the wrongdoer, just as bitter medicine

is a favor to the sick. For without it, he would not appreciate the evil

of his wrongdoing with sufficient force to repent of it, and abandon it.

Plato teaches the true value of punishment in the "Gorgias." "The doing

of wrong is the greatest of evils. To suffer punishment is the way to be

released from this evil. Not to suffer is to perpetuate the evil. To do

wrong, then, is second only in the scale of evils; but to do wrong and

not to be punished, is first and greatest of all. He who has done wrong

and has not been punished, is and ought to be the most miserable of all

men; the doer of wrong is more miserable than the sufferer; and he who

escapes punishment more miserable than he who suffers punishment."

+Punishment is the best thing we can do for one who has done

wrong.+--Punishment is not a good in itself. But it is good relatively

to the wrongdoer. It is the only way out of wrong into right. Punishment

need not be brutal or degrading. The most effectual punishment is often

purely mental; consisting in the sense of shame and sorrow which the

offender is made to feel. In some form or other every wrongdoer should

be made to feel painfully the wrongness of his deed. To "spare the rod,"

both literally and metaphorically, is to "spoil the child." The duty of

inflicting punishment, like all duty, is often hard and unwelcome. But

we become partakers in every wrong which we suffer to go unpunished and

unrebuked when punishment and rebuke are within our power.

THE VIRTUE.

+Forgiveness is not inconsistent with justice. It does not do away with

punishment. It spiritualizes punishment; substituting mental for bodily

pains.+--The sense of the evil and shame of wrongdoing, which is the

essence and end of punishment, forgiveness, when it is appreciated,

serves to intensify. Indeed it is impossible to inflict punishment

rightly until you have first forgiven the offender. For punishment

should be inflicted for the offender's good. And not until vengeance has

given way to forgiveness are we able to care for the offender's

well-being.

Forgiveness is a special form of love. It recognizes the humanity of the

offender, and treats him as a brother, even when his deeds are most

unbrotherly. But it cares so much for him that it will not shrink from

inflicting whatever merciful pains may be necessary to deliver him from

his own unbrotherliness. Forgiveness loves not the offense but the man.

It hates the offense chiefly because it injures the man. Its punishment

of the offense is the negative side of its positive devotion to the

person. The command "love your enemies" is not a hard impossibility on

the one hand, nor a soft piece of sentimentalism on the other. It is

possible, because there is a human, loveable side, even to the worst

villain, if we can only bring ourselves to think on that better side,

and the possibilities which it involves. It is practical, because regard

for that better side of his nature demands that we shall make him as

miserable in his wrongdoing as is necessary to lead him to abandon his

wrongdoing, and give the better possibilities of his nature a chance to

develop. The parent who punishes the naughty child loves him not less

but more than the parent who withholds the needed punishment. The state

which suffers crime to go unpunished becomes a nursery of criminals. It

wrongs itself; it wrongs honest citizens; but most of all it wrongs the

criminals themselves whom it encourages in crime by undue lenity. The

object of forgiveness is not to take away punishment, but to make

whatever punishment remains effective for the reformation of the

offender. It is to transfer the seat of suffering from the body, where

its effect is uncertain and indirect, to the mind, where sorrow for

wrongdoing is powerful and efficacious. Every wrong act brings its

penalty with it. In order to induce repentance and reformation that

penalty must in some way be brought home to the one who did the wrong.

Vengeance drives the penalty straight home, refusing to bear any part of

it itself. Forgiveness first takes the penalty upon itself in sorrow for

the wrong, and then invites the wrongdoer to share the sorrow which he

who forgives him has already borne. Vengeance smites the body, and often

drives in deeper the perversity. Forgiveness touches the heart and

gently but firmly draws the heart's affections away from the wrong, into

devotion to the right.

THE REWARD.

+Forgiveness, rightly received, works the reformation of the

offender.+--And to one who ardently loves righteousness there is no joy

comparable to that of seeing a man who has been doing wrong, turn from

it, renounce it, and determine that henceforth he will endeavor to do

right. Contrast heightens our emotions. And there is "joy over one

sinner that repenteth, more than over ninety and nine righteous persons

that need no repentance." Deliverance from wrong is effected by the firm

yet kindly presentation of the right as something still possible for us,

and into which a friend stands ready to welcome us. Reformation is

wrought by that blending of justice and forgiveness which at the same

time holds the wrong abhorrent and the wrongdoer dear. Reformation is

the end at which forgiveness aims, and its accomplishment is its own

reward.

THE TEMPTATION.

+The sight of heinous offenses and outrageous deeds against ourselves or

others tempts us to wreak our vengeance upon the offender.+--This

impulse of revenge served a useful purpose in the primitive condition of

human society. It still serves as the active support of righteous

indignation. But it is blind and rough; and is not suited to the

conditions of civilized life. Vengeance has no consideration for the

true well-being of the offender. It confounds the person with the deed

in wholesale condemnation. It renders evil for evil; it provokes still

further retaliation; and erects a single fault into the occasion of a

lasting feud. It is irrational, brutal, and inhuman; it is dangerous and

degrading.

THE VICE OF DEFECT.

+The absence of forgiveness in dealing with wrongdoers leads to undue

severity.+--The end of punishment being to bring the offender to realize

the evil of his deed and to repent of it, punishment should not be

carried beyond the point which is necessary to produce that result. To

continue punishment after genuine penitence is manifested is to commit a

fresh wrong ourselves. "If thy brother sin, rebuke him; and if he

repent, forgive him. And if he sin against thee seven times in a day,

and seven times turn again to thee, saying, I repent, thou shalt forgive

him." To ignore an unrepented wrong, and to continue to punish a

repented wrong, are equally wide of the mark of that love for the

offender which metes out to him both justice and forgiveness according

to his needs. All punishment which is not tempered with forgiveness is

brutal; and brutalizes both punisher and punished. It hardens the heart

of the offender; and itself constitutes a new offense against him.

These principles apply strictly to relations between individuals. In the

case of punishment by the state, the necessity of self-protection; of

warning others; and of approximate uniformity in procedure; added to the

impossibility of getting at the exact state of mind of the offender by

legal processes, render it necessary to inflict penalties in many cases

which are more severe than the best interest of the individual offenders

requires. To meet such cases, and to mitigate the undue severity of

uniform penalties when they fall too heavily on individuals, all

civilized nations give the power of pardon to the executive.

+Whether the penalty be in itself light or severe, it should always be

administered in the endeavor to improve and reform the character of the

offender.+--The period of confinement in jail or prison should be made a

period of real privation and suffering; but it should be especially the

privation of opportunity for indulgence in idleness and vice; and the

painfulness of discipline in acquiring the knowledge and skill necessary

to make the convict a self-respecting and self-supporting member of

society, after his term of sentence expires.

THE VICE OF EXCESS.

+Lenity ignores the wrong; and by ignoring it, becomes responsible for

its repetition.+--Lenity is sentimentality bestowed on criminals. It

treats them in the manner most congenial to its own feelings, instead of

in the way most conducive to their good. Forgiveness is regard for the

offender in view of his ability to renounce the offense and try to do

better in the future. Lenity confounds offender and offense in a

wholesale and promiscuous amnesty. The true attitude toward the

wrongdoer must preserve the balance set forth by the lawgiver of Israel

as characteristic of Israel's God, "full of compassion and gracious,

slow to anger and plenteous in mercy and truth; keeping mercy for

thousands, forgiving iniquity and transgression and sin: and _that will

by no means clear the guilty_." Lenity which "clears the guilty" is

neither mercy, nor graciousness, nor compassion, nor forgiveness. Such

lenity obliterates moral distinctions; disintegrates society; corrupts

and weakens the moral nature of the one who indulges in it; and confirms

in perversity him on whom it is bestowed.

THE PENALTY.

+Severity and lenity alike increase the perversity of the

offender.+--Severity drives the offender into fresh determination to do

wrong; and intrenches him behind the conception that he has been treated

unfairly. He is made to think that all the world is against him, and he

sees no reason why he should not set himself against the world. Lenity

leads him to think the world is on his side no matter what he does; and

so he asks himself why he should take the trouble to mend his ways.

Lenity to others leads us to be lenient toward ourselves; and we commit

wrong in expectation of that lenient treatment which we are in the habit

of according to others. Severity to others makes us ashamed to ask for

mercy when we need it for ourselves. Furthermore, knowing there is no

mercy in ourselves, we naturally infer that there is none in others. We

disbelieve in forgiveness; and our disbelief hides from our eyes the

forgiveness, which, if we had more faith in its presence, we might

find. Hence the unforgiving man can find no forgiveness for himself in

time of need; he sinks to that level of despair and confirmed

perversity, to which his own unrelenting spirit has doomed so many of

his erring brothers.

Practical Ethics · 第 16 / 22 章