THE PROVISION OF MILITARY MOTOR TRANSPORT
Systems of Direct Purchase and Subvention Compared--The Advantages
of the Latter--The Importance of Standardisation and Workshop
Equipment--The Limitations of the Subsidy Scheme.
Having decided definitely that a complete system of motor transport
must be employed primarily in order to secure greater efficiency and
freedom of movement of troops in the field, the next step is to decide
upon the best means of securing the availability of the necessary
number of suitable vehicles in time of war. Evidently, the simplest
procedure would be to depend solely and entirely upon the power of the
Government to commandeer or requisition the required supplies.
At first sight it may appear that nothing more is needed, but any such
conclusion would be highly erroneous. If we were to examine the fleet
of any large motor omnibus, motor cab, or motor haulage concern, we
should almost inevitably find that the vehicles employed were almost
all of one make and commonly of one type. If an operating company has
in the first instance decided to adopt a particular make of vehicle,
and if subsequent improvement in design reduces the efficiency of the
original type as compared with others of the market, then the natural
move is not to change from one manufacturer to another, but to increase
or partially renew the fleet by the purchase of new vehicles of the
same make but of a more modern model. The change from the old to the
new type does not involve alterations in by any means every part of
the mechanism, but only in those parts which have in any way shown
themselves capable of improvement. In the event of renewals being
required, it is not then necessary to stock an entirely new set of
spare parts for all portions of the car, but only to get in spares for
those parts, the design of which has been changed and improved. In this
way, the necessary stock of spare parts is so far as possible reduced,
and the work of maintaining the cars is in a similar degree simplified.
Almost every type of motor vehicle has its own peculiarities, and it
is evidently easier for a mechanic to undertake the maintenance of a
certain number of machines all of one make than to keep in running
order a similar number of miscellaneous vehicles varying essentially
from one another.
Then again, the standardisation of one make is an advantage, because
for purposes of maintenance the number of workshop appliances required
is reduced to a minimum, and it is possible in some cases to obtain
machines specially adapted for turning out in quantity some particular
part which figures largely in the maintenance of the fleet.
Yet another advantage is that the driver of any one car can, without
danger or loss of efficiency, be put on to any other car, if his own
is undergoing repair or overhaul, while the work of those departments
concerned with the storing and issuing of parts is greatly simplified,
and the accommodation required for the efficient operation of the whole
concern is reduced.
If these arguments apply to an industrial organisation working under
normal conditions, they apply still more strongly to a hastily enlarged
temporary organisation evolved in time of war. Moreover, in the latter
case the unreliable running of a fleet of cars does not represent
merely a temporary financial loss or a diminution in prestige. Its
result must inevitably be to cause, among the troops behind which
the motor column is working, a lack of necessities either in respect
of food or of warlike materials. In either case, the result is
immeasureable and the consequences may well prove fatal.
Then again, military motor vehicles are required to work under
peculiarly arduous and trying conditions. The very nature of their
service implies frequent long runs under the worst possible conditions
of weather and road surface. They may have to employ lanes or bye-ways
or even routes which can hardly be described as roads at all, and added
to this is the almost certain fact that the tracks over which they work
will have been materially injured intentionally or otherwise.
Those who live in the vicinity of any important military centre must
be well aware of the damaging effect that heavy military traffic has
upon the roads, even if well-constructed, in view of the inevitable
nature of the traffic. When plying on country roads never intended
for such use, the transport motors themselves will soon break up the
road surface. These considerations serve to show that the liability
to breakdown is much greater in military than in civilian transport,
and coupled with this is the certainty that the facilities for
conveniently carrying out repairs and overhauls must necessarily be
extremely limited. The transport columns are supported at their base by
travelling workshops manned by skilled mechanics and containing small
selections of those tools likely to be of the most general service. The
equipment of these workshops must be reduced to a minimum in order to
secure their portability, and it is highly important, if possible, to
prevent jobs coming in which cannot be satisfactorily tackled with the
machinery at the disposal of the mechanical staff.
It will thus be seen that everything points to the extreme
inadvisability of depending upon motor transport and supply columns
formed of a miscellaneous collection of vehicles of all types, all
makes and all ages. Looking at the other side of the question, the
ideal conditions are reached when every vehicle of the column is
identical and represents the very best make and type, and when all
the drivers are thoroughly acquainted with the idiosyncrasies of this
particular type of vehicle, and the mechanics responsible for repairs
equally experienced as regards every feature of the mechanism of the
machines.
To secure something approaching true standardisation in a fleet of
transport vehicles, either one or two alternative methods may be
adopted. The first and most obvious is that of direct purchase by
Government. At the moment of writing, this system is being extensively
adopted in Great Britain, and doubtless also in all other belligerent
countries in which it has been possible to keep suitable motor
manufacturing works in operation. Such steps are, however, being
taken, in order to meet a great emergency which has arisen before
alternative schemes have had time fully to mature. The establishment
of an army in time of peace is very much less than it is in war time,
and in time of war an army must be far more self-supporting than it
is in time of peace, when considerable quantities of supplies can be
brought regularly by civilian contractors to depôts where the troops
are stationed, and the military authorities require only to secure
the distribution of such supplies in detail. In time of war the whole
of the supplies must be delivered in bulk to a very limited number of
points, and from that time onwards the military authorities must be
responsible for what may be described as their wholesale as well as
their retail distribution.
Added to this are a number of other considerations, as, for example,
the fact that when on active service the scale of rations of the men
is increased, and supplies of warlike stores are rapidly expended and
have to be perpetually renewed. It is clear, then, that if the method
of direct purchase alone is depended upon, either the supply of motor
vehicles will be immensely greater than the useful requirement in times
of peace, or else facilities must be created for increasing their
supply instantaneously when mobilisation occurs, or the organisation of
new armies becomes essential.
Now, as in the present instance, it is possible after a war has
begun to provide for a steady and considerable supply of transport
motors to be handed over to the military authorities week by week,
provided always that the process of manufacturing is not seriously
interfered with either by the propinquity of military operations, or
by the need of drafting men in excessive numbers from the works to
the active forces. In our own case, it is quite within the bounds of
possibility to produce motors for the transport columns of new armies
just as rapidly as it is possible to make the personnel of those new
armies effective. This fact, however, does not cover the difficulty
occasioned by the necessary increase in transport facilities for the
standing army directly war breaks out. It has been suggested that the
difficulty might be overcome if the War Department were to purchase
large numbers of suitable motor lorries, and to employ the greater
part of them in time of peace for the carriage of general goods. This
scheme has the advantage that it not only provides the necessary fleet,
but simultaneously trains the necessary drivers; nevertheless, it has
the grave drawback that profitable employment of the kind required
could not be found unless the Government were to enter into serious
competition with haulage and delivery companies. It has been proposed
also that numbers of suitable motors might be used normally in the
service of the Post Office, and transferred on emergency to the War
Department, but this again is open to objection. The Post Office
fleets would have to be renewed hurriedly and under difficulties, and
a certain amount of disorganisation would almost certainly result.
Furthermore, the number of vehicles which could be usefully kept in
service by the postal authorities is small compared with the increased
military requirements occasioned by the outbreak of war.
We may take it, then, that the principle of maintaining in the
possession of the War Department in time of peace sufficient motor
vehicles to fill the whole of the needs in time of war is unworkable
except at enormous cost, since the majority of the vehicles could be
put to no useful work and would merely deteriorate and become obsolete
and, therefore, comparatively speaking, valueless were they to stand
idle. The whole of such a fleet would have to be replaced every three
or four years, and if this were not done an enemy equipped with more
modern vehicles would possess a marked advantage, since--though the
motor industry has now assumed enormous proportions--it is still so
young that progress in design is by no means stationary.
We now come to the question of whether it is possible to maintain
in time of peace only the number of vehicles actually required, and
to fill up the requirement in excess of this number as promptly as
possible, but nevertheless with some delay, when war breaks out.
On this point, Captain A. E. Davidson, R.E., a former Secretary of
the Mechanical Transport Committee of the War Office, has given the
following very definite opinion in a paper read by him at the Imperial
Motor Transport Conference, in his official capacity as representative
of the War Department:
“Emphasis must be laid on the necessity for obtaining the
transport immediately. The army which can mobilise in the shortest
space of time gains an immense advantage by being able to take
the initiative before the opposing armies are prepared, and the
army which mobilises most rapidly will be able to gain a decisive
advantage. This question has now been so carefully worked out in
detail that the complete mobilisation of an army can be arranged
for within a period that is reckoned in hours.”
[Illustration: _“The Autocar” photograph._
A FRENCH MOTOR WORKSHOP, ESPECIALLY EQUIPPED FOR THE SERVICE OF THE
FLYING CORPS.]
[Illustration: A GERMAN WORKSHOP CAR, CLOSED TO TAKE THE ROAD.]
[Illustration: TWO VIEWS OF PARTS OF THE BRITISH “KARRIER” SUBVENTION
TYPE LORRY, INDICATING THE EFFORTS MADE TO FACILITATE INSPECTION AND
REPLACEMENTS.
THE ENGINE VALVES WITH INSPECTION COVER REMOVED.]
[Illustration: HOW THE AXLE SHAFTS CAN BE WITHDRAWN. BY REMOVING THE
TOP AND BOTTOM CASING, THE WHOLE OF THE FINAL GEARING, INCLUDING THE
DIFFERENTIAL, CAN BE REMOVED WITHOUT JACKING UP THE VEHICLE OR TAKING
OFF THE LOAD.]
To meet this requirement, the additional motor transport columns must
also be capable of being mobilised with similar rapidity, and we are
forced back either on to the last resort of commandeering any vehicle
that comes handy, or else on to the preparation of a scheme which will
provide a substantial reserve of vehicles of approved make and type,
able to be made available at any instant at a few hours’ notice. Such a
scheme evidently involves the payment to the owners of these vehicles
of some sum intended to make up to them such loss as may result from
their liability to have their vehicles immediately commandeered. These
payments, moreover, must provide that the War Department shall have
the right of periodical inspection of the cars, so that they may
be well informed as to their condition, and may have certain knowledge
as to whether they are being properly driven and maintained in such
a way as to make them useful units of a fleet on active service. A
scheme of this sort is called a “subvention” or “subsidy” scheme, and
it is very generally admitted that such a scheme forms an essential
part of the organisation of transport and supply in every country
in which the civilian use of heavy motor vehicles is sufficiently
extensive to make the principle of subsidy applicable on a working
scale. Clearly, the amount of the subsidy which is offered to owners of
motor vehicles of a suitable type must depend, in the first instance,
on the conditions accompanying the payments. If--as to some extent in
the case of Great Britain--the subsidy scheme applies only to vehicles
of types which would not be employed for trade purposes were definite
encouragement not offered by the Government, the payments must be more
than sufficient to balance any disadvantages resulting from the use of
the subsidy type vehicle, as well as the inconvenience of undergoing
inspections.
Again, if the War Department makes various stipulations as to features
to be embodied in the design of subsidy vehicles, it is more or less
certain that these stipulations will entail manufacturing expenditure
resulting in an increase in the sale price of the machines as compared
with the price of ordinary models of similar carrying capacity.
Thus, the subsidy must also be sufficient to cover any increase in
first cost to the user. If this increase is, let us say, £50, and
the inconveniences entailed by adopting the type result in a loss of
efficiency estimated, let us say, at £30 a year, the subsidy, if it
is to form any real inducement, must evidently amount to a payment on
purchase of about £60 at the least, followed by a payment of, let us
say, £40 a year for three or four years.
In countries where heavy motor vehicles are not--unless some abnormal
encouragement is given--sufficiently extensively used for trade
purposes, the subsidy must of course be considerably higher. If the
conditions of service are so unfavourable to the use of mechanical
transport as to convince the trader that in changing, let us say, from
twenty horses and five waggons to a couple of 3-ton motor lorries, his
expenses will be increased by £100 or £200 a year, the scheme must take
this prospective loss into account. In that case, the scheme becomes
something more than mere subsidy, and partakes more of the nature of a
scheme designed artificially to encourage the use of a particular form
of transport solely on account of its utility to the Government in case
of war.