EXPERIENCES OF MOTORS IN ACTIVE SERVICE
The South African War--The Italian Transport in Tripoli--The Balkan
Campaigns.
Although mechanical transport was employed during the South African
war, the experiences then gained must not be applied with too much
rigidity to the conditions of the conflict taking place in Europe.
In South Africa, a considerable number of traction engines were put
into service, while steam motor lorries were also used. Colonel R. E.
Crompton, C.B., who was in charge of the British transport columns, has
described how “De Wet, knowing the country, destroyed bridge after
bridge until the roads and the railways were only islands, disconnected
by things called ‘deviations’--horrible places, full of dead animals,
horse transport, animal transport of all kinds, which had died there,
simply because there was practically no road.... The fact that we
were able, even though we had broken engines, to repair them from our
spares, so that the dead engines became live engines, so impressed
Lord Roberts that he felt that we were at the birth of real, practical
mechanical military transport with all the advantages it gives.”
There can be no doubt that the experience obtained during the South
African war pointed directly to the use in the first case of steam
tractors, and later--when they could be sufficiently perfected--of
internal combustion tractors with a bigger radius of action. These
conclusions resulted not only from the inherent conditions of military
service, but also from the local conditions of the country in which
this particular war took place.
Reviewing the possibilities of South Africa in times of peace, Mr. W.
W. Hoy, the General Manager of the Government Railways and Harbours,
while approving of the use of light passenger and goods vehicles
up to 2 or 3 tons capacity, lays stress on the desirability of the
light paraffin tractor for easy services on good roads, and the heavy
paraffin tractor for cross-country work with trains of trailers each
carrying from 12 to 25 tons of goods. If we admit that a country in
which these represent the main normal requirement cannot be safely
taken as indicating accurately even the war requirements of other
countries, we are reduced for practical experience to the Italian
campaign in Tripoli and the recent wars in the Balkans. Italy is
one of those countries in which commercial motor transport has not,
owing to unfavourable local conditions, made any great progress. As
a result the war was begun without any provision having been made in
this direction, and the authorities were at first very sceptical as
regards the desirability of employing motors at all in connection with
the operations of the army. After much discussion, two light lorries,
fitted with twin pneumatic tyres on the back wheels, were sent out on
trial. These served very rapidly to convince the staff officers of the
superiority of the system over horse transport. Consequently, thirty
more light Fiat lorries were sent out as promptly as possible, and
these were followed by larger consignments, bringing the whole fleet in
use up to the number of about 200. Arrived at Tripoli, the cars were
slung off the transport ships on to big pontoons, and towed to the
quay. From that point they were immediately employed for the transport
of all kinds of war material, as well as provisions and forage. They
were further utilised for the conveyance of large bodies of troops to
the front, and for carrying wounded to the hospitals and dead to the
improvised cemeteries. Most of the country over which they operated
was entirely devoid of roads, and consisted chiefly of rough loose
desert strewn with rocks and treacherous sandy hills. These peculiar
conditions account for the type of vehicle selected for employment.
Heavier lorries on solid tyres would no doubt have experienced even
greater difficulties in negotiating country of this class.
The following extract, from a full account published by the
manufacturers of the uses to which their vehicles were put, will serve
to give an idea of the varied employment of military motors:
“At the battle of Zanzur, on June 8th, 1912, fifty-four vehicles
took part and were divided into four columns under the personal
command of Capt. Corazzi. Ten were under the command of an officer
at the disposal of the Medical Corps; a second column, under
the command of Lieut. Milani, carried a load of barbed wire and
netting, sand bags and shovels; a third column, in Lieut. Bosio’s
charge, carried also 800 spades, 600 shovels, sand bags, and
barbed wire; and a fourth column of fourteen lorries, under Lieut.
Marocco, took a large quantity of dynamite and other explosives in
addition to pioneers’ tools.
“The first column to move were the ambulances, which left Tripoli
at two o’clock, and at 3.30 came out of the outer redoubt at
Gargaresh to follow the fighting column and to work under the
instructions of a surgeon-captain. The other columns left Tripoli
about three o’clock, and at 4.15 at Gargaresh, about 5-1/2 miles
from Tripoli, they formed up in a square about 350 yards in front
of the redoubt under cover of a hill, waiting for orders. At 5.30
they advanced, and leaving cover of the hills, moved forward
about 2-1/2 miles beyond the batteries. The nature of the ground
changed as the columns approached a sandbank, which had until
then protected them from the enemy’s fire. The passage over this
sand dune was extremely difficult, as the cars had to proceed in
single file at walking pace, exposed to a violent rifle fire.
Proceeding round the extreme north of the Arabo-Turkish trenches
the columns reached the Marabotto of Abd-el-Gelil shortly after the
arrival of the third battalion of the Fortieth Fusiliers, mountain
artillery, and a company of pioneers, and proceeded with the work
of fortification. When the columns returned to Gargaresh, and while
the Rainaldi Brigade was engaged against overwhelming forces of
the enemy, one of the motor columns, acting under Lieut. Milani,
was ordered to load provisions, whilst the other two were told off
to join the ambulance section. In the very line of fire the motors
brought succour to the wounded, conveyed some seventy disabled
soldiers to the temporary hospital at Gargaresh, and carried forty
dead to the cemetery. At Gargaresh the order arrived to convey to
Marabut the provisions and luggage of the 6th and 40th regiments of
the line. The three motor columns therefore re-formed, one going to
Tripoli to load provisions and returning to Marabut, the other two
being loaded up with luggage. The three columns then returned to
Tripoli.”
After two years of incessant service, and notwithstanding the “emery”
effect of the fine sand which was carried in clouds by the wind and
penetrated everywhere, it is generally understood that the Italian
military motor fleet maintained reliable services throughout the
war, and that the individual machines were in surprisingly good
condition when their service was completed. Results were, at any rate,
sufficiently satisfactory to justify the Italian Government in placing
considerable further orders, with a view to increasing their motor
columns. This war was probably the first event which enabled the motor
vehicle to prove itself in practice absolutely essential as a military
implement. A Tripoli newspaper summed up the value of the experience
obtained:
“Many people will have asked themselves how it was possible for
the Lequio Division to live, march, fight, and win with a base
of operations distant from 70 to 200 miles, with rapid and long
deviations which were almost of daily occurrence, in a country so
barren and inhospitable that man and beast would perish if they
were left for only two or three days without provisions.... The
motor lorry provided the solution of the problem; by its use in a
few hours provisions were brought from the stores and bases to the
fighting column, having been conveyed possibly hundreds of miles,
and, further, by its means not one day passed without the troops
having bread, wine, and coffee. The motor lorry was ubiquitous; it
transported ammunition or succoured the wounded, fetched fodder for
the horses and other animals, or money for the troops and for the
Arabs; it brought new boots for the soldiers or delivered urgent
messages, as well as being used for the transport of troops from
the various bases right up to the first fighting line in battle.
Only the advent of the autocar rendered possible many of the
daring moves of this war, as it solved the difficulties of desert
transport.”
As regards the uses of motors during the various Balkan campaigns, the
only reliable and available information appears to be that contained in
a series of articles contributed by Capt. A. H. Trapmann of the _Daily
Telegraph_ to the columns of _Motor Traction_. At the commencement
of the war in 1912, there were less than 100 motor vehicles in
Greece, and some sixty of these--the property of Greek subjects--were
immediately commandeered. The machines formed a fleet very far from
ideal, representing cars of all makes and sizes, many of them suffering
from negligent treatment or unskilful handling, and some very near the
termination of a chequered career. The officers entrusted with the duty
of purchasing the machines were completely ignorant of their value or
qualities, and the drivers into whose hands they were subsequently
put consisted mainly of people who could, or said they could, drive a
motor car, though the great majority did not profess to possess any
knowledge over and above that required for travelling with reasonable
safety and certainty, assuming the mechanism of the cars to give no
trouble at all. The better machines were chiefly allotted to the
various generals and their staff officers, while some of the worst were
fitted up with lorry bodies for the transport of goods.
After the fall of Salonica, the Greek objective was Janina, connected
with the port of Preveza by an excellent road about sixty-three miles
long. Directly Preveza fell into Greek hands, the authorities were
faced with the problem of provisioning an army, in the first instance
consisting of 15,000 men and gradually augmented to 60,000, operating
against a fortified town in a totally barren country intersected by
huge mountain ranges. The front of the army extended for about a
hundred miles, and only one good road was available from the base to
the centre of the advanced positions. Under these conditions, the
authorities realised the possibilities of motor transport, and about
thirty motor lorries, mainly obtained from Italy, were shipped to
Preveza and put into service. It was found that each lorry could,
in three hours, carry to the front about enough food for 1,000 men.
This, however, was not the only problem. The army was absorbing on
the average one ton of ammunition per day for every thousand men. The
lorries were only capable at the best of handling 2-ton loads, and
consequently were kept more than fully occupied. Moreover, the road,
though good in certain portions, was in others particularly dangerous,
being very winding and hewn for the most part out of the side of a
precipice. Heavy traffic and heavy rains contributed to make the
conditions yet worse, and under the circumstances, it is not surprising
that very serious accidents occurred, and that by the end of the first
six weeks only nine out of the original thirty lorries were still upon
the road. It then became necessary to replenish the supply, which was
managed in one way or another, and the service was maintained with
enormous difficulty under conditions of false economy, which dictated
considerable purchases of unreliable secondhand machines. Even so,
the results served completely to convince Captain Trapmann that motor
transport was the only solution of the supply problem in warfare.
It seems that a similar opinion was forced upon the Greek military
authorities, since one of the first moves when the second campaign
became inevitable in 1913, was the purchase of one hundred motor
lorries. This step, while good in itself, was inadequate, since no real
provision was made for the supply of competent and responsible drivers,
for adequate supervision, or for completely equipped workshops. Many
of the drivers were well-to-do enthusiasts who had volunteered for
service, and who very soon came to regret that they had done so.
It is one thing to drive a good touring car and to fall back upon
professional assistance whenever trouble occurs, but quite another to
handle and maintain a heavy motor lorry without competent backing and
under thoroughly bad conditions of service. Some 50 per cent. of the
motor fleet was usually out of commission, and the staff of the repair
shops were so incompetent that it was seldom that a car once taken to
pieces was ever fit for the road again. The following extract from
Capt. Trapmann’s account gives some idea of the difficulties which had
to be overcome:
“The strategy and tactics of the campaign against Bulgaria landed
the Greek headquarters at Doyrani on July 8th, and there nearly
two-thirds of the Greek motor service was concentrated on July
10th. Greek headquarters decided to move sixty miles west to Hadji
Beylik along the railway, and the vital question was how the cars
for the service of the staff, and the lorries for the army service
were to accomplish the journey. The single-line railway track was
impossible on account of unbridged gaps, and also because the
railway was in urgent demand for transport. The only semblance of
a road was a mule track two feet wide, which led for the most
part through a tangle of vegetation, and occasionally amidst a
wilderness of rocks and stones. Eventually it was decided literally
to force a road by sheer weight. The lorries took turns at leading,
raced full speed for twenty yards, and then bashed their way
through the jungle. After fifty yards or less the lorry would be
brought to a standstill by the accumulation of rubbish piled up in
front. This would be cleared away, the car would back, then start
on a fresh charge. When a lorry got seriously damaged it would
be replaced by another and taken in tow by a third. Sometimes
explosives had to be used, and small rivers were bridged by the
simple expedient of placing tree trunks in them until a car could
cross. It was bumpy work.
“In Macedonia a road of any sort was a luxury, the best roads
could not compare as regards surface with a fourth-class English
roadway, whilst as often as not the motors had to make their own
road as they went along. It must be remembered, also, that driving
in war time is very different from under peace conditions. Bridges
and culverts have usually been destroyed, telegraph lines sag
across the road, and at night time are apt to get entangled in the
driver’s neck with dire results. I, myself, have seen a goodly
number of motor smashes, one when a temporary bridge gave way
under an overloaded lorry, another when a contact mine exploded.
The worst accident I remember, however, took place soon after the
fall of Janina. A very old and depreciated lorry was being used to
convey passengers down to Preveza, a distance of sixty-three miles,
by a mountain road which for half its length was cut on the edge of
a precipice. At one of the awkward places on the road the steering
gear broke, and the car with its human freight dashed over the
cliff and fell into the river.”
The conclusions reached by Captain Trapmann as a result of very
exceptional opportunities of observing military motor transport
under active service conditions should be of considerable value. His
catalogue of desirable features is as follows:
(1) Clearance from ground in order to enable a car to pass over
rock-strewn stretches.
(2) An adjustable cow-catcher in front for use at night on good
stretches of road, on which, however, dead or wounded horses or men
may be lying.
(3) An inclined bullet shield of light steel to protect the front
of the radiator from casual sniping.
(4) A stout iron hook or ring in front and behind for towing
purposes, especially when a river has to be negotiated, the bridge
over which has been destroyed.
(5) Solid tyres with a set of non-skid chains which can be fitted
when occasion arises.
(6) A wire grappler to preserve the driver from the danger of
sagging telegraph wires hanging across the road.
While the experiences detailed in this chapter are, comparatively
speaking, on a very small scale, and consequently results cannot
confidently be applied in anticipation to a war of immensely greater
magnitude, they have at least served to show that even unavoidable lack
of experience, or avoidable lack of competence, cannot prevent the
motor vehicle from being a very valuable asset behind an army in the
field. The Tripoli and Balkan campaigns proved not only the necessity
of employing motors for the work of the transport and supply columns,
but also the possibility in so doing of saving the lives of very
many wounded men who, when dependence was placed on slower methods,
frequently died from exposure on their way down from the front to the
base.