our liberty which can never be amended, revoked or withdrawn.” He says
so in his brief. He also maintains that his state governments, not one
of their members elected by us as citizens of America, have omnipotent
power over our every liberty, except that they cannot change the number
of senators from each State. At one point in his brief he “proves”
overwhelmingly that the citizens of America universally demanded his
new Article, the Eighteenth Amendment. His proof is--and we cannot
deny the fact which he asserts as proof--that, in the year 1918, when
Americans were in the Argonne Forest in France, four thousand seven
hundred and forty-two Tories in forty-five state legislatures said
“Yes” to this new command to the one hundred million American citizens
on a subject not among the matters enumerated in our First Article.
That his “proof” might be perfect (for the claim that the making of the
command was demanded by the citizens of America) he fails to mention
the fact that not one of those four thousand odd Americans, who were
not the Americans in the Argonne or in our training camps preparing to
fight for human liberty, was elected for any purpose by the citizens of
America.
Reflecting upon this briefer’s admiration for the Statute of ’76 and
upon his knowledge that the “legislatures” never are the people, while
the “conventions” of the Fifth Article are the “people,” we wonder
if he ever read a certain statement of the early American who wrote
the Statute of ’76. It is a statement from Thomas Jefferson quoted by
Madison, author of the Fifth Article, when he was urging the American
people or “conventions” to make that Fifth Article. Jefferson was
talking about a constitution, in which “all the powers of government
... result to the legislative body,” as they result (under the modern
assumption as to what the Fifth Article says) to the state governments,
the new omnipotent legislature of the American people. This is what
Jefferson had to say, what Madison approved: “The concentrating
these in the same hands, is precisely the definition of despotic
government. It will be no alleviation, that these powers will be
exercised by a plurality of hands, and not by a single one. One hundred
and seventy-three despots would surely be as oppressive as one....
As little will it avail us, that they are chosen by ourselves. An
_elective_ despotism was not the government we fought for.” (_Fed._ No.
48.)
It is clearly the view of Wheeler and all his associates that the early
Americans did fight their Revolution so that we might have, in these
modern days, an elective despotism of four thousand seven hundred and
forty-two despots. That form of government is probably relieved from
the odium of the Madison and Jefferson attack, by the “alleviation”
that we ourselves, the citizens of America, those to be governed by
this “_elective despotism_,” do not elect or choose even one of the
despots!
We cannot linger longer with these amazing briefs of the champions
of the Eighteenth Amendment. From the viewpoint of unconscious
humor, we have become rather enamored of the Wheeler idea that
“state governments” and “the people of America” expressed the same
thought to the latter when they made the Fifth Article. Since we read
Wheeler’s brief, we have been trying the same method with some famous
statements of great Americans. For example, we have this new excerpt
from Washington’s famous Farewell Address: “The basis of our political
system is the right of the ‘state governments’ to make or alter the
people’s Constitution of government. And the Constitution which at any
time exists, till changed by an explicit and authentic act of ‘the
legislatures of three fourths of the states’”--(Washington said ‘the
whole people’)--“is sacredly obligatory upon all.”
And we like particularly the improved Wheeler concept of the rather
crude Gettysburg speech of Lincoln. In its new form, altered by the
Wheeler idea, it is wonderful to hear the appeal of Lincoln that we,
who were not among the dead at Gettysburg, should play our part “that
government of the people, by the state governments, and for those who
control the state governments, shall not perish from the earth.”
We wonder if Hughes and Wheeler and Sheppard and Webb realize how far
they have gone beyond the Calhoun idea that was repudiated forever at
Gettysburg! In the old days, the Calhoun doctrine was that a single
state, although but a political entity, could do as it pleased _in its
own affairs_, even to leaving the Union without reference to the wishes
of the citizens of America. That question was settled forever by the
result at Gettysburg. The modern claim, the sole claim upon which the
Eighteenth Amendment depends for existence, is that a state government,
if it combines with enough other state governments, can go outside its
own jurisdiction, outside the citizenship which chose the legislators
in it, and issue its omnipotent command telling the citizens _of
America_ what _they_ may do and may not do, “in all matters whatsoever.”
But we leave the Court of 1920, quite satisfied that the modern
“constitutional thinkers,” who filed their briefs therein, have not
exactly the American concept of the relation of government to human
beings, which would have located them at Valley Forge, with Marshall,
in the Winter of 1778.
We leave that Court, however, quite satisfied that the Court itself
still has the knowledge which Marshall had, the knowledge stated in the
Tenth Amendment and by the decision of that Court in 1907, that all the
powers not granted by the Constitution to the general government at
Washington “are _reserved_ to the _people_ and _can be exercised only
by them or, upon further grant from them_.”
We do not forget the question of the Court, the question which none
of the lawyers could answer, “In what way do counsel believe that the
Eighteenth Amendment _could_ be made CONSTITUTIONALLY?”
We do know the answer to that question. The Americans, in the
“conventions” we just left, wrote the answer in the Fifth Article in
the words which are the most important words in the Article and one
of our greatest securities to human liberty, “by conventions in three
fourths thereof.”
The “conventions” which mentioned themselves, the “conventions,” in
the Fifth Article, are the same “conventions” which demanded that the
declaration be made that every power, not granted in that Constitution
to the government at Washington, remained where it had been. As the
state governments had been incompetent to make the First Article or the
Eighteenth Amendment, they remained incompetent to make either of them.
If we needed any assurance that the Supreme Court still retains the
accurate conceptions of these early Americans, we find it in one of the
most significant facts in the whole remarkable story of the last five
years.
We do not need to recall how every lawyer dwells continuously upon
the fact that the Fifth Article _is_ a “_grant_” of power to make new
Articles. We do not need to refresh our mind with the recollection that
the Root brief referred to the Fifth Article over fifty times as a
“_grant_” of such power. We know that every argument in every brief was
based on the stated assumption that the Fifth Article _was_ a “_grant_”
and that it made the legislatures of state citizens attorneys in fact
for the citizens of America, who elect none of the members of those
legislatures.
Did this monumental error of all the lawyers have any effect upon the
accurate knowledge of the Supreme Court? Did this insistence upon
the absurd assumption that the Fifth Article _is_ a “_grant_,” in
which “conventions” _grant_ something to themselves and to the state
governments, lead the Court into the error of calling it a “grant?”
Read the conclusions of the Court, as they were stated by Judge Van
Devanter. The opening sentence of that statement sweeps aside every
assumption that the Fifth Article _is_ a “_grant_.” Can our knowledge,
brought right from the old “conventions,” be put more completely than
in the one statement: “Power to amend the Constitution was RESERVED by
Article V.”
Where is the “_grant_” all the lawyers have been talking about?
Where is the “_grant_” on which the Eighteenth Amendment depends for
existence? Where is the “_grant_” which makes the state legislatures of
state citizens attorneys in fact, for any purpose, for the _American_
citizens? Before the Constitution, in which is the Fifth Article,
there was no citizen of America. And, as the exclusive ability of
“conventions” to make NATIONAL Articles (like the ability of state
legislatures to make Articles which are _not_ national) “was _reserved_
by Article V,” the state governments, as imaginary attorneys for
ourselves, disappear entirely from the scene. We remain free citizens.
We have not become “subjects.”
This comforting knowledge is emphasized when we find that, as the
Supreme Court states its Fourth Conclusion, again the accurate
statement is that the ability to make the new Article “is within the
power to amend RESERVED by Article V of the Constitution.”
That is our own knowledge. We have brought from the conventions, in
which we have sat with the early Americans, their knowledge that the
ability of the “conventions” to make Articles _of that kind_, their
exclusive ability to do so, was _reserved_ to those “conventions,”
the assembled citizens of America. We know that the Tenth Amendment
expressly so declares. Therefore, when _we_ go to the Supreme Court,
with _our_ contention that we still are citizens and that a revolution
by government against the people, a revolution to make us “subjects,”
must be repudiated by the Supreme Court which we have established to
protect our human liberty against all usurpation by governments, _our_
challenge will be in the words of Wilson, uttered in the Pennsylvania
Convention where Americans first set their names to the Fifth Article:
“How comes it, sir, that these state governments dictate to their
superiors--to the majesty of the people?”
CHAPTER XXVI
THE AMERICAN CITIZEN WILL REMAIN
The United States [the great political society of men which this book
persistently calls America] form, for many, and for most important
purposes, a single nation.... In war, we are one people. In making
peace, we are one people. In all commercial regulations, we are one
and the same people. In many other respects, the American people are
one; and the government which is alone capable of controlling and
managing their interests in all these respects, is the government of
the Union. It is _their government, and in that character they have
no other_. America has chosen to be, in many respects, and to many
purposes, a nation; and for all these purposes, _her government_
is complete; to all these objects, it is competent. The people
have declared that, in the exercise of all powers given _for these
objects_, it is supreme. It can, then, in effecting these objects,
legitimately control all individuals or governments within the
American territory. (U. S. Supreme Court, Cohens v. Virginia, 6
_Wheat._ 264, at p. 413 et seq.)
These words of Marshall tell every American why there is an “America,”
a nation of men, in addition to a “United States,” a federation
or league of political entities. The league existed before the
Constitution created the nation. The league was not created by the
Constitution. But the league was continued by the Constitution in which
free men created the nation. In that Constitution, the league and its
component members (the states) were made subordinate to the nation and
_its_ component members, who are the citizens of America.
How comes it, then, that modern leaders, for five years last past, have
talked their nonsense about _another_ government of the one American
people? How comes it that they have argued and acted as if the Fifth
Article _constituted_ another government of the one American people?
It certainly would be startling for Marshall and his generation to
hear the Eighteenth Amendment claim that one important purpose for
which Americans chose to be one people was the purpose of enabling
thirty-six legislatures of state citizens to interfere, “in all matters
whatsoever,” with every individual liberty of all American citizens.
In the light of our education with the one American people who chose to
be, “in many respects, and to many purposes, a nation” and to have, IN
THAT CHARACTER, no government other than the government constituted by
the First Article, how otherwise, than by the one word “nonsense,” can
we dignify the five-year discussion as to the _extent_ of the powers
granted in the Fifth Article to _other_ governments, the respective
governments of the members of the league, to interfere with the
liberties of the members of the nation, the citizens of America?
Citizens of America, particularly emigrants from Europe, _must_ be
taught the reason _why_ and the fact _that_ the one American people
“were bound to have and did at last secure” a government free from
interference by “legislatures, _whether representing the states_ or the
federal government.” (Judge Parker, supra, in Preface.)
Who is to teach the average citizen the reason or the fact? Have our
most renowned lawyers shown any knowledge of either? Their own briefs
have been permitted to speak for them. Which of those briefs has put a
finger upon the basic flaw in the Eighteenth Amendment challenge to the
fact that the American citizens “did at last secure a Government” which
_its_ citizens “could control despite” all _legislatures_, whether
representing state citizens or themselves?
The men who wrote these briefs are far more than lawyers of great
renown. They are among the best known leaders of public opinion in
America. Many thousands of average citizens rely upon such men to
know and state every constitutional protection to individual liberty.
In any generation, reliance upon any public leaders for knowledge on
that matter is a distinct menace to individual liberty. The imaginary
Eighteenth Amendment will have served a useful purpose if it teaches
us that we must know _of our own knowledge_, if we want to remain free
citizens of America.
“No man, let his ingenuity be what it will, could enumerate all the
individual rights not relinquished by this Constitution.” (Iredell,
later a Supreme Court Justice, in the North Carolina convention, 4
_Ell. Deb._ 149)
These are the rights “retained by the people” of America in the Ninth
Amendment because not enumerated in the First Article.
“If this Constitution be adopted, it must be presumed the instrument
will be in the hands of every man in America, to see whether
authority be usurped; and any person by inspecting it may see if the
power claimed be enumerated. If it be not, he will know it to be a
usurpation.” (Iredell, in North Carolina convention, 4 _Ell. Deb._ 172.)
All granted powers to interfere with the individual freedom of the
_American_ citizen, “in that character,” are enumerated in the First
Article.
All powers _of that kind_ not enumerated therein are reserved in the
Tenth Amendment exclusively to the American citizens themselves to
be exercised or granted _by them_ in the “conventions” of the Fifth
Article.
One of these powers is that which some governments of state citizens,
in the Eighteenth Amendment, have attempted both to exercise and grant.
The brief of _which_ public leader has known or stated these facts to
the destruction of the Amendment and to the continued existence of the
free American citizen?
The experience of ages has taught that human liberty, even in a
republic, is never secure unless the citizens of the republic
themselves understand the basic security which protects that liberty.
The writer of this book wishes to keep his own individual liberties
secure against usurpation by any government in America. He wishes to
keep his status, as such citizen, to all governments in America--the
status established by the citizens of America through whose experience
we have been educated. He knows that such status must end forever
unless American citizens generally have the same earnest wish and, _of
their own knowledge_, know _how_ the Constitution secures that status
and their individual liberty.
Shortly after the American people had chosen to be a nation with
one government of enumerated powers, there came to that then land
of individual liberty an Irish exile. Quickly he assumed his place
with the great lawyers of America. And in the year 1824 he made clear
that he would have been able to teach _our_ new citizens and _our_
public leaders _how_ the one American people “_did at last secure_ a
government” which that one American people “could control despite” the
state legislatures. In the argument before the Supreme Court in the
famous case of Gibbons v. Ogden (9 _Wheat._ 1, at p. 87), where his
opponent was Webster, this is how Emmett stated a fact _then_ known and
“felt and acknowledged by all”:
“_The Constitution gives nothing to the states or to the people._ Their
rights existed before it was formed.... The Constitution _gives_ only
to the general government, and, so far as it operates on the state
or popular rights, it _takes away_ a portion, which it gives to the
general government.... But the states or the people must not be thereby
excluded from exercise of any part of the sovereign or popular rights
held by them before the adoption of the Constitution except where that
instrument has given it exclusively to the general government.” The
italics are those of Emmett.
What does this clear statement of fact (known by Emmett and his
generation to be the exact statement of the Tenth Amendment) make out
of every argument, whether for or against the Eighteenth Amendment,
based on the assumption that the Fifth Article does give something to
the states and their governments? Can any American citizen doubt that
it makes clear that to describe such arguments by any other word save
“nonsense” is to lend them a dignity which they do not possess?
Without a single exception, every argument during the last five years,
whether for or against the Eighteenth Amendment, has deserved the
criticism of the Supreme Court for the fact that such argument neither
knew nor considered the meaning of the Tenth Amendment.
It reads: “The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to
the states respectively, or to the people.” The argument of counsel
ignores the principal factor in this Article, to wit, “the people.”
Its principal purpose was not the distribution of power between the
United States and the states, but a reservation to the people of all
powers not granted. The Preamble of the Constitution declares who
framed it,--“We the people of the United States,” not the people of
one state, but the people of all the states; and Article X reserves to
the people of all the states the powers not delegated to the United
States. The powers affecting the internal affairs of the states not
granted to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited
by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, [the
power of each state for that state to its own people or citizens] and
all powers of a _national character_ which are not delegated to the
national government by the Constitution are reserved to the people of
the United States [the one people or citizens of America, that one
American people which Marshall so accurately knew]. The people who
adopted the Constitution, knew that in the nature of things they could
not forsee all the questions which might arise in the future, all the
circumstances which might call for the exercise of further _national_
powers than those granted to the United States, and, after making
provision for an Amendment to the Constitution by which any needed
additional powers would be granted, they reserved to themselves all
powers not so delegated. (Supreme Court, Kansas v. Colorado, 1907, 206
_U. S._ 46 at p. 90.)
Why has every argument, for or against the new Amendment, ignored
the simple and impressive fact that the one word “conventions”
was written into the Fifth Article and the Seventh Article by the
delegates at Philadelphia, very shortly after they had reasoned out
and reached their famous legal decision as to the difference between
the ability of “conventions” and the ability of “state legislatures,”
also named in the Fifth Article? Why completely ignore the decisive
effect of this fact when considered with the fact, that Philadelphia
mentioned “conventions” in both Articles and only in the Fifth
mentioned “state legislatures”? If we put ourselves exactly in the
position of Philadelphia when it was doing this, we see at once why
state “legislatures” are pointedly absent from the Seventh Article.
Philadelphia knew the nature of the First Article, that it constituted
government ability to interfere with individual freedom. Philadelphia
knew that neither “state legislatures” nor any combination of
governments can make an Article _of that kind_ in any land where men
are “citizens” and not “subjects.” That is why “legislatures” are not
mentioned in the Seventh Article. But Philadelphia did not know the
nature of any Article which might be _proposed_ at any particular time
in the future by the body which was to perform the duty of proposing,
the duty which Philadelphia was then performing. And Philadelphia knew
that any future _proposed_ Article might be of the kind which state
legislatures could make. It was the conviction of Hamilton that _all_
future _proposed_ Articles would be of the kind that “legislatures”
could make because they would be of the kind that did not relate to
“the mass of powers” to interfere with individual liberty. That is why
Philadelphia, almost immediately after it had omitted any mention of
“legislatures” in the Seventh Article, did mention “legislatures” in
the Fifth Article, which related to the making of future Articles whose
nature Philadelphia could not possibly know.
Let us not forget what Madison told us about the Seventh Article: “This
Article speaks for itself. The express authority of the people alone
could give due validity to the Constitution.” (_Fed._ 43.) This is his
statement that the Article itself tells us that “the express authority
of the people” _will_ make the Articles proposed from Philadelphia.
How does the Article speak for itself and tell us that? By its one
word “conventions.” Could Madison tell us more plainly that the word
“conventions,” which he and his associates wrote into the Seventh and
which he wrote into the Fifth Article, means “the express authority of
the people”?
Can any supporter of the Eighteenth Amendment find any statement from
Madison in which he tells us his word “legislatures” means what he has
just told us his word “conventions” means? And, when “conventions”
meant the “express authority of the people” before the Fifth or Seventh
Articles were written, how could the mention of “conventions” in the
Fifth imply a grant from the “conventions” to the “conventions”?
Why not admit the simple truth overlooked for the past five years?
The respective mentions of “Congress,” of “conventions” and of state
“legislatures” in the Fifth Article speak plainly of each body
respectively doing something which it could do if there were no Fifth
Article.
If there were no Fifth Article, could not Congress draft an Article
and _propose_ it and _propose_ a mode of ratification? Philadelphia
did all these things and knew and stated that it exercised no power in
doing any of them. The mention of Congress implies no “grant.” On the
contrary, it is a command which prevents the rest of us from making
such proposals and prevents “conventions” or state “legislatures” from
making Articles, within their respective abilities, _unless_ proposed
to them by “two thirds of both houses of Congress.”
If there were no Fifth Article, could not “conventions” make any kind
of an article, as they had made the National Articles of 1776 and as
they were making the Articles of 1787? The mention of “conventions”
implies no grant. On the contrary, it is a command telling the
“conventions” that a “Yes” from three fourths of the “conventions”
shall be necessary and sufficient for “_constitutional_” exercise of
the power they have. It is a great security for human freedom. It makes
very difficult oppression of the people by the people.
If there were no Fifth Article, could not state “legislatures” make
declaratory or _federal_ Articles, which neither exercise nor create
power to interfere with human individual freedom? They had, in 1781,
made an entire constitution of Articles _of that kind_. The mention of
“legislatures” implies no “grant.” On the contrary it is a command to
these “legislatures,” representing the members of the union of states.
The command comes from the superiors of the states, the “conventions”
of the whole American people.
It is not the only command which the “conventions” of that one people
made to the states and _their_ “legislatures.” How absurd to imply
from that command that it is a “grant” of power to those commanded
governments, giving them omnipotence over every human freedom of the
American people who made the command!
We know what Madison told the Americans in the “conventions,” when
he asked them to make his Fifth Article. He told them that it was
a “mode of procedure” in which either the general government or the
state governments could _originate_, by _proposal_, the introduction of
changes into the Constitution which is both _national_ and _federal_.
He pointedly did _not_ tell those Americans that the Fifth Article is
a “grant” of any ability to the state governments to make _national_
Articles and he pointedly did _not_ tell them that it is a “grant” of
ability to anyone to _make_ any Articles.
Why then was it necessary for the leading brief, in support of the
Eighteenth Amendment, to _add_ to Madison’s explanation of his own
Fifth Article (the explanation that it was a “mode of procedure”) the
absurd statement that it was a “grant” from the “conventions” to the
“conventions” and the state legislatures of power _to make_ Amendments?
Why then was it necessary that this brief, speaking of the Fifth
Article, should say: “The people thus ordained the mode of Amendment,”
exactly what Madison said, “and in their own interest they established
this power of Amendment”--exactly what Madison pointedly omitted to
state to the Americans he asked to make the Fifth Article?
The answer is simple. Without adding to the Madison statement what he
pointedly omitted to state, without stating the addition as axiomatic,
Hughes could not even _begin_ any argument for the Eighteenth Amendment.
The statement which Hughes adds to that of Madison is a statement which
flatly contradicts everything we have heard in the “conventions.” It
flatly contradicts everything the Americans did from 1775 on. It flatly
contradicts the Tenth Amendment declaration that the Fifth Article
gives _no_ power whatever to the states or _their_ governments. The
added statement is sheer “nonsense,” assumed and asserted as axiomatic
fact.
And, during the last five years, how has every argument against the
Eighteenth Amendment met the “nonsense” of the assumption that the
Fifth Article is a “grant?” In no way at all, except by assuming
and asserting the same “nonsense,” and by then undertaking to prove
another absurdity, namely, that the Fifth Article does not _relate_
to the making of fundamental changes _because_ the imaginary “grant”
is limited in extent and does not include power to take away from the
importance of the respective political entities which are the states.
Let no American citizen make any mistake as to this one fact. In no
argument either for or against the Eighteenth Amendment has there been
any challenge to the sheer assumption that the Fifth Article is a
“grant” of ability to make changes in the Constitution which is both
_federal_ and _national_. On the contrary, in every argument, the
foundation of everything asserted and urged is that very assumption.
In every argument against the Eighteenth Amendment, possible changes in
the Constitution (which is both federal and national) have been divided
into two classes, but not into the federal class and the national
class. It has been invariably contended that the first class include
those which _can_ be made under the imaginary “grant” of power in the
Fifth Article and in the mode of procedure therein prescribed. On the
other hand, it has been invariably contended that the other class
includes those which _cannot_ be made under that imaginary “grant” or
in _any_ CONSTITUTIONAL procedure _because_ they take away from the
citizens _of a state_ their right to govern themselves.
All arguments alike, whether for or against the Eighteenth Amendment,
have wholly ignored the fact that the citizens of _America_, for the
protection of the individual liberty of the one American people,
IN THAT CHARACTER, established the Constitution and made it the
supreme law over the citizens of the respective states and the states
themselves and the state governments and the league of the states,
which the citizens of America continued as subordinate to their nation
of men.
For this reason probably, no argument, on either side, has ever
recognized the identity of the “conventions” of the Seventh Article
with the “conventions” of the Fifth Article. For this reason probably,
no argument has ever recognized the identity of both “conventions” with
the most important factor and reservee in the Tenth Amendment, “the
people” of America, as distinguished from the lesser reservees, the
peoples or citizens of each state, “the states respectively.”
It is this very failure to recognize this identity which has forced
the opponents of the new Amendment into the “nonsense” of assuming
and asserting, with their adversaries, that the Fifth Article _is_ a
“grant” to the “conventions” and the state “legislatures.” If there
had not been this failure, everyone would have recognized that the
“conventions,” which made the Constitution, neither could nor did
“grant” to themselves, the “conventions” named in the Fifth Article,
any or all of the very power which they were then exercising. The
“nonsense” of the concept of such a “grant” is patent once there is
recognized the identity between the “conventions” with the most
important reservee of the Tenth Amendment, the one American people of
Marshall.
We all know that, for five years, that identity has never been known
or mentioned. The failure to know or to mention it has been emphasized
by the occasional references to “conventions” which have been made. In
one or two arguments, there has been passing attempt to support the
“nonsense,” that the Fifth Article is a “grant,” but a “grant” limited
in extent, by a suggestion that the Eighteenth Amendment could be
“grafted” on the Constitution entirely outside of any mode of procedure
_mentioned_ in the Constitution. The suggestion has been that it could
be “grafted” on the Constitution by “conventions” of the citizens _of
each state_, provided that the citizens of _every_ state gave their
consent. In these suggestions, we ourselves, the citizens _of America_,
the whole American people of Marshall, have figured not at all.
We, who _are_ the citizens of America, must now realize the vital
importance to our personal liberty of our own knowledge that we are
citizens of America as well as citizens of some particular state.
Wilson pointed out to the Americans in the Pennsylvania convention the
dual capacity of the American, if the new Constitution were adopted. We
remember his statement that “it was necessary to observe the two-fold
relation in which the people would stand--first as citizens of the
general government and, secondly, as citizens of their particular
state. The general government was meant for them in the first capacity;
the state governments in the second. Both governments were derived
from the people; both meant for the people; both therefore ought to
be regulated on the same principles.” And we remember the one most
important American principle, that every government in America must
get, directly from its own citizens, every power to interfere with
their individual freedom.
We cannot help contrasting the accurate statement of Wilson, “in this
Constitution the citizens of America appear dispensing a portion of
their power,” with what must be the modern statement, if the Eighteenth
Amendment is in the Constitution, namely, “in this Constitution the
_state governments_ appear dispensing to themselves and to the national
government another portion of the power of the citizens of America.”
And, if that modern statement is “nonsense,” what else but “nonsense”
are the arguments which rely upon its truth or which do not point out
its absurdity?
What action of _our_ public leaders, even in this year 1923, does not
disclose that they still have the Tory concept that states and their
governments, both of which are political entities, _can_ exercise or
grant power which the Tenth Amendment expressly declares that the
American citizens reserved exclusively to themselves, and which the
Supreme Court, even as late as 1907, clearly held “could be exercised
only by them or upon further grant from them?” No discerning American
has failed to note that the Senate still clings to the delusion of
1917, that states and _their_ citizens and _their_ governments have
anything whatever to do with the _national_ part of the Constitution
of the citizens of America. In the newspapers, on January 30, 1923,
under the heading, “Favor New Defense for Constitution,” appeared a
dispatch from Washington. It told how the senators on the Judiciary
Sub-Committee had agreed to report favorably a proposal again to amend
the Constitution by changing the language of the Fifth Article. And the
main element of the proposed change is to provide that any state may
require that ratification by its legislature be subject to confirmation
by popular vote of the citizens _of that state_.
The citizens of each state make their own Constitution. In it, they
give to their own government what ability they please to interfere
with their own individual freedom. What have the citizens _of any
State_, what have the citizens _of every state_, in their capacity
_as state citizens_, to do with grants of power to the American
government to interfere with the individual liberty of the _American_
citizens? Have not the _American_ citizens, in _every_ state,
protection against grants of _such_ power to the one government of
the _American_ people except by the citizens _of America_ themselves,
_in that character_? Is there anything in the Fifth Article, as it
was written by Madison and made by the one American people, which
permits any state governments--which have no power even over their own
respective citizens except by grant from them--to exercise or create
new government power to interfere with the liberty of the citizens of
the distinct and supreme nation, America?
Why persistently and insistently ignore the basic American legal
principle that every state government must get its own power over
its own citizens from them and that the only government of the
American citizens must get its every _national_ (as distinguished from
_federal_) power directly from the citizens _of America_, assembled in
the “conventions” named in the Fifth Article?
Is there any doubt that Madison, who wrote the Fifth Article, knew
whom its word “conventions” described? When he asked the one American
people to make the entire Constitution, this is what he told them about
the Seventh Article, in which the same word “conventions” was used:
“This Article speaks for itself. The express authority of the people
alone could give due validity to the Constitution.” If the Seventh
Article “speaks for itself” and points out that “the people alone”
are to make the Constitution, with its grants of _national_ power in
the First Article, what word in that Seventh Article identifies the
makers of the Constitution, which Madison and all Americans know was
made by the _one people_ of America? Is there any word in it except the
one word “conventions” to describe the people or citizens of America?
And if that one word “conventions” makes the Article speak for itself
and tell us that the American citizens themselves made the whole
Constitution, does not the word “conventions” in the Fifth Article
speak just as plainly for itself and tell us that it also describes and
identifies the one people of America, the citizens of America?
Why then tinker with the Fifth Article and repeat the monumental
error on which the existence of the Eighteenth Amendment is assumed?
Why propose an Amendment to the Fifth Article, which Amendment will
itself assume that the Fifth Article already is a “grant” to the state
legislatures of ability to give away from the citizens of America their
exclusive power to say to what extent and in what matters their one
American government may interfere with their individual freedom in
their character as American citizens?
Why not be sane and admit that the Fifth Article is not a “grant” to
the legislatures of state citizens? It is settled fact that each such
legislature, like every legislature in America, must get its every
power to govern its own citizens _from_ its own citizens. That is why
the Fourth Article guarantee of “a Republican Form of Government” to
every state has taught us (pp. 250-1) the absurdity of the thought that
the Fifth Article enables state governments outside Rhode Island to
give its government power to interfere with the individual freedom of
citizens of Rhode Island. And there is a further and more monumental
absurdity, in this same respect, when we contrast this Fourth Article
guarantee with the assumption that the Fifth Article is a “grant”
to the state legislatures. One of the great purposes for which the
whole American people made themselves one nation of men was that
the strength of such a great nation might be used to secure to the
Americans in every state the ability to govern themselves without any
interference from outside the state, in all matters except those in
which the citizens of America took from them the ability to govern
themselves. That is why the citizens of America wrote that guarantee
into the Fourth Article as a command to their inferiors, the states
and the state governments. Having thus secured “a Republican Form
of Government” to the Americans in every state by the command of
the Fourth Article, is it conceivable that the same whole American
people, immediately thereafter and in the Fifth Article, created for
the citizens of America a government which has not even the semblance
of “a Republican Form of Government”? That is the concept on which
the existence of the Eighteenth Amendment depends. It is not in the
Constitution unless, immediately after the guarantee of the Fourth
Article and _in_ the Fifth Article, the whole people of America
said: “We have just insisted that the Americans in each state must
be governed by a government which gets its power directly from them.
For ourselves, however, as the whole American people, we are content
to let two thirds of Congress and the legislatures of three fourths
of the states interfere with our individual freedom, in all matters
whatsoever. For that reason, we make this grant to those legislatures.
For ourselves, as one people, we have no desire for a Republican Form
of Government.”
Does not the claim that the Americans did say this in their Fifth
Article entitle us more justly than Henry to exclaim: “I suppose that I
am mad, or that my countrymen are so!” (3 _Ell. Deb._ 446.)
We know, with certainty, that the Eighteenth Amendment is not in our
Constitution, and we know that the real and invincible challenge to
its existence has never been made. What will be the epitaph of the
audacious attempt of government to dictate to Americans as “subjects,”
when the challenge is presented to the Supreme Court? No patriotic
American can have the slightest doubt. No man, familiar with its
history and traditions, can fail to know the answer of that Court to
the question, “Citizen or Subject?”
It is not unknown that there is growing up in America, even among many
public leaders and lawyers, an unfounded concept that the Supreme
Court was created by the American citizens _to make_ law. Such
concept is quite in accord with the concept--indeed it is part of the
concept--that government can create and constitute new government
of men. But the entire history and tradition of the Supreme Court
flatly denies the existence of any such concept in the mind of the
Court itself. Even in the National Prohibition Cases, the Court
quickly displayed the American concept of the relation of men to all
governments in America. When the lawyers had finished their incessant
talk about the imaginary Fifth Article “grant” which would make all
American citizens “subjects” of some governments of state citizens, had
the Tory concept of such a grant made the slightest impression upon
the mind of the Court? We all know that in the decisions, which merely
negatived four unsound challenges to the Amendment, the first statement
of the Court was a reference to the power “RESERVED” in the Fifth
Article.
And we know how, in the same litigations, the Court wholly ignored
the absurd claim, even when advanced by a former justice of the
Court, that, when governments had attempted to put anything into our
Constitution, so long as the attempt did not involve changing the
number of senators from a state, the Court was without power to review
the action of governments or to protect the American citizen against
usurpation by government.
The Constitution is not only the same in words, but the same in
meaning, and delegates the same powers to the government, and reserves
and secures the same rights and privileges to the citizen, and as
long as it continues to exist in its present form, it speaks not only
in the same words, but with the same meaning and intent with which
it spoke when it came from the hands of its framers and was voted on
and adopted _by the people of the United States_. Any other rule of
construction would abrogate the judicial character of the Court, and
make it the mere reflex of the popular opinion or passion of the day.
This Court was not created by the Constitution for such purposes.
Higher and graver trusts have been confided to it, and it must not
falter in the path of duty. (Scott v. Sandford, 19 _How._ 393, at p.
426.)
The high power has been conferred upon this Court of passing judgment
upon the acts of the state sovereignties and of the legislative and
executive branches of the federal government, of determining whether
they are beyond the limits of power marked out for them respectively
by the Constitution of the United States. (Luther v. Borden, 1849, 7
_How._ 1 at p. 47.)
The Court will never be called upon to exercise a higher or graver
trust than to answer the question “Citizen or Subject?”, when the real
challenge is made to the new attempted constitution of government of
men entirely by government. The Court is not unaware that the whole
American people established their Constitution for the one purpose of
protecting individual liberty.
The simple, classical, precise, yet comprehensive language in
which it is couched, leaves, at most, but very little latitude for
construction; and when its intent and meaning is discovered, nothing
remains but to execute the will of those who made it, in the best
manner to effect the purposes intended. The great and paramount
purpose was to unite this mass of wealth and power, for the protection
of the humblest individual; his rights, civil and political, his
interests and prosperity, are the sole _end_; the rest are nothing but
the _means_. (Justice Johnson, Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 _Wheat._ 1, at p.
223.)
Nor will anyone familiar with the unbroken tradition of the Supreme
Court listen, with aught but mingled incredulity and indignation, to
the suggestion that the Court itself has not always understood that it
is itself but a part of the _limited_ government of the one American
people, created by that people as one means to that sole end.
“It is emphatically the province and duty of the Judiciary Department
to say what the law _is_.”
This is the clear statement of Marshall in Marbury v. Madison, 1
_Cranch._ 137, declaring unconstitutional a section of an act of
Congress, which had been passed at the first session in 1789. The
entire Bench and Bar of America, including the Supreme Court, for
fourteen years, had practiced on the assumption that the section was
constitutional. Yet in 1803, the Supreme Court declared it to be
unconstitutional. Nothing could more clearly establish the knowledge of
the Supreme Court that no continued thought (even by the Court itself),
that any command of legislatures is valid, will ever blind the Court to
its bounden duty to announce the fact that the command was made without
authority from the people, when that fact is once made clear to the
Court.
Exactly the same attitude was taken by the Court in relation to an
income tax and a _federal_ limitation on a _national_ power given to
impose direct taxation.
When that federal limitation was imposed it was aimed only at taxation
on land and at what were then known as “poll” or “capitation” taxes.
In the days of the “conventions” where we have sat, all other kinds of
taxation were deemed to be indirect taxation.
In the very early days of the Supreme Court, this knowledge of the
“convention” days was echoed in decisions which, _on that ground_, held
that certain taxes, which today might be regarded as direct taxation,
were not within the federal limitation as to apportionment of direct
taxes among the states. Among those taxes, those imposed without
apportionment, were a tax on carriages and receipts of insurance
companies and on the inheritance of real estate. Even as late as the
days of the Civil War, when a tax was imposed upon incomes and without
apportionment among states, the Supreme Court held that such tax was
not a direct tax within the meaning of “direct tax” to those who
imposed the federal limitation.
Nevertheless, when the income tax law of 1894 had been enacted, its
opponents again carried to the Supreme Court the claim that it violated
the federal limitation on the power of direct taxation, because it did
not apportion the tax among the states. And the Supreme Court, by a
divided vote and on the ground that a tax on the income from land was a
tax on the land itself and consequently a direct tax, held the Income
Tax Law of 1894 to be void. It was by reason of this decision that the
Sixteenth Amendment was proposed and adopted, making the _federal_
change in the Constitution that lifted the _federal_ limitation from
the national power of direct taxation insofar as a tax on incomes was
concerned.
In these decisions, as in the many others which have followed the same
clear American concept of duty and power, the Supreme Court has always
known and followed the reason stated by Hamilton for its existence as
part of the _limited_ government of the one American people.
In _Federalist_, Nos. 78 and 81, appealing to the Americans to make
the Constitution, Hamilton points out that the Constitution does not
authorize the Supreme Court to exercise its will to make the law what
the Court thinks it _ought to be_, but does impose upon the Court the
duty of exercising its judgment to ascertain what the law _has been
made_ by those competent to make it. And then he points out that the
Supreme Court, in this Constitution of a self-governing people, is made
the great bulwark of the people against legislative encroachment upon
the rights or powers of the people reserved to themselves.
This knowledge of Hamilton has been the knowledge of the Supreme
Court from its institution. It has been reiterated and explained and
expounded in that Court from the days of Marshall to our own day. It
has become part and parcel of the great traditions of that Court, which
are the foundation of the great respect which the average American
citizen pays to its decisions and its authority as his own great
protection against usurpation of power by other departments of his
various governments.
And so the average American citizen will look forward with certainty
to the decision of that Court when the _real_ challenge is made to
the existence of the Eighteenth Amendment by an American who does
know and assert the plain facts which mean that either there is no
Eighteenth Amendment or there never has been an American citizen.
It _is_ simple fact that the existence of the Eighteenth Amendment,
that government-made constitution of government of men, is absolutely
incompatible with the existence of a citizen of America. It _is_ simple
fact that the Fifth Article did not grant to state governments or to
any governments the ability to make Articles like the First Article or
the Eighteenth Amendment, or else the Fifth Article made all Americans
“subjects” of a part of the state governments, with omnipotent ability
in those governments to legislate for Americans “in all matters
whatsoever.”
And it is simple fact that the Supreme Court must and will--when the
real challenge is at last made--decide that the Eighteenth Amendment is
not in the _national_ part of the American Constitution because it was
made by governments and not by the “conventions” of the Fifth Article.
Otherwise, in the face of history, in the face of the record of the
“conventions” of the American citizens, and in the face of all that
the Supreme Court has hitherto decided, the Court must decide that the
American citizen has never existed. The possibility that there should
be such a decision is absolutely beyond conception.
What the decision _will_ be was long ago foreshadowed and forecast
by Daniel Webster. It would almost seem as if Webster had heard the
Sheppard claim that the states made the Constitution and that the
states had then agreed between themselves that the governments of
thirty-six of the states, in combination, could command the American
citizen in any matter of his individual freedom. It would almost seem
as if Webster had heard Hughes deny, while his associate lawyers
for the Eighteenth Amendment still asserted with Sheppard, that the
Constitution was a compact between states and then had heard them all
insist that the Fifth Article was a “grant” which made thirty-six
governments of state citizens an omnipotent Parliament over all
citizens of America.
“When the gentleman says, the Constitution is a compact between the
states, he uses language exactly applicable to the old Confederation.
He speaks as if he were in Congress before 1789. He describes fully
that old state of things then existing. The Confederation was, in
strictness, a compact; the states, as states, were parties to it. We
had no other general government. But that was found insufficient, and
inadequate to the public exigencies. The _people_ were not satisfied
with it, and undertook to establish a better. _They_ undertook to
form a general government which would stand on a new basis--not a
confederacy, not a league, not a compact between states, but a
constitution; a popular government, founded in popular election,
directly responsible to the people themselves, and divided into
branches, with prescribed _limits of power_, and prescribed duties.
_They_ ordained such a government; _they_ gave it the name of a
constitution; and therein _they_ established a distribution of powers
between this, their general government, and their several state
governments. When _they_ shall have become dissatisfied with this
distribution, _they_ can alter it. _Their own power over their own
instrument remains._ But until _they_ shall alter it, it must stand as
_their_ will, and is equally binding on the general government and on
the states.” (Webster’s concluding remarks in the reply to Hayne, 4
_Ell. Deb._ 518.)
Is not the same doctrine certain from the Court which knew the whole
Constitution so well that it decided, in the important case of Barron
v. Mayor of Baltimore, supra, p. 376, that the entire Constitution gave
no power of any kind to the state governments? Is not the same doctrine
certain from the Court which held:
The powers the people have given to the General Government are named
in the Constitution, and all not there named, either expressly or by
implication, are reserved to the people, and can be exercised only by
them, or upon further grant from them. (Turner v. Williams, 194 _U.
S._ 279 at 296.)
When the real challenge to the Eighteenth Amendment is presented before
that Court, it will be necessary for the defenders of the Amendment to
abandon the disguise in which they attempt to conceal the real nature
of their Tory concept. No one of them has been bold enough to state
in words the real claim about the Fifth Article. That real claim is
that the Article is a “grant” and that the “grant” gives to thirty-six
governments of state citizens unrestricted ability to interfere with
the freedom of the American citizen on every subject enumerated in the
First Article and on every subject not enumerated in the First Article.
That is not the way any defender of the Amendment states his claim.
It is always stated that those thirty-six governments can change the
Constitution by putting into it anything which the American citizens,
assembled in their “conventions,” can put into it. Our education with
the Americans in the “conventions” has taught us that both statements
are exactly the same statement. If the thirty-six state governments
can make the command to the American citizens which is embodied in the
First Section of the Eighteenth Amendment, by putting that command
into the _national_ part of our Constitution, any thirty-six state
legislatures can make any command to the American citizens on any
subject enumerated or not enumerated in the First Article. The claim,
that the Fifth Article “grants” to the thirty-six state governments
the right to put the command in the Constitution, is identical with
the claim that the Fifth Article “grants” to the state governments the
right to make the command to the citizens of America. A legislative
command to human beings, interfering with their individual freedom,
is a legislative command by whatever name it may be called. Mere
omission to call a legislative command by the usual names, an “Act” or
“Statute,” cannot alter its essential nature.
From June 21st, 1788, the birthday of the American nation of men, there
has been but one possible answer to the question which is the title of
this book. That one answer was known to everyone in the “conventions”
which made the Fifth Article. The Americans in those conventions all
knew that they were becoming “citizens” of America, not “subjects” of
any governments. They knew that they were dispensing part of the power
of the American citizens to Congress in the First Article; _and that
the rest of that power they were reserving to themselves_. They knew
that they were giving no power whatever to the state governments with
whom _they_ never deal except to command those governments.
That is why Pendleton, in the Virginia convention, made his statement
of fact in the oratorical form of a question, because the one answer
to the question was known and “felt and acknowledged by all.” His
statement of fact, made in the oratorical form of a question, is, in
substance, exactly the title of this book:
“Who but the people can delegate powers?... What have the state
governments to do with it?” (3 _Ell. Deb._ 37.)
APPENDICES
APPENDIX I
THE ORIGINAL CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect
Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the
common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings
of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this
Constitution for the United States of America.
Article. I.
Section, 1. All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in
a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and
House of Representatives.
Section. 2. The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members
chosen every second Year by the People of the several States, and the
Electors in each State shall have ^^{the} Qualifications requisite for
Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature.
No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to the
Age of twenty five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United
States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State
in which he shall be chosen.
Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the
several States which may be included within this Union, according to
their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the
whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for
a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of
all other Persons. The actual Enumeration shall be made within three
Years after the first Meeting of the Congress of the United States,
and within every subsequent Term of ten Years, in such Manner as they
shall by Law direct. The Number of Representatives shall not exceed
one for every thirty Thousand, but each State shall have at Least one
Representative; and until such enumeration shall be made, the State of
New Hampshire shall be entitled to chuse three, Massachusetts eight,
Rhode-Island and Providence Plantations one, Connecticut five, New-York
six, New Jersey four, Pennsylvania eight, Delaware one, Maryland six,
Virginia ten, North Carolina five, South Carolina five, and Georgia
three.
When vacancies happen in the Representation from any State, the
Executive Authority thereof shall issue Writs of Election to fill such
Vacancies.
The House of Representatives shall chuse their Speaker and other
Officers; and shall have the sole Power of Impeachment.
Section. 3. The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two
Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof, for six
Years; and each Senator shall have one Vote.
Immediately after they shall be assembled in Consequence of the first
Election, they shall be divided as equally as may be into three
Classes. The Seats of the Senators of the first Class shall be vacated
at the Expiration of the second Year, of the second Class at the
Expiration of the fourth Year, and of the third Class at the Expiration
of the sixth Year, so that one third may be chosen every second Year;
and if Vacancies happen by Resignation, or otherwise, during the
Recess of the Legislature of any State, the Executive thereof may make
temporary Appointments until the next Meeting of the Legislature, which
shall then fill such Vacancies.
No Person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to the Age of
thirty Years, and been nine Years a Citizen of the United States, and
who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State for which
he shall be chosen.
The Vice President of the United States shall be President of the
Senate, but shall have no Vote, unless they be equally divided.
The Senate shall chuse their other Officers, and also a President
pro tempore, in the Absence of the Vice President, or when he shall
exercise the Office of President of the United States.
The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When
sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation. When
the President of the United States ^^{is tried} the Chief Justice shall
preside: And no Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of
two thirds of the Members present.
Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to
removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office
of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the Party
convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment,
Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law.
Section. 4. The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for
Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the
Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or
alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.
The Congress shall assemble at least once in every Year, and such
Meeting shall be on the first Monday in December, unless they shall by
Law appoint a different Day.
Section. 5. Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns
and Qualifications of its own Members, and a Majority of each shall
constitute a Quorum to do Business; but a smaller Number may adjourn
from day to day, and may be authorized to compel the Attendance of
absent Members, in such Manner, and under such Penalties as each House
may provide.
Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its
Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence of two
thirds, expel a Member.
Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to
time publish the same, excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment
require Secrecy; and the Yeas and Nays of the Members of either House
on any question shall, at the Desire of one fifth of those Present, be
entered on the Journal.
Neither House, during the Session of Congress, shall, without the
Consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any
other Place than that in which the two Houses shall be sitting.
Section. 6. The Senators and Representatives shall receive a
Compensation for their Services, to be ascertained by Law, and paid out
of the Treasury of the United States. They shall in all Cases, except
Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest
during their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and
in going to and returning from the same; and for any Speech or Debate
in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place.
No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which he was
elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the
United States, which shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereof
shall have been encreased during such time; and no Person holding any
Office under the United States, shall be a Member of either House
during his Continuance in Office.
Section. 7. All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the
House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with
Amendments as on other Bills.
Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the
Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of
the United States; If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall
return it, with his Objections to that House in which it shall have
originated, who shall enter the Objections at large on their Journal,
and proceed to reconsider it. If after such Reconsideration two thirds
of that House shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall be sent, together
with the Objections, to the other House, by which it shall likewise be
reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of that House, it shall
become a Law. But in all such Cases the Votes of both Houses shall be
determined by yeas and Nays, and the Names of the Persons voting for
and against the Bill shall be entered on the Journal of each House
respectively. If any Bill shall not be returned by the President within
ten Days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him,
the Same shall be a Law, in like Manner as if he had signed it, unless
the Congress by their Adjournment prevent its Return, in which Case it
shall not be a Law.
Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate
and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of
Adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the United States;
and before the Same shall take Effect, shall be approved by him, or
being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate
and House of Representatives, according to the Rules and Limitations
prescribed in the Case of a Bill.
Section. 8. The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes,
Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the
common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all
Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United
States;
To borrow Money on the credit of the United States;
To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
States, and with the Indian Tribes;
To establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the
subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States;
To coin Money, regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin, and fix
the Standard of Weights and Measures;
To provide for the Punishment of counterfeiting the Securities and
current Coin of the United States;
To establish Post Offices and post Roads;
To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries;
To constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court;
To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas,
and Offences against the Law of Nations;
To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules
concerning Captures on Land and Water;
To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use
shall be for a longer Term than two Years;
To provide and maintain a Navy;
To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval
Forces;
To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the
Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions;
To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and
for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service
of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the
Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia
according to the discipline prescribed by Congress;
To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over
such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession
of particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the
Seat of the Government of the United States, and to exercise like
Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature
of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts,
Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings;--And
To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying
into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by
this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any
Department or Officer thereof.
Section. 9. The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of
the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be
prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred
and eight, but a Tax or duty may be imposed on such Importation, not
exceeding ten dollars for each Person.
The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended,
unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may
require it.
No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.
No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion
to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken.
No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State.
No Preference shall be given by any Regulation of Commerce or Revenue
to the Ports of one State over those of another: nor shall Vessels
bound to, or from, one State, be obliged to enter, clear, or pay Duties
in another.
No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of
Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the
Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from
time to time.
No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States: And no
Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under them, shall, without
the Consent of the Congress, accept of any present, Emolument, Office,
or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State.
Section. 10. No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or
Confederation; grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit
Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in
Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law
impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility.
No State shall, without the Consent of ^^{the} Congress, lay any
Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely
necessary for executing it’s inspection Laws: and the net Produce of
all Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on Imports or Exports, shall
be for the Use of the Treasury of the United States; and all such Laws
shall be subject to the Revision and Controul of ^^{the} Congress.
No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of
Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any
Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power, or
engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as
will not admit of delay.
Article. II.
Section. 1. The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the
United States of America. He shall hold his Office during the Term of
four Years, and, together with the Vice President, chosen for the same
Term, be elected, as follows:
Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may
direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and
Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress: but
no Senator or Representative, or Person holding an Office of Trust or
Profit under the United States, shall be appointed an Elector.
The Electors shall meet in their respective States, and vote by Ballot
for two Persons, of whom one at least shall not be an Inhabitant of
the same State with themselves. And they shall make a List of all the
Persons voted for, and of the Number of Votes for each; which List
they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the Seat of the
Government of the United States, directed to the President of the
Senate. The President of the Senate shall, in the Presence of the
Senate and House of Representatives, open all the Certificates, and
the Votes shall then be counted. The Person having the greatest Number
of Votes shall be the President, if such Number be a Majority of the
whole Number of Electors appointed; and if there be more than one
who have such Majority, and have an equal Number of Votes, then the
House of Representatives shall immediately chuse by Ballot one of them
for President; and if no Person have a Majority, then from the five
highest on the List the said House shall in like Manner chuse the
President. But in chusing the President, the Votes shall be taken by
States, the Representation from each State having one Vote; A quorum
for this Purpose shall consist of a Member or Members from two thirds
of the States, and a Majority of all the States shall be necessary to
a Choice. In every Case, after the Choice of the President, the Person
having the greatest Number of Votes of the Electors shall be the Vice
President. But if there should remain two or more who have equal Votes,
the Senate shall chuse from them by Ballot the Vice President.
The Congress may determine the Time of chusing the Electors, and the
Day on which they shall give their Votes; which Day shall be the same
throughout the United States.
No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United
States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be
eligible to the Office of President; neither shall any Person be
eligible to that Office who shall not have attained to the Age of
thirty-five Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident within the United
States.
In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death,
Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the
said Office, the Same shall devolve on the Vice President, and the
Congress may by Law provide for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation
or Inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring
what Officer shall then act as President, and such Officer shall act
accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a President shall be
elected.
The President shall, at stated Times, receive for his Services, a
Compensation, which shall neither be encreased nor diminished during
the Period for which he shall have been elected, and he shall not
receive within that Period any other Emolument from the United States,
or any of them.
Before he enter on the Execution of his Office, he shall take the
following Oath or Affirmation:--“I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I
will faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States,
and will to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect and defend the
Constitution of the United States.”
Section. 2. The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and
Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States,
when called into the actual Service of the United States; he may
require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of
the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of
their respective Offices, and he shall have Power to grant Reprieves
and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of
Impeachment.
He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate,
to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur;
and he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls,
Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United
States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and
which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the
Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the
President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.
The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen
during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall
expire at the End of their next Session.
Section. 3. He shall from time to time give to the Congress Information
of the State of the Union, and recommend to their Consideration
such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient; he may, on
extraordinary Occasions, convene both Houses, or either of them, and
in Case of Disagreement between them, with Respect to the Time of
Adjournment, he may adjourn them to such Time as he shall think proper;
he shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers; he shall take
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed, and shall Commission all the
Officers of the United States.
Section. 4. The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the
United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and
Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.
Article III.
Section. 1. The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested
in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may
from time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme
and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour,
and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation,
which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.
Section. 2. The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law
and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United
States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their
Authority;--to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers
and Consuls;--to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;--to
Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;--to
Controversies between two or more States;--between a State and Citizens
of another State;--between Citizens of different States,--between
Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different
States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign
States, Citizens or Subjects.
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls,
and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have
original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the
supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and
Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress
shall make.
The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by
Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes
shall have been committed; but when not committed within any State, the
Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have
directed.
Section. 3. Treason against the United States, shall consist only in
levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them
Aid and Comfort. No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the
Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in
open Court.
The Congress shall have Power to declare the Punishment of Treason, but
no Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture
except during the Life of the Person attainted.
Article. IV.
Section. 1. Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the
public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.
And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such
Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.
Section. 2. The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all
Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.
A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime,
who shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall on
Demand of the executive Authority of the State from which he fled, be
delivered up, to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the
Crime.
No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws
thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or
Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour, but
shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or
Labour may be due.
Section. 3. New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union;
but no new State shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of
any other State; nor any State be formed by the Junction of two or more
States, or Parts of States, without the Consent of the Legislatures of
the States concerned as well as of the Congress.
The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules
and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging
to the United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so
construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the United States, or of any
particular State.
Section. 4. The United States shall guarantee to every State in this
Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them
against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the
Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic
Violence.
Article. V.
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it
necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the
Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States,
shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either
Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this
Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of
the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the
one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress;
Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One
thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first
and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that
no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of it’s equal Suffrage
in the Senate.
Article. VI.
All Debts contracted and Engagements entered into, before the Adoption
of this Constitution, shall be as valid against the United States under
this Constitution, as under the Confederation.
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby,
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.
The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members
of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial
Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall
be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution; but no
religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office
or public Trust under the United States.
Article. VII.
The Ratification of the Conventions of nine States, shall be sufficient
for the Establishment of this Constitution between the States so
ratifying the Same.
The Word, “the,” being interlined between the seventh and eighth
Lines of the first Page, The Word “Thirty” being partly written on an
Erazure in the fifteenth Line of the first Page, The Words “is tried”
being interlined between the thirty second and thirty third Lines of
the first Page and the Word “the” being interlined between the forty
third and forty fourth Lines of the second Page.
Attest WILLIAM JACKSON Secretary
done in Convention by the Unanimous Consent of the States present the
Seventeenth Day of September in the Year of our Lord one thousand seven
hundred and Eighty seven and of the Independence of the United States
of America the Twelfth. In witness whereof We have hereunto subscribed
our Names,
GO WASHINGTON--Presidt and deputy from Virginia
New Hampshire { JOHN LANGDON }
{ NICHOLAS GILMAN }
Massachusetts { NATHANIEL GORHAM
{ RUFUS KING
Connecticut { WM. SAML. JOHNSON
{ ROGER SHERMAN
New York ALEXANDER HAMILTON
{ WIL: LIVINGSTON
{ DAVID BREARLEY.
New Jersey { WM PATERSON.
{ JONA: DAYTON
{ B FRANKLIN
{ THOMAS MIFFLIN
{ ROBT MORRIS
{ GEO. CLYMER
Pennsylvania { THOS FITZSIMONS
{ JARED INGERSOLL
{ JAMES WILSON
{ GOUV MORRIS
{ GEO: READ
{ GUNNING BEDFORD jun
Delaware { JOHN DICKINSON
{ RICHARD BASSETT
{ JACO: BROOM
{ JAMES MCHENRY
Maryland { DAN OF ST THOS JENIFER
{ DAN. CARROLL
{ JOHN BLAIR
Virginia { JAMES MADISON Jr.
{ WM BLOUNT
North Carolina { RICHD DOBBS SPAIGHT.
{ HU WILLIAMSON
{ J. RUTLEDGE
{ CHARLES COTESWORTH PINCKNEY
South Carolina { CHARLES PINCKNEY
{ PIERCE BUTLER.
{ WILLIAM FEW
Georgia { ABR BALDWIN
APPENDIX II
THE RESOLUTION WHICH PROPOSED THE CONSTITUTION TO THE CONVENTIONS OF
THE PEOPLE OF AMERICA
In Convention Monday September 17th 1787.
Present
The States of
New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Mr. Hamilton from New York,
New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina,
South Carolina and Georgia.
Resolved,
That the preceding Constitution be laid before the United States in
Congress assembled, and that it is the Opinion of this Convention,
that it should afterwards be submitted to a Convention of Delegates,
chosen in each State by the People thereof, under the Recommendation
of its Legislature, for their Assent and Ratification; and that each
Convention assenting to, and ratifying the Same, should give Notice
thereof to the United States in Congress assembled.
Resolved, That it is the Opinion of this Convention, that as soon as
the Conventions of nine States shall have ratified this Constitution,
the United States in Congress assembled should fix a Day on which
Electors should be appointed by the States which shall have ratified
the same, and a Day on which the Electors should assemble to vote
for the President, and the Time and Place for commencing Proceedings
under this Constitution. That after such Publication the Electors
should be appointed, and the Senators and Representatives elected:
That the Electors should meet on the Day fixed for the Election of
the President, and should transmit their Votes certified, signed,
sealed and directed, as the Constitution requires, to the Secretary
of the United States in Congress assembled, that the Senators and
Representatives should convene at the Time and Place assigned; that
the Senators should appoint a President of the Senate, for the sole
Purpose of receiving, opening and counting the Votes for President;
and, that after he shall be chosen, the Congress, together with the
President, should, without Delay, proceed to execute this Constitution.
By the Unanimous Order of the Convention
GO WASHINGTON Presidt
W. JACKSON Secretary.
APPENDIX III
THE FIRST SEVENTEEN AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION
1. Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.
2. A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free
State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be
infringed.
3. No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house,
without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner
to be prescribed by law.
4. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
5. No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand
Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the
Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself, nor to be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation.
6. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have
been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
7. In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no
fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of
the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.
8. Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed,
nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.
9. The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.
10. The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution,
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people.
11. The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens
or Subjects of any Foreign State.
12. The Electors shall meet in their respective states, and vote
by ballot for President and Vice-President, one of whom, at least,
shall not be an inhabitant of the same state with themselves; they
shall name in their ballots the person voted for as President, and
in distinct ballots the person voted for as Vice-President, and they
shall make distinct lists of all persons voted for as President,
and of all persons voted for as Vice-President, and of the number
of votes for each, which lists they shall sign and certify, and
transmit sealed to the seat of the government of the United States
directed to the President of the Senate;--The President of the Senate
shall, in the presence of the Senate and House of Representatives,
open all the certificates and the votes shall then be counted;--The
person having the greatest number of votes for President, shall be
the President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of
Electors appointed; and if no person have such majority, then from the
persons having the highest numbers not exceeding three on the list
of those voted for as President, the House of Representatives shall
choose immediately, by ballot, the President. But in choosing the
President, the votes shall be taken by states, the representation from
each state having one vote; a quorum for this purpose shall consist
of a member or members from two-thirds of the states, and a majority
of all the states shall be necessary to a choice. And if the House of
Representatives shall not choose a President whenever the right of
choice shall devolve upon them, before the fourth day of March next
following, then the Vice-President shall act as President, as in the
case of death or other constitutional disability of the President.--The
person having the greatest number of votes as Vice-President, shall
be the Vice-President, if such number be a majority of the whole
number of Electors appointed, and if no person have a majority, then
from the two highest numbers on the list, the Senate shall choose the
Vice-President; a quorum for the purpose shall consist of two-thirds of
the whole number of Senators, and a majority of the whole number shall
be necessary to a choice. But no person constitutionally ineligible to
the office of President shall be eligible to that of Vice-President of
the United States.
13. Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted,
shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their
jurisdiction. Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this
article by appropriate legislation.
14. Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States,
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several
States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number
of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the
right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President
and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in Congress,
the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of
the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of
such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion,
or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced
in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to
the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.
Section 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress,
or elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil
or military, under the United States, or under any State, who, having
previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of
the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an
executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution
of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion
against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof.
But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such
disability.
Section 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States,
authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and
bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall
not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any State shall
assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection
or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the loss or
emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims
shall be held illegal and void.
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article.
15. Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall
not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude--
Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by
appropriate legislation--
16. The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes,
from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several
States, and without regard to any census or enumeration.
17. The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators
from each State, elected by the people thereof, for six years; and each
Senator shall have one vote. The electors in each State shall have the
qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of
the State legislatures.
When vacancies happen in the representation of any State in the
Senate, the executive authority of such State shall issue writs of
election to fill such vacancies: _Provided_, That the legislature
of any State may empower the executive thereof to make temporary
appointments until the people fill the vacancies by election as the
legislature may direct.
This amendment shall not be so construed as to affect the election
or term of any Senator chosen before it becomes valid as part of the
Constitution.
APPENDIX IV
THE ALLEGED EIGHTEENTH AMENDMENT
Section 1. After one year from the ratification of this article the
manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors within,
the importation thereof into, or the exportation thereof from the
United States and all territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof for
beverage purposes is hereby prohibited.
Sec. 2. The Congress and the several States shall have concurrent power
to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
Sec. 3. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been
ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of the
several States, as provided in the Constitution, within seven years
from the date of the submission hereof to the States by the Congress.
APPENDIX V
THE NINETEENTH AMENDMENT
The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied
or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.
Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation.
Transcriber’s Notes
Minor punctuation errors have been fixed.
Page xvii: “state legislalatures” changed to “state legislatures”
Page 34: “independent governernments” changed to “independent
governments”
Page 76: “This govermnent” changed to “This government”
Page 290: “entire subesquent” changed to “entire subsequent”
Page 432: “the semblence of” changed to “the semblance of”
Page 448: “he appointed” changed to “be appointed”
Page 456: “of the Independance” changed to “of the Independence”
Page 457: “Pensylvania” changed to “Pennsylvania”
Page 458: “the preceeding Constitution” changed to “the preceding
Constitution”