CHAPTER VIII

PHILADELPHIA ANSWERS “CONVENTIONS, NOT LEGISLATURES”

We recall how clearly the Americans at Philadelphia, in 1787, knew

that any grant of _national_ power to interfere with the freedom of

individuals _was_ the constitution of government. We recall the bitter

conflict of opinion, threatening the destruction of the assembly, over

the manner of choosing the members of the legislature to exercise

whatever powers _of that kind_ the citizens of America might grant. We

recall the great opposition to the proposal of a grant of _any_ power

_of that kind_ and to the particular proposal of each of the enumerated

powers _of that kind_, all embodied in the First Article.

We have thus come to know with certainty that the minds of the

Americans at Philadelphia, during those strenuous four months, were

concentrated mainly upon a proposal to grant some _national_ power to

interfere with the human freedom of all Americans. In other words, we

have _their_ knowledge that their proposed First Article, by reason

of its grants of _such_ power, would constitute a new nation and

government of men, if those grants were validly made by those competent

to make _such_ grants.

Under which circumstances, we realize that it became necessary for

them to make a great legal decision, in the construction of basic

American law, and, _before_ making that decision, which was compelled

to be the result of judgment and not of will, accurately to ascertain

one important legal fact. Indeed, their decision was to be the actual

conclusion reached in the effort to ascertain that legal fact. This

was the single question to which they must find the right answer:

“Under our basic American law, can legislatures ever give to government

any power to interfere with the human freedom of men, or must every

government in America obtain its only valid powers _of that kind_ by

direct grant from its own citizens?”

It is easy for us to state that they should have known that the answer

to that question was expressly and authoritatively given in the

Statute of ’76. It was there plainly enacted that every just power of

any government must be derived from the direct grant of those to be

governed by its exercise. Yet our own leaders for the last five years

have not even asked the question, much less known the right answer.

At Philadelphia, in 1787, they _did_ know it. They had no doubt

whatever about it. We shall see that quickly in our brief review of

the record they made at Philadelphia in ascertaining and deciding,

as a legal necessity, to whom their First Article and its enumerated

grants of _national_ power must be sent and, when we boast of how

quickly we knew the answer, we should admit that we did not know it

until _after_ we had lived again with them through their experience of

the preceding ten or twelve years which had educated them, as it has

just educated us, to that knowledge. Furthermore, many of us average

Americans will be unable to explain, until later herein, why, during

the last five years, our own leaders have not known the right answer.

The Statute of ’76 has not been wholly unknown to them. The record of

the Philadelphia Convention and the ratifying conventions has not been

entirely a closed book to them. The important and authentic statements

of Webster and other leaders of past generations have been read by

many of them. If they did not understand and know the correct answer,

as we now realize they have _not_ known, let us not withhold from the

Americans at Philadelphia our just tribute of gratitude that they _did_

accurately know, when it was amazingly important to us that they should

know.

When _those_ Americans came to answer that question, there were

facts which might have misled them as other similar facts of lesser

importance have undoubtedly misled our leaders.

In 1776, from that same Philadelphia had gone a suggestion that a

constitution of government, with Articles granting power to government,

be made in each former colony. In 1787, there had gone from that same

Philadelphia a proposal that a constitution of a general government for

America be made, with Articles granting power to that government. The

proposal of 1776 had suggested that the proposed Articles be made by

the people themselves, assembled in conventions. The proposal of 1777

had suggested that the proposed Articles be made by the legislative

governments of the states. Both proposals, even as to the makers

of the respective Articles, had been acted upon. All the Articles,

although some had been made by the people themselves and others by

legislatures, had been generally recognized as valid law. Some of the

men at Philadelphia in 1787 had been members of the proposing Second

Continental Congress, when the respective proposals of 1776 and 1777

had gone from Philadelphia. When, in 1787, they were called upon to

find and state, as their legal decision, the correct answer to their

important question, it was necessary for them to ascertain, as between

state “legislatures” and the people themselves, in “conventions,”

_which_ could validly make the Articles which had been worded and were

about to be proposed. It would not, therefore, have been beyond the

pale of our own experience if the earlier proposals had misled them and

they had made the wrong answer to the question which confronted them.

Furthermore, as we have already noted, although we can little realize

the influence of such a fact upon men seeking the correct legal answer

to an important question, their whole proposal was a new adventure

for men on an uncharted sea of self-government. Under all of which

circumstances, let us again pay them their deserved tribute that they

went unerringly to the only correct answer.

We know that the essence of that answer is expressed in the Seventh

Article proposed from Philadelphia. Only one answer was possible to

Americans of that generation. They had been “subjects” and had become

“citizens.” They knew the vital distinctions between the two relations

to government.

The Convention which framed the Constitution was, indeed, elected by

the state legislatures. But the instrument, when it came from their

hands, was a mere proposal, without obligation, or pretensions to it.

It was reported to the then existing Congress of the United States,

with the request that it might “be submitted to a convention of

delegates, chosen _in_ each state by the _people_ thereof, under the

recommendation of its legislature, for their assent and ratification.”

This mode of proceeding was adopted; and by the Convention, by

Congress, and by the state legislatures, the instrument was submitted

to the people. They acted upon it in the only manner in which they

can act safely, _effectively_, and wisely, on such a subject, by

assembling in convention. It is true, they assembled in their several

states; and where else should they have assembled? No political

dreamer was ever wild enough to think of breaking down the lines which

separate the states, and of compounding the _American_ people into one

common mass. Of consequence, when they [the _American_ people] act,

they act _in_ their states. But the measures _they_ adopt do not, on

that account, cease to be the measures of the people themselves, or

become the measures of the state governments. From these conventions

the Constitution [_the First Article grants of power to interfere

with individual freedom_] derives its whole authority. The government

proceeds directly from the people; is “ordained and established” in

the name of the people.... It required not the affirmance, and could

not be negatived, by the state governments.... To the formation of a

league, such as was the Confederation, the state sovereignties were

certainly competent.

But, when a general government of America was to be given any national

power to interfere with the individual freedom of its citizens, as in

the First Article of 1787 and in the Eighteenth Amendment of 1917,

acting directly on the people, the necessity of referring it to the

people, and of deriving its powers directly from them, was felt and

acknowledged by all. The government of the Union, then, (whatever

may be the influence of this fact on the case,) is, emphatically,

and truly, a government of the people. In form and _in substance_ it

emanates from them. _Its powers are granted by them_, and are to be

exercised directly on them, and for their benefit. (Marshall in the

Supreme Court, M’Culloch v. Maryland, 4 _Wheat._ 316.)

Marshall was one of the Americans who had been at Valley Forge in

1778, and at other places whose sacrifices _made_ it the basic law of

America that all power over American citizens _must_ be derived by

direct grant from themselves. Later, he was prominent in the Virginia

convention where all Americans in Virginia knew and acted upon this

basic law. These facts qualified him to testify, from the Bench of the

Supreme Court, that _all_ Americans _then_ knew and acknowledged the

binding command of that basic law.

Under such circumstances, it was impossible that the Americans at

Philadelphia should not have known and obeyed that law in the drafting

of their proposed Seventh _and Fifth_ Articles. Both of these Articles,

the Seventh wholly, and the Fifth partly, deal with the _then_

future grant of national power over the people and its only _legal_

gift by direct grant from the people themselves, assembled in their

“conventions.” Both Articles name the people of America, by the one

word “conventions.”

That Philadelphia should not have strayed from the legal road clearly

marked by the Statute of ’76 was certain when we recall how large a

part Madison played at Philadelphia, and particularly how he personally

worded and introduced, in the closing hours at Philadelphia, what we

know as its Fifth Article. As to his personal knowledge of this basic

law, we recall his letter of April, 1787, where he said, “To give

the new system its proper energy, it will be desirable to have it

ratified by the authority of the people, and not merely by that of the

legislatures.” And we recall his later words, when urging Americans to

adopt the Constitution with its Fifth and Seventh Articles, he said of

the Seventh, “This Article speaks for itself. The express authority of

the people _alone_ could give due validity to the Constitution,” to its

grants of power over the people in its First Article. (_Fed._ No. 43.)

That we may fix firmly in our own minds the knowledge which all

Americans _then_ had, which _our_ leaders never acquired or have

entirely forgotten, let us briefly review what the earlier Americans

did at Philadelphia in obedience to that knowledge of basic American

law.

On May 28, Randolph of Virginia “opened the main business” of the

Convention. He proposed fifteen resolutions embodying the suggestion of

what should be in the different Articles. Resolution Number 15 was that

such Articles should be submitted to “_conventions_,” “to be expressly

chosen by the people, to consider and decide thereon.” (5 _Ell. Deb._

128.)

The first short debate on this Resolution took place on June 5. In

it Madison stated that he “thought this provision _essential_. The

Articles of Confederation themselves were defective in this respect,

resting, in many of the states, on the _legislative_ sanction only.”

The resolution was then postponed for further consideration. On June

12, “The question was taken on the 15th Resolution, to wit, referring

the new system to the people of the United States for ratification. It

passed in the affirmative.” (5 _Ell. Deb._ 183.) This was all in the

Committee of the Whole.

On June 13, that Committee made their full report, in which the

Randolph Resolution Number 15 was embodied in words as Resolution

Number 19 of the report. On June 16, while the Convention was again

sitting as a Committee of the Whole, the great struggle was on between

the conflicting opinions as to how and in what proportion should be

elected the future legislators who were to exercise the granted powers

over Americans. On that day, the discussion centered on the relative

merits of the Randolph _national_ proposals and a set of _federal_

Articles amending the existing Federal Constitution. In supporting

Randolph, Wilson of Pennsylvania stated that “he did not fear that the

people would not follow us into a _national_ government; and it will

be a further recommendation of Mr. Randolph’s plan that it is to be

submitted to _them_, and not to the _legislatures_, for ratification.”

(5 _Ell. Deb._ 196.)

On July 23, Resolution Number 19 came up for action. Remembering how

insistent many of the delegates were that the _general_ government

should be kept a purely _federal_ one, it is not surprising to find

Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut opening the short debate with a motion

that the Constitution “be referred to the legislatures of the states

for ratification.” But it will also be remembered that the powers

to be granted in the new Articles had not yet been settled. The

_nationalists_ in the Convention, intent on having some _national_

Articles, knew that the proposed ratification must be by the people

themselves, “felt and acknowledged by all” to be the only competent

grantors of _national_ powers.

Colonel Mason of Virginia “considered a reference of the plan to the

authority of the people as one of the most important and essential

of the resolutions. _The legislatures have no power to ratify it._

They are the mere creatures of the state constitutions, and cannot

be greater than their creators.... Whither, then, must we resort? To

the people, with whom all power remains that has not been given up in

the constitutions derived from them. It was of great moment that this

doctrine should be cherished, as the basis of free government.” (5

_Ell. Deb._ 352.)

Rufus King of Massachusetts, influenced undoubtedly by the error

of thinking that the Convention meant to act within the Articles

of Confederation, was inclined to agree with Ellsworth “that the

legislatures had a competent authority, the acquiescence of the

people of America in the Confederation being equivalent to a formal

ratification by the people.... At the same time, he preferred a

reference to the authority of the people, expressly delegated to

conventions, as the most certain means of obviating all disputes and

doubts concerning the legitimacy of the new Constitution.” (5 _Ell.

Deb._ 355.)

Madison “thought it clear that the legislatures were incompetent to the

proposed changes. These changes would make essential inroads on the

state constitutions; and it would be a novel and dangerous doctrine,

that a legislature could change the constitution under which it held

its existence.” (5 _Ell. Deb._ 355.)

Ellsworth’s motion to send to the state legislative governments, and

not to the people themselves, assembled in “conventions,” was lost by

a vote of seven to three. Resolution Number 19, that the new Articles

must be sent to the people themselves was adopted by a vote of nine to

one, Ellsworth and King both voting for it. (5 _Ell. Deb._ 356.)

This impressive discussion, now continued for over a month of 1787,

with its display of accurate knowledge of the distinction between

sending Articles to legislatures and “_referring_” them to the people,

makes quite amusing what we shall hear later in 1917. It will come

from the counsel of the political organization which dictated that

governments should make the supposed Eighteenth Amendment. After he

kindly tells us that history has proven that these Americans of 1787

“builded more wisely than they knew,” meaning “than he knew,” he

shall later impart to us the remarkable information that “the framers

in the Constitutional Convention knew very little, if anything, about

referendums.”

The Resolutions, which had now become twenty-three in number,

on July 26, were referred to the Committee of Detail to prepare

Articles in conformity therewith. On August 6, that Committee made

its report of twenty-three worded Articles. In Article XXII was

embodied the requirement that the Constitution should be submitted

“to a _convention_ chosen in each state, under the recommendation

of its legislature, in order to receive the ratification of such

_convention_.” This provision, the Philadelphia answer and always the

only legal answer to the question as to who can validly grant power

to interfere with individual freedom, was later seen not properly to

belong in the Constitution itself. For which reason, it was taken out

of the Constitution and embodied in a separate Resolution which went

with the Constitution from Philadelphia.

In Article XXI, the first draft of our Article VII, it was provided:

“The ratification of the _conventions_ of ---- states shall be

sufficient for organizing this Constitution.” (5 _Ell. Deb._ 381.)

The month of August was passed in the great debates on the proposed

grants of national power and the other proposed Articles. When the

Convention was drawing to a close on August 30, Articles XXI and XXII

were reached.

Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania “moved to strike out of Article

XXI the words, ‘_conventions_ of the,’ after ‘ratification,’ leaving

the states to pursue their own modes of ratification.” Rufus King

“thought that striking out ‘_conventions_,’ as the requisite mode,

was equivalent to giving up the business altogether.” Madison pointed

out that, “The people were, in fact, the fountain of all power.” The

motion of Morris was beaten. An attempt was made to fill the blank in

Article XXI with the word “thirteen.” “All the states were ‘No’ except

Maryland.” The blank was then filled by the word “nine” the vote being

eight to three. The two articles were then passed, the vote thereon

being ten to one. (5 _Ell. Deb._ 499-502.)

On September 10, the beginning of the last business week of the

Convention, Gerry of Massachusetts moved to reconsider these two

Articles. The short discussion was not in connection with any matter

in which we are now interested. His motion was lost. The entire set of

worded Articles was then referred to a committee for revising the style

and arrangement of the Articles agreed upon. (5 _Ell. Deb._ 535.)

On Wednesday, September 12, that Committee reported our Constitution,

with its seven Articles, as we know them except for some slight

changes made during the discussions of the last three or four days of

the Convention. In these seven Articles, the language of the earlier

Article XXII did not appear. As it really was the statement of the

correct legal conclusion of the Convention that its proposed Articles,

_because_ they would grant power to interfere with individual freedom,

_must_ necessarily be made by the people themselves, its proper place

was outside the Constitution itself and in a special Resolution of the

same nature as every Congress resolution proposing an amendment to that

Constitution. That was the view of the Committee and, on Thursday,

September 13, the Committee reported such special Resolutions, in the

very words of the former Article XXII. “The proceedings on these

Resolutions are not given by Mr. Madison, nor in the Journal of the

Federal Convention. In the Journal of Congress, September 28, 1787,

Volume 4, p. 781, they are stated to have been presented to that body,

as having passed in the Convention on September 17 immediately after

the signing of the Constitution.” (5 _Ell. Deb._ 602.)

This is the Resolution:

“RESOLVED, That the preceding Constitution be laid before the United

States in Congress assembled; and that it is the opinion of this

Convention, that it should afterwards be submitted to a convention

of delegates chosen in each state by the people thereof, under the

recommendation of its legislature, for their assent and ratification;

and that each convention, assenting to and ratifying the same, should

give notice thereof to the United States in Congress assembled.

“RESOLVED, That it is the opinion of this Convention, that, as soon as

the conventions of nine states shall have ratified this Constitution,

the United States in Congress assembled should fix a day, etc.” (5

_Ell. Deb._ 541.)

This Resolution is the most authoritative statement of the legal

conclusion reached by these leaders of a people _then_ “better

acquainted with the science of government than any other people in the

world.” The conclusion _itself_ was compelled by accurate knowledge

that the government of “citizens” can validly obtain only from the

citizens themselves, by their direct grant, any power to interfere with

their individual freedom. The expression of that knowledge, in the

Resolution, is, in many respects, one of the most important recorded

legal decisions ever made in America. We average Americans, educated

with those Americans at Philadelphia through their experience of the

years between 1775 and 1787, cannot misunderstand the meaning and

importance of that decision. Instructed by our review of their actions

and their reasoning at Philadelphia in reaching that conclusion and

making that legal decision, we know, with an accurate certainty, that

it was their declaration to the world and to us that no proposal from

Philadelphia suggested that Americans again resume the relation of

“subjects” to any government or governments.

Our minds impressed with this accurate knowledge that such was not

their purpose, we now prepare to complete our education as American

citizens, not subjects, by reading the Philadelphia story and language

of their Fifth Article, their only other Article which even _partly_

concerned the future grant of new government power to interfere with

individual American freedom. By reason of _our_ education, we will then

come to the reading of the language of this Article, as the Americans

read it and understood it when they made it in their “conventions” that

followed the proposing convention of Philadelphia.

Being educated “citizens” and not “subjects,” we ourselves will no

longer, as _our_ leaders have done for five years, mistake the only

correct and legal answer to the indignant outburst of Madison, who

wrote this Fifth Article at Philadelphia. “Was, then, the American

Revolution effected, was the American Confederacy formed, was the

precious blood of thousands spilt, and the hard-earned substance of

millions lavished, not that the people of America should enjoy peace,

liberty, and safety, but that the governments of the individual states,

that particular municipal establishments, might enjoy a certain extent

of power, and be arrayed with certain dignities and attributes of

sovereignty? We have heard of the impious doctrine in the Old World,

that the people were made for kings, not kings for the people. Is the

same doctrine to be revived in the New, in another shape--that the

solid happiness of the people is to be sacrificed to the views of

political institutions of a different form?” (_Fed._ No. 45.)

The American answer, from the people of America assembled in the

conventions that ratified that Fifth Article, was a clear and emphatic

“No.” The Tory answer of the last five years, from _our_ leaders and

our governments, has been an insistent “Yes.”

No one, however, with any considerable degree of truthfulness, can

assert that there has come from the American people themselves, during

the last five years, any very audible “Yes.” To whatever extent

individual opinions may differ as to the wisdom or legality of the

new constitution of government of men, made entirely by governments,

no unbiased observer has failed to note one striking fact. By a very

extensive number of Americans otherwise law-abiding, Americans in all

classes of society, the new government edict, the government command to

“subjects,” has been greeted with a respect and obedience strikingly

similar to the respect and obedience with which an earlier generation

of Americans received the Stamp Act and the other government edicts

between 1765 and 1776.

When the Americans of that earlier generation were denounced by the

government which had issued those edicts to its “subjects,” one of

the latter, five years before Americans ceased to be “subjects” of

that government, stated: “Is it a time for us to sleep when our free

government is essentially changed, and a new one is forming upon a

quite different system--a government without the least dependence upon

the people?”

It may be but a coincidence that, while our American government was

announcing its recognition of the wide-spread American disrespect

for the new government edict, it is only a few days since throughout

America there resounded many eulogies of the Samuel Adams, who made

that statement in the Boston _Gazette_ of October 7, 1771. In those

eulogies, there was paid to him the tribute that he largely helped

to bring about the amazing result of American desire for individual

freedom which culminated in the assembling of the Americans in the

“conventions” which ratified the proposed Constitution.

We have already sensed that the existence of the supposed Eighteenth

Amendment depends entirely upon an amazing modern meaning _put into_

the Fifth Article made in those conventions. Let _us_, therefore, who

are Americans now educated in the experience of the Americans who

assembled in those “conventions,” sit therein with them and there read

the story and the language of the Fifth Article as they read it when

they made it.

Citizen or subject? · 第 8 / 17 章