INFANTRY IN ATTACK AND DEFENCE.
=124.= GENERAL PRINCIPLES.
1. It is impossible to lay down a fixed and unvarying system of attack
or defence. Although such system might appear capable of modification
to meet different conditions, yet constant practice in a stereotyped
formation inevitably leads to want of elasticity, accustoms all ranks
to work by rule rather than by the exercise of their wits, and cramps
both initiative and intelligence. In peace exercises, where blank
cartridges take the place of bullets, the inherent and paralysing
defects of a normal system may easily escape notice; in war they betray
themselves in waste of life and failure.
It is therefore strictly forbidden either to formulate or to practise a
normal form of either attack or defence. To the training of the troops
in movements before the enemy, general principles and broad rules alone
are applicable; and the practical knowledge of these principles and
rules can only be instilled by intelligent instruction and constantly
diversified exercises on broken ground.
2. In no two military operations is the situation exactly the same. The
character of the ground, the extent of the co-operation of the other
arms, the strength and _moral_ of the opposing forces, their
physical condition, and the objects they wish to achieve must always
differ.
3. The attitude originally assumed by either, or both, of the opposing
forces, may be reversed during an engagement. A vigorous counter-attack
by an army offering battle in a defensive position may throw the
adversary on the defensive; or an assailant may fight a delaying or
retaining action in one part of the field, while in another part his
action may be essentially offensive; but these and other variations in
a combat resolve themselves in every case into attack and defence.
4. Since the conditions of modern warfare render decentralisation of
command in action an absolute necessity, no good results are to be
expected unless the subordinate leaders have been trained to use their
intelligence, and unless they have been given ample opportunities
of acting on their own judgment in attack and defence, and have
constantly, in peace practices, been called upon to consider the
necessity of departing from their original orders.
Nor can the results be good if commanding officers fail to realise
the very limited extent to which they are able to exert their powers
of command under fire, and if, in peace, they attempt to exercise a
personal control which would be impossible in action. They should
be most careful, therefore, to act in peace practices exactly as
they would in war, and abstain from all interference which would be
impracticable under fire.
5. During the combat, as at all other times, the commander of every
body of troops is responsible for the local protection of his command
against surprise.
6. Ample information, both before and during an engagement, is so
exceedingly important that methodical and complete arrangements should
be made to obtain it. Nothing should be left to chance. All available
means should be employed. In every command some simple method of
collecting and transmitting reports should be established and the
system should have been practised beforehand.
=125.= _Position and Duties of Leaders in Action._
1. The difficulties of command are much increased by the fact that the
leader can no longer personally control and direct all ranks by word of
mouth, and that even under long range fire the mounted officers must
often dismount.
2. During the fight, the commander of a considerable body of infantry
can only influence the course of the action by the employment of his
reserve. Nevertheless, the influence of the commander, if exerted in
the proper manner, viz., by means of clear, comprehensive, and concise
orders, framed after careful reconnaissance, made known to all the
subordinate leaders, and providing for the combined and simultaneous
action of his whole force, will be very great.
3. The commander’s position will, as a rule, be selected so that
he can obtain an extensive view. It should be sufficiently central
to facilitate the receipt of reports and the issue of orders. The
subordinate leaders will take post where they can best exercise
supervision over their commands, watch the enemy, and receive and
transmit orders.
4. Keeping in view the paramount importance of decentralisation of
command, it is essential that superior officers, including battalion
commanders, should never trespass on the proper sphere of action of
their subordinates. Personal example has undoubtedly an extraordinary
influence, especially under heavy fire, and there are times when every
other consideration must be sacrificed to leading or steadying the
troops. But any attempt to exercise personal control over all portions
of the force must inevitably lead to the neglect of other duties, such
as feeding the firing line at the right place and time, protecting the
flanks, meeting counter-attacks, reporting to, or communicating with,
the superior commander, and maintaining connection with adjoining
units. Moreover, all unnecessary changes of position by an officer
commanding any considerable body of troops are to be deprecated, as
interfering with the timely reception and transmission of reports and
orders.
5. No great success can be expected in war, nor is it possible to
develop the powers of judgment in peace, unless each leader is allowed
ample latitude in choosing the means that he considers best adapted
for dealing with tactical situations. It is only when his methods are
manifestly wrong that there should be interference; and it is always to
be remembered, in peace practice, that while negligence, forgetfulness,
and disobedience call for the severest censure, errors of judgment
should be treated differently. It is through mistakes, pointed out and
explained by competent authority, that future error is avoided and a
capacity for correct and rapid decision is developed.
On the other hand, independence which neglects the object indicated in
the orders of the superior, disregards the importance of co-operation,
and imperils, without reason, the unity of command, must be firmly
repressed.
=126.= _Fire Action._
1. The attainment of superiority of fire is a necessary preliminary
to the achievement of decisive success. Fire superiority may be
obtained, other factors being equal, by superiority of numbers, better
leadership, more perfect armament, greater accuracy of fire; better use
of cover; surprise.
Troops should, as a general principle, seek to secure superiority of
fire by accuracy rather than rapidity, but as rapid fire can produce
great results in a short space of time, circumstances will often occur
which will justify the large expenditure of ammunition which its
employment demands.
2. An intelligent distribution of fire is of the first importance. For
example, concentration of fire is of great value, and when there is a
choice of targets, preference should be given to that which, at the
moment, is of the greatest tactical importance.
The great ranging power of the rifle will also frequently afford
opportunities of concentrating fire from a wide frontage on to
important localities, and of directing an effective oblique or enfilade
fire against portions of the enemy’s line.
Even when the enemy is invisible he may be subjected to considerable
loss by directing fire so as to sweep the ground of which he is known
to be in possession.
3. The longer the range the greater will be the volume of fire
necessary to produce effect, and the more important will be an accurate
knowledge of the distance.
4. Economy of ammunition should be effected not by limiting fire
when needed, but by judiciously timing its use, and by reserving
it altogether if no advantage is to be gained. Pauses in fire are
necessary both for the purpose of maintaining control, and for the
regulation of expenditure of ammunition; moreover, sudden bursts of
fire will produce greater results than slow continuous fire.
5. The control of fire is in the hands of the company commanders and
their subordinates. To the company commander, as a general rule,
must be left the choice of the moment of opening fire, but to the
half-company, section and squad leaders, who will be in the firing
line, must be left the choice of targets. They should always bear in
mind, however, that if an exceptionally favourable target presents
itself fire should at once be opened, notwithstanding the fact that
no orders have been received. The only exception to this rule is when
orders have been given that fire is to be withheld until the enemy
comes within a certain range.
=127.= _Fire Discipline._
Fire discipline means strict attention to the signals and orders of
the commander, combined with intelligent observation of the enemy. It
ensures the careful adjustment of the sight, deliberate aim, economy of
ammunition, and prompt cessation of fire when the target disappears, or
the leader sounds his whistle.
It requires of the men endurance of the enemy’s fire, even when no
reply is possible; and, when superior control no longer exists, a cool
and intelligent use of the rifle.
=128.= _Ranges._
================+===============+================+=================
Terms applied to| Rifle. | Field Art. | Heavy Batteries.
ranges. | | |
----------------+---------------+----------------+-----------------
| Yards. | Yards. | Yards.
Distant |2,800 to 2,000 | 6,000 to 4,500 | 10,000 to 6,000.
Long |2,000 to 1,400 | 4,500 to 3,500 | 6,000 to 4,000.
Effective | 1,400 to 600 | 3,500 to 2,000 | 4,000 to 2,500.
Decisive | 600 and under | 2,000 and under| 2,500 and under.
================+===============+================+=================
The extreme width of the area of ground struck by the bullets of an
effective shrapnel is about 25 yards.
The limit of the forward effect of shrapnel at effective range on level
ground is about 300 yards.
The radius of the explosion of a high explosive shell is about 25 yards.
THE ATTACK.
NATURE OF AN OFFENSIVE ACTION.
The normal type of an offensive battle is a methodical progression from
point to point, each successive capture weakening the enemy’s hold
on his main position, and paving the way for a further advance; and
each successive advance being deliberately prepared and systematically
carried out.
=129.= _Distribution of Infantry in the Attack._
1. Infantry, whether in the holding or in the main attack, is formed
into three bodies, distributed in depth:--
The first to develop the attack. This portion will be divided
into _Scouts_ and _Firing Line_, portions of which may be kept
back as _Supports_ until required.
The second to reinforce, and, if possible, to complete the
attack. This portion will consist of _Reserves_ in the hands of
battalion, brigade and other commanders.
The third to be employed, if necessary, in completing an attack,
to confirm a success, or meet an unforeseen emergency. This
portion is termed the _General Reserve_, and remains at the
disposal of the commander of the whole force.
2. The General Reserve should only in very special circumstances fall
short of a quarter of the body to which it belongs.
On the other hand, the leading body of infantry should be as small
as possible, and, exclusive of the supports, should seldom exceed a
quarter of the whole.
=130.= _Preliminary Measures._
1. While the commander, under cover of the advanced guard, is
reconnoitring the position, the infantry of the main body will receive
orders from him to occupy a position of assembly (_i.e._, a position
out of range, and if possible, out of sight), and will assume a
preparatory formation.
2. As a general rule, a portion of the force will be told off to
hold the enemy, another portion to deliver the decisive attack, and
sometimes a third portion to distract the enemy’s attention by feints.
3. It is generally essential that attacks should be delivered against
front and flank simultaneously.
The moral effect of a flank attack is so great that the main effort
will usually be made against the flank.
4. It is advisable that the arrangements for the flank attack should
be made as soon as the enemy’s position has been reconnoitred, and the
force detailed for the operation moved off to a position of assembly
whence it can move directly on the objective.
Surprise is so important an element in outflanking attacks, that every
advantage should be taken of the ground to conceal the movement to this
position of assembly even if the march be somewhat lengthened. The
scouts should be instructed to be more than usually careful to keep out
of sight.
5. The orders for the attack will usually be issued when the troops are
in the position of assembly; more rarely when they are in column of
route. In both cases the procedure will be the same. The subordinate
commanders will be called up and receive their instructions; and
the force told off into three distinct bodies, as laid down in S.
=129=.
6. The modern conditions which obtain on the battlefield tend to
prolong the duration of an action, and it may be several days before
either side can gain a substantial advantage over its adversary.
In such cases arrangements will have to be made for strengthening
localities gained, sending up ammunition, food, and water to the firing
line, and for replacing exhausted troops during the night.
=131.= _Issue of Orders._
1. Before assuming formation for attack every commander will carefully
explain to his subordinates what their particular task is.
The officer commanding will draw attention to any positions or
peculiarities of ground he intends to turn to account during the
advance, indicate the arrangements to be made for a covering fire, and
prescribe, when necessary, which portion of the force is to direct. He
will point out any ground which might favour counter-attack.
2. Verbal explanations should, if possible, be given when the enemy’s
position first comes within view, and the commanders of all ranks
given an opportunity of being shown their objectives, of scrutinising
the ground, and explaining the situation to their subordinates.
3. When the objectives cannot be seen from the spot where the troops
receive their orders, or where, from the character of the intervening
country the objectives cannot be clearly seen through the advance, or
when detours to avoid impassable ground have to be made, the direction
of the attack should be distinctly stated by reference to a map when
possible, and the compass bearing of it given. Staff officers, or
others acquainted with the ground may also be employed to guide the
columns.
4. For further instructions on this subject see “Combined Training,” S.
=115=.
5. It is important that a complete system of signalling between
all parts of an attacking force, in addition to other methods of
communication, should be arranged, S. =124= (6).
=132.= _Duties of the several bodies._
1. _Scouts, Firing Line and Supports._--The duties of the scouts are
detailed in S. =87=.
When scouts can advance no farther they will lie still until absorbed
by the advancing firing line.
The duties of the firing line are to gain ground to the front, and, if
checked by a superior fire, to hold on until reinforced.
The supports reinforce the firing line as soon as the latter can make
no further progress.
It is undesirable that all the supports should be thrown into the
firing line simultaneously. It will very often happen that only certain
portions of the firing line are hard pressed or unable to advance,
whilst during the advance to decisive range a crowd of men in the
firing line is always to be avoided. On the other hand, in certain
conditions, especially on very open ground, to hold back at the outset
portions of the force allotted to the firing line may result in their
not being able to go forward at all when required to reinforce, or in
serious losses when doing so.
2. _The Reserves._--The reserves provide the reinforcements required to
bring the firing line up to its maximum density of one rifle per yard,
and to maintain it at such until a superiority of fire over the defence
has been gained; a portion of the reserves should be held in hand, if
possible, to furnish the further reinforcements and impetus necessary
to deliver the assault, S. =137=.
The reserves will also cover the advance of the firing line by long
range fire, wherever the ground will admit of it; when opportunity
occurs they bring an outflanking fire on the enemy’s position; they
protect the flanks against counter-attack; and, in addition, may be
called on to supply a fresh firing line after a successful assault,
should the enemy take up a second position.
3. _The General Reserves._--This force, which is under the direct
control of the commander of the whole force, is to be employed to
meet eventualities; it should be prepared to meet counter-attacks,
and in the case of success to march rapidly to the front to take up
the pursuit; in the case of a reverse the general reserves may serve
as a rallying point, but before deciding to hold back such portion of
his force for this purpose, the commander must consider whether he
cannot achieve success by employing the whole of his available force in
breaking down the defence.
A commander can only exercise a direct influence on his command so
long as he retains at his disposal a portion of his force with which
to meet the varying contingencies of an engagement. If he keeps in
his own hands a strong reserve, he will have it in his power to take
instant advantage of any mistake the enemy may commit, to restore the
battle should the leading troops meet with a serious check, to meet a
counter-attack, or, in case of need, to provide the additional strength
required to drive the attack home.
=133.= _Infantry Formations with Regard to Fire._
1. _Beyond distant ranges_ formations in lines of columns are generally
convenient for infantry about to attack.
_At long ranges_ infantry in large deep columns offer a better target
to hostile fire than when in line. But troops in lines of small columns
are less vulnerable than when in line, as they are able to take more
advantage of the ground.
_At effective ranges_ troops in any formation except lines of
skirmishers will suffer heavy losses.
_At decisive ranges_ the extended line must be considerably reinforced
in order to bring an effective fire to bear against the defence, for no
advance can be made within this zone until the enemy’s fire is greatly
shaken.
2. It may be concluded, then, that infantry attacking a well armed
enemy across open ground will, in the initial stages of the attack,
be in lines of company columns, which, as effective ranges are
approached, will give way to lines of skirmishers widely extended;
and that as decisive ranges are approached and it becomes necessary
to break down the enemy’s fire, to enable any further advance to be
made without undue loss, the firing line will have to be reinforced
until eventually, in order to obtain the maximum fire effect and thus
establish a superiority of fire, it contains as many men as can use
their rifles effectively.
=134.= _Fire._
1. As a general principle troops should, if possible, not be launched
to the decisive attack unless their movements can be covered by the
fire action of other bodies specially told off for this purpose, and
posted in such a position that they can watch the progress of the
attack. The fire of such bodies will necessarily be delivered at long
range. The firing line, however, should endeavour before opening fire
to advance as close to the enemy’s position as possible consistent
with not suffering undue losses. The actual distance at which fire
should be opened must depend on the effect of the enemy’s fire. Minor
losses may be accepted, but sooner or later, according as the ground
is favourable or unfavourable, the severity of the enemy’s fire will
render a reply imperative.
2. To enable the attack to be prosecuted it is clear that from
this moment the hostile fire must be met by fire of greater power,
its intensity and duration being dependent on the effect produced.
Moreover, from this point forward movement will, as a rule, be
contingent on the mutual fire support afforded to one another by
neighbouring bodies, and on the effects produced by the covering fire
brought to bear on the enemy’s line whenever the ground admits of such
action, by supports, reserves and the troops specially told off for
this purpose.
Covering fire should be delivered so as to strike the enemy, disturb
his aim, and compel him to seek shelter when the assailant is exposed
or in difficulties. In such circumstances intensity of fire is of the
first importance; but fire should be reserved when the assailant’s
progress is satisfactory, or when he is under cover.
3. It has been stated that the assailant in a decisive attack should,
except in the case of troops detailed for covering fire, reserve
his fire for those ranges at which fire action is likely to be most
effective, but in certain circumstances it may be advantageous to
commence firing at long range.
For example:--
(i) By troops engaged in a flank attack, in order to secure the
advantages of enfilade fire.
(ii) When a favourable target presents itself.
(iii) In a holding, or demonstrative action, to prevent the
enemy from changing his position, or to deceive him as to the
true objective.
(iv) To concentrate a powerful fire from an extended frontage on
an important locality in the hostile position.
(v) To oblige the enemy to expose his dispositions.
(vi) In pursuit.
(vii) In siege warfare, to harass the enemy.
4. Long range fire requires a large expenditure of ammunition, and
it is necessary, if it is to produce a corresponding effect, and if
waste of cartridges is to be avoided, that it should be carefully
controlled and concentrated, and that the distance should be accurately
ascertained; or if this is not possible, that a considerable depth of
ground should be evenly swept by fire by the use of combined sights.
=135.= _Co-operation between Artillery and Infantry in the
Attack._
1. Both in attack and defence the most intimate co-operation between
the artillery and infantry must be aimed at, if the latter are to
derive the full advantage of the support of the former. In the
preliminary stages of the attack the advance of the infantry will draw
the fire of the defence and thus find a target for the artillery,
whilst the fire of the latter, combined with that of other covering
bodies, will enable the firing line to approach in extended order
towards the enemy’s position without undue loss.
2. In the subsequent fire action the artillery and infantry must
co-operate in shaking the fire of the defence so as to admit of the
further advances of the firing line, which should take advantage of the
slackening of the fire of the defence, caused by the fire of the quick
firing artillery covering the advance, to push in closer to the enemy’s
position.
3. At the crisis of the engagement, preparatory to the assault, the
artillery and infantry must combine to bring the heaviest possible
fire to bear against the point or points against which it is proposed
to drive home the attack, in order that a superiority of fire over the
defence may be rapidly established; and at no other time is the close
co-operation so important, if the full effect of the two arms is to be
obtained.
=136.= _The Decisive Attack._
The procedure of the troops engaged in the decisive attack is governed
by the following principles:--
1. Success largely depends on the close and intelligent co-operation of
all parts of the force engaged, and the attacks delivered by different
portions of the force should as a rule be simultaneous, for this
purpose communication between them must be carefully maintained.
2. The main object of the attack is to attain a superiority of fire by
establishing the strongest possible firing line, on good fire positions
within decisive range of each objective, preparatory, if necessary, to
capturing it by an assault. Whether the objective be the defenders main
position, or an advanced position, the attack will be conducted on the
same principle.
3. To reach decisive range with as little loss as possible, the
advance, which will be covered by the fire of the artillery and
reserves, should be rapid and energetic, and be made in successive
lines of skirmishers widely extended and preceded by scouts; the firing
line should avoid opening fire until either the defenders, or their
position, can be clearly distinguished, if the results are to justify
the delay and expenditure of ammunition entailed; when once this point
is reached, the first line of skirmishers should be reinforced in order
that the fire may be effective, S. =134= (2).
The further advance will now be a matter of the greatest difficulty,
for the reinforced firing line will offer a considerable target to the
defenders, and that at decisive range; it will only be possible to
approach closer to the enemy when the movement of one portion of the
firing line is supported by the fire of the remainder, but whether the
advance to the next fire positions is to be made by alternate rushes
of complete portions of the firing line, or by pushing forward a few
extended men as from a fresh starting point, covered by the fire of
the rest, and gradually reinforcing them, thus building up a fresh
firing line, must depend on varying circumstances such as the nature
of the ground and the volume of the enemy’s fire, and the choice of
method must therefore be left to subordinate commanders, who alone will
possess any control at this stage of the fight.
4. On open ground and at effective ranges long lines of men rising
simultaneously, and making even short rushes forward, will generally
suffer heavier losses than small bodies suddenly moving forward, as the
latter surprise the enemy, and thus for a time avoid his aimed fire.
The rush should be continued only as long as the surprise lasts. The
closer the ranges, the shorter should be the rushes.
5. It is by no means necessary that the firing line should be
everywhere of the same density. It is from covered positions that fire
is most effective; and it is at these points, therefore, that force
should be concentrated.
6. The firing line, which will be continually strengthened by
successive reinforcements, will thus fight its way forward until the
immediate objective is enveloped, or partially enveloped, at the
closest range by a strong firing line, which, in combination with the
artillery will bring as powerful a fire as possible to bear against
the defence, in order to rapidly establish a superiority of fire
preparatory to the assault.
7. Positions affording cover in advance of the enemy’s main position,
which may be seized or occupied, should, if necessary, be put in a
state of defence; here the troops will re-form and a further advance
made by repeating the process of attack against the next objective, as
from a fresh starting point.
=137.= _The Assault._
As soon as it becomes evident that superiority of fire has been
attained, which is generally made known by movements to the rear along
the enemy’s line, or by the decreasing accuracy and volume of his fire,
the troops detailed to drive home the attack will close in on the
firing line, and carry it forward to the assault.
The signal for this decisive movement should, as a rule, come from the
senior officers present, and be sounded on the bugle. But the method of
advance must be left to the company officers, for at such short range
it is not possible to transmit the necessary orders all along the line.
During the delivery of the assault on the enemy’s position, the men
will cheer, bugles be sounded, and the pipes played.
If the assault is successful, the attacking troops should pursue the
enemy with their fire and re-form for a further advance.
=138.= _Rallying and Redistribution._
After each successful assault, the task of rallying the men, and
of forming a defensive line until the advance can be resumed,
will generally fall to the subordinate leaders. This will be much
facilitated if there are bodies in rear, well in hand, which can be
sent forward to carry on the attack, and, as may sometimes be possible,
rush the enemy’s second position before he has recovered from the loss
of the first.
All important points won should be at once placed in a state of
defence, with a view to serving as supporting points for a fresh
advance, S. =136= (7), and “Combined Training,” S. =122=.
=139.= _Holding Attacks._
1. In order to prevent the enemy from reinforcing that portion of his
line against which it is intended to drive home the decisive attack,
other portions of his line, and particularly that portion near which
his reserves are believed to be, must be threatened or held by a
display of force. In order to mislead the enemy as to the direction
of the main attack, and to prevent him, when the crisis of the fight
approaches, from thinning those portions of the line which are only
threatened, and meeting the decisive attack with nearly his whole
strength, the troops engaged in the holding attack must act with
vigour when the attack develops, and be prepared to convert their
demonstration into a real attack as soon as the right moment arrives.
2. These troops must therefore be in sufficient strength to enable them
to advance against the enemy’s position with a good chance of success.
As a rule, it will be advisable in the preliminary stages of the action
to extend the firing-line at wide intervals, to keep the reinforcing
lines well back, and, owing to the danger of a counter-attack, not to
permit the firing-line, unless the ground is peculiarly favourable, to
advance within decisive range, S. =145= (2). Sudden outbursts of
heavy fire at different points, and the use of machine guns, will give
effect to demonstrations.
=140.= _Feints._
Feints are in their nature much like holding attacks, but are usually
carried out by small forces which have little offensive power. The
feint should not be made prematurely, otherwise its true character will
become apparent to the enemy too soon.
The endeavour of the commander of a party told off to feint will be
to divert the enemy’s attention from the locality whence the decisive
attack will be launched. He should be allowed great independence in
action.
=141.= _Flank Attacks._
Troops told off to outflank the enemy will generally act on identically
the same lines as those detailed to assail the front, for, as a rule,
flank attacks are locally frontal attacks. The very fact that he is
being attacked simultaneously from two different directions, that his
line of retreat is threatened, and that a part of his force is exposed
to enfilade fire, must have a most serious effect on the enemy’s
_moral_, and consequently on the accuracy of his aim, and the
promptitude of his manœuvres; whilst the new front will probably not be
so strong naturally as the main front. The flank of a position should,
therefore, be the object of particular attention. If the force detailed
for an outflanking movement actually succeeds in placing itself in
prolongation of the enemy’s line, before he can change position, or
while he is in the act of changing position, a surprise will have
been effected, and if the opportunity is utilised with due vigour, an
immediate and overwhelming success should be the result.
=142.= _Surprises._
If the enemy is surprised, it is of the utmost importance to
reach decisive range as rapidly as possible, and to increase the
demoralisation which the surprise will have already produced by
pressing forward to close quarters with the greatest energy. In such
conditions, the deliberate advance from cover to cover, and the gradual
building up, by means of successive reinforcements, of a powerful
firing-line, should be discarded, and the firing-line be strong from
the very first. Nevertheless, it will still be necessary to retain a
portion of the attacking force in reserve to meet counter-attacks and
unforeseen contingencies.
=143.= _Local flanking fire._
The incidents of a battle and the nature of the ground constantly offer
opportunities, even to troops engaged in a frontal attack, for bringing
an enfilade or oblique fire to bear upon part of the enemy’s line, thus
facilitating the advance of other portions of the attacking force, or
even causing the evacuation of some important post. Commanders of all
ranks, therefore, however small the parties they command, must always
be on the look-out for such opportunities of lightening the task of
their comrades.
=144.= _Formations._
1. The preparatory formation of infantry is line, or lines, of
battalions in lines of company columns at varying intervals and
distances.
2. After leaving the position of assembly, formations will be regulated
by commanders in conformity with the rules laid down in S. =133=.
3. The firing line will, except in the preparatory stages of the
attack, be in skirmishing order, though in the final stages of the
attack, preparatory to the assault, the men may be as close to one
another as will admit of them using their rifles effectively. In open
ground the bodies in rear will also be in skirmishing order; but during
a protracted fight, when the firing-line is making slow progress,
officers commanding bodies in rear of the firing-line should utilise
all cover, closing them sufficiently to enable them to execute any
manœuvre that may be ordered without confusion or delay.
4. In wooded or close country, or when there is no chance of coming
under unexpected fire, the bodies in rear of the firing-line may move
in lines of company columns.
5. These bodies should move in as compact a formation as the nature
of the ground allows; but the importance of a rapid extension to the
front should always be held in view. Battalions or companies echeloned
to the rear in order to protect a flank should adopt a formation which
will enable them to change direction in order to meet cavalry or
counter-attack with the utmost rapidity.
=145.= _Frontage._
1. The frontage occupied in attacking, having regard to the fact that
the position should be enveloped, must as a rule be greater than that
of the defence. It is unnecessary, however, that the attacking force
should be in equal strength along the whole front. Those portions of
the position against which the main attack is not directed should be
engaged by a holding attack, and the flank which is not to be seriously
attacked may be observed or merely threatened by a feint. Troops
engaged in holding attacks and feints should try to deceive the enemy
as to their real strength. They may occupy, therefore, a comparatively
wider front than the troops detailed for the decisive attack.
2. Troops engaged in a decisive attack must follow a different
procedure. The object is to establish the strongest possible
firing-line at decisive range from the position, S. =153= (1).
Against a weak enemy, however, or an enemy holding an exposed position,
or when the advance is covered by a very superior artillery fire, the
frontage allotted to a battalion may be greater than under normal
conditions. But it is always to be borne in mind that troops extended
at very wide intervals are peculiarly susceptible to counter-attack,
and that their attack is certain to lose in vigour and resolution.
3. In the case of a company, or small force, attacking independently
the men need not be so close as in the case of larger forces.
=146.= _Distances._
1. The distances between the several bodies in which troops are
distributed for attack depend upon the nature of the ground, and
the weapons of the enemy, and they must be fixed by the officers in
immediate command.
2. The scouts should be sufficiently far in advance of, and on the
exposed flanks of, the firing-line, to protect it from surprise.
In close or undulating country it will be necessary to provide for
connecting links in order that there may be no danger of touch with
the advanced scouts being lost, and of reports, verbal or by signal,
failing to reach the commanders of the firing-line. In wooded country
the distance may be decreased.
3. In close country, and in wood-fighting, the distances between the
several bodies into which an attacking force is divided should seldom
exceed 200 yards. In open ground greater distances are necessary,
except against a badly-armed enemy.
4. The distance of the general reserve should be usually greater than
that between the other bodies in order that it may not be prematurely
drawn into the fight.
5. The general rule is that the troops in rear should be brought closer
to the firing-line, the nearer the moment for the assault approaches.
=147.= _Intervals._
An arbitrary rule as regards intervals is undesirable. Each portion of
the force engaged will generally be told off to attack a particular
section of the enemy’s line, and the frontage to be occupied by each
left to the discretion of their commanding officers. It is essential
that there should be a clear understanding as to responsbility for
searching, and, if necessary, clearing, all dangerous ground which lies
between units. This should be notified in the orders for attack.
=148.= _Direction and Pace._
1. Each unit should be given a point to move on. Nevertheless, in
moving through woods, or over ground so close that it is impracticable
to fix a point to march upon, a unit of direction, which should march
by compass bearing, or by some well-defined landmark, such as a road
or stream, is the only means of avoiding confusion and delay, S.
=131= (3).
2. A change in the direction of the line of march is effected by giving
a fresh point or points to move on.
3. When once a firing-line has been formed, a change of direction
under fire will be effected either as described in S. =48=, or by
forming a new firing-line in the required direction from the troops in
rear, the old firing-line being withdrawn.
4. Undue rapidity tends to exhaust the men, and thus impair the
accuracy of their fire. During the earlier stages of the attack, the
ordinary pace should, therefore, be maintained.
5. When the defender’s fire begins to tell seriously the advance must
be continued according to circumstances as laid down in S. =136=
(3).
=149.= _Machine Guns._
1. The effective use of a machine gun depends on the promptitude of its
commander in utilising opportunities which are, as a rule, very brief.
2. Machine guns form an integral part of the battalion to which
they belong, and will, as a rule, be employed under the orders of
its commander. This should not, however, prevent general officers
commanding brigades from detaching machine guns from their battalions,
especially in the case of reserve battalions, and employing them either
massed or in groups should the tactical situation so demand. It must
be remembered, however, that when massed their position will be more
easily discovered, and they will form a large and vulnerable target for
the enemy’s fire.
3. Machine guns may be employed with advantage in the attack in the
following conditions:--
(i) To cover the advance of the firing line by engaging the
enemy from positions in close support of it.
The gun should generally be regarded as a long range weapon and
in ordinary open ground it would rarely be advisable to push it
into the firing line, where it would offer a conspicuous target
to the fire of the enemy, but in a broken or enclosed country,
where the gun could be brought up under cover, occasions may
arise where it could be usefully employed in a forward position.
When the ground is favourable, the gun would with advantage
accompany that portion of the reserves told off to cover the
advance of the remainder by long-range fire.
(ii) To bring a concentrated fire on any particular spot.
(iii) To assist in repelling counter-attacks to which the firing
line may suddenly become exposed, and in the protection of the
flanks against cavalry or counter-attack.
(iv) To bring fire to bear upon an enemy from a position on a
flank of the battalion. The gun would, when so placed, be less
liable to draw the fire of the enemy upon the infantry which it
is supporting.
(v) To give effect to holding attacks by sudden outbursts of
fire.
(vi) To establish possession of points gained.
4. The machine gun commander must be fully acquainted with the orders
given to the infantry he is acting with and with all subsequent orders
issued. It is his business to watch his infantry, and conform to their
movements and keep touch generally. He should be allowed great liberty
of action.
5. Especial care must be exercised to bring the gun into action without
exposing it, and to screen it when in action. Machine guns should
generally be used singly, though occasions may occur when it may be
advisable to use them in pairs.
THE COMPANY IN ATTACK.
=150.= GENERAL RULES.
1. In executing an attack independently, the company commander will
employ his four sections in accordance with the principles laid down
in the preceding pages. He will see that his advance is protected by
scouts; and after as thorough a reconnaissance as his means permit, he
will carefully explain to the subordinate leaders and men the object
to be attained and the plan of action, and will make certain that all
understand what is expected of them. He will tell off the company into
firing-line and support, arrange, if possible, for outflanking the
enemy, keep a small reserve in his own hand, and act generally in the
same manner as the commander of a considerable force.
2. In executing an attack in conjunction with the remainder of the
battalion, the company commander must explain to his subordinates and
men the orders he has received, and the method in which he intends to
carry them out. During the advance he should place himself where he can
best watch the firing-line and the enemy, and at the same time issue
orders to his support. His duties in action are as follows:--
(i) He will detach scouts to the front, and if necessary to the
flanks, to cover his advance.
(ii) He will be careful to co-operate with the companies on his
flanks, to cover their advance by fire, and to maintain the
direction.
(iii) He will keep the battalion commander acquainted with any
change in the dispositions of the enemy, and pass on any useful
information received from the scouts.
(iv) He is responsible that his supply of ammunition is
complete, and will make the necessary arrangements to bring up
a further supply; he will also ensure that the ammunition of
disabled men is collected and distributed.
(v) He will exercise a general control over the fire of his
company.
(vi) He will, if opportunity offers, lend aid to other companies
by enfilading, or firing obliquely on, a portion of the enemy’s
line.
(vii) He will lead his company in the assault.
(viii) If the assault succeeds, he will lose no time in rallying
and reforming his company, in replenishing ammunition, and if
necessary securing the position against counter-attack by means
of entrenchments.
3. When two or more officers are present with a company, one will
always be with the firing line.
4. Half-company commanders in the firing line will place themselves
where they can best supervise the skirmishers. Their duties in action
are as follows:--
(i) They must be constantly on the look out for the signals of
the company commander, and of the scouts.
(ii) They must maintain the direction.
(iii) They will see that fire is not wasted, and that it is
concentrated on important targets.
(iv) They will observe the enemy’s movements, and report at once
to the company commander.
(v) If the assault succeeds, they will lose no time in rallying
and reforming their half-companies.
(vi) During the advance they will take all leaderless men of
other companies and corps under their command, and keep them
until the action is over, or the force re-forms.
5. The frontage occupied by a company acting independently depends on
the nature of the operation. There may be a considerable gap between
the frontal and the flank attacks; and a portion of the company,
extended at wide intervals, may be told off merely to hold the enemy,
while the remainder, at closer intervals, make the decisive attack.
The rule that a strong firing-line should be established in a good
fire-position at a decisive range must always be observed by the
portion of the company which is told off for the decisive attack; and
although the men need not be so close as in the case of larger forces,
still, to dislodge an enemy of nearly equal strength, the firing-line,
at decisive range, should not be weaker than one rifle to every two or
three yards of front.
6. When the company is acting in concert with the remainder of the
battalion, its frontage, as a rule, will be assigned by the battalion
commander.
7. The company commander must always be guided by circumstances in
deciding on the strength of his firing-line, and on the formation of
the remainder. The general procedure will be to gradually reinforce
the scouts, when they are checked by the enemy’s fire, and thus build
up a firing line, which, at decisive range, shall be strong enough to
gain superiority over the enemy’s fire. This procedure is, however,
by no means to be regarded as invariable. It might be desirable, for
instance, to deploy the whole company at once in the firing line.
S. =153= (3). This may sometimes be advisable on open ground
without cover, when less loss would be incurred than by gradually
reinforcing a weaker firing-line.
8. In order that tactical unity may be maintained as long as possible,
it will usually be advisable that complete squads or sections be
extended on the first advance, further reinforcements being furnished
by the other squads of the same sections, or other sections of the same
half company.
THE BATTALION IN ATTACK.
=151.= GENERAL RULES.
1. The battalion commander is practically in the same position as the
commander of a brigade, with the exception that he has under him eight
small units instead of four large units.
2. Nevertheless, so limited are his powers of personal control upon the
field of battle, that success, as a rule, will depend on the clearness
and comprehensiveness of the order which commits his companies to the
attack, as well as on the manner in which he has trained his company
leaders. It is of importance, therefore, that the battalion should
never be hurried into action; but that time should be taken for a
survey of the ground, for the issue of orders, and for the instructions
to be given by the company leaders to their subordinates and the men.
3. A battalion, whether acting alone or forming part of a larger force
engaged in an attack, will be sub-divided into three bodies, viz.,
firing-line, supports and reserves, on the same principle as laid down
in S. =129=. The firing-line, which in the first instance will
not exceed a quarter of the whole battalion, will usually be furnished
by the same companies as the supports, whilst the reserves will be
supplied by the remainder, and be under the direct control of the
battalion commander.
When the battalion forms part of a larger force, the commander will
employ his reserves in strengthening such portions of his firing-line
as most require reinforcement, the whole battalion, as a rule, being
eventually absorbed into the firing-line.
4. When the battalion is acting independently, the commanding officer
will act on the same principles as the commander of a larger force.
He will detail certain companies for the flank attack, and others
if necessary, for a holding attack, or for a feint. He will make
arrangements from the companies of the reserve for the protection of
the flanks against counter-attack, and if the ground permits, for
covering the advance by long-range fire. He will retain a portion of
his battalion as a general reserve at his own disposal; and select a
portion of the enemy’s line against which the decisive attack will be
pressed home.
He will assign a portion of the objective to each company that forms
part of the firing-line; but it should seldom be necessary for him, if
his company leaders are well trained, to indicate the formation to be
adopted.
5. The battalion, on reaching the zone of distant fire, will form lines
of company columns, preceded, and, if necessary, flanked by scouts.
6. It is impossible to lay down any rule as to the number of companies
in the firing-line. But it is always advisable, when the battalion
first forms for attack, whether it is acting alone or with others, to
put in no more than are actually required at the moment; the remainder
being kept well in hand, but in such formations as will enable them to
take advantage of cover, and avoid unnecessary loss.
Before the enemy’s exact position is ascertained, the advance must be
cautious and deliberate, and it is dangerous in such circumstances to
place several companies alongside one another on a broad frontage.
=152.= _Orders._
The orders issued to a battalion will differ in degree but not in
principle from those given to a larger force, S. =131=; as a rule
they will be issued verbally, but in any case they should be personally
explained by the commanding officer when the position comes into view.
=153.= _Distribution of the companies in the decisive attack._
1. In order to establish a strong firing-line within decisive range
of the enemy’s position, it is desirable that, making allowance for
losses, there should be, at the commencement of the attack, at least
125 rifles to every 100 yards of front, exclusive of that portion of
the reserves which will furnish the final reinforcement necessary to
deliver the assault. These 125 men are disposed in several bodies, the
bodies in rear, _i.e._, the supports and reserves, supplying the
successive reinforcements which gradually build up the firing-line to
its maximum strength.
2. Whether these 125 rifles are furnished by two or more companies must
be determined by the commanding officer.
3. To extend whole companies in the firing-line at the outset, the
supports being formed from other companies, is a proceeding which can
seldom be justified; leading as it must to a premature admixture of
tactical units, and to the surrender, at an unnecessarily early period,
of the control of the firing-line. The rule that all reinforcements
should be furnished as long as possible by the same unit should never
be infringed.
4. When the battalion is acting in concert with other units, the
frontage assigned to it, if the attack is intended to be decisive, must
be in proportion to its strength.
5. Battalions should be constantly exercised in forming for the attack
from a position of assembly, the frontage being always varied, and
a different number of companies told off to the firing-line and the
reserve. It is only by practice that a commanding officer can acquire
the facility of recognising at once how many companies should be
extended in firing-line, and how many allotted to the reserve.
=154.= _The firing-line and supports._
The formation of the firing-line and supports, and the distance of
the latter from the firing-line, will be determined by the company
commanders. There is no necessity that these should be the same in
every company so long as the general principles laid down for the
attack are intelligently applied.
=155.= _The reserve._
1. Next to the conception of a sound plan of attack, and the issue
of clear and comprehensive orders to the company commanders, the
most important duty of the officer commanding a battalion is the
handling of his reserve. It is by means of the reserve that he makes
his influence felt in action, and by reinforcing the firing-line at
the right time and at the right place keeps the attack moving and
eventually attains the superiority of fire. But judicious feeding of
the firing-line is not all that is required. Not only must its flanks
be protected, and its advance covered by long-range fire; but if the
enemy is well-trained, counter-attack is always to be apprehended;
and--what is also dangerous--a sudden reinforcement of the defence,
when the struggle for fire-superiority is at its height may take
place. It should be the aim, then, of the officer commanding, so to
husband his reserve, that while prosecuting the attack with vigour by
means of timely reinforcements, he may still have a sufficient force
at his disposal to meet emergencies. From first to last, therefore,
he should retain at least a portion of the reserve in his own hand,
for even a half-company may be of the greatest service in repelling a
sudden counter-attack, or in forming a rallying point if the attack is
repulsed.
2. If heavy losses are to be expected before a strong firing-line can
be established within decisive range of the enemy’s position, the
reserve should be stronger than the firing-line and supports. If,
on the other hand, the opposition is weak, or decisive range can be
reached under cover, the reserve may be of the same strength as the
firing-line and supports. It is to be observed, however, that the
firing-line and supports here alluded to are those engaged in the
decisive attack; companies engaged in a holding attack, or in a feigned
or false attack, are not to be counted when calculating the strength of
the reserve.
3. It may be advisable to divide the reserve into two distinct bodies,
one following the flank attack, the other the frontal attack.
4. When the flanks (or flank) of the battalion are exposed, a portion
of the reserve will be told off as a protection against counter-attack
and for extended patrolling.
5. On open ground, in order to avoid unnecessary loss, the reserve must
advance in several lines of skirmishers. In close country, the reserve
should move in as compact a formation as the ground will permit, due
regard being paid to the protection of the flanks.
6. The initial formation of the companies in reserve will be decided
by the officer commanding, and will depend altogether upon the
ground. Wide intervals are not so essential as for the firing-line
and supports, and on ground which is little exposed to fire company
columns, or columns of fours may be resorted to with advantage. It will
seldom be necessary, however, that the formation of each successive
line should be identical; and, during the advance, the formation of
each company will be altered, in order to take advantage of cover or to
avoid shot-swept spaces, at the discretion of its own commander.
=156.= _Holding Attack._
The holding attack will be carried out by a battalion in accordance
with the principles already laid down; the frontage being larger, and
the reserve smaller than in a decisive attack, S. =139=.
=157.= _Instruction._
It is always advisable, in instructing a battalion, to hand over
the entire control of the companies in firing-line or reserve,
with the exception of the portion retained at the disposal of the
officer commanding, to their own leaders, and to give each of the
latter a free hand in carrying out the task assigned to him. Such a
method, with inexperienced company officers, may at first lead to
mistakes and misunderstandings; but as soon as these officers gain
confidence, become accustomed to working in concert, and understand
what is required of them, energetic combination will take the place
of hesitation and bewilderment, and the officer commanding will find
himself supported by a body of zealous and self-reliant assistants,
capable of executing his intentions without depending on continual
instructions.
Moreover, the practice of carrying out an attack by the co-operation
of several independent units is the only method possible in a hotly
contested action.
It must be made clear whether the battalion is supposed to be acting
alone or in conjunction with other troops.
THE BRIGADE IN ATTACK.
=158.= GENERAL RULES.
1. The rules for the battalion in attack apply in all respects to the
brigade, and even to larger forces of infantry, with the exception that
in the position of assembly the brigade or division will usually be
drawn up in line, or lines, of battalions in quarter column or lines of
company columns, and will advance as far as the zone of distant fire in
this formation. The commander assigns to the battalion leaders their
respective tasks, leaving them perfect freedom as to the manner of
execution, and the way in which they form their commands.
2. The frontage of the brigade will depend on the situation, as also
the strength of the brigade reserve. The latter should always consist
of a complete unit or units, of which a small portion may be kept
back at the crisis of the attack to form a rallying point in case of
reverse, S. =132= (3).
3. The orders issued by the brigadier will be in the same form as those
issued by the officer commanding a larger force, S. 131.
4. The brigadier will be accompanied by signallers, who will maintain
communication with all the battalions of the brigade during the attack.
THE DIVISION IN ATTACK.
=159.= GENERAL RULES.
1. The best battle-formation for the infantry of a division engaged
in a decisive attack, and, generally speaking, in all attacks, is the
two brigades placed alongside each other, dividing the front, and
regulating their own reserves. If the division is acting alone, it is
important that, as a general rule, the divisional commander should
retain two complete battalions as general reserve. During the action
the divisional commander should be accompanied by a party of mounted
signallers.
2. The divisional commander assigns to the brigadiers their respective
tasks, leaving them perfect freedom as to the manner of execution.
3. The orders issued by the divisional commander will be drawn up
and issued as directed in S. =131=, and “Combined Training,” S.
=115=.
4. If the divisional commander finds it necessary to detach a
battalion, or in an unforeseen contingency to give an individual
battalion direct orders for the execution of some movement, he should
at once inform the brigadier to whom the battalion belongs.
5. In the instruction of the brigade or division a most useful exercise
is to practice deployments for attack under different suppositions,
such as an enemy occupying different extents of front, an enemy
suddenly discovered in position half-right, half-left, or flanking the
line of march.
THE DEFENCE.
=160.= _Distribution of Infantry for defence._
1. Infantry detailed for the defence of the entrenchments will
generally be distributed in two bodies, viz.,
(i) _Firing Line_ and _Supports_.
(ii) _Local Reserves._
For the decisive counter-attack, a separate body, _The General
Reserve_, which has nothing to do with the immediate defence of the
entrenchments, will be retained in the hands of the officer commanding.
2. The strength of the firing line will depend entirely on the extent
of the field of fire and the character of the cover. If the conditions
are favourable to the defence a few men can easily protect a wide
front. If there is any chance of a surprise, or of the position being
attacked by a sudden rush, the firing line should be as dense as is
compatible with the free use of the rifle by every man engaged.
3. The duty of the supports is to replace casualties in the firing
line, and they should therefore be posted near at hand and under cover.
In strong positions very small supports will be quite sufficient, or
they may even be dispensed with altogether.
4. The duties of the local reserves are to deliver local
counter-attacks, to reinforce the firing line at critical moments, and
to protect the flanks; they will also furnish the outposts and supply
detachments to occupy temporary positions, either in front or beyond
the flanks of the entrenchments. S. =161= (7), also “Combined
Training,” =125= (4). Local reserves should be well covered,
especially from artillery fire; but there should be no obstacle to
their being brought rapidly to the front.
=161.= _Occupation of the position._
1. It is far more important that every man should see well to the
front, and be well covered, than that the front should be regular and
continuous.
Each section, or even each squad, may have its own entrenchment. These
entrenchments will not necessarily be in one general line. The main
consideration is a good field of fire and provision of oblique or
enfilade fire to support other parts of the line.
2. Weak points should be strongly held. Between the points held spaces
may be left unoccupied, provided they can be swept by an effective
cross-fire.
3. When there is no time to entrench every man must improvise cover for
himself, and this should be constantly practised in peace. When the
troops occupy entrenchments every man should see that he can use his
rifle effectively, and if necessary make the improvements necessary to
enable him to do so.
4. The distance of all prominent objects and exposed points on the
probable lines of attack should be carefully ascertained, noted and
communicated to the men.
If time permit, these distances should be defined by marks.
5. If possible, objects which might assist the enemy in finding the
range should be removed, and all works and entrenchments should be
hidden with bushes, grass, &c.
6. Arrangements should be made to ensure that men, if suddenly called
on at night to man the entrenchments, fire in the required direction.
This can best be done by so designing parapets, loopholes, &c., that
the line of fire of a rifle resting on them grazes the ground in
advance for some distance.
7. In addition to the outposts, which will protect the front and flanks
of the position, troops may be specially detailed to take up temporary
positions to mislead the enemy, embarrass his reconnoitring patrols and
delay his advance, S. =160= (4); such troops should be withdrawn
before they become seriously engaged, care being taken not to mask the
fire of the main position during the retirement.
=162.= _Entrenching a Position._
1. Trenches on the sky-line afford so excellent a target, that such a
position, especially if the enemy has good artillery, should always be
avoided. They may, however, be constructed on the sky-line and left
unoccupied for the purpose of deceiving the enemy.
2. When placed at the foot of slopes that trend towards the enemy they
have the advantage that fire from them is more grazing than it would
be if they were placed higher up the slope, but a retreat under fire
from them will probably involve heavy loss. It is, as a rule, easy to
conceal them in such a position. On the other hand, the field of fire
from low-lying trenches is often very limited, and it is generally more
easy to open up communication with the rear when trenches are close to
the crest-line than when they are much in advance of it.
3. Trenches which can bring fire to bear at decisive range on to the
ground over which the attack must pass, and which are themselves
concealed from the attackers in the early stages, are most valuable in
surprising the enemy at the most critical period of the attack.
4. Trenches should always be concealed and head cover provided when
possible, covered communication from the rear should also be provided
when time is available.
5. Important tactical points and such others which, owing to the dead
ground in their vicinity, constitute a weakness to position, should be
further strengthened by placing barbed wire entanglements or abattis
in front of them, trenches being so placed as to bring an effective
fire to bear on such obstacles.
6. When time admits, deep trenches just in rear of the crest-line may
be usefully provided to give cover to the supports or the garrisons of
the advanced trenches till they are required.
=163.= _Fire._
1. As the difficulties of ammunition supply and want of knowledge of
ranges are not so great as in the attack, it will often be expedient to
open fire at long ranges in order to oblige the assailant to deploy and
adopt a definite course of action which it will be difficult for him to
rectify when exposed to fire.
Long-range fire may also be used to deceive the enemy as to the
dispositions and strength of the defender, and to check the advance of
reinforcements.
The employment of long-range fire must, however, be regulated by the
effect produced on the enemy. If this is observed to be small, it will
be wiser to reserve ammunition for closer ranges where better results
may be expected, and on occasion it may be advisable to encourage the
enemy’s advance by a weak fire or by withholding it entirely, and to
receive him at decisive ranges with a fire of the greatest intensity
possible.
=164.= _Machine Guns._
1. In defence, as in attack, machine guns may be employed singly, or in
pairs.
2. They should not be isolated, and are not adapted for use against
lines of widely extended skirmishers, but are most suitable to protect
flanks, to flank salients or portions of the line, to cover obstacles,
to deny the passage of defiles to the enemy, or to bring a heavy fire
to bear from ground which, owing to its narrow frontage, is unsuited
for the deployment of infantry. If employed in the firing line, they
should be carefully concealed. Alternative positions connected by a
covered communication should be prepared, if possible, for use in case
they come under effective artillery fire.
3. If not utilised for these purposes they should be retained as a
reserve of fire, either in the hands of the battalion commander or
brigadier, to be used to check the advance of hostile reinforcements,
to meet turning movements, to support the firing-line in crises, to
prepare and cover the counter-attack, or against close deep formations
at long range.
4. In pursuit they should endeavour to operate against the flanks of
the enemy from decisive range.
=165.= _Position of the Reserves._
1. The local reserves will be in their respective sections. For the
protection of the flanks they will be echeloned in rear of the flanks
or of one flank if the other is unassailable. If the flanks are secure,
the most suitable position for them, if it provides good cover, is in
rear of the centre of the section to which they belong.
2. The general reserve will usually be posted in rear of the centre of
the position, until the direction of the counter-attack can be decided;
but in certain cases, as when, for instance, the defender is equal or
superior in numbers, it may be echeloned in rear of that flank where
the ground offers the greatest facilities for the counter-attack.
3. The reserves should be most carefully hidden until the moment for
action arrives. If no natural cover is available, artificial cover
should, if possible, be provided for them.
=166.= _Duties of Officers Commanding Reserves._
1. The officers commanding the reserves, whether local or general, must
make themselves acquainted with all ground over which they may have to
act. They should know the direction of all roads and tracks; and they
must keep a watch, by means of staff officers and patrols, on the
progress of the engagement, so that they may anticipate orders, and
have their troops formed up ready to move as soon as they are called
for.
=167.= _Local Counter-attacks._
1. Local counter-attacks, which are the special duty of the local
reserves, may be made at any moment. Should the enemy gain some local
success either in the position itself, or on ground close to it,
whence he could seriously threaten the defence of the position, the
necessity for counter-attack becomes imperative. In such cases, the
sooner the attack is delivered the better, so that the enemy may have
no opportunity of strengthening the ground he has gained.
2. Local counter-attacks are delivered on the initiative of the
officers in charge of sections of the defensive line. They should
seldom be carried far in advance of the entrenchments; and directly
the enemy’s firing-line falls back, the troops should be reformed as
rapidly as possible.
4. Local counter-attacks should also be delivered when the enemy
advances to the assault. Bayonets will be fixed when his line arrives
within a few hundred yards of the position, every available man brought
up into the firing-line, and the charge met with rapid fire, and if
that fails to stop him, with a counter-charge. In this counter-charge,
which should be practised at all manœuvres, the men will cheer, bugles
be sounded, and pipes played.
=168.= _Decisive Counter-attack._
1. The decisive counter-attack will be delivered by the general
reserve, it will usually be directed against the enemy’s flanks,
and in such a manner as to threaten his line of retreat, although
opportunities for breaking the centre may sometimes occur. The
counter-attack should come, if possible, in the form of a surprise, and
should be carried through with the utmost vigour and resolution; all
ranks should understand that they must press forward until the last
reserve has been thrown in.
2. To judge the right time for the decisive counter-attack is as
difficult as it is important. The most favourable moment is when
the enemy has expended his reserves in endeavouring to storm the
entrenchments. If, however, the defending force is carefully concealed,
or if the enemy is led to believe that the front is much longer than
it really is, he may commit mistakes such as exposing a portion of
his force without hope of support from the remainder, extending his
front so far that the greater part of his force is in the firing-line,
exposing his flanks, or posting his reserves in the wrong place; and
these mistakes, all of which are favourable to the counter-attack, may
occur at any period of the engagement--. It is important, therefore,
that the course of the action should be closely watched, that the
staff should make arrangements for incessant patrolling, constant
observation, and the rapid transmission of reports, and that the
general reserve should be prepared for immediate action throughout the
fight.
3. When launched to the attack the firing-line, as a rule, should
be thicker than at the commencement of an ordinary attack, and it
is unnecessary that it should be preceded, though it must always be
flanked, by scouts. A portion of the force should be echeloned in rear,
in order to deal with the enemy’s reserves.
4. The formation in which the general reserve will carry out the
counter-attack cannot be laid down; but care should be taken that the
troops composing it are formed up in such a manner as to be able to
advance and come into action in any direction with the least possible
delay.
5. It is possible that there will be little time for issuing detailed
orders, but the direction and manner of carrying out the counter-attack
should be carefully pointed out to all subordinate commanders, who will
explain the same to the troops, and impress on them the importance of
getting to close quarters as quickly as possible.
THE COMPANY IN DEFENCE.
=169.= GENERAL RULES.
1. When acting independently the company will act in accordance with
the principles enumerated in S. =160=. The reserve will, as a
rule, undertake the defence of the flanks, in addition to its other
duties. It may often be conveniently placed in rear of the centre.
To deceive the enemy as to the extent of the position scouts must be
employed in place of larger bodies, and they should be encouraged
to use all sorts of stratagems, such as constantly changing their
positions, opening rapid fire, &c., &c., in order to effect their
purpose. Concealment is imperative.
All dead ground in front or on the flanks of the position should be
carefully observed.
2. When acting in battalion, a company told off to furnish a portion
of the firing-line will usually keep a part in support. But it will
often be advisable to extend only a few men at first, and to retain the
remainder in rear until the enemy’s infantry advance to the attack, but
they should be able to reach their places in the firing line without
being observed by the enemy.
3. The occupation of the ground allotted to a company will be carried
out in accordance with S. =161=.
=170.= _Duties of the Subalterns, Section, and Squad Leaders._
1. They are responsible that communication is maintained between the
different portions of the company, that all movements of the company
are at once reported, that the fire is kept under control, that the men
aim at the targets pointed out to them, and that all instructions as
regards cover, concealment, ranges, and water are scrupulously observed.
2. They will see:--
(i) That every man has good cover.
(ii) That the firing-line is well hidden, the existence of
entrenchments concealed, and every man is in such a position
that he can use his rifle.
(iii) That ranges are taken and communicated to the men.
(iv) That every man has plenty of ammunition and a full
water-bottle, and that the ammunition from the killed and
wounded is collected and distributed.
(v) That the support knows the position of the firing-line.
3. They will ascertain the position of the dressing station and of the
reserve ammunition.
4. They will report to the company commander all movements of the enemy
and any opportunity which appears to be favourable to counter-attack.
5. They will see that their flanks, if exposed, are protected by scouts.
6. They will be careful to keep in communication with the companies or
either flank.
=171.= _Duties of the Company Leader._
Nothing in the previous section is intended to relieve the company
commander of his responsibility in all that concerns his command.
He will make arrangements for the distribution of fresh supplies
of ammunition, but it is important he should not allow himself to
become too much engrossed in details which should be looked to by his
subordinates.
In defence, the occupation, to the best advantage, of the ground
allotted to him, is the company commander’s first duty.
THE BATTALION IN DEFENCE.
=172.= GENERAL RULES.
1. If the front is very extended, or if it runs through close or broken
country, it may be broken up into sections of defence.
2. When acting independently the officer commanding will himself give
the signal for the decisive counter-attack. This attack will, as a
rule, be commanded by the officer specially detailed to command the
general reserve.
=173.= _Duties of the Commanding Officer._
1. He will see that the reserve ammunition is conveniently placed.
2. He will ensure that communication is maintained with the troops on
either flank.
3. He will report all movements of the enemy.
4. If he commands a section of the defence, he will watch for
opportunities for local counter-attack.
5. He will keep up communication by means of his signallers with his
brigadier.
6. He will fix on some central position, where he can receive reports,
and communicate rapidly with all portions of his force.
7. He will arrange for first treatment of casualties on the spot, and
for their transfer to the dressing station of the bearer company.
8. He will make himself acquainted with the best line of retirement to
the rallying position.
THE BRIGADE AND DIVISION IN DEFENCE.
=174.= GENERAL RULES.
1. The duties of a brigade or divisional commander are practically the
same as those of the officer commanding a battalion.
It may be repeated, however: (i) that the rule of detailing a complete
unit, with an adequate staff, for the delivery of the decisive
counter-attack, should always be observed; (ii) that the position of
the officer commanding should be carefully selected.
2. On an extended field of battle, and particularly in broken country,
it is not always easy to find a place where the firing-line can be
supervised, and the opportunities for counter-attack observed before
it is too late to take advantage of them; and in some cases, the
officer commanding will have to rely entirely on the reports of his
staff officers and the subordinate commanders. It is essential, then,
that the system of collection and transmission of information should
be complete and thoroughly understood; in peace exercises as much
attention should be paid to this most important point as to training
officers and men to make clear, concise and useful reports.
SUPPLY AND TRANSPORT OF S.A. (·303-INCH) AMMUNITION IN THE FIELD.
=175.= _Supply and transport of ammunition in the field._
1. _Service ammunition and regimental reserve._--A battalion takes
with it into the field, in regimental charge,
Service { 100 rounds per rifle, carried by the soldier;
ammunition. { 4,000 rounds packed on the carriage of the
{ machine gun[8];
{ 2 boxes on each of eight pack animals (_i.e._,
{ one pack animal per company); and 16
{ boxes in each of five S.A.A. carts, also
Regimental { 6,600 rounds per machine gun in one
reserve. { S.A.A. cart. (1,000 rounds for Short L.E.
{ rifle and for machine gun, and 1,100
{ rounds for L.M. or L.E. rifle are carried
{ in each box).
On the march one pack animal will be in rear of each company; four
S.A.A. carts (including that carrying the machine gun ammunition),
will be in rear of the battalion; the remaining two carts will form a
brigade reserve.
Officers commanding battalions will arrange for the replenishment of
this ammunition at every favourable opportunity. They are responsible
that the ammunition carried by the men is complete, and that when
ammunition is expended, it is replaced with the least possible delay.
2. _Brigade Reserve._--A brigade reserve of small arms ammunition
will be formed by two S.A.A. carts being detached from each battalion,
these will follow in rear of the brigade. Each brigadier will detail a
mounted officer to take charge of the brigade reserve.
3. _Divisional Reserve._--A divisional reserve of 100 rounds per
rifle and 8,800 rounds per machine gun is carried in the small arms
ammunition section of the ammunition columns of brigades of divisional
artillery, each of which will supply one of the infantry brigades of
the division to which they belong. The same number of rounds for corps
troops is carried in the special section attached to the ammunition
column of the horse artillery brigade. The divisional reserves are in
artillery charge.
4. _Ammunition Park._--Fifty rounds per rifle and 9,000 rounds per
machine gun.
5. _General arrangements in the action._--In action the ammunition
pack animals will be advanced as close as possible to their respective
companies, every advantage of cover being taken in doing so; two S.A.A.
carts will follow as close in rear of the supports to the firing-line
as the hostile fire will permit, one being usually in rear of each
wing; the remaining cart will follow in rear of the battalion reserve.
The cart carrying the machine gun ammunition will move as directed
by the officer commanding the machine guns. During an action the
regimental reserve ammunition carried in the carts will be in charge
of the serjeant-major, who should get into communication with the
supports and also the brigade reserve by means of signallers.
The brigade reserve of ammunition will follow in rear of the centre of
the brigade, or as the General Officer Commanding may direct. It should
be accompanied by signallers, who should maintain communication with
the various regimental reserves.
When a S.A.A. cart with the supports is emptied, it will be replaced
by a full cart from the regimental reserve, the empty cart being sent
back to the brigade reserve, when it will be replaced by a full one.
As soon as there are four empty S.A.A. carts with the brigade reserve
the officer in charge will send a message as follows to the officer in
charge of the divisional reserve: “Send up four S.A.A. carts to the
--th brigade.” It is, however, unnecessary to wait till four carts are
empty, if ammunition is urgently required.
On the arrival of the carts from the divisional reserve, the horses
will be unhooked and changed, and empty carts sent back to the
divisional reserve.
In the event of a brigade in action being ordered to advance through
woods or over broken ground where communication cannot be maintained,
the S.A.A. carts of the brigade reserve may be distributed between
battalions, and the divisional reserve would conform to the general
movement.
In the case of a battalion being detached to any distance a similar
course would be pursued, a brigade reserve being reformed as soon as
possible.
6. _Instructions for the officer in charge of the brigade reserve of
ammunition._
(i) He will as soon as possible open up communication with the
divisional reserve and also with the various regimental reserves.
(ii) A mounted orderly will be sent to him from the divisional
reserve to be used only for the purpose of communicating with
the divisional reserve. He will communicate with the regimental
reserves by means of signallers.
(iii) The earliest opportunity is to be taken (when four S.A.A.
carts are empty, or sooner if necessary) to fill up empty
carts from the divisional reserve. The brigade reserve should
be regarded as available for the brigade generally, and also
in case of necessity it will supply ammunition to any troops
engaged.
(iv) Men and horses belonging to the brigade reserve are not to
be sent to the divisional reserve.
Men and horses belonging to the divisional reserve are
not to be sent further to the front than the brigade
reserve, except in a case of emergency.
(v) Empty S.A.A. carts are to remain with the brigade reserve
until they are replaced by full ones.
(vi) Receipts prepared by the officer in charge of the
divisional reserve will be signed by the officer in charge of
the brigade reserve for the number of full carts received by him.
(vii) After an action or during a pause in the engagement all
deficiencies of ammunition must be made good from the divisional
reserve.
7. _Battalion arrangements for issuing extra ammunition._--Each
company commander will detail one non-commissioned officer and two
privates to act as ammunition carriers (if the company is strong, three
privates should be detailed). Only men of strength and activity should
be selected for this duty, the importance of which cannot be overrated.
Whenever a serious engagement is imminent, officer commanding
battalions will issue to the men 50 rounds from the S.A.A. carts, so
that, if possible, every man shall carry 150 rounds on his person. The
extra ammunition should generally be issued before leaving the halting
place of the previous night.
During an action every opportunity will be taken for supplying
ammunition to the firing line by sending some up by carriers or with
reinforcements. The carriers bring the ammunition from the pack animals
(or from the S.A.A. carts) in canvas ammunition bags, and distribute it
to the men in the ranks. The bags, when not in use, are carried on the
pack animals. The loads are not to exceed 600 rounds to each carrier.
When more ammunition is required by the firing-line it will be taken
forward by any men at hand, acting as carriers.
The carriers will move direct to the companies for which they are
destined. If there is a difficulty in their getting back they may be
retained in their ranks till the action is over.
It is the duty of section and squad commanders to make sure that all
ammunition from the killed and wounded is collected and distributed.
The system of carrying ammunition by hand, here provided for, is not
to prevent every endeavour being made to push the S.A.A. carts as far
forward as practicable. They ought, in ordinary circumstances, to get
within 1,000 yards of the firing-line, and in broken and undulating
ground considerably nearer. With pack animals, it should be practicable
to get within 500 yards of the firing-line.
The immense importance of having a supply of ammunition out of sight of
the enemy, and yet within easy reach of the firing-line, will justify
great risks being incurred in getting it to such a position.
=176.= _Entrenching Tools._
1. The entrenching tools of a battalion are carried on two tool carts
and on eight pack animals (_i.e._, one per company).
A brigade reserve of entrenching tools is carried on one G.S. wagon.
2. On the march, the pack animals carrying the tools will be with those
carrying the ammunition, _i.e._, one in rear of each company.
3. In action, the pack animal carrying the tools will keep as close to
its company as the enemy’s fire will admit, but the driver must use
his discretion in doing so; for instance, on bare open country it will
seldom be advisable to advance the animals close to the firing line,
whereas when advanced positions have been secured, it will usually be
necessary to take tools at once up to the firing line, in order that
the position may be strengthened against counter-attacks.
The tool carts will usually accompany the ammunition cart with the
reserve, and will be under the serjeant-major, the tools, if necessary,
being carried forward when required by men from the reserve.
The brigade reserve of tools will remain with the brigade ammunition
reserve, and will be under the orders of the officer in charge of the
latter.