CHAPTER I.

Transcriber's Note

The punctuation and spelling from the original text have been faithfully

preserved. Only obvious typographical errors have been corrected.

THE CRITICAL PERIOD OF

AMERICAN HISTORY

1783-1789

BY

JOHN FISKE

"I am uneasy and apprehensive, more so than during the war."

JAY TO WASHINGTON, _June_ 27, 1786.

[Illustration]

BOSTON AND NEW YORK

HOUGHTON, MIFFLIN AND COMPANY

The Riverside Press, Cambridge

Copyright, 1888,

BY JOHN FISKE.

_All rights reserved._

_The Riverside Press, Cambridge, Mass., U.S.A._ Electrotyped and Printed

by H.O. Houghton & Co.

To

MY DEAR CLASSMATES,

FRANCIS LEE HIGGINSON

AND

CHARLES CABOT JACKSON,

_I DEDICATE THIS BOOK._

PREFACE.

This book contains the substance of the course of lectures given in the

Old South Meeting-House in Boston in December, 1884, at the Washington

University in St. Louis in May, 1885, and in the theatre of the

University Club in New York in March, 1886. In its present shape it may

serve as a sketch of the political history of the United States from the

end of the Revolutionary War to the adoption of the Federal

Constitution. It makes no pretensions to completeness, either as a

summary of the events of that period or as a discussion of the political

questions involved in them. I have aimed especially at grouping facts in

such a way as to bring out and emphasize their causal sequence, and it

is accordingly hoped that the book may prove useful to the student of

American history.

My title was suggested by the fact of Thomas Paine's stopping the

publication of the "Crisis," on hearing the news of the treaty of 1783,

with the remark, "The times that tried men's souls are over." Commenting

upon this, on page 55 of the present work, I observed that so far from

the crisis being over in 1783, the next five years were to be the most

critical time of all. I had not then seen Mr. Trescot's "Diplomatic

History of the Administrations of Washington and Adams," on page 9 of

which he uses almost the same words: "It must not be supposed that the

treaty of peace secured the national life. Indeed, it would be more

correct to say that the most critical period of the country's history

embraced the time between 1783 and the adoption of the Constitution in

1788."

That period was preëminently the turning-point in the development of

political society in the western hemisphere. Though small in their mere

dimensions, the events here summarized were in a remarkable degree

germinal events, fraught with more tremendous alternatives of future

welfare or misery for mankind than it is easy for the imagination to

grasp. As we now stand upon the threshold of that mighty future, in the

light of which all events of the past are clearly destined to seem

dwindled in dimensions and significant only in the ratio of their

potency as causes; as we discern how large a part of that future must be

the outcome of the creative work, for good or ill, of men of English

speech; we are put into the proper mood for estimating the significance

of the causes which determined a century ago that the continent of North

America should be dominated by a single powerful and pacific federal

nation instead of being parcelled out among forty or fifty small

communities, wasting their strength and lowering their moral tone by

perpetual warfare, like the states of ancient Greece, or by perpetual

preparation for warfare, like the nations of modern Europe. In my book

entitled "American Political Ideas, viewed from the Standpoint of

Universal History," I have tried to indicate the pacific influence

likely to be exerted upon the world by the creation and maintenance of

such a political structure as our Federal Union. The present narrative

may serve as a commentary upon what I had in mind on page 133 of that

book, in speaking of the work of our Federal Convention as "the finest

specimen of constructive statesmanship that the world has ever seen." On

such a point it is pleasant to find one's self in accord with a

statesman so wise and noble as Mr. Gladstone, whose opinion is here

quoted on page 223.

To some persons it may seem as if the years 1861-65 were of more

cardinal importance than the years 1783-89. Our civil war was indeed an

event of prodigious magnitude, as measured by any standard that history

affords; and there can be little doubt as to its decisiveness. The

measure of that decisiveness is to be found in the completeness of the

reconciliation that has already, despite the feeble wails of

unscrupulous place-hunters and unteachable bigots, cemented the Federal

Union so powerfully that all likelihood of its disruption may be said to

have disappeared forever. When we consider this wonderful harmony which

so soon has followed the deadly struggle, we may well believe it to be

the index of such a stride toward the ultimate pacification of mankind

as was never made before. But it was the work done in the years 1783-89

that created a federal nation capable of enduring the storm and stress

of the years 1861-65. It was in the earlier crisis that the pliant twig

was bent; and as it was bent, so has it grown; until it has become

indeed a goodly and a sturdy tree.

CAMBRIDGE, October 10, 1888.

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER I.

RESULTS OF YORKTOWN. PAGE

Fall of Lord North's ministry 1

Sympathy between British Whigs and the revolutionary

party in America 2

It weakened the Whig party in England 3

Character of Lord Shelburne 4

Political instability of the Rockingham ministry 5, 6

Obstacles in the way of a treaty of peace 7, 8

Oswald talks with Franklin 9-11

Grenville has an interview with Vergennes 12

Effects of Rodney's victory 13

Misunderstanding between Fox and Shelburne 14

Fall of the Rockingham ministry 15

Shelburne becomes prime minister 16

Defeat of the Spaniards and French at Gibraltar 17

French policy opposed to American interests 18

The valley of the Mississippi; Aranda's prophecy 19

The Newfoundland fisheries 20

Jay detects the schemes of Vergennes 21

And sends Dr Vaughan to visit Shelburne 22

John Adams arrives in Paris and joins with Jay in insisting

upon a separate negotiation with England 23, 24

The separate American treaty, as agreed upon:

1. Boundaries 25

2. Fisheries; commercial intercourse 26

3. Private debts 27

4. Compensation of loyalists 28-32

Secret article relating to the Yazoo boundary 33

Vergennes does not like the way in which it has been done 33

On the part of the Americans it was a great diplomatic

victory 34

Which the commissioners won by disregarding the instructions

of Congress and acting on their own responsibility 35

The Spanish treaty 36

The French treaty 37

Coalition of Fox with North 38-42

They attack the American treaty in Parliament 43

And compel Shelburne to resign 44

Which leaves England without a government, while for

several weeks the king is too angry to appoint ministers 44

Until at length he succumbs to the coalition, which presently

adopts and ratifies the American treaty 45

The coalition ministry is wrecked upon Fox's India Bill 46

Constitutional crisis ends in the overwhelming victory of

Pitt in the elections of May, 1784 47

And this, although apparently a triumph for the king, was

really a death-blow to his system of personal government 48, 49

CHAPTER II.

THE THIRTEEN COMMONWEALTHS.

Cessation of hostilities in America 50

Departure of the British troops 51

Washington resigns his command 52

And goes home to Mount Vernon 53

His "legacy" to the American people 54

The next five years were the most critical years in American

history 55

Absence of a sentiment of union, and consequent danger of

anarchy 56, 57

European statesmen, whether hostile or friendly, had little

faith in the stability of the Union 58

False historic analogies 59

Influence of railroad and telegraph upon the perpetuity of

the Union 60

Difficulty of travelling a hundred years ago 61

Local jealousies and antipathies, an inheritance from primeval

savagery 62, 63

Conservative character of the American Revolution 64

State governments remodelled; assemblies continued from

colonial times 65

Origin of the senates in the governor's council of assistants 66

Governors viewed with suspicion 67

Analogies with British institutions 68

The judiciary 69

Restrictions upon suffrage 70

Abolition of primogeniture, entails, and manorial privileges 71

Steps toward the abolition of slavery and the slave-trade 72-75

Progress toward religious freedom 76, 77

Church and state in Virginia 78, 79

Persecution of dissenters 80

Madison and the Religions Freedom Act 81

Temporary overthrow of the church 82

Difficulties in regard to ordination; the case of Mason Weems 83

Ordination of Samuel Seabury by non-jurors at Aberdeen 84

Francis Asbury and the Methodists 85

Presbyterians and Congregationalists 86

Roman Catholics 87

Except in the instance of slavery, all the changes described

in this chapter were favourable to the union of the states 88

But while the state governments, in all these changes, are

seen working smoothly, we have next to observe, by

contrast, the clumsiness and inefficiency of the federal government 89

CHAPTER III.

THE LEAGUE OF FRIENDSHIP.

The several states have never enjoyed complete sovereignty 90

But in the very act of severing their connection with Great

Britain, they entered into some sort of union 91

Anomalous character of the Continental Congress 92

The articles of confederation; they sought to establish a

"league of friendship" between the states 93-97

But failed to create a federal government endowed with real

sovereignty 98-100

Military weakness of the government 101-103

Extreme difficulty of obtaining a revenue 104, 105

Congress, being unable to pay the army, was afraid of it 106

Supposed scheme for making Washington king 107

Greene's experience in South Carolina 108

Gates's staff officers and the Newburgh address 109

The danger averted by Washington 110, 111

Congress driven from Philadelphia by mutinous soldiers 112

The Commutation Act denounced in New England 113

Order of the Cincinnati 114-117

Reasons for the dread which it inspired 118

Congress finds itself unable to carry out the provisions of

the treaty with Great Britain 119

Persecution of the loyalists 120, 121

It was especially severe in New York 122

Trespass Act of 1784 directed against the loyalists 123

Character and early career of Alexander Hamilton 124-126

The case of Rutgers _v._ Waddington 127, 128

Wholesale emigration of Tories 129, 130

Congress unable to enforce payment of debts to British creditors 131

England retaliates by refusing to surrender the fortresses

on the northwestern frontier 132, 133

CHAPTER IV.

DRIFTING TOWARD ANARCHY.

The barbarous superstitions of the Middle Ages concerning

trade were still rife in the eighteenth century 134

The old theory of the uses of a colony 135

Pitt's unsuccessful attempt to secure free trade between

Great Britain and the United States 136

Ship-building in New England 137

British navigation acts and orders in council directed against

American commerce 138

John Adams tried in vain to negotiate a commercial treaty

with Great Britain 139, 140

And could see no escape from the difficulties except in systematic

reprisal 141

But any such reprisal was impracticable, for the several

states imposed conflicting duties 142

Attempts to give Congress the power of regulating commerce

were unsuccessful 143, 144

And the several states began to make commercial war upon one another 145

Attempts of New York to oppress New Jersey and Connecticut 146

Retaliatory measures of the two latter states 147

The quarrel between Connecticut and Pennsylvania over the

possession of the valley of Wyoming 148-150

The quarrel between New York and New Hampshire over

the possession of the Green Mountains 151-153

Failure of American diplomacy because European states

could not tell whether they were dealing with one nation

or with thirteen 154, 155

Failure of American credit; John Adams begging in Holland 156, 157

The Barbary pirates 158

American citizens kidnapped and sold into slavery 159

Lord Sheffield's outrageous pamphlet 160

Tripoli's demand for blackmail 161

Congress unable to protect American citizens 162

Financial distress after the Revolutionary War 163, 164

State of the coinage 165

Cost of the war in money 166

Robert Morris and his immense services 167

The craze for paper money 168

Agitation in the southern and middle states 169-171

Distress in New England 172

Imprisonment for debt 173

Rag-money victorious in Rhode Island; the "Know Ye" measures 174-176

Rag-money defeated in Massachusetts; the Shays insurrection 177-181

The insurrection suppressed by state troops 182

Conduct of the neighbouring states 183

The rebels pardoned 184

Timidity of Congress 185, 186

CHAPTER V.

GERMS OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY.

Creation of a national domain beyond the Alleghanies 187, 188

Conflicting claims to the western territory 189

Claims of Massachusetts and Connecticut 189, 190

Claims of New York 190

Virginia's claims 191

Maryland's novel and beneficent suggestion 192

The several states yield their claims in favour of the United

States 193, 194

Magnanimity of Virginia 195

Jefferson proposes a scheme of government for the northwestern

territory 196

Names of the proposed ten states 197

Jefferson wishes to prohibit slavery in the national domain 198

North Carolina's cession of western lands 199

John Sevier and the state of Franklin 200, 201

The northwestern territory 202

Origin of the Ohio company 203

The Ordinance of 1787 204-206

Theory of folkland upon which the ordinance was based 207

Spain, hearing of the secret article in the treaty of 1783,

loses her temper and threatens to shut up the Mississippi

River 208, 209

Gardoqui and Jay 210

Threats of secession in Kentucky and New England 211

Washington's views on the political importance of canals

between east and west 212

His far-sighted genius and self-devotion 213

Maryland confers with Virginia regarding the navigation of

the Potomac 214

The Madison-Tyler motion in the Virginia legislature 215

Convention at Annapolis, Sept 11, 1786 216

Hamilton's address calling for a convention at Philadelphia 217

The impost amendment defeated by the action of New

York; last ounce upon the camel's back 218-220

Sudden changes in popular sentiment 221

The Federal Convention meets at Philadelphia, May, 1787 222

Mr. Gladstone's opinion of the work of the convention 223

The men who were assembled there 224, 225

Character of James Madison 226, 227

The other leading members 228

Washington chosen president of the convention 229

CHAPTER VI.

THE FEDERAL CONVENTION.

Why the proceedings of the convention were kept secret for

so many years 230

Difficulty of the problem to be solved 231

Symptoms of cowardice repressed by Washington's impassioned

speech 232

The root of all the difficulties; the edicts of the federal

government had operated only upon states, not upon

individuals, and therefore could not be enforced without

danger of war 233-233

The Virginia plan, of which Madison was the chief author,

offered a radical cure 236

And was felt to be revolutionary in its character 237-239

Fundamental features of the Virginia plan 240, 241

How it was at first received 242

The House of Representatives must be directly elected by

the people 243

Question as to the representation of states brings out the

antagonism between large and small states 244

William Paterson presents the New Jersey plan; not a

radical cure, but a feeble palliative 245

Straggle between the Virginia and New Jersey plans 246-249

The Connecticut compromise, according to which the national

principle is to prevail in the House of Representatives,

and the federal principle in the Senate,

meets at first with fierce opposition 250, 251

But is at length adopted 252

And proves a decisive victory for Madison and his methods 253

A few irreconcilable members go home in dudgeon 254

But the small states, having been propitiated, are suddenly

converted to Federalism, and make the victory complete 255

Vague dread of the future west 255

The struggle between pro-slavery and anti-slavery parties

began in the convention, and was quieted by two compromises 256

Should representation be proportioned to wealth or to population? 257

Were slaves to be reckoned as persons or as chattels? 258

Attitude of the Virginia statesmen 259

It was absolutely necessary to satisfy South Carolina 260

The three fifths compromise, suggested by Madison, was a

genuine English solution, if ever there was one 261

There was neither rhyme nor reason in it, but for all that,

it was the best solution attainable at the time 262

The next compromise was between New England and South

Carolina as to the foreign slave-trade and the power of

the federal government over commerce 263

George Mason calls the slave-trade an "infernal traffic" 264

And the compromise offends and alarms Virginia 265

Belief in the moribund condition of slavery 266

The foundations of the Constitution were laid in compromise 267

Powers granted to the federal government 268

Use of federal troops in suppressing insurrections 269

Various federal powers 270

Provision for a federal city under federal jurisdiction 271

The Federal Congress might compel the attendance of members 272

Powers denied to the several states 272

Should the federal government he allowed to make its

promissory notes a legal tender in payment of debts?

powerful speech of Gouverneur Morris 273

Emphatic and unmistakable condemnation of paper money

by all the leading delegates 274

The convention refused to grant to the federal government

the power of issuing inconvertible paper, but did not

think an express prohibition necessary 275

If they could have foreseen some recent judgments of the

supreme court, they would doubtless have made the

prohibition explicit and absolute 276

Debates as to the federal executive 277

Sherman's suggestion as to the true relation of the executive

to the legislature 278

There was to be a single chief magistrate, but how should

he be chosen? 279

Objections to an election by Congress 280

Ellsworth and King suggest the device of an electoral college,

which is at first rejected 281

But afterwards adopted 282

Provisions for an election by Congress in the case of a failure

of choice by the electoral college 283

Provisions for counting the electoral votes 284

It was not intended to leave anything to be decided by the

president of the Senate 285

The convention foresaw imaginary dangers, but not the real

ones 286

Hamilton's opinion of the electoral scheme 287

How it has actually worked 288

In this part of its work the convention tried to copy from

the British Constitution 289

In which they supposed the legislative and executive departments

to be distinct and separate 290

Here they were misled by Montesquieu and Blackstone 291

What our government would be if it were really like that

of Great Britain 292-294

In the British government the executive department is not

separated from the legislative 295

Circumstances which obscured the true aspect of the case a

century ago 296-298

The American cabinet is analogous, not to the British cabinet,

but to the privy council 299

The federal judiciary, and its remarkable character 300-301

Provisions for amending the Constitution 302

The document is signed by all but three of the delegates 303

And the convention breaks up 304

With a pleasant remark from Franklin 305

CHAPTER VII.

CROWNING THE WORK.

Franklin lays the Constitution before the legislature of

Pennsylvania 306

It is submitted to Congress, which refers it to the legislatures

of the thirteen states, to be ratified or rejected by

the people in conventions 307

First American parties, Federalists and Antifederalists 308, 309

The contest in Pennsylvania 310

How to make a quorum 311

A war of pamphlets and newspaper squibs 312, 313

Ending in the ratification of the Constitution by Delaware,

Pennsylvania, and New Jersey 314

Rejoicings and mutterings 315

Georgia and Connecticut ratify 316

The outlook in Massachusetts 317, 318

The Massachusetts convention meets 319

And overhauls the Constitution clause by clause 320

On the subject of an army Mr. Nason waxes eloquent 321

The clergymen oppose a religious test 322

And Rev. Samuel West argues on the assumption that all

men are not totally depraved 323

Feeling of distrust in the mountain districts 324

Timely speech of a Berkshire farmer 325, 326

Attitude of Samuel Adams 326, 327

Meeting of mechanics at the Green Dragon 327

Charges of bribery 328

Washington's fruitful suggestion 329

Massachusetts ratifies, but proposes amendments 330

The Long Lane has a turning and becomes Federal Street 331

New Hampshire hesitates, but Maryland ratifies, and all

eyes are turned upon South Carolina 332

Objections of Rawlins Lowndes answered by Cotesworth

Pinckney 333

South Carolina ratifies the Constitution 334

Important effect upon Virginia, where thoughts of a southern

confederacy had been entertained 335, 336

Madison and Marshall prevail in the Virginia convention,

and it ratifies the Constitution 337

New Hampshire had ratified four days before 338

Rejoicings at Philadelphia; riots at Providence and Albany 339

The struggle in New York 340

Origin of the "Federalist" 341-343

Hamilton wins the victory, and New York ratifies 344

All serious anxiety is now at an end; the laggard states,

North Carolina and Rhode Island 345

First presidential election, January 7, 1789; Washington is

unanimously chosen 346

Why Samuel Adams was not selected for vice-president 347

Selection of John Adams 348

Washington's journey to New York, April 16-23 349

His inauguration 350

THE CRITICAL PERIOD OF AMERICAN HISTORY.

CHAPTER I.

RESULTS OF YORKTOWN.

[Sidenote: Sympathy between British Whigs and the revolutionary party in

America.]

The 20th of March, 1782, the day which witnessed the fall of Lord

North's ministry, was a day of good omen for men of English race on both

sides of the Atlantic. Within two years from this time, the treaty which

established the independence of the United States was successfully

negotiated at Paris; and at the same time, as part of the series of

events which resulted in the treaty, there went on in England a rapid

dissolution and reorganization of parties, which ended in the

overwhelming defeat of the king's attempt to make the forms of the

constitution subservient to his selfish purposes, and established the

liberty of the people upon a broader and sounder basis than it had ever

occupied before. Great indignation was expressed at the time, and has

sometimes been echoed by British historians, over the conduct of those

Whigs who never lost an opportunity of expressing their approval of the

American revolt. The Duke of Richmond, at the beginning of the contest,

expressed a hope that the Americans might succeed, because they were in

the right. Charles Fox spoke of General Howe's first victory as "the

terrible news from Long Island." Wraxall says that the celebrated buff

and blue colours of the Whig party were adopted by Fox in imitation of

the Continental uniform; but his unsupported statement is open to

question. It is certain, however, that in the House of Commons the Whigs

habitually alluded to Washington's army as "our army," and to the

American cause as "the cause of liberty;" and Burke, with characteristic

vehemence, declared that he would rather be a prisoner in the Tower with

Mr. Laurens than enjoy the blessings of freedom in company with the men

who were seeking to enslave America. Still more, the Whigs did all in

their power to discourage enlistments, and in various ways so thwarted

and vexed the government that the success of the Americans was by many

people ascribed to their assistance. A few days before Lord North's

resignation, George Onslow, in an able defence of the prime minister,

exclaimed, "Why have we failed so miserably in this war against America,

if not from the support and countenance given to rebellion in this very

House?"

[Sidenote: It weakened the Whigs in England.]

[Sidenote: Character of Lord Shelburne.]

Now the violence of party leaders like Burke and Fox owed much of its

strength, no doubt, to mere rancorousness of party spirit. But, after

making due allowance for this, we must admit that it was essentially

based upon the intensity of their conviction that the cause of English

liberty was inseparably bound up with the defeat of the king's attempt

upon the liberties of America. Looking beyond the quarrels of the

moment, they preferred to have freedom guaranteed, even at the cost of

temporary defeat and partial loss of empire. Time has shown that they

were right in this, but the majority of the people could hardly be

expected to comprehend their attitude. It seemed to many that the great

Whig leaders were forgetting their true character as English statesmen,

and there is no doubt that for many years this was the chief source of

the weakness of the Whig party. Sir Gilbert Elliot said, with truth,

that if the Whigs had not thus to a considerable extent arrayed the

national feeling against themselves, Lord North's ministry would have

fallen some years sooner than it did. The king thoroughly understood the

advantage which accrued to him from this state of things; and with that

short-sighted shrewdness of the mere political wire-puller, in which few

modern politicians have excelled him, he had from the outset preferred

to fight his battle on constitutional questions in America rather than

in England, in order that the national feeling of Englishmen might be

arrayed on his side. He was at length thoroughly beaten on his own

ground, and as the fatal day approached he raved and stormed as he had

not stormed since the spring of 1778, when he had been asked to entrust

the government to Lord Chatham. Like the child who refuses to play when

he sees the game going against him, George threatened to abdicate the

throne and go over to Hanover, leaving his son to get along with the

Whig statesmen. But presently he took heart again, and began to resort

to the same kind of political management which had served him so well in

the earlier years of his reign. Among the Whig statesmen, the Marquis of

Buckingham had the largest political following. He represented the old

Whig aristocracy, his section of the party had been first to urge the

recognition of American independence, and his principal followers were

Fox and Burke. For all these reasons he was especially obnoxious to the

king. On the other hand, the Earl of Shelburne was, in a certain sense,

the political heir of Lord Chatham, and represented principles far more

liberal than those of the Old Whigs. Shelburne was one of the most

enlightened statesmen of his time. He was an earnest advocate of

parliamentary reform and of free trade. He had paid especial attention

to political economy, and looked with disgust upon the whole barbaric

system of discriminative duties and commercial monopolies which had been

so largely instrumental in bringing about the American Revolution. But

being in these respects in advance of his age, Lord Shelburne had but

few followers. Moreover, although a man of undoubted integrity, quite

exempt from sordid or selfish ambition, there was a cynical harshness

about him which made him generally disliked and distrusted. He was so

suspicious of other men that other men were suspicious of him; so that,

in spite of many admirable qualities, he was extremely ill adapted for

the work of a party manager.

It was doubtless for these reasons that the king, when it became clear

that a new government must be formed, made up his mind that Lord

Shelburne would be the safest man to conduct it. In his hands the Whig

power would not be likely to grow too strong, and dissensions would be

sure to arise, from which the king might hope to profit. The first place

in the treasury was accordingly offered to Shelburne; and when he

refused it, and the king found himself forced to appeal to Lord

Rockingham, the manner in which the bitter pill was taken was quite

characteristic of George III. He refused to meet Rockingham in person,

but sent all his communications to him through Shelburne, who, thus

conspicuously singled out as the object of royal preference, was certain

to incur the distrust of his fellow ministers.

[Sidenote: Political instability of the Rockingham ministry.]

The structure of the new cabinet was unstable enough, however, to have

satisfied even such an enemy as the king. Beside Rockingham himself,

Lord John Cavendish, Charles Fox, Lord Keppel, and the Duke of Richmond

were all Old Whigs. To offset these five there were five New Whigs, the

Duke of Grafton, Lords Shelburne, Camden, and Ashburton, and General

Conway; while the eleventh member was none other than the Tory

chancellor, Lord Thurlow, who was kept over from Lord North's ministry.

Burke was made paymaster of the forces, but had no seat in the cabinet.

In this curiously constructed cabinet, the prime minister, Lord

Rockingham, counted for little. Though a good party leader, he was below

mediocrity as a statesman, and his health was failing, so that he could

not attend to business. The master spirits were the two secretaries of

state, Fox and Shelburne, and they wrangled perpetually, while Thurlow

carried the news of all their quarrels to the king, and in cabinet

meetings usually voted with Shelburne. The ministry had not lasted five

weeks when Fox began to predict its downfall. On the great question of

parliamentary reform, which was brought up in May by the young William

Pitt, the government was hopelessly divided. Shelburne's party was in

favour of reform, and this time Fox was found upon the same side, as

well as the Duke of Richmond, who went so far as to advocate universal

suffrage. On the other hand, the Whig aristocracy, led by Rockingham,

were as bitterly opposed as the king himself to any change in the method

of electing parliaments; and, incredible as it may seem, even such a man

as Burke maintained that the old system, rotten boroughs and all, was a

sacred part of the British Constitution, which none could handle rudely

without endangering the country! But in this moment of reaction against

the evil influences which had brought about the loss of the American

colonies, there was a strong feeling in favour of reform, and Pitt's

motion was only lost by a minority of twenty in a total vote of three

hundred. Half a century was to elapse before the reformers were again to

come so near to victory.

But Lord Rockingham's weak and short-lived ministry was nevertheless

remarkable for the amount of good work it did in spite of the king's

dogged opposition. It contained great administrative talent, which made

itself felt in the most adverse circumstances. To add to the

difficulty, the ministry came into office at the critical moment of a

great agitation in Ireland. In less than three months, not only was the

trouble successfully removed, but the important bills for disfranchising

revenue officers and excluding contractors from the House of Commons

were carried, and a tremendous blow was thus struck at the corrupt

influence of the crown upon elections. Burke's great scheme of

economical reform was also put into operation, cutting down the pension

list and diminishing the secret service fund, and thus destroying many

sources of corruption. At no time, perhaps, since the expulsion of the

Stuarts, had so much been done toward purifying English political life

as during the spring of 1782. But during the progress of these important

measures, the jealousies and bickerings in the cabinet became more and

more painfully apparent, and as the question of peace with America came

into the foreground, these difficulties hastened to a crisis.

[Sidenote: Obstacles in the way of a treaty of peace.]

From the policy which George III. pursued with regard to Lord Shelburne

at this time, one would suppose that in his secret heart the king

wished, by foul means since all others had failed, to defeat the

negotiations for peace and to prolong the war. Seldom has there been a

more oddly complicated situation. Peace was to be made with America,

France, Spain, and Holland. Of these powers, America and France were

leagued together by one treaty of alliance, and France and Spain by

another, and these treaties in some respects conflicted with one another

in the duties which they entailed upon the combatants. Spain, though at

war with England for purposes of her own, was bitterly hostile to the

United States; and France, thus leagued with two allies which pulled in

opposite directions, felt bound to satisfy both, while pursuing her own

ends against England. To deal with such a chaotic state of things, an

orderly and harmonious government in England should have seemed

indispensably necessary. Yet on the part of England the negotiation of a

treaty of peace was to be the work of two secretaries of state who were

both politically and personally hostile to each other. Fox, as secretary

of state for foreign affairs, had to superintend the negotiations with

France, Spain, and Holland. Shelburne was secretary of state for home

and colonial affairs; and as the United States were still officially

regarded as colonies, the American negotiations belonged to his

department. With such a complication of conflicting interests, George

III. might well hope that no treaty could be made.

[Sidenote: Oswald talks with Franklin.]

The views of Fox and Shelburne as to the best method of conceding

American independence were very different. Fox understood that France

was really in need of peace, and he believed that she would not make

further demands upon England if American independence should once be

recognized. Accordingly, Fox would have made this concession at once as

a preliminary to the negotiation. On the other hand, Shelburne felt sure

that France would insist upon further concessions, and he thought it

best to hold in reserve the recognition of independence as a

consideration to be bargained for. Informal negotiations began between

Shelburne and Franklin, who for many years had been warm friends. In

view of the impending change of government, Franklin had in March sent a

letter to Shelburne, expressing a hope that peace might soon be

restored. When the letter reached London the new ministry had already

been formed, and Shelburne, with the consent of the cabinet, answered it

by sending over to Paris an agent, to talk with Franklin informally, and

ascertain the terms upon which the Americans would make peace. The

person chosen for this purpose was Richard Oswald, a Scotch merchant,

who owned large estates in America,--a man of very frank disposition and

liberal views, and a friend of Adam Smith. In April, Oswald had several

conversations with Franklin. In one of these conversations Franklin

suggested that, in order to make a durable peace, it was desirable to

remove all occasion for future quarrel; that the line of frontier

between New York and Canada was inhabited by a lawless set of men, who

in time of peace would be likely to breed trouble between their

respective governments; and that therefore it would be well for England

to cede Canada to the United States. A similar reasoning would apply to

Nova Scotia. By ceding these countries to the United States it would be

possible, from the sale of unappropriated lands, to indemnify the

Americans for all losses of private property during the war, and also to

make reparation to the Tories, whose estates had been confiscated. By

pursuing such a policy, England, which had made war on America

unjustly, and had wantonly done it great injuries, would achieve not

merely peace, but reconciliation, with America; and reconciliation, said

Franklin, is "a sweet word." No doubt this was a bold tone for Franklin

to take, and perhaps it was rather cool in him to ask for Canada and

Nova Scotia; but he knew that almost every member of the Whig ministry

had publicly expressed the opinion that the war against America was an

unjust and wanton war; and being, moreover, a shrewd hand at a bargain,

he began by setting his terms high. Oswald doubtless looked at the

matter very much from Franklin's point of view, for on the suggestion of

the cession of Canada he expressed neither surprise nor reluctance.

Franklin had written on a sheet of paper the main points of his

conversation, and, at Oswald's request, he allowed him to take the paper

to London to show to Lord Shelburne, first writing upon it a note

expressly declaring its informal character. Franklin also sent a letter

to Shelburne, describing Oswald as a gentleman with whom he found it

very pleasant to deal. On Oswald's arrival in London, Shelburne did not

show the notes of the conversation to any of his colleagues, except Lord

Ashburton. He kept the paper over one night, and then returned it to

Franklin without any formal answer. But the letter he showed to the

cabinet, and on the 23d of April it was decided to send Oswald back to

Paris, to represent to Franklin that, on being restored to the same

situation in which she was left by the treaty of 1763, Great Britain

would be willing to recognize the independence of the United States.

Fox was authorized to make a similar representation to the French

government, and the person whom he sent to Paris for this purpose was

Thomas Grenville, son of the author of the Stamp Act.

As all British subjects were prohibited from entering into negotiations

with the revolted colonies, it was impossible for Oswald to take any

decisive step until an enabling act should be carried through

Parliament. But while waiting for this he might still talk informally

with Franklin. Fox thought that Oswald's presence in Paris indicated a

desire on Shelburne's part to interfere with the negotiations with the

French government; and indeed, the king, out of his hatred of Fox and

his inborn love of intrigue, suggested to Shelburne that Oswald "might

be a useful check on that part of the negotiation which was in other

hands." But Shelburne paid no heed to this crooked advice, and there is

nothing to show that he had the least desire to intrigue against Fox. If

he had, he would certainly have selected some other agent than Oswald,

who was the most straightforward of men, and scarcely close-mouthed

enough for a diplomatist. He told Oswald to impress it upon Franklin

that if America was to be independent at all she must be independent of

the whole world, and must not enter into any secret arrangement with

France which might limit her entire freedom of action in the future. To

the private memorandum which desired the cession of Canada for three

reasons, his answers were as follows: "1. _By way of

reparation._--Answer. No reparation can be heard of. 2. _To prevent

future wars._--Answer. It is to be hoped that some more friendly method

will be found. 3. _As a fund of indemnification to loyalists._--Answer.

No independence to be acknowledged without their being taken care of."

Besides, added Shelburne, the Americans would be expected to make some

compensation for the surrender of Charleston, Savannah, and the city of

New York, still held by British troops. From this it appears that

Shelburne, as well as Franklin, knew how to begin by asking more than he

was likely to get.

[Sidenote: Grenville has an interview with Vergennes.]

While Oswald submitted these answers to Franklin, Grenville had his

interview with Vergennes, and told him that, if England recognized the

independence of the United States, she should expect France to restore

the islands of the West Indies which she had taken from England. Why

not, since the independence of the United States was the sole avowed

object for which France had gone to war? Now this was on the 8th of May,

and the news of the destruction of the French fleet in the West Indies,

nearly four weeks ago, had not yet reached Europe. Flushed with the

victories of Grasse, and exulting in the prowess of the most formidable

naval force that France had ever sent out, Vergennes not only expected

to keep the islands which he had got, but was waiting eagerly for the

news that he had acquired Jamaica into the bargain. In this mood he

returned a haughty answer to Grenville. He reminded him that nations

often went to war for a specified object, and yet seized twice as much

if favoured by fortune; and, recurring to the instance which rankled

most deeply in the memories of Frenchmen, he cited the events of the

last war. In 1756 England went to war with France over the disputed

right to some lands on the Ohio River and the Maine frontier. After

seven years of fighting she not only kept these lands, but all of

Canada, Louisiana, and Florida, and ousted the French from India into

the bargain. No, said Vergennes, he would not rest content with the

independence of America. He would not even regard such an offer as a

concession to France in any way, or as a price in return for which

France was to make a treaty favourable to England. As regards the

recognition of independence, England must treat directly with America.

[Sidenote: Effects of Rodney's victory.]

[Sidenote: Fall of the Rockingham ministry, July 1, 1782.]

Grenville was disappointed and chagrined by this answer, and the

ministry made up their minds that there would be no use in trying to get

an honourable peace with France for the present. Accordingly, it seemed

better to take Vergennes at his word, though not in the sense in which

he meant it, and, by granting all that the Americans could reasonably

desire, to detach them from the French alliance as soon as possible. On

the 18th of May there came the news of the stupendous victory of Rodney

over Grasse, and all England rang with jubilee. Again it had been shown

that "Britannia rules the wave;" and it seemed that, if America could be

separately pacified, the House of Bourbon might be successfully defied.

Accordingly, on the 23d, five days after the news of victory, the

ministry decided "to propose the independence of America in the first

instance, instead of making it the condition of a general treaty." Upon

this Fox rather hastily maintained that the United States were put at

once into the position of an independent and foreign power, so that the

business of negotiating with them passed from Shelburne's department

into his own. Shelburne, on the other hand, argued that, as the

recognition of independence could not take effect until a treaty of

peace should be concluded, the negotiation with America still belonged

to him, as secretary for the colonies. Following Fox's instructions,

Grenville now claimed the right of negotiating with Franklin as well as

with Vergennes; but as his written credentials only authorized him to

treat with France, the French minister suspected foul play, and turned a

cold shoulder to Grenville. For the same reason, Grenville found

Franklin very reserved and indisposed to talk on the subject of the

treaty. While Grenville was thus rebuffed and irritated he had a talk

with Oswald, in the course of which he got from that simple and

high-minded gentleman the story of the private paper relating to the

cession of Canada, which Franklin had permitted Lord Shelburne to see.

Grenville immediately took offence; he made up his mind that something

underhanded was going on, and that this was the reason for the coldness

of Franklin and Vergennes; and he wrote an indignant letter about it to

Fox. From the wording of this letter, Fox got the impression that

Franklin's proposal was much more serious than it really was. It

naturally puzzled him and made him angry, for the attitude of America

implied in the request for a cession of Canada was far different from

the attitude presumed by the theory that the mere offer of independence

would be enough to detach her from her alliance with France. The plan of

the ministry seemed imperilled. Fox showed Grenville's letter to

Rockingham, Richmond, and Cavendish; and they all inferred that

Shelburne was playing a secret part, for purposes of his own. This was

doubtless unjust to Shelburne. Perhaps his keeping the matter to himself

was simply one more illustration of his want of confidence in Fox; or,

perhaps he did not think it worth while to stir up the cabinet over a

question which seemed too preposterous ever to come to anything. Fox,

however, cried out against Shelburne's alleged duplicity, and made up

his mind at all events to get the American negotiations transferred to

his own department. To this end he moved in the cabinet, on the last day

of June, that the independence of the United States should be

unconditionally acknowledged, so that England might treat as with a

foreign power. The motion was lost, and Fox announced that he should

resign his office. His resignation would probably of itself have broken

up the ministry, but, by a curious coincidence, on the next day Lord

Rockingham died; and so the first British government begotten of

Washington's victory at Yorktown came prematurely to an end.

[Sidenote: Shelburne prime minister.]

The Old Whigs now found some difficulty in choosing a leader. Burke was

the greatest statesman in the party, but he had not the qualities of a

party leader, and his connections were not sufficiently aristocratic.

Fox was distrusted by many people for his gross vices, and because of

his waywardness in politics. In the dissipated gambler, who cast in his

lot first with one party and then with the other, and who had shamefully

used his matchless eloquence in defending some of the worst abuses of

the time, there seemed as yet but little promise of the great reformer

of later years, the Charles Fox who came to be loved and idolized by all

enlightened Englishmen. Next to Fox, the ablest leader in the party was

the Duke of Richmond, but his advanced views on parliamentary reform put

him out of sympathy with the majority of the party. In this

embarrassment, the choice fell upon the Duke of Portland, a man of great

wealth and small talent, concerning whom Horace Walpole observed, "It is

very entertaining that two or three great families should persuade

themselves that they have a hereditary and exclusive right of giving us

a head without a tongue!" The choice was a weak one, and played directly

into the hands of the king. When urged to make the Duke of Portland his

prime minister, the king replied that he had already offered that

position to Lord Shelburne. Hereupon Fox and Cavendish resigned, but

Richmond remained in office, thus virtually breaking his connection with

the Old Whigs. Lord Keppel also remained. Many members of the party

followed Richmond and went over to Shelburne. William Pitt, now

twenty-three years old, succeeded Cavendish as chancellor of the

exchequer; Thomas Townshend became secretary of state for home and

colonies, and Lord Grantham became foreign secretary. The closing days

of Parliament were marked by altercations which showed how wide the

breach had grown between the two sections of the Whig party. Fox and

Burke believed that Shelburne was not only playing a false part, but was

really as subservient to the king as Lord North had been. In a speech

ridiculous for its furious invective, Burke compared the new prime

minister with Borgia and Catiline. And so Parliament was adjourned on

the 11th of July, and did not meet again until December.

[Sidenote: French policy opposed to American interests.]

The task of making a treaty of peace was simplified both by this change

of ministry and by the total defeat of the Spaniards and French at

Gibraltar in September. Six months before, England had seemed worsted in

every quarter. Now England, though defeated in America, was victorious

as regarded France and Spain. The avowed object for which France had

entered into alliance with the Americans was to secure the independence

of the United States, and this point was now substantially gained. The

chief object for which Spain had entered into alliance with France was

to drive the English from Gibraltar, and this point was now decidedly

lost. France had bound herself not to desist from the war until Spain

should recover Gibraltar; but now there was little hope of accomplishing

this, except by some fortunate bargain in the treaty, and Vergennes

tried to persuade England to cede the great stronghold in exchange for

West Florida, which Spain had lately conquered, or for Oran or

Guadaloupe. Failing in this, he adopted a plan for satisfying Spain at

the expense of the United States; and he did this the more willingly as

he had no love for the Americans, and did not wish to see them become

too powerful. France had strictly kept her pledges; she had given us

valuable and timely aid in gaining our independence; and the sympathies

of the French people were entirely with the American cause. But the

object of the French government had been simply to humiliate England,

and this end was sufficiently accomplished by depriving her of her

thirteen colonies.

[Sidenote: The valley of the Mississippi; Aranda's prophecy.]

The immense territory extending from the Alleghany Mountains to the

Mississippi River, and from the border of "West Florida to the Great

Lakes, had passed from the hands of France into those of England at the

peace of 1763; and by the Quebec Act of 1774 England had declared the

southern boundary of Canada to be the Ohio River. At present the whole

territory, from Lake Superior down to the southern boundary of what is

now Kentucky, belonged to the state of Virginia, whose backwoodsmen had

conquered it from England in 1779. In December, 1780, Virginia had

provisionally ceded the portion north of the Ohio to the United States,

but the cession was not yet completed. The region which is now Tennessee

belonged to North Carolina, which had begun to make settlements there as

long ago as 1758. The trackless forests included between Tennessee and

West Florida were still in the hands of wild tribes of Cherokees and

Choctaws, Chickasaws and Creeks. Several thousand pioneers from North

Carolina and Virginia had already settled beyond the mountains, and the

white population was rapidly increasing. This territory the French

government was very unwilling to leave in American hands. The

possibility of enormous expansion which it would afford to the new

nation was distinctly foreseen by sagacious men. Count Aranda, the

representative of Spain in these negotiations, wrote a letter to his

king just after the treaty was concluded, in which he uttered this

notable prophecy: "This federal republic is born a pygmy. A day will

come when it will be a giant, even a colossus, formidable in these

countries. Liberty of conscience, the facility for establishing a new

population on immense lands, as well as the advantages of the new

government, will draw thither farmers and artisans from all the nations.

In a few years we shall watch with grief the tyrannical existence of

this same colossus." The letter went on to predict that the Americans

would presently get possession of Florida and attack Mexico. Similar

arguments were doubtless used by Aranda in his interviews with

Vergennes, and France, as well as Spain, sought to prevent the growth of

the dreaded colossus. To this end Vergennes maintained that the

Americans ought to recognize the Quebec Act, and give up to England all

the territory north of the Ohio River. The region south of this limit

should, he thought, be made an Indian territory, and placed under the

protection of Spain and the United States. A line was to be drawn from

the mouth of the Cumberland River, following that stream about as far

as the site of Nashville, thence running southward to the Tennessee,

thence curving eastward nearly to the Alleghanies, and descending

through what is now eastern Alabama to the Florida line. The territory

to the east of this irregular line was to be under the protection of the

United States; the territory to the west of it was to be under the

protection of Spain. In this division, the settlers beyond the mountains

would retain their connection with the United States, which would not

touch the Mississippi River at any point. Vergennes held that this was

all the Americans could reasonably demand, and he agreed with Aranda

that they had as yet gained no foothold upon the eastern bank of the

great river, unmindful of the fact that at that very moment the

fortresses at Cahokia and Kaskaskia were occupied by American garrisons.

[Illustration: MAP OF NORTH AMERICA,

Showing the Boundaries of the UNITED STATES, CANADA, and the SPANISH

POSSESSIONS, according to the proposals of the Court of France in

1782.]

[Sidenote: The Newfoundland fisheries.]

Upon another important point the views of the French government were

directly opposed to American interests. The right to catch fish on the

banks of Newfoundland had been shared by treaty between France and

England; and the New England fishermen, as subjects of the king of Great

Britain, had participated in this privilege. The matter was of very

great importance, not only to New England, but to the United States in

general. Not only were the fisheries a source of lucrative trade to the

New England people, but they were the training-school of a splendid race

of seamen, the nursery of naval heroes whose exploits were by and by to

astonish the world. To deprive the Americans of their share in these

fisheries was to strike a serious blow at the strength and resources of

the new nation. The British government was not inclined to grant the

privilege, and on this point Vergennes took sides with England, in order

to establish a claim upon her for concessions advantageous to France in

some other quarter. With these views, Vergennes secretly aimed at

delaying the negotiations; for as long as hostilities were kept up, he

might hope to extort from his American allies a recognition of the

Spanish claims and a renouncement of the fisheries, simply by

threatening to send them no further assistance in men or money. In order

to retard the proceedings, he refused to take any steps whatever until

the independence of the United States should first be irrevocably

acknowledged by Great Britain, without reference to the final settlement

of the rest of the treaty. In this Vergennes was supported by Franklin,

as well as by Jay, who had lately arrived in Paris to take part in the

negotiations. But the reasons of the American commissioners were very

different from those of Vergennes. They feared that, if they began to

treat before independence was acknowledged, they would be unfairly dealt

with by France and Spain, and unable to gain from England the

concessions upon which they were determined.

[Sidenote: Jay detects the schemes of Vergennes.]

Jay soon began to suspect the designs of the French minister. He found

that he was sending M. de Rayneval as a secret emissary to Lord

Shelburne under an assumed name; he ascertained that the right of the

United States to the Mississippi valley was to be denied; and he got

hold of a dispatch from Marbois, the French secretary of legation at

Philadelphia, to Vergennes, opposing the American claim to the

Newfoundland fisheries. As soon as Jay learned these facts, he sent his

friend Dr. Benjamin Vaughan to Lord Shelburne to put him on his guard,

and while reminding him that it was greatly for the interest of England

to dissolve the alliance between America and France, he declared himself

ready to begin the negotiations without waiting for the recognition of

independence, provided that Oswald's commission should speak of the

thirteen United States of America, instead of calling them colonies and

naming them separately. This decisive step was taken by Jay on his own

responsibility, and without the knowledge of Franklin, who had been

averse to anything like a separate negotiation with England. It served

to set the ball rolling at once. After meeting the messengers from Jay

and Vergennes, Lord Shelburne at once perceived the antagonism that had

arisen between the allies, and promptly took advantage of it. A new

commission was made out for Oswald, in which the British government

first described our country as the United States; and early in October

negotiations were begun and proceeded rapidly. On the part of England,

the affair was conducted by Oswald, assisted by Strachey and

Fitzherbert, who had succeeded Grenville. In the course of the month

John Adams arrived in Paris, and a few weeks later Henry Laurens, who

had been exchanged for Lord Cornwallis and released from the Tower, was

added to the company. Adams had a holy horror of Frenchmen in general,

and of Count Vergennes in particular. He shared that common but mistaken

view of Frenchmen which regards them as shallow, frivolous, and

insincere; and he was indignant at the position taken by Vergennes on

the question of the fisheries. In this, John Adams felt as all New

Englanders felt, and he realized the importance of the question from a

national point of view, as became the man who in later years was to earn

lasting renown as one of the chief founders of the American navy. His

behaviour on reaching Paris was characteristic. It is said that he left

Count Vergennes to learn of his arrival through the newspapers. It was

certainly some time before he called upon him, and he took occasion,

besides, to express his opinions about republics and monarchies in terms

which courtly Frenchmen thought very rude.

[Sidenote: Franklin overruled by Jay and Adams.]

The arrival of Adams fully decided the matter as to a separate

negotiation with England. He agreed with Jay that Vergennes should be

kept as far as possible in the dark until everything was cut and dried,

and Franklin was reluctantly obliged to yield. The treaty of alliance

between France and the United States had expressly stipulated that

neither power should ever make peace without the consent of the other,

and in view of this Franklin was loth to do anything which might seem

like abandoning the ally whose timely interposition had alone enabled

Washington to achieve the crowning triumph of Yorktown. In justice to

Vergennes, it should be borne in mind that he had kept strict faith

with us in regard to every point that had been expressly stipulated; and

Franklin, who felt that he understood Frenchmen better than his

colleagues, was naturally unwilling to seem behindhand in this respect.

At the same time, in regard to matters not expressly stipulated,

Vergennes was clearly playing a sharp game against us; and it is

undeniable that, without departing technically from the obligations of

the alliance, Jay and Adams--two men as honourable as ever lived--played

a very sharp defensive game against him. The traditional French subtlety

was no match for Yankee shrewdness. The treaty with England was not

concluded until the consent of France had been obtained, and thus the

express stipulation was respected; but a thorough and detailed agreement

was reached as to what the purport of the treaty should be, while our

not too friendly ally was kept in the dark. The annals of modern

diplomacy have afforded few stranger spectacles. With the indispensable

aid of France we had just got the better of England in fight, and now we

proceeded amicably to divide territory and commercial privileges with

the enemy, and to make arrangements in which the ally was virtually

ignored. It ceases to be a paradox, however, when we remember that with

the change of government in England some essential conditions of the

case were changed. The England against which we had fought was the

hostile England of Lord North; the England with which we were now

dealing was the friendly England of Shelburne and Pitt. For the moment,

the English race, on both sides of the Atlantic, was united in its main

purpose and divided only by questions of detail, while the rival

colonizing power, which sought to work in a direction contrary to the

general interests of English-speaking people, was in great measure

disregarded.

[Sidenote: The separate American treaty, as agreed upon: 1. Boundaries;]

As soon as the problem was thus virtually reduced to a negotiation

between the American commissioners and Lord Shelburne's ministry, the

air was cleared in a moment. The principal questions had already been

discussed between Franklin and Oswald. Independence being first

acknowledged, the question of boundaries came up for settlement. England

had little interest in regaining the territory between the Alleghanies

and the Mississippi, the forts in which were already held by American

soldiers, and she relinquished all claim upon it. The Mississippi River

thus became the dividing line between the United States and the Spanish

possessions, and its navigation was made free alike to British and

American ships. Franklin's suggestion of a cession of Canada and Nova

Scotia was abandoned without discussion. It was agreed that the boundary

line should start at the mouth of the river St. Croix, and, running to a

point near Lake Madawaska in the highlands separating the Atlantic

watershed from that of the St. Lawrence, should follow these highlands

to the head of the Connecticut River, and then descend the middle of the

river to the forty-fifth parallel, thence running westward and through

the centre of the water communications of the Great Lakes to the Lake of

the Woods, thence to the source of the Mississippi, which was supposed

to be west of this lake. This line was marked in red ink by Oswald on

one of Mitchell's maps of North America, to serve as a memorandum

establishing the precise meaning of the words used in the description.

It ought to have been accurately fixed in its details by surveys made

upon the spot; but no commissioners were appointed for this purpose. The

language relating to the northeastern portion of the boundary contained

some inaccuracies which were revealed by later surveys, and the map used

by Oswald was lost. Hence a further question arose between Great Britain

and the United States, which was finally settled by the Ashburton treaty

in 1842.

[Sidenote: 2. Fisheries; commercial intercourse;]

The Americans retained the right of catching fish on the banks of

Newfoundland and in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, but lost the right of

drying their fish on the Newfoundland coast. On the other hand, no

permission was given to British subjects to fish on the coasts of the

United States. As regarded commercial intercourse, Jay sought to

establish complete reciprocal freedom between the two countries, and a

clause was proposed to the effect that "all British merchants and

merchant ships, on the one hand, shall enjoy in the United States, and

in all places belonging to them, the same protection and commercial

privileges, and be liable only to the same charges and duties as their

own merchants and merchant ships; and, on the other hand, the merchants

and merchant ships of the United States shall enjoy in all places

belonging to his Britannic Majesty the same protection and commercial

privileges, and be liable only to the same charges and duties as British

merchants and merchant ships, saving always to the chartered trading

companies of Great Britain such exclusive use and trade, and the

respective ports and establishments, as neither the other subjects of

Great Britain nor any the most favoured nation participate in."

Unfortunately for both countries, this liberal provision was rejected on

the ground that the ministry had no authority to interfere with the

Navigation Act.

[Sidenote: 3. Private debts;]

Only two questions were now left to be disposed of,--the question of

paying private debts, and that of compensating the American loyalists

for the loss of property and general rough treatment which they had

suffered. There were many old debts outstanding from American to British

merchants. These had been for the most part incurred before 1775, and

while many honest debtors, impoverished during the war, felt unable to

pay, there were doubtless many others who were ready to take advantage

of circumstances and refuse the payment which they were perfectly able

to make. It was scarcely creditable to us that any such question should

have arisen. Franklin, indeed, argued that these debts were more than

fully offset by damages done to private property by British soldiers:

as, for example, in the wanton raids on the coasts of Connecticut and

Virginia in 1779, or in Prevost's buccaneering march against Charleston.

To cite these atrocities, however, as a reason for the non-payment of

debts legitimately owed to innocent merchants in London and Glasgow was

to argue as if two wrongs could make a right. The strong sense of John

Adams struck at once to the root of the matter. He declared "he had no

notion of cheating anybody. The questions of paying debts and

compensating Tories were two." This terse statement carried the day, and

it was finally decided that all private debts on either side, whether

incurred before or after 1775, remained still binding, and must be

discharged at their full value in sterling money.

[Sidenote: 4. Compensation of loyalists.]

The last question of all was the one most difficult to settle. There

were many loyalists in the United States who had sacrificed everything

in the support of the British cause, and it was unquestionably the duty

of the British government to make every possible effort to insure them

against further injury, and, if practicable, to make good their losses

already incurred. From Virginia and the New England states, where they

were few in number, they had mostly fled, and their estates had been

confiscated. In New York and South Carolina, where they remained in

great numbers, they were still waging a desultory war with the patriots,

which far exceeded in cruelty and bitterness the struggle between the

regular armies. In many cases they had, at the solicitation of the

British government, joined the invading army, and been organized into

companies and regiments. The regular troops defeated at King's Mountain,

and those whom Arnold took with him to Virginia, were nearly all

American loyalists. Lord Shelburne felt that it would be wrong to

abandon these unfortunate men to the vengeance of their fellow

countrymen, and he insisted that the treaty should contain an amnesty

clause providing for the restoration of the Tories to their civil

rights, with compensation for their confiscated property. However

disagreeable such a course might seem to the victorious Americans, there

were many precedents for it in European history. It had indeed come to

be customary at the close of civil wars, and the effect of such a policy

had invariably been good. Cromwell, in his hour of triumph, inflicted no

disabilities upon his political enemies; and when Charles II. was

restored to the throne the healing effect of the amnesty act then passed

was so great that historians sometimes ask what in the world had become

of that Puritan party which a moment before had seemed supreme in the

land. At the close of the war of the Spanish Succession, the rebellious

people of Catalonia were indemnified for their losses, at the request of

England, and with a similar good effect. In view of such European

precedents, Vergennes agreed with Shelburne as to the propriety of

securing compensation and further immunity for the Tories in America.

John Adams insinuated that the French minister took this course because

he foresaw that the presence of the Tories in the United States would

keep the people perpetually divided into a French party and an English

party; but such a suspicion was quite uncalled for. There is no reason

to suppose that in this instance Vergennes had anything at heart but the

interests of humanity and justice.

On the other hand, the Americans brought forward very strong reasons why

the Tories should not be indemnified by Congress. First, as Franklin

urged, many of them had, by their misrepresentations to the British

government, helped to stir up the disputes which led to the war; and as

they had made their bed, so they must lie in it. Secondly, such of them

as had been concerned in burning and plundering defenceless villages,

and wielding the tomahawk in concert with bloodthirsty Indians, deserved

no compassion. It was rather for them to make compensation for the

misery they had wrought. Thirdly, the confiscated Tory property had

passed into the hands of purchasers who had bought it in good faith and

could not now be dispossessed, and in many cases it had been distributed

here and there and lost sight of. An estimate of the gross amount might

be made, and a corresponding sum appropriated for indemnification. But,

fourthly, the country was so impoverished by the war that its own

soldiers, the brave men whose heroic exertions had won the independence

of the United States, were at this moment in sore distress for the want

of the pay which Congress could not give them, but to which its honour

was sacredly pledged. The American government was clearly bound to pay

its just debts to the friends who had suffered so much in its behalf

before it should proceed to entertain a chimerical scheme for satisfying

its enemies. For, fifthly, any such scheme was in the present instance

clearly chimerical. The acts under which Tory property had been

confiscated were acts of state legislatures, and Congress had no

jurisdiction over such a matter. If restitution was to be made, it must

be made by the separate states. The question could not for a moment be

entertained by the general government or its agents.

Upon these points the American commissioners were united and inexorable.

Various suggestions were offered in vain by the British. Their troops

still held the city of New York, and it was doubtful whether the

Americans could hope to capture it in another campaign. It was urged

that England might fairly claim in exchange for New York a round sum of

money wherewith the Tories might be indemnified. It was further urged

that certain unappropriated lands in the Mississippi valley might be

sold for the same purpose. But the Americans would not hear of buying

one of their own cities, whose independence was already acknowledged by

the first article of the treaty which recognized the independence of the

United States and as for the western lands, they were wanted as a means

of paying our own war debts and providing for our veteran soldiers.

Several times Shelburne sent word to Paris that he would break off the

negotiation unless the loyalist claims were in some way recognized. But

the Americans were obdurate. They had one advantage, and knew it.

Parliament was soon to meet, and it was doubtful whether Lord Shelburne

could command a sufficient majority to remain long in office. He was,

accordingly, very anxious to complete the treaty of peace, or at least

to detach America from the French alliance, as soon as possible. The

American commissioners were also eager to conclude the treaty. They had

secured very favourable terms, and were loth to run any risk of

spoiling what had been done. Accordingly, they made a proposal in the

form of a compromise, which nevertheless settled the point in their

favour. The matter, they said, was beyond the jurisdiction of Congress,

but they agreed that Congress should _recommend_ to the several states

to desist from further proceedings against the Tories, and to reconsider

their laws on this subject; it should further recommend that persons

with claims upon confiscated lands might be authorized to use legal

means of recovering them, and to this end might be allowed to pass to

and fro without personal risk for the term of one year. The British

commissioners accepted this compromise, unsatisfactory as it was,

because it was really impossible to obtain anything better without

throwing the whole negotiation overboard. The constitutional difficulty

was a real one indeed. As Adams told Oswald, if the point were further

insisted upon, Congress would be obliged to refer it to the several

states, and no one could tell how long it might be before any decisive

result could be reached in this way. Meanwhile, the state of war would

continue, and it would be cheaper for England to indemnify the loyalists

herself than to pay the war bills for a single month. Franklin added

that, if the loyalists were to be indemnified, it would be necessary

also to reckon up the damage they had done in burning houses and

kidnapping slaves, and then strike a balance between the two accounts;

and he gravely suggested that a special commission might be appointed

for this purpose. At the prospect of endless discussion which this

suggestion involved, the British commissioners gave way and accepted the

American terms, although they were frankly told that too much must not

be expected from the recommendation of Congress. The articles were

signed on the 30th of November, six days before the meeting of

Parliament. Hostilities in America were to cease at once, and upon the

completion of the treaty the British fleets and armies were to be

immediately withdrawn from every place which they held within the limits

of the United States. A supplementary and secret article provided that

if England, on making peace with Spain, should recover West Florida, the

northern boundary of that province should be a line running due east

from the mouth of the Yazoo River to the Chattahoochee.

[Sidenote: Vergennes does not like the way in which it has been done.]

Thus by skilful diplomacy the Americans had gained all that could

reasonably be asked, while the work of making a general peace was

greatly simplified. It was declared in the preamble that the articles

here signed were provisional, and that the treaty was not to take effect

until terms of peace should be agreed on between England and France.

Without delay, Franklin laid the whole matter, except the secret

article, before Vergennes, who forthwith accused the Americans of

ingratitude and bad faith. Franklin's reply, that at the worst they

could only be charged with want of diplomatic courtesy, has sometimes

been condemned as insincere, but on inadequate grounds. He had consented

with reluctance to the separate negotiation, because he did not wish to

give France any possible ground for complaint, whether real or

ostensible. There does not seem, however, to have been sufficient

justification for so grave a charge as was made by Vergennes. If the

French negotiations had failed until after the overthrow of the

Shelburne ministry; if Fox, on coming into power, had taken advantage of

the American treaty to continue the war against France; and if under

such circumstances the Americans had abandoned their ally, then

undoubtedly they would have become guilty of ingratitude and treachery.

There is no reason for supposing that they would ever have done so, had

the circumstances arisen. Their preamble made it impossible for them

honourably to abandon France until a full peace should be made, and more

than this France could not reasonably demand. The Americans had kept to

the strict letter of their contract, as Vergennes had kept to the strict

letter of his, and beyond this they meted out exactly the same measure

of frankness which they received. To say that our debt of gratitude to

France was such as to require us to acquiesce in her scheme for

enriching our enemy Spain at our expense is simply childish. Franklin

was undoubtedly right. The commissioners may have been guilty of a

breach of diplomatic courtesy, but nothing more. Vergennes might be

sarcastic about it for the moment, but the cordial relations between

France and America remained undisturbed.

[Sidenote: A great diplomatic victory.]

On the part of the Americans the treaty of Paris was one of the most

brilliant triumphs in the whole history of modern diplomacy. Had the

affair been managed by men of ordinary ability, some of the greatest

results of the Revolutionary War would probably have been lost; the new

republic would have been cooped up between the Atlantic Ocean and the

Alleghany Mountains; our westward expansion would have been impossible

without further warfare in which European powers would have been

involved; and the formation of our Federal Union would doubtless have

been effectively hindered, if not, indeed, altogether prevented. To the

grand triumph the varied talents of Franklin, Adams, and Jay alike

contributed. To the latter is due the credit of detecting and baffling

the sinister designs of France; but without the tact of Franklin this

probably could not have been accomplished without offending France in

such wise as to spoil everything. It is, however, to the rare

discernment and boldness of Jay, admirably seconded by the sturdy Adams,

that the chief praise is due. The turning-point of the whole affair was

the visit of Dr. Vaughan to Lord Shelburne. The foundation of success

was the separate negotiation with England, and here there had stood in

the way a more formidable obstacle than the mere reluctance of Franklin.

The chevalier Luzerne and his secretary Marbois had been busy with

Congress, and that body had sent well-meant but silly and pusillanimous

instructions to its commissioners at Paris to be guided in all things by

the wishes of the French court. To disregard such instructions required

all the lofty courage for which Jay and Adams were noted, and for the

moment it brought upon them something like a rebuke from Congress,

conveyed in a letter from Robert Livingston. As Adams said, in his

vehement way, "Congress surrendered their own sovereignty into the hands

of a French minister. Blush! blush! ye guilty records! blush and perish!

It is glory to have broken such infamous orders." True enough; the

commissioners knew that in diplomacy, as in warfare, to the agent at a

distance from his principal some discretionary power must be allowed.

They assumed great responsibility, and won a victory of incalculable

grandeur.

[Sidenote: The Spanish treaty.]

The course of the Americans produced no effect upon the terms obtained

by France, but it seriously modified the case with Spain. Unable to

obtain Gibraltar by arms, that power hoped to get it by diplomacy; and

with the support of France she seemed disposed to make the cession of

the great fortress an ultimatum, without which the war must go on.

Shelburne, on his part, was willing to exchange Gibraltar for an island

in the West Indies; but it was difficult to get the cabinet to agree on

the matter, and the scheme was violently opposed by the people, for the

heroic defence of the stronghold had invested it with a halo of romance

and endeared it to every one. Nevertheless, so persistent was Spain, and

so great the desire for peace on the part of the ministry, that they had

resolved to exchange Gibraltar for Guadaloupe, when the news arrived of

the treaty with America. The ministers now took a bold stand, and

refused to hear another word about giving up Gibraltar. Spain scolded,

and threatened a renewal of hostilities, but France was unwilling to

give further assistance, and the matter was settled by England's

surrendering East Florida, and allowing the Spaniards to keep West

Florida and Minorca, which were already in their hands.

[Sidenote: The French treaty.]

By the treaty with France, the West India islands of Grenada, St.

Vincent, St. Christopher, Dominica, Nevis, and Montserrat were restored

to England, which in turn restored St. Lucia and ceded Tobago to France.

The French were allowed to fortify Dunkirk, and received some slight

concessions in India and Africa; they retained their share in the

Newfoundland fisheries, and recovered the little neighbouring islands of

St. Pierre and Miquelon. For the fourteen hundred million francs which

France had expended in the war, she had the satisfaction of detaching

the American colonies from England, thus inflicting a blow which it was

confidently hoped would prove fatal to the maritime power of her ancient

rival; but beyond this short-lived satisfaction, the fallaciousness of

which events were soon to show, she obtained very little. On the 20th of

January, 1783, the preliminaries of peace were signed between England,

on the one hand, and France and Spain, on the other. A truce was at the

same time concluded with Holland, which was soon followed by a peace, in

which most of the conquests on either side were restored.

[Sidenote: Coalition of Fox with North.]

A second English ministry was now about to be wrecked on the rock of

this group of treaties. Lord Shelburne's government had at no time been

a strong one. He had made many enemies by his liberal and reforming

measures, and he had alienated most of his colleagues by his reserved

demeanour and seeming want of confidence in them. In December several

of the ministers resigned. The strength of parties in the House of

Commons was thus quaintly reckoned by Gibbon: "Minister 140; Reynard 90;

Boreas 120; the rest unknown or uncertain." But "Reynard" and "Boreas"

were now about to join forces in one of the strangest coalitions ever

known in the history of politics. No statesman ever attacked another

more ferociously than Fox had attacked North during the past ten years.

He had showered abuse upon him; accused him of "treachery and

falsehood," of "public perfidy," and "breach of a solemn specific

promise;" and had even gone so far as to declare to his face a hope that

he would be called upon to expiate his abominable crimes upon the

scaffold. Within a twelvemonth he had thus spoken of Lord North and his

colleagues: "From the moment when I shall make any terms with one of

them, I will rest satisfied to be called the most infamous of mankind. I

would not for an instant think of a coalition with men who, in every

public and private transaction as ministers, have shown themselves void

of every principle of honour and honesty. In the hands of such men I

would not trust my honour even for a moment." Still more recently, when

at a loss for words strong enough to express his belief in the

wickedness of Shelburne, he declared that he had no better opinion of

that man than to deem him capable of forming an alliance with North. We

may judge, then, of the general amazement when, in the middle of

February, it turned out that Fox had himself done this very thing. An

"ill-omened marriage," William Pitt called it in the House of Commons.

"If this ill-omened marriage is not already solemnized, I know a just

and lawful impediment, and in the name of the public safety I here

forbid the banns." Throughout the country the indignation was great.

Many people had blamed Fox for not following up his charges by actually

bringing articles of impeachment against Lord North. That the two

enemies should thus suddenly become leagued in friendship seemed utterly

monstrous. It injured Fox extremely in the opinion of the country, and

it injured North still more, for it seemed like a betrayal of the king

on his part, and his forgiveness of so many insults looked

mean-spirited. It does not appear, however, that there was really any

strong personal animosity between North and Fox. They were both men of

very amiable character, and almost incapable of cherishing resentment.

The language of parliamentary orators was habitually violent, and the

huge quantities of wine which gentlemen in those days used to drink may

have helped to make it extravagant. The excessive vehemence of political

invective often deprived it of half its effect. One day, after Fox had

exhausted his vocabulary of abuse upon Lord George Germaine, Lord North

said to him, "You were in very high feather to-day, Charles, and I am

glad you did not fall upon me." On another occasion, it is said that

while Fox was thundering against North's unexampled turpitude, the

object of his furious tirade cosily dropped off to sleep. Gibbon, who

was the friend of both statesmen, expressly declares that they bore

each other no ill will. But while thus alike indisposed to harbour

bitter thoughts, there was one man for whom both Fox and North felt an

abiding distrust and dislike; and that man was Lord Shelburne, the prime

minister.

As a political pupil of Burke, Fox shared that statesman's distrust of

the whole school of Lord Chatham, to which Shelburne belonged. In many

respects these statesmen were far more advanced than Burke, but they did

not sufficiently realize the importance of checking the crown by means

of a united and powerful ministry. Fox thoroughly understood that much

of the mischief of the past twenty years, including the loss of America,

had come from the system of weak and divided ministries, which gave the

king such great opportunity for wreaking his evil will. He had himself

been a member of such a ministry, which had fallen seven months ago.

When the king singled out Shelburne for his confidence, Fox naturally

concluded that Shelburne was to be made to play the royal game, as North

had been made to play it for so many years. This was very unjust to

Shelburne, but there is no doubt that Fox was perfectly honest in his

belief. It seemed to him that the present state of things must be

brought to an end, at whatever cost. A ministry strong enough to curb

the king could be formed only by a coalescence of two out of the three

existing parties. A coalescence of Old and New Whigs had been tried last

spring, and failed. It only remained now to try the effect of a

coalescence of Old Whigs and Tories.

Such was doubtless the chief motive of Fox in this extraordinary move.

The conduct of North seems harder to explain, but it was probably due to

a reaction of feeling on his part. He had done violence to his own

convictions out of weak compassion for George III., and had carried on

the American war for four years after he had been thoroughly convinced

that peace ought to be made. Remorse for this is said to have haunted

him to the end of his life. When in his old age he became blind, he bore

this misfortune with his customary lightness of heart; and one day,

meeting the veteran Barré, who had also lost his eyesight, he exclaimed,

with his unfailing wit, "Well, colonel, in spite of all our differences,

I suppose there are no two men in England who would be gladder to _see_

each other than you and I." But while Lord North could jest about his

blindness, the memory of his ill-judged subservience to the king was

something that he could not laugh away, and among his nearest friends he

was sometimes heard to reproach himself bitterly. When, therefore, in

1783, he told Fox that he fully agreed with him in thinking that the

royal power ought to be curbed, he was doubtless speaking the truth. No

man had a better right to such an opinion than he had gained through

sore experience. In his own ministry, as he said to Fox, he took the

system as he found it, and had not vigour and resolution enough to put

an end to it; but he was now quite convinced that in such a country as

England, while the king should be treated with all outward show of

respect, he ought on no account to be allowed to exercise any real

power.

Now this was in 1783 the paramount political question in England, just

as much as the question of secession was paramount in the United States

in 1861. Other questions could be postponed; the question of curbing the

king could not. Upon this all-important point North had come to agree

with Fox; and as the principal motive of their coalition may be thus

explained, the historian is not called upon to lay too much stress upon

the lower motives assigned in profusion by their political enemies. This

explanation, however, does not quite cover the case. The mass of the

Tories would never follow North in an avowed attempt to curb the king,

but they agreed with the followers of Fox, though not with Fox himself,

in holy horror of parliamentary reform, and were alarmed by a recent

declaration of Shelburne that the suffrage must be extended so as to

admit a hundred new county members. Thus while the two leaders were

urged to coalescence by one motive, their followers were largely swayed

by another, and this added much to the mystery and general

unintelligibleness of the movement. In taking this step Fox made the

mistake which was characteristic of the Old Whig party. He gave too

little heed to the great public outside the walls of the House of

Commons. The coalition, once made, was very strong in Parliament, but it

mystified and scandalized the people, and this popular disapproval by

and by made it easy for the king to overthrow it.

[Sidenote: Fall of Shelburne's ministry.]

It was agreed to choose the treaty as the occasion for the combined

attack upon the Shelburne ministry. North, as the minister who had

conducted the unsuccessful war, was bound to oppose the treaty, in any

case. It would not do for him to admit that better terms could not have

been made. The treaty was also very unpopular with Fox's party, and with

the nation at large. It was thought that too much territory had been

conceded to the Americans, and fault was found with the article on the

fisheries. But the point which excited most indignation was the virtual

abandonment of the loyalists, for here the honour of England was felt to

be at stake. On this ground the treaty was emphatically condemned by

Burke, Sheridan, and Wilberforce, no less than by North. It was ably

defended in the Commons by Pitt, and in the Lords by Shelburne himself,

who argued that he had but the alternative of accepting the terms as

they stood, or continuing the war; and since it had come to this, he

said, without spilling a drop of blood, or incurring one fifth of the

expense of a year's campaign, the comfort and happiness of the American

loyalists could be easily secured. By this he meant that, should America

fail to make good their losses, it was far better for England to

indemnify them herself than to prolong indefinitely a bloody and ruinous

struggle. As we shall hereafter see, this liberal and enlightened policy

was the one which England really pursued, so far as practicable, and her

honour was completely saved. That Shelburne and Pitt were quite right

there can now be little doubt. But argument was of no avail against the

resistless power of the coalition. On the 17th of February Lord John

Cavendish moved an amendment to the ministerial address on the treaty,

refusing to approve it. On the 21st he moved a further amendment

condemning the treaty. Both motions were carried, and on the 24th Lord

Shelburne resigned. He did not dissolve Parliament and appeal to the

country, partly because he was aware of his personal unpopularity, and

partly because, in spite of the general disgust at the coalition, there

was little doubt that on the particular question of the treaty the

public opinion agreed with the majority in Parliament, and not with the

ministry. For this reason, Pitt, though personally popular, saw that it

was no time for him to take the first place in the government, and when

the king proceeded to offer it to him he declined.

[Sidenote: The king's wrath.]

[Sidenote: The treaty is adopted, after all, by the coalition ministry,

which presently falls.]

For more than five weeks, while the treasury was nearly empty, and the

question of peace or war still hung in the balance, England was without

a regular government, while the angry king went hunting for some one who

would consent to be his prime minister. He was determined not to submit

to the coalition. He was naturally enraged at Lord North for turning

against him. Meeting one day North's father, Lord Guilford, he went up

to him, tragically wringing his hands, and exclaimed in accents of woe,

"Did I ever think, my Lord Guilford, that your son would thus have

betrayed me into the hands of Mr. Fox?" He appealed in vain to Lord

Gower, and then to Lord Temple, to form a ministry. Lord Gower suggested

that perhaps Thomas Pitt, cousin of William, might be willing to serve.

"I desired him," said the king, "to apply to Mr. Thomas Pitt, or Mr.

Thomas anybody." It was of no use. By the 2d of April Parliament had

become furious at the delay, and George was obliged to yield. The Duke

of Portland was brought in as nominal prime minister, with Fox as

foreign secretary, North as secretary for home and colonies, Cavendish

as chancellor of the exchequer, and Keppel as first lord of the

admiralty. The only Tory in the cabinet, excepting North, was Lord

Stormont, who became president of the council. The commissioners,

Fitzherbert and Oswald, were recalled from Paris, and the Duke of

Manchester and David Hartley, son of the great philosopher, were

appointed in their stead. Negotiations continued through the spring and

summer. Attempts were made to change some of the articles, especially

the obnoxious article concerning the loyalists, but all to no purpose.

Hartley's attempt to negotiate a mutually advantageous commercial treaty

with America also came to nothing. The definitive treaty which was

finally signed on the 3d of September, 1783, was an exact transcript of

the treaty which Shelburne had made, and for making which the present

ministers had succeeded in turning him out of office. No more emphatic

justification of Shelburne's conduct of this business could possibly

have been obtained.

The coalition ministry did not long survive the final signing of the

treaty. The events of the next few months are curiously instructive as

showing the quiet and stealthy way in which a political revolution may

be consummated in a thoroughly conservative and constitutional country.

Early in the winter session of Parliament Fox brought in his famous bill

for organizing the government of the great empire which Clive and

Hastings had built up in India. Popular indignation at the ministry had

been strengthened by its adopting the same treaty of peace for the

making of which it had assaulted Shelburne; and now, on the passage of

the India Bill by the House of Commons, there was a great outcry. Many

provisions of the bill were exceedingly unpopular, and its chief object

was alleged to be the concentration of the immense patronage of India

into the hands of the old Whig families. With the popular feeling thus

warmly enlisted against the ministry, George III. was now emboldened to

make war on it by violent means; and, accordingly, when the bill came up

in the House of Lords, he caused it to be announced, by Lord Temple,

that any peer who should vote in its favour would be regarded as an

enemy by the king. Four days later the House of Commons, by a vote of

153 to 80, resolved that "to report any opinion, or pretended opinion,

of his majesty upon any bill or other proceeding depending in either

house of Parliament, with a view to influence the votes of the members,

is a high crime and misdemeanour, derogatory to the honour of the crown,

a breach of the fundamental privileges of Parliament, and subversive of

the constitution of this country." A more explicit or emphatic defiance

to the king would have been hard to frame. Two days afterward the Lords

rejected the India Bill, and on the next day, the 18th of December,

George turned the ministers out of office.

[Sidenote: Constitutional crisis, ending in the overwhelming victory of

Pitt, May, 1784.]

In this grave constitutional crisis the king invited William Pitt to

form a government, and this young statesman, who had consistently

opposed the coalition, now saw that his hour was come. He was more than

any one else the favourite of the people. Fox's political reputation was

eclipsed, and North's was destroyed, by their unseemly alliance. People

were sick of the whole state of things which had accompanied the

American war. Pitt, who had only come into Parliament in 1780, was free

from these unpleasant associations. The unblemished purity of his life,

his incorruptible integrity, his rare disinterestedness, and his

transcendent ability in debate were known to every one. As the worthy

son of Lord Chatham, whose name was associated with the most glorious

moment of English history, he was peculiarly dear to the people. His

position, however, on taking supreme office at the instance of a king

who had just committed an outrageous breach of the constitution, was

extremely critical, and only the most consummate skill could have won

from the chaos such a victory as he was about to win. When he became

first lord of the treasury and chancellor of the exchequer, in December,

1783, he had barely completed his twenty-fifth year. All his colleagues

in the new cabinet were peers, so that he had to fight single-handed in

the Commons against the united talents of Burke and Sheridan, Fox and

North; and there was a heavy majority against him, besides. In view of

this adverse majority, it was Pitt's constitutional duty to dissolve

Parliament and appeal to the country. But Fox, unwilling to imperil his

great majority by a new election, now made the fatal mistake of opposing

a dissolution; thus showing his distrust of the people and his dread of

their verdict. With consummate tact, Pitt allowed the debates to go on

till March, and then, when the popular feeling in his favour had grown

into wild enthusiasm, he dissolved Parliament. In the general election

which followed, 160 members of the coalition lost their seats, and Pitt

obtained the greatest majority that has ever been given to an English

minister.

[Sidenote: Overthrow of George III.'s system of personal government.]

Thus was completed the political revolution in England which was set on

foot by the American victory at Yorktown. Its full significance was only

gradually realized. For the moment it might seem that it was the king

who had triumphed. He had shattered the alliance which had been formed

for the purpose of curbing him, and the result of the election had

virtually condoned his breach of the constitution. This apparent

victory, however, had been won only by a direct appeal to the people,

and all its advantages accrued to the people, and not to George III. His

ingenious system of weak and divided ministries, with himself for

balance-wheel, was destroyed. For the next seventeen years the real

ruler of England was not George III., but William Pitt, who, with his

great popular following, wielded such a power as no English sovereign

had possessed since the days of Elizabeth. The political atmosphere was

cleared of intrigue; and Fox, in the legitimate attitude of leader of

the new opposition, entered upon the glorious part of his career. There

was now set in motion that great work of reform which, hindered for a

while by the reaction against the French revolutionists, won its

decisive victory in 1832. Down to the very moment at which American and

British history begin to flow in distinct and separate channels, it is

interesting to observe how closely they are implicated with each other.

The victory of the Americans not only set on foot the British revolution

here described, but it figured most prominently in each of the political

changes that we have witnessed, down to the very eve of the overthrow of

the coalition. The system which George III. had sought to fasten upon

America, in order that he might fasten it upon England, was shaken off

and shattered by the good people of both countries at almost the same

moment of time.