IN THE NARROW SEAS
‘This battle fares like to the morning’s war,
When dying clouds contend with growing light,
What time the shepherd, blowing of his nails,
Can neither call it, perfect day nor night.
Now sways it this way, like a mighty sea,
Forced by the tide to combat with the wind;
Now sways it that way, like the selfsame sea,
Forced to retire by fury of the wind:
Some time the flood prevails, and then the wind;
Now one the better, then another best;
Both tugging to be victors, breast to breast,
Yet neither conquerors nor conquered:
So is the equal poise of the fell war.’
HENRY VI. PART III.
Action of August 28 in the Heligoland Bight—Fate of the German Light
Cruisers—Paralysis of German Naval Enterprise—The Ostend
Demonstration—The Royal Naval Air Service—The Air Situation at the
Outbreak of War—The Admiralty take Charge at Home—The Zeppelin
Menace and the ‘Hornets’—Offence the true Defence—Beginning of the
Dunkirk Guerrilla—Samson’s Aeroplanes—The Armoured Cars—First dawn
of the Tank idea—General Joffre’s request—The Omnibus Brigade—An
Embarrassing Responsibility—The Sinking of the _Aboukir_, _Hogue_
and _Cressy_.
I now have to chronicle a brilliant episode which came at a most timely
moment and throughout which we enjoyed the best of good luck. My
insistent desire to develop a minor offensive against the Germans in the
Heligoland Bight led to conferences with Commodore Tyrwhitt, who
commanded the light cruisers and destroyers of ‘The Harwich Striking
Force,’ and Commodore Keyes, the head of the Submarine Service also
stationed at Harwich. On August 23 Commodore Keyes called personally
upon me at the Admiralty with a proposal for ‘a well-organised drive
commencing before dawn from inshore close to the enemy’s coast.’ On the
24th I presided at a meeting in my room between him and Commodore
Tyrwhitt and the First Sea Lord and the Chief of the Staff.
The plan which the two Commodores then outlined was at once simple and
daring. Since the first hours of the war our submarines had prowled
about in the Heligoland Bight. They had now accumulated during a period
of three weeks accurate information about the dispositions of the enemy.
They knew that he was in the habit of keeping a flotilla of destroyers
attended by a couple of small cruisers, cruising and patrolling each
night to the North of Heligoland, and that these were accustomed to be
relieved shortly after daylight by a second flotilla which worked on a
much less extended beat. They proposed to take two flotillas of our best
destroyers and two light cruisers from Harwich by night and reach just
before dawn a point inside the Northern Coast of the Heligoland Bight
not far from the island of Sylt. From this point they would make a
left-handed scoop inshore, falling upon and chasing back the outcoming
flotilla if they met it, and then would all turn together in a long line
abreast Westward towards home to meet and if possible destroy the
incoming German flotilla. Six British submarines in two divisions would
take part in the operation so as to attack the German heavy ships should
they come out, and two battle-cruisers (the _Invincible_ and _New
Zealand_) then stationed at the Humber would act as support.
Such was in short the plan proposed by these officers and approved by
the First Sea Lord. Action was fixed for the 28th. As soon as Sir John
Jellicoe was informed of these intentions, he offered to send in further
support three battle-cruisers and six light cruisers. He did more. He
sent Sir David Beatty. The result was a success which far exceeded the
hopes of the Admiralty, and produced results of a far-reaching character
upon the whole of the naval war.
At dawn on the 28th, Admiral Tyrwhitt’s flotillas, led by the _Arethusa_
and _Fearless_, reached their point of attack and, in the words of
Admiral Scheer, ‘broke into the Heligoland Bight.’ The enemy was taken
by surprise. The weather near the land was increasingly misty. The
Heligoland batteries came into action, but without effect. The German
battleships and battle-cruisers could not cross the bar of the outer
Jade owing to the tide till 1 p.m. Only the German light cruisers on
patrol or close at hand in the Elbe or the Ems could come to the aid of
their flotillas. A confused, dispersed and prolonged series of combats
ensued between the flotillas and light cruisers and continued until
after four o’clock in the afternoon. During all this time the British
light forces were rampaging about the enemy’s most intimate and
jealously guarded waters.
Very little, however, turned out as had been planned. Owing to a
mischance, arising primarily from a fault in Admiralty staff work, the
message apprising Commodores Keyes and Tyrwhitt of the presence of
Admiral Beatty with his additional battle cruisers and light cruisers,
did not reach them in time; nor was Admiral Beatty aware of the areas in
which the British submarines were working. Several awkward
embarrassments followed from this and might easily have led to
disastrous mistakes. However, fortune was steady, and the initial
surprise together with the resolute offensive carried us safely through.
The German light cruisers precipitately proceeding to the assistance of
their flotillas and animated by the hopes of cutting off our own, ran
into the British battle-cruisers. Admiral Beatty, in spite not only of
the risk of mines and submarines, but also—for all he could know—of
meeting superior forces, had with extraordinary audacity led his
squadron far into the Bight. Two enemy cruisers (the _Ariadne_ and the
_Köln_) were smashed to pieces by the enormous shells of the Lion and
the _Princess Royal_: a third (the _Mainz_) was sunk by the light
cruisers and destroyers. Three others (the _Frauenlob_, _Strassburg_ and
the _Stettin_) limped home with many casualties. One German destroyer
was sunk. The rest in the confusion and light mist escaped, though
several were injured.
The good news trickled into the Admiralty during the day, but for some
time we were very anxious about the _Arethusa_. A feed-pipe had been
smashed by a shell and her steaming power was reduced to seven or eight
knots. However, she returned unmolested to the Thames.
Not a single British ship was sunk or, indeed, seriously injured; and
our casualties did not exceed thirty-five killed and about forty
wounded, in spite of the fact that, in the words of the German
Lieutenant Tholens, ‘The English ships made the greatest efforts to pick
up the survivors.’[59] Two hundred and twenty-four Germans, many
desperately wounded, were rescued in circumstances of much danger by
Commodore Keyes on the destroyer _Lurcher_, and brought to England.
Considerably more than a thousand Germans, including the Flotilla
Admiral and the Destroyer Commodore, perished. A son of Admiral von
Tirpitz was among the prisoners. Much more important, however, than
these material gains was the effect produced upon the morale of the
enemy. The Germans knew nothing of our defective Staff work and of the
risks we had run. All they saw was that the British did not hesitate to
hazard their greatest vessels as well as their light craft in the most
daring offensive action and had escaped apparently unscathed. They felt
as we should have felt had German destroyers broken into the Solent and
their battle-cruisers penetrated as far as the Nab. The results of this
action were far-reaching. Henceforward the weight of British naval
prestige lay heavy across all German sea enterprise. Upon the Emperor
the impression produced was decisive. Thus Scheer (p. 57): ‘The
restrictions imposed on the Battle Fleet were adhered to.’ And still
more explicit, von Tirpitz (p. 357): ‘... August 28th, a day fateful,
both in its after effects and incidental results, for the work of our
navy.... The Emperor did not want losses of this sort.... Orders were
issued by the Emperor ... after an audience to Pohl, to which I as usual
was not summoned, to restrict the initiative of the Commander-in-Chief
of the North Sea Fleet: the loss of ships was to be avoided, fleet
sallies and any greater undertakings must be approved by His Majesty in
advance,’ etc. On von Tirpitz protesting against ‘this muzzling policy’
... ‘there sprang up from that day forth an estrangement between the
Emperor and myself, which steadily increased.’
The German Navy was indeed ‘muzzled.’ Except for furtive movements by
individual submarines and minelayers not a dog stirred from August till
November. Meanwhile our strength, both offensive afloat and defensive in
our harbours, was steadily and rapidly increasing.
The news of this naval action reached the French and British armies in
the dark hour before the dawn of victory and was everywhere published to
the retreating troops.[60]
* * * * *
As the German armies pressed forward towards Paris they turned the back
of their right shoulder increasingly towards the sea. The Belgian Army
making a sortie from Antwerp struck towards the German lines of
communication and endeavoured to hamper and delay the great advance. In
order to help the Belgians and to take some pressure off our own
hard-pressed Army, the Admiralty, in consultation with Lord Kitchener,
attempted to make a diversion. A brigade of Marines was disembarked,
covered by warships (Aug. 26), at Ostend in the hopes that it would
attract the attention of the enemy and give him the impression that
larger forces would follow from the sea.
_Telegram to Belgian Government._
25. 8. 14.
‘In order to delay southward German advance and to create diversion
favourable to the forward movement of the Belgian Army, Admiralty wish
to send a brigade of Marines, 3,000 strong, to Ostend at daylight,
26th, covered by battleships and cruisers accompanied by an aeroplane
squadron. This brigade will push out reconnaissances to Bruges,
Thourout, and Dixmude, and will remain at Ostend to cover the
disembarkation of a larger force should circumstances render that
desirable. Do you agree? If so, please send the necessary instructions
to your local authorities. Publicity is useful in this case. The
impression to be produced is that a considerable British army is
landing.’
_Orders to General Aston._
25. 8. 14.
‘1. At daylight to-morrow, if circumstances allow, you will disembark
such portions of your brigade as have arrived at Ostend and occupy the
town. You will push out reconnaissances of cyclists to Bruges,
Thourout, and Dixmude. You will establish yourself at Ostend, forming
an entrenched picket line around the town in such a way as to enable
you to cover the debarkation of a Division of the Army. A squadron of
aeroplanes will reach you before noon, having previously made an
aerial reconnaissance of the country within 30 miles of Ostend. The
aeroplanes will be placed under your orders.
‘2. The object of this movement is to create a diversion, favourable
to the Belgians, who are advancing from Antwerp and to threaten the
western flank of the German southward advance. It should therefore be
ostentatious. You should not advance inland from Ostend without
further orders, but some enterprise may be permitted to the patrols.
Information about the enemy will be supplied you personally at the
Admiralty.
‘The object in view would be fully attained if a considerable force of
the enemy were attracted to the coast. You will be re-embarked as soon
as this is accomplished.’
To give further publicity I announced in the House of Commons that a
British force had begun landing at Ostend. The Marines remained on shore
for the best part of a week and were then withdrawn. The old battleships
and cruisers which covered them were no doubt in more danger from
submarines than we thought at the time, but no mishap occurred; nor was
there any loss ashore or afloat. There was no means at the time of
knowing whether this petty operation exercised any appreciable influence
on German movements. We now know that it was certainly a factor. The
Head of the Operations Branch of the German General Staff in his
narrative shows that the news of this landing reached Main Headquarters
on August 30. He says:—
‘One day countless British troops were said to have landed at Ostend
and to be marching on Antwerp; on another that there were about to be
great sorties from Antwerp. Even landings of Russian troops, 80,000
men, at Ostend were mentioned. At Ostend a great entrenched camp for
the English was in preparation.’
General Dupont, the French Director of Military Intelligence, goes much
further and ranks the Belgian sortie as a culminating element in the
German decision to make a general retreat, taken on September 10.[61]
An unbroken chain of events drew the Admiralty again to the Belgian
Coast; and to explain this a digression is necessary.
Before the war the British air force was divided into the Royal Flying
Corps and the Royal Naval Air Service, the former of which were to be
concerned with aeroplanes and the latter with hydro-aeroplanes, or
seaplanes as I christened them for short. The War Office claimed on
behalf of the Royal Flying Corps complete and sole responsibility for
the aerial defence of Great Britain. But owing to the difficulties of
getting money, they were unable to make any provision for this
responsibility, every aeroplane they had being earmarked for the
Expeditionary Force. Seeing this and finding myself able to procure
funds by various shifts and devices, I began in 1912 and 1913, to form
under the Royal Naval Air Service flights of aeroplanes as well as of
seaplanes for the aerial protection of our naval harbours, oil tanks and
vulnerable points, and also for a general strengthening of our exiguous
and inadequate aviation. In consequence I had in my own hand on the eve
of the war fifty efficient naval machines, or about one-third of the
number in possession of the Army. The War Office viewed this development
with disfavour, and claimed that they alone should be charged with the
responsibility for home defence. When asked how they proposed to
discharge this duty, they admitted sorrowfully that they had not got the
machines and could not get the money. They adhered however to the
principle.
When the war began the situation foreseen arose. The whole of the
military aeroplanes went to France at once with the Expeditionary Force,
and not a single squadron or even an effective machine remained to guard
British vulnerable points from German aerial attack. The Admiralty was,
however, found provided with a respectable force of its own which
immediately took over the protection of our dockyards and patrolled our
shores in connection with the coast watch.
As the Germans overran Belgium and all the Channel ports were exposed,
the danger of air attacks upon Great Britain became most serious and
real. Zeppelins had already cruised over Antwerp, and it was known that
London was in range of the Zeppelin sheds at Düsseldorf and Cologne. To
meet this danger there was nothing except the naval aeroplanes the
Admiralty had been able to scrape and smuggle together. On September 3
Lord Kitchener asked me in Cabinet whether I would accept, on behalf of
the Admiralty, the responsibility for the aerial defence of Great
Britain, as the War Office had no means of discharging it. I thereupon
undertook to do what was possible with the wholly inadequate resources
which were available. There were neither anti-aircraft guns nor
searchlights, and though a few improvisations had been made, nearly a
year must elapse before the efficient supplies necessary could be
forthcoming. Meanwhile at any moment half a dozen Zeppelins might arrive
to bomb London or, what was more serious, Chatham, Woolwich or
Portsmouth.
I rated the Zeppelin much lower as a weapon of war than almost any one
else. I believed that this enormous bladder of combustible and explosive
gas would prove to be easily destructible. I was sure the fighting
aeroplane, rising lightly laden from its own base, armed with incendiary
bullets, would harry, rout and burn these gaseous monsters. I had
proclaimed this opinion to the House of Commons in 1913, using the
often-quoted simile of the hornets.
I therefore did everything in my power in the years before the war to
restrict expenditure upon airships and to concentrate our narrow and
stinted resources upon aeroplanes. I confined the naval construction of
airships to purely experimental limits, and in April, 1915, when the
slow progress and inferior quality of our only rigid experimental
airship were manifest, I gave orders that it should be scrapped, the
plant broken up and the labour and material devoted to increasing the
output of aeroplanes. Had I had my way, no airships would have been
built by Great Britain during the war (except the little ‘Blimps’ for
teasing submarines). After I left the Admiralty this policy was
reversed, and forty millions of money were squandered by successive
Boards in building British Zeppelins, not one of which on any occasion
ever rendered any effective fighting service. Meanwhile the alternative
policy of equipping the Fleet with aerial observation by flying
aeroplanes off warships or off properly constructed carriers lagged
pitifully with the result that at the Battle of Jutland we had no
British airships and only one aeroplane in the air.
The hornet theory, at one time so fiercely derided, was, of course,
ultimately vindicated by the war. Zeppelins were clawed down in flames
from the sky over both land and sea by aeroplanes until they did not
dare to come any more. The aeroplane was the means by which the Zeppelin
menace was destroyed, and it was virtually the only means, apart from
weather and their own weakness, by which Zeppelins were ever destroyed.
However, although my thought was perfectly sound in principle and the
policy following from it was unquestionably right, we were not in a
position at the beginning of the war to produce effective results.
Aeroplane engines were not powerful enough to reach the great heights
needed for the attack of Zeppelins in the short time available. Night
flying had only just been born; the location of aircraft by sound was
unknown; the network of telephones and observation points was
non-existent. And here was the danger, certainly real and not easy to
measure, literally on top of us.
It was easy to order the necessary guns, searchlights, etc., and set on
foot the organisation which should produce and employ them. But it was
no use sitting down and waiting for a year while these preparations were
completing. Only offensive action could help us. I decided immediately
to strike, by bombing from aeroplanes, at the Zeppelin sheds wherever
these gigantic structures could be found in Germany and secondly, to
prevent the erection of any new Zeppelin sheds in the conquered parts of
Belgium or France. Here again the policy was right. Our resources were,
however, feeble and slender. Compared to the terrific developments at
the end of the war, they were pitiful. Still, they were all we had, and
all that our knowledge of aviation at that time could bestow.
Deficiencies in material had to be made good by daring. All honour to
the naval airmen, the pioneers of the aerial offensive, who planned and
executed in these early months the desperate flights over hostile
territory in an element then scarcely known, which resulted in the raids
on Düsseldorf and Cologne on the Rhine, Friedrichshaven on Lake
Constance, and Cuxhaven in the Heligoland Bight. Altogether in the first
twelve months of the war six Zeppelins were destroyed in the air or in
their sheds by the offensive action of a handful of British naval
airmen; and few were destroyed by any other agency except accident.
In order to strike at the Zeppelin sheds in Germany and to prevent the
erection of new ones in Belgium, it was necessary to start from as near
the enemy’s line as possible. Extracts from my own minutes, principally
to Captain Sueter, the enterprising and energetic Director of the Air
Division, give as good an account as any other.
_September 1, 1914._
Director of Air Division.
Chief of Staff.
The largest possible force of naval aeroplanes should be stationed in
Calais or Dunkirk. Reports have been received, and it is also
extremely probable, that the Germans will attempt to attack London and
other places by Zeppelin airships, of which it is said a considerable
number exist. The close proximity of the French coast to England
renders such an attack thoroughly feasible. The proper defence is a
thorough and continual search of the country for 70 to 100 miles
inland with a view to marking down any temporary airship bases, or
airships replenishing before starting to attack. Should such airships
be located they should be immediately attacked. Commander Samson, with
Major Gerrard as second in command, will be entrusted with this duty;
and the Director of Air Division will take all steps to supply them
with the necessary pilots, aeroplanes and equipment.
_September 3, 1914._
Secretary.
Director of Air Division.
Third Sea Lord.
Aerial searchlights must immediately be got ready for use in
conjunction with the aerial guns. Propose me without delay the
quickest means of meeting this need, with estimates of time and money.
At least thirty or forty aerial searchlights are required.
‘Vernon’[62] should co-operate. Drastic and energetic action is
required.
2. Let me have a return on one sheet of paper showing all
anti-aircraft guns, regular or improvised, available afloat and
ashore, at the present time; and what deliveries may be expected in
the next two months. Let me have also any suggestions for increasing
their number. No one can doubt that aerial attack upon England must be
a feature of the near future.
_September 5, 1914._
Secretary.
First Sea Lord.
Third Sea Lord.
Chief of Staff.
Director of Naval Ordnance.
Director of Air Division.
There can be no question of defending London by artillery against
aerial attack. It is quite impossible to cover so vast an area; and if
London, why not every other city? Defence against aircraft by guns is
limited absolutely to points of military value....
Far more important than London are the vulnerable points in the Medway
and at Dover and Portsmouth. Oil-tanks, power-houses, lock-gates,
magazines, airship sheds, all require to have their aerial guns
increased in number. Portsmouth in particular requires attention now
that enemy’s territory has come so near.
Aerial searchlights must be provided in connection with every group of
guns....
But, after all, the great defence against aerial menace is to attack
the enemy’s aircraft as near as possible to their point of departure.
Director of Air Division has already received directions on this. The
principle is as follows:—
(_a_) A strong oversea force of aeroplanes to deny the French and
Belgian coasts to the enemy’s aircraft, and to attack all Zeppelins
and air bases or temporary air bases which it may be sought to
establish, and which are in reach.
(_b_) We must be in constant telegraphic and telephonic communication
with the oversea aeroplane squadrons. We must maintain an intercepting
force of aeroplanes and airships at some convenient point within range
of a line drawn from Dover to London, and local defence flights at
Eastchurch and Calshot.
(_c_) A squadron of aeroplanes will be established at Hendon, also in
telephonic communication with the other stations, for the purpose of
attacking enemy aircraft which may attempt to molest London. Landing
grounds must be prepared in all the parks; railings must be removed,
and the area marked out by a large white circle by day and by a good
system of lighting at night. It is indispensable that airmen of the
Hendon flight should be able to fly by night, and their machines must
be fitted with the necessary lights and instruments.
Agreeably with the above, instructions must be prepared for the
guidance of the Police, Fire Brigade, and civil population under
aerial bombardment. This will have to be sustained with composure.
Arrangements must be concerted with the Home Office and the Office of
Works for the extinction of lights upon a well-conceived plan, for the
clearance and illumination in the parks, in order that the defending
aeroplanes can have freedom of action, etc.
The whole of the points dealt with in this minute are to be elaborated
and put into precise detail this afternoon by a Committee composed as
follows:—
Third Sea Lord (in the Chair).
Director of Air Division.
Director of Naval Ordnance.
And a representative of the War Office from either the Master General
of the Ordnance or Home Defence Department.
I expect to receive not later than to-morrow a definite programme for
action within the lines of this minute.
The whole matter is of the highest urgency.
_September 5, 1914._
Secretary.
First Sea Lord.
Director of Air Division.
In order to discharge adequately the responsibilities which we have
assumed for the aerial defence of England, it is necessary that we
should maintain an aerial control over the area approximately 100
miles radius from Dunkirk. To do this, we must support the aeroplanes
which are stationed on the French coast with sufficient armed motor
cars and personnel to enable advanced subsidiary aeroplane bases to be
established 30, 40 and 50 miles inland.
According to all accounts received, the Germans, in so far as they
have penetrated this region, have done it simply by bluff. Small
parties of Uhlans, taking advantage of the terror inspired by their
atrocities in Belgium, have made their way freely about the country,
and have imposed themselves upon the population. We require, in the
first instance, 200 or 300 men with 50 or 60 motor cars, who can
support and defend our advanced aerial bases. I should propose to draw
these by suitable volunteers from the Marine Brigade. They should be
placed under the orders of Commander Samson, and should operate from
Dunkirk. It will be necessary first to obtain permission from the
French authorities. This, after consultation with Lord Kitchener, I am
taking steps to do. We ought to be able to make it quite impossible
for parties of 15 or 20 Uhlans to make their way with safety through
this area. During the next week the Germans will presume on their
immunity, and will be found in occupation of numbers of places where
they cannot possibly maintain any effective force. The advantage of an
aeroplane reconnaissance is that the approach of any serious body of
troops can be discovered while it is still at least two days’ march
away. There ought, therefore, to be no difficulty in chopping these
small parties of the enemy without our force getting into any trouble.
Propose me plans for immediate action on these lines in detail.
_October 2, 1914._
Secretary.
Director of Naval Ordnance.
Director of the Air Division.
The experiments with regard to projectiles for use against aircraft
must be worked out on the most generous scale, eight or ten different
lines being pursued simultaneously, the necessary funds being
provided. It is perfectly useless in time of war to go through
successively the whole series of experiments appropriate to peace-time
administration. Let me have a report on the projectiles available. We
must have means of attacking Zeppelins, not only with shells from
guns, but with incendiary bullets or grenades from aeroplanes.
The needs and activities of the naval aeroplanes in the neighbourhood of
Dunkirk led directly to the development of the armoured car, and the
armoured car led directly to the birth of the tank, which was in essence
only an armoured car capable of crossing trenches. Almost immediately
after the German inroad into Belgium, I received accounts of the
remarkable work done by a Belgian motor-car, hastily equipped with
armour and a machine gun, in shooting down and driving back the numerous
Uhlans with which the enemy were seeking to overrun the country.
Commander Samson was prompt to realise and seize the advantage of
armoured cars for the purpose of protecting his aeroplane operations and
also on their own account. In view of the reports received from him and
other sources, I gave, during the latter part of August and September,
successive orders for the formation of armoured-car squadrons under the
Admiralty; and as all this arose out of the aeroplane squadron stationed
at Dunkirk, the formation of the armoured-car squadrons was entrusted to
Commodore Sueter. In this task this officer displayed great energy, and
in a very short time no less than seven or eight squadrons were called
into being, based on the purchase of all the Rolls-Royce cars that were
available and rapidly improvised armour protection.
The first few cars had scarcely begun to show their advantages in
Commander Samson’s guerrilla from Dunkirk when the difficulty which
ultimately led to the creation of the tank manifested itself. The German
cavalry sought to protect themselves against the attack of the armoured
cars by digging trenches across the road.
To meet this, I gave the following directions:—
_September 23, 1914._
Colonel Ollivant.
Director of Air Division.
Royal Naval Division Administration.
It is most important that the motor transport and armed motor-cars
should be provided to a certain extent with cars carrying the means of
bridging small cuts in the road, and an arrangement of planks capable
of bridging a ten- or twelve-feet span quickly and easily should be
carried with every ten or twelve machines. A proportion of tools
should also be supplied.
Let me have proposals at once.[63]
Other conditions, however, swept down upon us very quickly, and by the
middle of October, after the events to be narrated in the next chapters,
the trench lines on both sides reached the sea and became continuous
over the whole front. Thus at the moment when the new armoured-car force
was coming into effective existence at much expense and on a
considerable scale, it was confronted with an obstacle and a military
situation which rendered its employment practically impossible. The
conclusion was forced naturally and obviously upon me, and no doubt upon
others, that if the armoured car on which so much money and labour had
been spent could not move _round_ the enemy’s trenches and operate
against an open flank of his army, some method should be devised which
would enable it to traverse and pass _over_ the trenches themselves.
This subject will, however, be dealt with in its proper place.
The air was the first cause that took us to Dunkirk. The armoured car
was the child of the air; and the tank its grandchild.
But besides all this the undefended condition of the Channel ports
against any serious effort by the enemy inspired the Admiralty with
lively alarm. The danger of the Germans taking Dunkirk, Calais and
Boulogne stared us in the face for many anxious weeks. On September 3 I
minuted to the First Sea Lord:—
‘With the Germans along the French coast, modified dispositions will
become necessary. The danger from aerial attack must not be
underrated. The possibility of the Germans taking very heavy guns to
Calais after taking the town, and getting submarines down from the
Elbe to operate from Calais as a base, should also be considered. We
could of course stop any surface craft, but submarines might slip
through secretly and be a great nuisance when once established.
On the 10th September I went to Dunkirk myself and was to some extent
reassured. I made the following note at the time for the information of
those concerned:—
‘_September 11, 1914._
‘The First Lord visited Dunkirk and Calais on the 10th instant, and
conferred with the Governors of both places.
‘Dunkirk is being defended on a considerable scale, and has already
developed substantial strength. Lines of defence are constructed on a
radius of 4 to 6 miles approximately from the enceinte of the town,
which are armed by over 400 pieces of artillery and held by 18,000
men. These works, which are strongly executed, can be further
protected by large inundations both of fresh and salt water. The fresh
water inundations are now accumulating; the salt can be turned on at
any time in two days. The place should certainly require a siege in
form to reduce it, and it is getting stronger every week. The First
Lord promised the assistance of warships if required to cover the
flanks. The anchorage at Dunkirk gives sufficient water for the
_Majestic_ class, and is certainly close to the shore. The high
sandhills would require the fire to be indirect, but otherwise there
would be no difficulty. There is nothing to cause disquietude in the
measures taken for the defence of Dunkirk. It seems probable that they
are sufficient to make it not worth while for the enemy to undertake
the reduction of the fortress.
‘Calais is simply an enceinte rather larger in extent than that of
Dunkirk, and protected by a few well-executed outlying fieldworks. All
that can be said about Calais is that it could not be taken by a _coup
de main_. It is garrisoned by 7,000 troops, but it could certainly not
be counted on to hold out for more than a few days against a
determined attack.’
In the third week of September Marshal Joffre telegraphed to Lord
Kitchener asking whether a Brigade of Marines could not be sent to
Dunkirk to reinforce the garrison and to confuse the enemy with the
idea of British as well as French forces being in this area. Lord
Kitchener asked me whether the Admiralty would help in this matter.
I agreed to send the brigade if he would also send some Yeomanry
Cavalry for its local protection. He sent a regiment. I was thus
led, though by no means unwillingly, into accepting a series of
minor responsibilities of a very direct and personal kind, which
made inroads both upon my time and thought and might well—though I
claim they did not—have obscured my general view. I formed a small
administration to handle the business, in which Colonel Ollivant[64]
was the moving spirit. On his suggestion we took fifty motor
omnibuses from the London streets so as to make our Marines as
mobile as possible, and very soon we had British detachments
ostentatiously displaying themselves in Ypres, Lille, Tournai and
Douai. Many risks were run by those engaged in these petty
operations, first under General Aston and subsequently when his
health had failed, under General Paris. No mishap occurred either to
the Marines or to the Yeomanry. They played their part in the
general scheme without loss or misadventure. It was, however, with
sincere relief that a month later, on the arrival of the leading
troops of Sir John French’s Army in the neighbourhood, I transferred
these detachments to the Commander-in-Chief, and divested myself of
anxieties which though subsidiary were burdensome.
Looking back with after-knowledge and increasing years, I seem to have
been too ready to undertake tasks which were hazardous or even forlorn.
Taking over responsibility for the air defence of Great Britain when
resources were practically non-existent and formidable air attacks
imminent was from a personal point of view “some love but little
policy.” The same is true of the Dunkirk guerrilla. Still more is it
true of the attempt to prolong the defence of Antwerp which will be
related in the next chapter. I could with perfect propriety, indeed with
unanswerable reasons, have in every one of these cases left the burden
to others. I believed, however, that the special knowledge which I
possessed, and the great and flexible authority which I wielded in this
time of improvisation, would enable me to offer less unsatisfactory
solutions of these problems than could be furnished in the emergency by
others in less commanding positions. I could at that time give
directions over a very large and intricate field of urgent and swiftly
changing business which were acted upon immediately by a great variety
of authorities who otherwise would have had no common connecting centre.
So I acted for the best, with confidence in the loyalty of my
colleagues, in the goodwill of the public, and, above all, in my own
judgment which I seemed to see confirmed from day to day by many
remarkable events.
* * * * *
This chapter, which began with good luck and success, must end, however,
with misfortune. The original War Orders had been devised to meet the
situation on the outbreak of hostilities. They placed the pieces on the
board in what we believed to be the best array, and left their future
disposition to be modified by experience. Under these orders the 7th
Cruiser Squadron in the Third Fleet, consisting of the old cruisers of
the _Bacchante_ class (_Bacchante_, _Euryalus_ (flagship), _Cressy_,
_Aboukir_, _Hogue_), was based on the Nore ‘in order to ensure the
presence of armoured ships in the southern approaches of the North Sea
and eastern entrance to the Channel, and to support the 1st and 3rd
Flotillas operating in that area from Harwich.’ The object of these
flotillas was ‘to keep the area south of the 54th parallel clear of
enemy torpedo craft and minelayers.’ The Cruiser Force was ‘to support
them in the execution of these duties and also, with the flotillas, to
keep a close watch over enemy war vessels and transports in order that
their movement may be reported at the earliest moment.’
This very necessary patrol had accordingly been maintained day after day
without incident of any kind happening, and we had now been six weeks at
war. In war all repetitions are perilous. You can do many things with
impunity if you do not keep on doing them over and over again.
It was no part of my duty to deal with the routine movements of the
Fleet and its squadrons, but only to exercise a general supervision. I
kept my eyes and ears open for every indication that would be useful,
and I had many and various sources of information. On September 17,
during my visit to the Grand Fleet, I heard an expression used by an
officer which instantly arrested my attention. He spoke of ‘the
live-bait squadron.’ I demanded what was meant, and was told that the
expression referred to these old cruisers patrolling the narrow waters
in apparently unbroken peace. I thereupon reviewed the whole position in
this area. I discussed it with Commodore Tyrwhitt and with Commodore
Keyes. The next morning I addressed the following minute to the First
Sea Lord:—
_September 18, 1914._
Secretary.
First Sea Lord.
The force available for operations in the narrow seas should be
capable of minor action without the need of bringing down the Grand
Fleet. To this end it should have effective support either by two or
three battle cruisers or battleships of the Second Fleet working from
Sheerness. This is the most efficiently air and destroyer patrolled
anchorage we possess. They can lie behind the boom, and can always be
at sea when we intend a raid. Battle cruisers are much to be
preferred.
The _Bacchantes_ ought not to continue on this beat. The risk to such
ships is not justified by any services they can render. The narrow
seas, being the nearest point to the enemy, should be kept by a small
number of good modern ships.
The _Bacchantes_ should go to the western entrance of the Channel and
set Bethell’s battleships—and later Wemyss’ cruisers—free for convoy
and other duties.
The first four _Arethusas_ should join the flotillas of the narrow
seas.
I see no sufficient reason to exchange these flotillas now that they
know their work with the northern ones.
As the “M” boats are delivered they should be formed into a separate
half-flotilla and go north to work with the Grand Fleet.
The _King Alfred_ should pay off and be thoroughly repaired.
Prince Louis immediately agreed and gave directions to the Chief of the
Staff to make the necessary redistribution of forces. With this I was
content, and I dismissed the matter from my mind, being sure that the
orders given would be complied with at the earliest moment. Before they
could take effect, disaster occurred.
Pending the introduction of the new system, the Admiralty War Staff
carried on with the old. The equinoctial weather was, however, so bad
that the destroyer flotillas were ordered back to harbour by the Admiral
commanding the _Bacchante_ squadron. That officer, however, proposed to
continue his patrol in the Dogger area with the cruisers alone. The
Admiralty War Staff acquiesced in the principle of these arrangements
but on the 19th instructed him to watch instead the Broad Fourteens:—
‘The Dogger Bank patrol need not be continued. Weather too bad for
destroyers to go to sea. Arrange for cruisers to watch Broad
Fourteens.’
This routine message did not of course come before me. It was not sent,
however, by the War Staff without proper consideration. In the short
steep seas which are the features of gales in these narrow waters, a
submarine would be at a serious disadvantage and could only observe with
extreme difficulty and imperfection. The rough weather which drove in
our destroyers was believed to be an important protection against enemy
submarines.
Both Admiral and Admiralty, therefore, were in agreement to leave the
cruisers at sea without their flotilla. If the weather moderated, it was
intended that one of Commodore Tyrwhitt’s flotillas should join them
there on the morning of the 20th. The sea, however, continued so high on
the 20th that the flotilla, led by the _Fearless_, had to turn back to
Harwich. Thus all through the 19th, 20th and 21st the three cruisers,
the _Aboukir_, _Cressy_ and _Hogue_, were left to maintain the watch in
the narrow waters without a flotilla screen. The Admiral in the
_Euryalus_ had to return to harbour on the 20th to coal his ship. He
left the squadron in command of the senior captain after enjoining
special precautions. There was no more reason to expect that they would
be attacked at this time than at any other. On the contrary, rumours of
German activity to the northward had brought the whole Grand Fleet out
in a southerly sweep down to the line between Flamborough Head and the
Horn Reef. Nor was there any connection between the orders to these
cruisers and the movement of the Marine Brigade from Dover to Dunkirk
which took place on the 20th. The cruisers were simply fulfilling their
ordinary task, which from frequent repetition had already become
dangerous and for which they were not in any case well suited.
As soon as the weather began to abate on the 21st, Commodore Tyrwhitt
started off again for the Broad Fourteens with eight destroyers, and was
already well on his way when the morning of the 22nd broke. As the sea
subsided, the danger from submarines revived. The three cruisers,
however, instead of going to meet their destroyers, steamed slowly
northward without zigzagging and at under ten knots, as no doubt they
had often done before. Meanwhile a single German submarine, becoming
more venturesome every day, was prowling southward down the Dutch coast.
At 6.30 a.m., shortly after daylight, the _Aboukir_ was struck by a
torpedo. In twenty-five minutes this old vessel capsized. Some of her
boats were smashed by the explosion, and hundreds of men were swimming
in the water or clinging to wreckage. Both her consorts had hurried with
chivalrous simplicity to the aid of the sinking ship. Both came to a
dead standstill within a few hundred yards of her and lowered all their
boats to rescue the survivors. In this posture they in their turn were
both sunk, first the _Hogue_ and then the _Cressy_, by the same
submarine. Out of over 2,000 men on board these three ships, only 800
were saved, and more than 1,400 perished. The ships themselves were of
no great value: they were among the oldest cruisers of the Third Fleet
and contributed in no appreciable way to our vital margins. But like all
Third Fleet ships, they were almost entirely manned with reservists,
most of whom were married men; and they carried also young cadets from
Osborne posted for safety to ships which it was thought would not be
engaged in the great battles. This cruel loss of life, although small
compared to what the Army was enduring, constituted the first serious
forfeit exacted from the Navy in the war. It greatly stimulated and
encouraged the enterprise of the German submarines. The commander of the
fatal boat (Lieutenant Weddigen) was exultingly proclaimed as a national
hero. Certainly the destruction with his own fingers of fourteen hundred
persons was an episode of a peculiar character in human history. But, as
it happened, he did not live long to enjoy his sombre fame. A storm of
criticism was directed at the Admiralty, and naturally it was focussed
on me. ‘Here was an instance of the disaster which followed from the
interference of a civilian Minister in naval operations and the
overriding of the judgment of skilful and experienced Admirals.’ The
writer[65] of a small but venomous brochure which was industriously
circulated in influential circles in London did not hesitate to make
this charge in the most direct form,[66] and it was repeated in
countless innuendoes throughout the British Press. I did not, however,
think it possible to make any explanation or reply.
I caused the most searching inquiries to be made in the Admiralty into
the responsibility for this tragic event. The necessary Court of Inquiry
was convened. The Court found that the responsibility for the position
of the cruisers on that day was attributable to the Admiralty War Staff
telegram of the 19th which has been already quoted. The First Sea Lord
held that this was a reflection upon the Admiralty by a subordinate
Court; but it seemed to me that the criticism was just and that it
should stand. It was, however, by no means exhaustive. One would expect
senior officers in command of cruiser squadrons to judge for themselves
the danger of their task, and especially of its constant repetition; and
while obeying any orders they received, to represent an unsatisfactory
situation plainly to the Admiralty instead of going on day after day,
and week after week, until superior authority intervened or something
lamentable happened. One would expect also that ordinary precautions
would be observed in the tactical conduct of squadrons. Moreover,
although the impulse which prompted the _Hogue_ and _Cressy_ to go to
the rescue of their comrades in the sinking _Aboukir_ was one of
generous humanity, they could hardly have done anything more unwise or
more likely to add to the loss of life. They should at once have steamed
away in opposite directions, lowering boats at the first opportunity.
I remitted all these matters to Lord Fisher when two months later he
arrived at the Admiralty; but he laconically replied that ‘most of the
officers concerned were on half pay, that they had better remain there,
and that no useful purpose would be served by further action.’