IRELAND AND THE EUROPEAN BALANCE
The Oil Reserves and Supply—The Anglo-Persian Agreement—The 1914
Estimates—The Rise of Naval Expenditure—The Canadian Ships—The
Conflict over the Estimates—The Admiralty Case—A New Year’s
Declaration—Final Stage of the Estimates—The European Calm and the
Anglo-German Détente—Renewed Efforts for an Anglo-German Naval
Agreement—British Party Strife and Irish Feuds—Aggravation of the
Irish Struggle—Faction—The Curragh Episode—Parliamentary
Fury—Appeals to Reason—The Buckingham Palace Conference—Visits of
the British Squadrons to Kiel and Kronstadt—The Crime of
Sarajevo—The Sunlit World—Origin of the Test Mobilisation—The
Great Review.
During the whole of 1913 I was subjected to an ever-growing difficulty
about the oil supply. We were now fully committed to oil as the sole,
motive power for a large proportion of the Fleet, including all the
newest and most vital units. There was great anxiety on the Board of
Admiralty and in the War Staff about our oil-fuel reserves. The Second
Sea Lord, Sir John Jellicoe, vehemently pressed for very large increases
in the scales contemplated. The Chief of the War Staff was concerned not
only about the amount of the reserves but about the alleged danger of
using so explosive a fuel in ships of war. Lastly, Lord Fisher’s Royal
Commission, actuated by Admiralty disquietude, showed themselves
inclined to press for a reserve equal to four years’ expected war
consumption. The war consumption itself had been estimated on the most
liberal scale by the Naval Staff. The expense of creating the oil
reserve was however enormous. Not only had the oil to be bought in a
monopoly-ridden market, but large installations of oil tanks had to be
erected and land purchased for the purpose. Although this oil-fuel
reserve when created was clearly, whether for peace or war, as much an
asset of the State as the gold reserve in the Bank of England, we were
not allowed to treat it as capital expenditure: all must be found out of
the current Estimates. At the same time, the Treasury and my colleagues
in the Cabinet were becoming increasingly indignant at the naval
expense, which it might be contended was largely due to my precipitancy
in embarking on oil-burning battleships and also in wantonly increasing
the size of the guns and the speed and armour of these vessels. On the
one hand, therefore, I was subjected to this ever-growing naval
pressure, and on the other to a solid wall of resistance to expense. In
the midst of all lay the existence of our naval power.
I had thus to fight all the year on two fronts: on one to repulse the
excessive and, as I thought, extravagant demands of the Royal Commission
and of my naval advisers, and on the other to wrest the necessary
supplies from the Treasury and the Cabinet. I had to be very careful
that arguments intended for one front did not become known to my
antagonists on the other. I wrote to Lord Fisher that to prescribe a
four years standard of reserves would be the death-blow to the oil
policy of which he was the champion. I was forced to enter into
arguments of extreme technical detail with the Second Sea Lord and the
War Staff both as to the probable consumption per month of oil in the
opening phases of a naval war, and secondly upon the number of months’
supply that should be in the country in each individual month. I had
extreme difficulties with the Board of Admiralty in regard to the
reductions which I thought necessary in both scales, and I feared for
some time that I should lose the services of the Second Sea Lord. This,
however, was happily averted and we finally agreed upon reduced scales
which were in the end accepted by all concerned. These conclusions stood
the test of war.
The reduced scales estimated a total consumption in the first ten months
of war of 1,000,000 tons. The actual consumption was 800,000. At the end
of the ten months we held 1,000,000 tons in reserve, or another twelve
months’ supply at the current rate of expenditure, apart from further
purchases which proceeded ceaselessly on the greatest scale.
During this year (1913) also I carried through the House of Commons the
Bill authorising the Anglo-Persian Oil Convention. This encountered a
confusing variety of oppositions—economists deprecating naval
expenditure; members for mining constituencies who were especially
sensible of the danger of departing from the sound basis of British
coal; oil magnates who objected to a national inroad upon their
monopolies; Conservatives who disapproved of State trading; partisan
opponents who denounced the project as an unwarrantable gamble with
public money and did not hesitate to impute actual corruption. There was
always a danger of these divergent forces combining on some particular
stage or point. However, we gradually threaded our way through these
difficulties and by the Autumn the Convention was the law of the land.
We now at any rate had an oil supply of our own.
All our financial commitments, fomented by rising prices and the
ever-increasing complexity and refinement of naval appliances, came
remorselessly to a head at the end of 1913 when the Estimates for the
new year had to be presented first to the Treasury and then to the
Cabinet. Knowing that the conflict would be most severe, I warned all
Admiralty departments to be well ahead with their financial work and to
prepare justification for the unprecedented demands we were obliged to
make. We set forth our case in a volume of some eighty pages in which we
analysed minutely each vote and marshalled our reasons. The main burden
of this task fell upon the Financial Secretary, Dr. Macnamara, whose
long experience of Admiralty business was invaluable.
We failed to reach any agreement with the Treasury in the preliminary
discussions, and the whole issue was remitted to the Cabinet at the end
of November. There followed nearly five months of extreme dispute and
tension, during which Naval Estimates formed the main and often the sole
topic of conversation at no less than fourteen full and prolonged
meetings of the Cabinet. At the outset I found myself almost in a
minority of one. I was not in a position to give way on any of the
essentials, especially in regard to the Battleship programme, without
departing from the calculated and declared standards of strength on
which the whole of our policy towards Germany depended. The Cabinet had
decided in 1912 to maintain equality in the Mediterranean with the
Austrian Fleet, four Dreadnoughts of which were steadily building.
Moreover, the issue was complicated by the promised three Canadian
Dreadnoughts. The Canadian Government had stipulated that these should
be additional to the 60 per cent. standard. We had formally declared
that they were indispensable, and on this assurance Sir Robert Borden
was committed to a fierce party fight in Canada. As it was now clear,
owing to the action of the Canadian Senate, that these ‘additional’
‘indispensable’ ships would not be laid down in the ensuing year, I was
forced to demand the earlier laying down of three at least of the
battleships of the 1914–15 programme. This was a very hard matter for
the Cabinet to sanction. By the middle of December it seemed to me
certain that I should have to resign. The very foundations of naval
policy were challenged, and the controversy was maintained by
Ministerial critics specially acquainted with Admiralty business, versed
in every detail of the problem and entitled to be exactly informed on
every point. The Prime Minister, however, while appearing to remain
impartial, so handled matters that no actual breach occurred. On several
occasions when it seemed that disagreement was total and final, he
prevented a decision adverse to the Admiralty by terminating the
discussion; and in the middle of December, when this process could go on
no longer, he adjourned the whole matter till the middle of January.
I wrote to him on December 18:—
‘Your letter is very kind, and I appreciate _fully_ all the
difficulties of the situation. But there is no chance whatever of my
being able to go on, if the quota of capital ships for 1914–15 is
reduced below four. Even the _Daily News_ does not expect that. I base
myself on (1) my public declarations in Parliament; (2) the 60 per
cent. standard (see Minute of the Sea Lords); (3) the Cabinet decision
on the Mediterranean; and (4) my obligations towards Mr. Borden. You
must in this last aspect consider broad effects.
‘If on a general _révirement_ of Naval Policy the Cabinet decide to
reduce the quota, it would be indispensable that a new exponent should
be chosen. I have no doubts at all about my duty.
‘My loyalty to you, my conviction of your superior judgment and
superior record on naval matters, prompt me to go all possible lengths
to prevent disagreement in the Cabinet. But no reduction or
postponement beyond the year of the four ships is possible to me.
‘I gathered that the final decision was to stand over till we
reassemble in January. But there is no hope of any alteration in my
view on this cardinal point, or of the view of my naval advisers.’
To the First Sea Lord I wrote on December 26:—
‘I could not in any circumstances remain responsible if the declared
programme of four ships were cut down. But my responsibility is
greater than anyone else’s, and I hold my naval colleagues perfectly
free to review the situation without regard to the action which I
should take in the circumstances which may now be apprehended.’
Prince Louis, however, assured me that he and the other Sea Lords would
not remain in their appointments in the situation described. My two
political colleagues, Dr. Macnamara and Mr. Lambert, the Civil Lord,
were both stalwart Radicals, but there was no doubt that they also would
have declined responsibility. They had both been at the Admiralty for
six or seven years, and their devotion to the interests of the Navy and
of the National Defence was unquestionable. We thus all stood together.
During the interval of the Christmas holidays, which I spent in the
south of France, I restated the Admiralty case in the light of all the
discussions which had taken place. The closing passages of this Document
may be reproduced.
THE GENERAL SITUATION
No survey of British naval expenditure and no controversy arising out
of it can be confined to our naval strength. It must also have regard
to our military weakness compared to all the other European States
that are building Navies. Even the modest establishments which
Parliament has regarded as necessary have not been and are not being
maintained. In 1913, when the five Great Powers of Europe have added
over 50 millions to their military expenditure, when every Power in
the world is increasing the numbers and efficiency of its soldiers,
our regular army has dropped by 6,200 men. The Special Reserve is
20,000 short, and the Territorials are 65,000 short. Only the belief
that the naval strength of the country is being effectively maintained
prevents a widespread, and in important respects a well justified,
alarm. If at any time we lose the confidence which the country has
given to our naval administration in the last 5 years, the public
attention cannot fail to be turned into channels which, apart from
raising awkward questions, will lead directly to largely increased
expenditure.
Our naval standards and the programmes which give effect to them must
also be examined in relation not only to Germany but to the rest of
the world. We must begin by recognising how different the part played
by our Navy is from that of the Navies of every other country. Alone
among the great modern States we can neither defend the soil upon
which we live nor subsist upon its produce. Our whole regular army is
liable to be ordered abroad for the defence of India. The food of our
people, the raw material of their industries, the commerce which
constitutes our wealth, has to be protected as it traverses thousands
of miles of sea and ocean from every quarter of the globe. Our
necessary insistence upon the right of capture of private property at
sea exposes British merchant ships to the danger of attack not only by
enemy’s warships but by converted armed-merchantmen. The burden of
responsibility laid upon the British Navy is heavy, and its weight
increases year by year.
All the world is building ships of the greatest power, training
officers and men, creating arsenals, and laying broad and deep the
foundations of future permanent naval development and expansion. In
every country powerful interests and huge industries are growing up
which will render any check or cessation in the growth of Navies
increasingly difficult as time passes. Besides the Great Powers, there
are many small States who are buying or building great ships of war
and whose vessels may by purchase, by some diplomatic combination, or
by duress, be brought into the line against us. None of these Powers
need, like us, Navies to defend their actual safety or independence.
They build them so as to play a part in the world’s affairs. It is
sport to them. It is death to us.
These possibilities were described by Lord Crewe in the House of Lords
last year. It is not suggested that the whole world will turn upon us,
or that our preparations should contemplate such a monstrous
contingency. By a sober and modest conduct, by a skilful diplomacy we
can in part disarm and in part divide the elements of potential
danger. But two things must be remembered. First, that our diplomacy
depends in a great part for its effectiveness upon our naval position,
and that our naval strength is the one great balancing force which we
can contribute to our own safety and to the peace of the world.
Secondly, we are not a young people with a scanty inheritance. We have
engrossed to ourselves, in times when other powerful nations were
paralysed by barbarism or internal war, an immense share of the wealth
and traffic of the world. We have got all we want in territory, and
our claim to be left in the unmolested enjoyment of vast and splendid
possessions, often seems less reasonable to others than to us.
Further, we do not always play the humble rôle of passive
unassertiveness. We have intervened regularly—as it was our duty to
do, and as we could not help doing—in the affairs of Europe and of the
world. We are now deeply involved in the European situation. We have
responsibilities in many quarters. It is only two years ago that the
Chancellor of the Exchequer went to the Mansion House and delivered a
speech which to save Europe from war, brought us to the very verge of
it. I have myself heard the Foreign Secretary say to my predecessor
that he had received so stiff a communication from the German
Ambassador, that the Fleet must be placed in a condition of readiness
to be attacked at any moment. The impression which those events
produced in my mind is ineffaceable. I saw that even a Liberal
Government, whose first and most profound resolve must always be to
preserve peace, might be compelled to face the gravest and most
hateful possibilities. All Governments in England will not be Liberal
Governments; all Foreign Secretaries will not have the success of Sir
Edward Grey. We have passed through a year of continuous anxiety and,
although I believe the foundations of peace among the Great Powers
have been strengthened, the causes which might lead to a general war
have not been removed and often remind us of their presence. There has
not been the slightest abatement of naval and military preparation. On
the contrary, we are witnessing this year increases of expenditure by
the Continental Powers beyond all previous experience. The world is
arming as it has never armed before. Every suggestion of arrest or
limitation has been brushed aside. From time to time awkward things
happen, and situations occur which make it necessary that the naval
force at our immediate disposal, now in this quarter now in that,
should be rapidly counted up. On such occasions the responsibilities
which rest on the Admiralty come home with brutal reality to the
Minister at its head, and unless our naval strength is solidly, amply
and unswervingly maintained, with due and fair regard to the opinions
of the professional advisers of the Government, I could not feel that
I was doing my duty if I did not warn the country of its danger.
The memorandum and the interval for reflection produced a certain change
in the situation, and on my return to England in the middle of January,
I was informed by several of my most important colleagues that they
considered the Admiralty case on main essentials had been made good. The
conflict, however, renewed itself with the utmost vigour. We continued
to pump out documents and arguments from the Admiralty in a ceaseless
stream, dealing with each new point as it was challenged. I telegraphed
to Sir Robert Borden acquainting him with the crisis that was developing
about the three ships to be accelerated in lieu of the Canadian
Dreadnoughts, informing him of my intention to resign if unsuccessful,
and invoking his aid by a full exposition of the Canadian point of view.
This he most readily gave, setting forth in a masterly telegram the
embarrassed position in which his Government would stand in their naval
effort if no additional measure were taken by us to cover their interim
default.
Meanwhile, echoes of the controversy had found their way into the
newspapers. As early as January 3, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, in
an interview with the _Daily Chronicle_, had deplored the folly of
expenditure upon armaments, had pointedly referred to the resignation of
Lord Randolph Churchill on the subject of economy, and had expressed the
opinion that the state and prospects of the world were never more
peaceful. The Liberal and Radical press were loud in their economy
chorus, and a very strong movement against the Admiralty developed among
our most influential supporters in the House of Commons. However,
Parliament soon reassembled. The Irish question began to dominate
attention. Eager partisans of the Home Rule cause were by no means
anxious to see the Government weakened by the resignation of the entire
Board of Admiralty. We were already so hard pressed in the party
struggle that the defection even of a single Minister might have
produced a serious effect. No one expected me to pass away in sweet
silence. The prospect of a formidable naval agitation added to the Irish
tension was recognised as uninviting. In order to strengthen myself with
my party, I mingled actively in the Irish controversy; and in this
precarious situation the whole of February and part of March passed
without any ground given or taken on either side.
At last, thanks to the unwearying patience of the Prime Minister, and to
his solid, silent support, the Naval Estimates were accepted practically
as they stood. In all these months of bickering we had only lost three
small cruisers and twelve torpedo-boats for harbour defence. Estimates
were presented to Parliament for 52½ millions. We had not secured this
victory without being compelled to give certain general assurances with
regard to the future. I agreed, under proper reserves, to promise a
substantial reduction on the Estimates of the following year. When the
time came, I was not pressed to redeem this undertaking.
* * * * *
The spring and summer of 1914 were marked in Europe by an exceptional
tranquillity. Ever since Agadir the policy of Germany towards Great
Britain had not only been correct but considerate. All through the
tangle of the Balkan Conferences British and German diplomacy laboured
in harmony. The long distrust which had grown up in the Foreign Office,
though not removed, was sensibly modified. Some at least of those who
were accustomed to utter warnings began to feel the need of revising
their judgment. The personalities who expressed the foreign policy of
Germany seemed for the first time to be men to whom we could talk and
with whom common action was possible. The peaceful solution of the
Balkan difficulties afforded justification for the feeling of
confidence. For months we had negotiated upon the most delicate
questions on the brink of local rupture, and no rupture had come. There
had been a score of opportunities had any Power wished to make war.
Germany seemed, with us, to be set on peace. Although abroad the
increase of armaments was proceeding with constant acceleration,
although the fifty million capital tax had been levied in Germany, and
that alarm bell was ringing for those that had ears to hear, a distinct
feeling of optimism passed over the mind of the British Government and
the House of Commons. There seemed also to be a prospect that the
personal goodwill and mutual respect which had grown up between the
principal people on both sides might play a useful part in the future:
and some there were who looked forward to a wider combination in which
Great Britain and Germany, without prejudice to their respective
friendships or alliances, might together bring the two opposing European
systems into harmony and give to all the anxious nations solid
assurances of safety and fair play.
Naval rivalry had at the moment ceased to be a cause of friction. We
were proceeding inflexibly for the third year in succession with our
series of programmes according to scale and declaration. Germany had
made no further increases since the beginning of 1912. It was certain
that we could not be overtaken as far as capital ships were concerned. I
thought that the moment was opportune to renew by another method the
conversations about a naval agreement if not a naval holiday which had
been interrupted in 1912. I therefore suggested to the Foreign Secretary
that I should meet Admiral von Tirpitz if a convenient opportunity
presented itself, and I set out in the following minute some of the
points which I thought might be discussed and which, though small, if
agreed upon would make for easement and stability.
_May 20, 1914._
Prime Minister.
Sir Edward Grey.
In Madrid at Easter, Sir Ernest Cassel told me that he had received
from Herr Ballin a statement to this effect: ‘How I wish that I could
get Churchill here during the Kiel Week. Tirpitz will never allow the
Chancellor to settle any naval questions, but I know he would like to
have a talk with his English colleague on naval matters, and I am sure
that if the subject of limiting naval armaments were ever approached
in a businesslike way, some agreement would be reached.’ On the same
day I received a telegram from the Admiralty, saying that the Foreign
Office particularly wished a British squadron to visit German ports
simultaneously with other naval visits. Personally I should like to
meet Tirpitz, and I think a non-committal, friendly conversation, if
it arose naturally and freely, might do good, and could not possibly
do any harm. Indeed, after all I have said about a Naval Holiday, it
would be difficult for me to repulse any genuine desire on his part
for such a conversation. The points I wish to discuss are these:—
1st. My own Naval Holiday proposals and to show him, as I can easily
do, the good faith and sound reasons on which they are based. I do not
expect any agreement on these, but I would like to strip the subject
of the misrepresentation and misunderstanding with which it has been
surrounded, and put it on a clear basis in case circumstances should
ever render it admissible.
2nd. I wish to take up with him the suggestion which he made in his
last speech on Naval Estimates of a limitation in the size of capital
ships. Even if numbers could not be touched, a limitation in the size
would be a great saving, and is on every ground to be desired. This
subject could only be satisfactorily explored by direct personal
discussion in the first instance.
3rd. I wish to encourage him to send German ships to foreign stations
by showing him how much we wish to do the same, and how readily we
shall conform to any dispositions which have the effect of reducing
the unwholesome concentration of fleets in Home Waters. Quite apart
from the diplomatic aspect, it is bad for the discipline and
organisation of both navies, and the Germans fully recognise this.
4th. I wish to discuss the abandonment of secrecy in regard to the
numbers and general characteristics (apart from special inventions) of
the ships, built and building, in British and German dockyards. This
policy of secrecy was instituted by the British Admiralty a few years
ago with the worst results for us, for we have been much less
successful in keeping our secrets than the Germans. I should propose
to him in principle that we gave the Naval Attachés equal and
reciprocal facilities to visit the dockyards and see what was going on
just as they used to do in the past. If this could be agreed upon it
would go a long way to stopping the espionage on both sides which is a
continued cause of suspicion and ill-feeling.
I hope, in view of the very strong feeling there is about naval
expenditure and the great difficulties I have to face, my wish to put
these points to Admiral von Tirpitz if a good opportunity arises, and
if it is clear that he would not resent it, may not be dismissed. On
the other hand, I do not wish to go to Germany for the purpose of
initiating such a discussion. I would rather go for some other reason
satisfactory in itself, and let the discussion of these serious
questions come about only if it is clearly appropriate....
For the present I suggest that nothing should be done until the
Emperor’s invitation arrives; and, secondly, until we hear what
Tirpitz’s real wish is.
W. S. C.
Sir Edward Grey was apprehensive that more harm than good might result
from such a discussion, and I do not myself pronounce upon the point;
but I am anxious to place the letter on record as a proof of my desire
while maintaining our naval position to do all that could be done to
mitigate asperity between the British and German Empires.
* * * * *
The strange calm of the European situation contrasted with the rising
fury of party conflict at home. The quarrel between Liberals and
Conservatives had taken on much of that tense bitterness and hatred
belonging to Irish affairs. As it became certain that the Home Rule Bill
would pass into law under the machinery of the Parliament Act, the
Protestant counties of Ulster openly developed their preparations for
armed resistance. In this they were supported and encouraged by the
whole Conservative party. The Irish Nationalist leaders—Mr. Redmond, Mr.
Dillon, Mr. Devlin and others—watched the increasing gravity of the
situation in Ulster with apprehension. But there were elements behind
them whose fierceness and whose violence were indescribable; and every
step or gesture of moderation on the part of the Irish Parliamentary
Party excited passionate anger. Between these difficulties Mr. Asquith’s
Government sought to thread their way.
From the earliest discussions on the Home Rule Bill in 1909 the
Chancellor of the Exchequer and I had always advocated the exclusion of
Ulster on a basis of county option or some similar process. We had been
met by the baffling argument that such a concession might well be made
as the final means of securing a settlement, but would be fruitless till
then. The time had now arrived when the Home Rule issue had reached its
supreme climax, and the Cabinet was generally agreed that we could not
go farther without providing effectually for the exclusion of Ulster. In
March, therefore, the Irish leaders were informed that the Government
had so resolved. They resisted vehemently. They had it in their power at
any time to turn out the Government, and they would have been powerfully
reinforced from within the Liberal Party itself. There is no doubt that
the Irish leaders feared, and even expected, that any weakening of the
Bill would lead to its and their repudiation by the Irish people.
Confronted, however, with the undoubted fact that the Government would
not shrink from being defeated and broken up on the point, they yielded.
Amendments were framed which secured to any Ulster county the right to
vote itself out of the Home Rule Bill until after two successive General
Elections had taken place in the United Kingdom. There could be no
greater practical safeguard than this. It preserved the principle of
Irish unity, but it made certain that unity could never be achieved
except by the free consent of the Protestant North after seeing a Dublin
Parliament actually on trial for a period of at least five years.
These proposals were no sooner announced to Parliament than they were
rejected with contumely by the Conservative opposition. We, however,
embodied them in the text of the Bill and compelled the Irish Party to
vote for their inclusion. We now felt that we could go forward with a
clear conscience and enforce the law against all who challenged it. My
own personal view had always been that I would never coerce Ulster to
make her come under a Dublin Parliament, but I would do all that was
necessary to prevent her stopping the rest of Ireland having the
Parliament they desired. I believe this was sound and right, and in
support of it I was certainly prepared to maintain the authority of
Crown and Parliament under the Constitution by whatever means were
necessary. I spoke in this sense at Bradford on March 14th.
It is greatly to be hoped that British political leaders will never
again allow themselves to be goaded and spurred and driven by each other
or by their followers into the excesses of partisanship which on both
sides disgraced the year 1914, and which were themselves only the
culmination of that long succession of biddings and counter-biddings for
mastery to which a previous chapter has alluded. No one who has not been
involved in such contentions can understand the intensity of the
pressures to which public men are subjected, or the way in which every
motive in their nature, good, bad and indifferent, is marshalled in the
direction of further effort to secure victory. The vehemence with which
great masses of men yield themselves to partisanship and follow the
struggle as if it were a prize fight, their ardent enthusiasm, their
glistening eyes, their swift anger, their distrust and contempt if they
think they are to be baulked of their prey; the sense of wrongs mutually
interchanged, the extortion and enforcement of pledges, the infectious
loyalties, the praise that waits on violence, the chilling disdain, the
honest disappointment, the cries of ‘treachery’ with which every
proposal of compromise is hailed; the desire to keep good faith with
those who follow, the sense of right being on one’s side, the harsh
unreasonable actions of opponents—all these acting and reacting
reciprocally upon one another tend towards the perilous climax. To fall
behind is to be a laggard or a weakling, not sincere, not courageous; to
get in front of the crowd, if only to command them and to deflect them,
prompts often very violent action. And at a certain stage it is hardly
possible to keep the contention within the limits of words or laws.
Force, that final arbiter, that last soberer, may break upon the scene.
The preparations of the Ulster men continued. They declared their
intention of setting up a provisional Government. They continued to
develop and train their forces. They imported arms unlawfully and even
by violence. It need scarcely be said that the same kind of symptoms
began to manifest themselves among the Nationalists. Volunteers were
enrolled by thousands, and efforts were made to procure arms.
As all this peril grew, the small military posts in the North of
Ireland, particularly those containing stores of arms, became a source
of preoccupation to the War Office. So also did the position of the
troops in Belfast. The Orangemen would never have harmed the Royal
forces. It was more than probable that the troops would fraternise with
them. But the Government saw themselves confronted with a complete
overturn of their authority throughout North-East Ulster. In these
circumstances, military and naval precautions were indispensable. On
14th March it was determined to protect the military stores at
Carrickfergus and certain other places by small reinforcements, and as
it was expected that the Great Northern Railway of Ireland would refuse
to carry the troops, preparations were made to send them by sea. It was
also decided to move a battle squadron and a flotilla from Arosa Bay,
where they were cruising, to Lamlash whence they could rapidly reach
Belfast. It was thought that the popularity and influence of the Royal
Navy might produce a peaceable solution, even if the Army had failed.
Beyond this nothing was authorised, but the Military Commanders, seeing
themselves confronted with what might well be the opening movements in a
civil war, began to study plans of a much more serious character on what
was the inherently improbable assumption that the British troops would
be forcibly resisted and fired upon by the Orange army.
These military measures, limited though they were, and the possible
consequences that might follow them, produced the greatest distress
among the officers of the Army, and when on 20th March the
Commander-in-Chief in Ireland and other Generals made sensational
appeals to gatherings of officers at the Curragh to discharge their
constitutional duty in all circumstances, they encountered very general
refusals.
These shocking events caused an explosion of unparalleled fury in
Parliament and shook the State to its foundations. The Conservatives
accused the Government of having plotted the massacre of the loyalists
of Ulster, in which design they had been frustrated only by the
patriotism of the Army. The Liberals replied that the Opposition were
seeking to subvert the Constitution by openly committing themselves to
preparations for rebellion, and had seduced not the Army but its
officers from their allegiance by propaganda. We cannot read the debates
that continued at intervals through April, May and June, without
wondering that our Parliamentary institutions were strong enough to
survive the passions by which they were convulsed. Was it astonishing
that German agents reported and German statesmen believed that England
was paralysed by faction and drifting into civil war, and need not be
taken into account as a factor in the European situation? How could they
discern or measure the deep unspoken understandings which lay far
beneath the froth and foam and fury of the storm?
In all these scenes I played a prominent and a vehement part, but I
never doubted for a moment the strength of the foundation on which we
rested. I felt sure in my own mind that, now that the sting was out of
the Home Rule Bill, nothing in the nature of civil war would arise. On
the contrary I hoped for a settlement with the Conservative Party not
only upon the Home Rule Bill with Ulster excluded, but also on other
topics which ever since 1909 had been common ground between some of
those who were disputing so angrily. I felt, however, that the Irish
crisis must move forward to its climax, and that a reasonable settlement
could only be reached in the recoil.
On the 28th April I closed a partisan reply to a violent attack with the
following direct appeal to Sir Edward Carson:—
‘I adhere to my Bradford speech ... but I will venture to ask the
House once more at this moment in our differences and quarrels to
consider whither it is we may find ourselves going.... Apart from the
dangers which this controversy and this Debate clearly show exist at
home, look at the consequences abroad.
‘Anxiety is caused in every friendly country by the belief that for
the time being Great Britain cannot act. The high mission of this
country is thought to be in abeyance, and the balance of Europe
appears in many quarters for the time being to be deranged. Of course,
foreign countries never really understand us in these islands. They do
not know what we know, that at a touch of external difficulties or
menace all these fierce internal controversies would disappear for the
time being, and we should be brought into line and into tune. But why
is it that men are so constituted that they can only lay aside their
own domestic quarrels under the impulse of what I will call a higher
principle of hatred?...
‘Why cannot the right hon. and learned Gentleman (Sir Edward Carson)
say boldly, “Give me the Amendments to this Home Rule Bill which I ask
for, to safeguard the dignity and the interests of Protestant Ulster,
and I in return will use all my influence and goodwill to make Ireland
an integral unit in a federal system”?’
These words gave the debate an entirely new turn. The Prime Minister
said the next day, ‘The First Lord’s proposal was made on his own
account, but I am heartily in sympathy with it.’ Mr. Balfour declared
that it had ‘the promise and the potency of a settlement which would
avoid this final and irreparable catastrophe of civil war.’ Later, Sir
Edward Carson, after laying stress on the gravity of the crisis and the
weakening it entailed on the position of Great Britain abroad, declared
that he would not quarrel with the matter or the manner of my proposal,
and that ‘he was not very far from the First Lord.’ If Home Rule passed,
his most earnest hope would be that it might be such a success that
Ulster might come under it, and that mutual confidence and good will
might arise in Ireland, rendering Ulster a stronger unit in the federal
scheme. These potent indications were not comprehended on the Continent.
During the whole of May and June the party warfare proceeded in its most
strident form, but underneath the surface negotiations for a settlement
between the two great parties were steadily persisted in. These
eventuated on the 20th July in a summons by the King to the leaders of
the Conservative, Liberal and Irish parties to meet in conference at
Buckingham Palace. When this conference was in its most critical stage I
wrote the following letter to Sir Edward Grey: the wording is curious in
view of the fact that I had then no idea of what the next forty-eight
hours was to produce. On this I am content to rest so far as the Irish
question before the war is concerned.
_Mr. Churchill to Sir Edward Grey_
_July 22, 1914._
... Failing an Irish agreement there ought to be a British decision.
Carson and Redmond, whatever their wishes, may be unable to agree
about Tyrone; they may think it worth a war; and from their point of
view it may be worth a war. But that is hardly the position of the
forty millions who dwell in Great Britain; and their interests must,
when all is said and done, be our chief and final care. In foreign
affairs you would proceed by two stages. First you would labour to
stop Austria and Russia going to war; second, if that failed, you
would try to prevent England, France, Germany and Italy being drawn
in. Exactly what you would do in Europe, is right in this domestic
danger, with the difference that in Europe the second step would only
hope to limit and localise the conflict, whereas at home the second
step—if practicable and adopted—would prevent the local conflict.
The conference therefore should labour to reduce the difference to the
smallest definite limits possible. At that point, if no agreement had
been reached, the Speaker should be asked to propose a partition; and
we should offer the Unionist leaders to accept it if _they_ will....
I want peace by splitting the outstanding differences, if possible
with Irish acquiescence, but if necessary over the heads of both Irish
parties.
* * * * *
At the end of June the simultaneous British naval visits to Kronstadt
and Kiel took place. For the first time for several years some of the
finest ships of the British and German Navies lay at their moorings at
Kiel side by side surrounded by liners, yachts and pleasure craft of
every kind. Undue curiosity in technical matters was banned by mutual
agreement. There were races, there were banquets, there were speeches.
There was sunshine, there was the Emperor. Officers and men fraternised
and entertained each other afloat and ashore. Together they strolled arm
in arm through the hospitable town, or dined with all good will in mess
and wardroom. Together they stood bareheaded at the funeral of a German
officer killed in flying an English seaplane.
In the midst of these festivities, on the 28th June, arrived the news of
the murder of the Archduke Charles at Sarajevo. The Emperor was out
sailing when he received it. He came on shore in noticeable agitation,
and that same evening, cancelling his other arrangements, quitted Kiel.
Like many others, I often summon up in my memory the impression of those
July days. The world on the verge of its catastrophe was very brilliant.
Nations and Empires crowned with princes and potentates rose
majestically on every side, lapped in the accumulated treasures of the
long peace. All were fitted and fastened—it seemed securely—into an
immense cantilever. The two mighty European systems faced each other
glittering and clanking in their panoply, but with a tranquil gaze. A
polite, discreet, pacific, and on the whole sincere diplomacy spread its
web of connections over both. A sentence in a dispatch, an observation
by an ambassador, a cryptic phrase in a Parliament seemed sufficient to
adjust from day to day the balance of the prodigious structure. Words
counted, and even whispers. A nod could be made to tell. Were we after
all to achieve world security and universal peace by a marvellous system
of combinations in equipoise and of armaments in equation, of checks and
counter-checks on violent action ever more complex and more delicate?
Would Europe thus marshalled, thus grouped, thus related, unite into one
universal and glorious organism capable of receiving and enjoying in
undreamed of abundance the bounty which nature and science stood hand in
hand to give? The old world in its sunset was fair to see.
But there was a strange temper in the air. Unsatisfied by material
prosperity the nations turned restlessly towards strife internal or
external. National passions, unduly exalted in the decline of religion,
burned beneath the surface of nearly every land with fierce if shrouded
fires. Almost one might think the world wished to suffer. Certainly men
were everywhere eager to dare. On all sides the military preparations,
precautions and counter precautions had reached their height. France had
her Three Years’ military service; Russia her growing strategic
Railways. The Ancient Empire of the Hapsburgs, newly smitten by the
bombs of Sarajevo, was a prey to intolerable racial stresses and
profound processes of decay. Italy faced Turkey; Turkey confronted
Greece; Greece, Serbia and Roumania stood against Bulgaria. Britain was
rent by faction and seemed almost negligible. America was three thousand
miles away. Germany, her fifty million capital tax expended on
munitions, her army increases completed, the Kiel Canal open for
Dreadnought battleships that very month, looked fixedly upon the scene
and her gaze became suddenly a glare.
* * * * *
In the autumn of 1913, when I was revolving the next year’s Admiralty
policy in the light of the coming Estimates, I had sent the following
minute to the First Sea Lord:—
_October 22, 1913._
First Sea Lord.
Second Sea Lord.
Secretary.
We have now had manœuvres in the North Sea on the largest scale for
two years running, and we have obtained a great deal of valuable data
which requires to be studied. It does not therefore seem necessary to
supplement the ordinary tactical exercises of the year 1914–15 by
Grand Manœuvres. A saving of nearly £200,000 could apparently be
effected in coal and oil consumption, and a certain measure of relief
would be accorded to the Estimates in an exceptionally heavy year.
In these circumstances I am drawn to the conclusion that it would be
better to have no Grand Manœuvres in 1914–15, but to substitute
instead a mobilisation of the Third Fleet. The whole of the Royal
Fleet Reserve, and the whole of the Reserve officers could be
mobilised and trained together for a week or ten days. The Third Fleet
ships would be given the exact complements they would have in war, and
the whole mobilisation system would be subjected to a real test. The
balance Fleet Reservists could be carefully tested as to quality, and
trained either afloat or ashore. I should anticipate that this would
not cost more than £100,000, in which case there would still be a
saving on the fuel of the manœuvres. While the Third Fleet ships were
mobilised the First Fleet ships would rest, and thus plenty of
officers would be available for the training of the reservists on
shore, and possibly, if need be, for their peace training afloat. This
last would, of course, reveal what shortage exists. A very large staff
would be employed at all the mobilising centres to report upon the
whole workings of the mobilisation. The schools and training
establishments would be closed temporarily according to the
mobilisation orders, and the whole process of putting the Navy on a
war footing, so far as the Third Fleet was concerned, would be carried
out. I should not propose to complete the Second Fleet, as we know all
about that.
At another time in the year I should desire to see mobilised the whole
of the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve, and put them afloat on First
Fleet ships for a week as additional to complements.
Please put forward definite proposals, with estimates, for carrying
out the above policy, and at the same time let me have your opinion
upon it.
W. S. C.
Prince Louis agreed. The necessary measures were taken and the project
was mentioned to Parliament on the 18th March, 1914. In pursuance of
these orders and without connection of any kind with the European
situation, the Test Mobilisation began on the 15th July. Although there
was no legal authority to compel the reservists to come up, the response
was general, upwards of 20,000 men presenting themselves at the naval
depots. The whole of our mobilisation arrangements were thus subjected
for the first time in naval history to a practical test and thorough
overhaul. Officers specially detached from the Admiralty watched the
process of mobilisation at every port in order that every defect,
shortage or hitch in the system might be reported and remedied. Prince
Louis and I personally inspected the process at Chatham. All the
reservists drew their kits and proceeded to their assigned ships. All
the Third Fleet ships coaled and raised steam and sailed for the general
concentration at Spithead. Here on the 17th and 18th of July was held
the grand review of the Navy. It constituted incomparably the greatest
assemblage of naval power ever witnessed in the history of the world.
The King himself was present and inspected ships of every class. On the
morning of the 19th the whole Fleet put to sea for exercises of various
kinds. It took more than six hours for this armada, every ship decked
with flags and crowded with bluejackets and marines, to pass, with bands
playing and at 15 knots, before the Royal Yacht, while overhead the
naval seaplanes and aeroplanes circled continuously. Yet it is probable
that the uppermost thought in the minds both of the Sovereign and those
of his Ministers there present was not the imposing spectacle of British
majesty and might defiling before their eyes, not the oppressive and
even sultry atmosphere of continental politics, but the haggard,
squalid, tragic Irish quarrel which threatened to divide the British
nation into two hostile camps.
One after another the ships melted out of sight beyond the Nab. They
were going on a longer voyage than any of us could know.