[A transcriber's note follows the text.]
THE BRITISH STATE
TELEGRAPHS
[Illustration: MacMillan Company logo]
THE BRITISH STATE
TELEGRAPHS
A STUDY OF THE PROBLEM OF A LARGE BODY OF
CIVIL SERVANTS IN A DEMOCRACY
BY
HUGO RICHARD MEYER
SOMETIME ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL ECONOMY IN THE
UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO, AUTHOR OF "GOVERNMENT
REGULATION OF RAILWAY RATES;" "MUNICIPAL
OWNERSHIP IN GREAT BRITAIN"
New York
THE MACMILLAN COMPANY
LONDON: MACMILLAN & CO., LTD.
1907
_All right reserved_
COPYRIGHT, 1907
BY THE MACMILLAN COMPANY
Set up and electrotyped. Published October 1907
THE MASON-HENRY PRESS
SYRACUSE, NEW YORK
TO MY BROTHER
PREFACE
In order to keep within reasonable limits the size of this volume, the
author has been obliged to reserve for a separate volume the story of
the Telephone in Great Britain. The series of books promised in the
Preface to the author's _Municipal Ownership in Great Britain_ will,
therefore, number not four, but five.
CONTENTS
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION 3
Scope of the inquiry.
CHAPTER II
THE ARGUMENT FOR THE NATIONALIZATION OF THE TELEGRAPHS 13
The indictment of the telegraph companies. The argument
from foreign experience. The promise of reduced tariffs
and increased facilities. The alleged financial success of
foreign State telegraphs: Belgium, Switzerland and France. The
argument from English company experience.
CHAPTER III
THE ALLEGED BREAK-DOWN OF LAISSEZ-FAIRE 36
Early history of telegraphy in Great Britain. The adequacy of
private enterprise. Mr. Scudamore's loose use of statistics.
Mr. Scudamore's test of adequacy of facilities. Telegraphic
charges and growth of traffic in Great Britain. The alleged
wastefulness of competition. The telegraph companies' proposal.
CHAPTER IV
THE PURCHASE OF THE TELEGRAPHS 57
Upon inadequate consideration the Disraeli Ministry estimates
at $15,000,000 to $20,000,000 the cost of nationalization.
Political expediency responsible for Government's inadequate
investigation. The Government raises its estimate to
$30,000,000; adding that it could afford to pay $40,000,000
to $50,000,000. Mr. Goschen, M. P., and Mr. Leeman, M. P.,
warn the House of Commons against the Government's estimates,
which had been prepared by Mr. Scudamore. The Gladstone
Ministry, relying on Mr. Scudamore, estimates at $3,500,000
the "reversionary rights" of the railway companies, for which
rights the State ultimately paid $10,000,000 to $11,000,000.
CHAPTER V
NONE OF MR. SCUDAMORE'S FINANCIAL FORECASTS WERE REALIZED 77
The completion of the telegraph system costs $8,500,000;
Mr. Scudamore's successive estimates had been respectively
$1,000,000 and $1,500,000. Mr. Scudamore's brilliant forecast
of the increase of traffic under public ownership. Mr.
Scudamore's appalling blunder in predicting that the State
telegraphs would be self-supporting. Operating expenses on the
average exceed 92.5% of the gross earnings, in contrast to
Mr. Scudamore's estimate of 51% to 56%. The annual telegraph
deficits aggregate 26.5% of the capital invested in the plant.
The financial failure of the State telegraphs is not due to
the large price paid to the telegraph companies and railway
companies. The disillusionment of an eminent advocate of
nationalization, Mr. W. Stanley Jevons.
CHAPTER VI
THE PARTY LEADERS IGNORE THEIR FEAR OF AN ORGANIZED CIVIL
SERVICE 94
Mr. Disraeli, Chancellor of the Exchequer, opposes the
enfranchisement of the civil servants. Mr. Gladstone, Leader
of the Opposition, assents to enfranchisement, but expresses
grave apprehensions of evil results.
CHAPTER VII
THE HOUSE OF COMMONS IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE FINANCIAL FAILURE OF
THE STATE TELEGRAPHS 99
Sir S. Northcote, Chancellor of the Exchequer in Mr.
Disraeli's Ministry of 1874 to 1880, is disillusioned. The
State telegraphs become self-supporting in 1879-80. The House
of Commons, under the leadership of Dr. Cameron, M. P., for
Glasgow, overrides the Ministry and cuts the tariff almost in
two. In 1890-91 the State telegraphs would again have become
self-supporting, had not the House of Commons, under pressure
from the civil service unions, increased wages and salaries.
The necessity of making money is the only effective incentive
to sound management.
CHAPTER VIII
THE STATE TELEGRAPHS SUBSIDIZE THE NEWSPAPER PRESS 113
Why the newspaper press demanded nationalization. Mr.
Scudamore gives the newspaper press a tariff which he deems
unprofitable. Estimates of the loss involved in transmitting
press messages, made by responsible persons in the period from
1876 to 1900. The State telegraphs subsidize betting on horse
races.
CHAPTER IX
THE POST OFFICE EMPLOYEES PRESS THE HOUSE OF COMMONS FOR INCREASES
OF WAGES AND SALARIES 127
British Government's policy as to wages and salaries for
routine work, as distinguished from work requiring a high
order of intelligence. The Fawcett revision of wages, 1881.
Lord Frederick Cavendish, Financial Secretary to the Treasury,
on pressure exerted on Members of Parliament by the telegraph
employees. Sir S. A. Blackwood, Permanent Secretary to the
Post Office, on the Fawcett revision of 1881. Evidence as to
civil servants' pressure on Members of Parliament presented
to the Royal Commission on Civil Establishments, 1888. The
Raikes revision of 1890-91; based largely on the Report of the
Committee on the Indoor Staff, which Committee had recommended
increases in order "to end agitation." The Earl Compton, M.
P., champions the cause of the postal employees in 1890; and
moves for a Select Committee in 1891. Sir James Fergusson,
Postmaster General in the Salisbury Ministry, issues an
order against Post Office servants "endeavoring to extract
promises from any candidate for election to the House of
Commons with reference to their pay or duties." The Gladstone
Ministry rescinds Sir James Fergusson's order. Mr. Macdonald's
Motion, in 1893, for a House of Commons Select Committee. Mr.
Kearley's Motion, in 1895. The Government compromises, and
appoints the so-called Tweedmouth Inter-Departmental Committee.
CHAPTER X
THE TWEEDMOUTH COMMITTEE REPORT 165
The Government accepts all recommendations made by the
Committee. Sir Albert K. Rollit, one of the principal
champions in the House of Commons of the postal employees,
immediately follows with a Motion "intended to reflect
upon the Report of the Tweedmouth Committee." Mr. Hanbury,
Financial Secretary to the Treasury, intimates that it
may become necessary to disfranchise the civil servants.
The Treasury accepts the recommendations of the so-called
Norfolk-Hanbury Committee. The average of expenses on account
of wages and salaries rises from 11.54 cents per telegram
in 1895-96, to 13.02 cents in 1902-03, concomitantly with
an increase in the number of telegrams from 79,423,000 to
92,471,000.
CHAPTER XI
THE POST OFFICE EMPLOYEES CONTINUE TO PRESS THE HOUSE OF COMMONS
FOR INCREASES OF WAGES AND SALARIES 182
The Post Office employees demand "a new judgment on the
old facts." Mr. S. Woods' Motion, in February, 1898. Mr.
Steadman's Motions in February and June, 1899. Mr. Hanbury,
Financial Secretary to the Treasury, points out that the
postal employees are demanding a House of Commons Select
Committee because under such a Committee "the agitation and
pressure, now distributed over the whole House, would be
focussed and concentrated upon the Select Committee." Mr.
Steadman's Motion, in April, 1900. Mr. Bayley's Motion, in
June, 1901. Mr. Balfour, Prime Minister, confesses that the
debate has filled him "with considerable anxiety as to the
future of the public service if pressure of the kind which
has been put upon the Government to-night is persisted in
by the House." Captain Norton's Motion, in April, 1902. The
Government compromises by appointing the Bradford Committee
of business men. Mr. Austen Chamberlain, Postmaster General,
states that Members from both sides of the House "seek from
him, in his position as Postmaster General, protection for
them in the discharge of their public duties against the
pressure sought to be put upon them by employees of the Post
Office." He adds: "Even if the machinery by which our Select
Committees are appointed were such as would enable us to
secure a Select Committee composed of thoroughly impartial
men who had committed themselves by no expression of opinion,
I still think that it would not be fair to pick out fifteen
Members of this House and make them marked men for the purpose
of such pressure as is now distributed more or less over the
whole Assembly."
CHAPTER XII
THE BRADFORD COMMITTEE REPORT 214
The Bradford Committee ignores its reference. It recommends
measures that would cost $6,500,000 a year, in the hope of
satisfying the postal employees, who had asked for $12,500,000
a year. Lord Stanley, Postmaster General, rejects the Bradford
Committee's Report; but grants increases in wages aggregating
$1,861,500 a year.
CHAPTER XIII
THE HOUSE OF COMMONS SELECT COMMITTEE ON POST OFFICE SERVANTS,
1906 226
The Post Office Civil Servants' Unions demand the adoption
of the Bradford Committee Report. Lord Stanley, Postmaster
General, applies the words "blackmail" and "blood-sucking"
to the postal employees' methods. Captain Norton moves for a
House of Commons Select Committee. Mr. Austen Chamberlain,
Chancellor of the Exchequer, in vain asks the Opposition
Party's support for a Select Committee to which shall be
referred the question of the feasibility of establishing a
permanent, non-political Commission which shall establish
general principles for settling disputes between the civil
servants and the Government of the day. Captain Norton's
Motion is lost, nine Ministerial supporters voting for it, and
only two Opposition members voting against it. Mr. J. Henniker
Heaton's appeal to the British public for "An End to Political
Patronage." The Post Office employees, in the campaign
preceding the General Election of January, 1906, induce nearly
450 of the 670 parliamentary candidates who succeeded in being
elected, to pledge themselves to vote for a House of Commons
Select Committee on Post Office Wages. Immediately upon the
opening of Parliament, the Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman Liberal
Ministry gives the Post Office employees a House of Commons
Select Committee.
CHAPTER XIV
THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, UNDER PRESSURE FROM THE CIVIL SERVICE UNIONS,
CURTAILS THE EXECUTIVE'S POWER TO DISMISS INCOMPETENT AND REDUNDANT
EMPLOYEES 245
The old practice of intervention by Members of Parliament on
behalf of individual civil servants with political influence
has given way to the new practice of intervention on behalf
of the individual civil servant because he is a member of a
civil service union. The new practice is the more insidious
and dangerous one, for it means class bribery. The doctrine
that entrance upon the State's service means "something very
nearly approaching to a freehold provision for life." Official
testimony of various prominent civil servants, especially of
Mr. (now Lord) Welby, Permanent Secretary to the Treasury
from 1885 to 1894; and Mr. T. H. Farrer, Permanent Secretary
to Board of Trade from 1867 to 1886. The costly practice of
giving pensions no solution of the problem of getting rid of
unsatisfactory public servants.
CHAPTER XV
THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, UNDER PRESSURE FROM THE CIVIL SERVICE UNIONS,
CURTAILS THE EXECUTIVE'S POWER TO PROMOTE EMPLOYEES ACCORDING TO
MERIT 267
The civil service unions oppose promotion by merit, and
demand promotion by seniority. Testimony presented before:
Select Committee on Civil Services Expenditure, 1873; Select
Committee on Post Office, 1876; Royal Commission to inquire
into the Civil Establishments, 1888; from statement made in
House of Commons, in 1887, by Mr. Raikes, Postmaster General;
and before the so-called Tweedmouth Committee, 1897. Instances
of intervention by Members of House of Commons on behalf of
civil servants who have not been promoted, or are afraid they
shall not be promoted.
CHAPTER XVI
MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS INTERVENE ON BEHALF OF PUBLIC
SERVANTS WHO HAVE BEEN DISCIPLINED 302
Evidence presented before: The Royal Commission appointed
to inquire into the Civil Establishments, 1888; and the
Tweedmouth Committee, 1897. Instances of intervention by
Members of Parliament. Mr. Austen Chamberlain, Financial
Secretary to the Treasury, in April, 1902, states that
at a low estimate one-third of the time of the highest
officials in the Post Office is occupied with petty questions
of discipline and administrative detail, because of the
intervention of Members of Parliament. He adds that it is
"absolutely deplorable" that time and energy that should be
given to the consideration of large questions must be given
to matters that "in any private business would be dealt with
by the officer on the spot." Sir John Eldon Gorst's testimony
before the Committee on National Expenditure, 1902.
CHAPTER XVII
THE SPIRIT OF THE CIVIL SERVICE 323
The doctrine of an "implied contract" between the State
and each civil servant, to the effect that the State may
make no change in the manner of administering its great
trading departments without compensating every civil servant
however remotely or indirectly affected. The hours of
work may not be increased without compensating every one
affected. Administrative "mistakes" may not be corrected
without compensating the past beneficiaries of such
mistakes. Violation of the order that promotion must not
be mechanical, or by seniority alone, may not be corrected
without compensating those civil servants who would have
been benefitted by the continued violation of the aforesaid
order. The State may not demand increased efficiency of its
servants without compensating every one affected. Persons
filling positions for which there is no further need, must
be compensated. Each civil servant has a "vested right" to
the maintenance of such rate of promotion as obtains when he
enters the service, irrespective of the volume of business or
of any diminution in the number of higher posts consequent
upon administrative reforms. The telegraph clerks demand that
their chances of promotion be made as good as those of the
postal clerks proper, but they refuse to avail themselves of
the opportunity to pass over to the postal side proper of the
service, on the ground that the postal duties proper are
more irksome than the telegraph duties. Members of Parliament
support recalcitrant telegraph clerks whom the Government is
attempting to force to learn to perform postal duties, in
order that it may reap advantage from having combined the
postal service and the telegraphs in 1870. Special allowances
may not be discontinued; and vacations may not be shortened,
without safeguarding all "vested interests." Further
illustrations of the hopelessly unbusinesslike spirit of the
rank and file of the public servants.
CHAPTER XVIII
THE HOUSE OF COMMONS STANDS FOR EXTRAVAGANCE 360
Authoritative character of the evidence tendered by the
several Secretaries of the Treasury. Testimony, in 1902, of
Lord Welby, who had been in the Treasury from 1856 to 1894.
Testimony of Sir George H. Murray, Permanent Secretary to the
Post Office and sometime Private Secretary to the late Prime
Minister, Mr. Gladstone. Testimony of Sir Ralph H. Knox, in
the War Office since 1882. Testimony of Sir Edward Hamilton,
Assistant Secretary to the Treasury since 1894. Testimony of
Mr. R. Chalmers, a Principal Clerk in the Treasury; and of
Sir John Eldon Gorst. Mr. Gladstone's tribute to Joseph Hume,
the first and last Member of the House of Commons competent
to criticize effectively the details of expenditure of the
State. Evidence presented before the Select Committee on Civil
Services Expenditure, 1873.
CHAPTER XIX
CONCLUSION 378
INDEX 393
THE BRITISH STATE TELEGRAPHS
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
SCOPE OF THE INQUIRY
The story of the British State Telegraphs divides itself into two
parts: the purchase of the telegraphs, in 1870, from the companies
that had established the industry of telegraphy; and the subsequent
conduct of the business of telegraphy by the Government. The first
part is covered by Chapters II to VI; the second part by the remaining
chapters. Both parts contain a record of fact and experience that
should be of service to the American public at the present moment, when
there is before them the proposal to embark upon the policy of the
municipal ownership and operation of the so-called municipal public
service industries. The second part, however, will interest a wider
body of readers than the first part; for it deals with a question that
is of profound interest and importance at all times--the problem of a
large body of civil servants in a Democracy.
Chapters II to VI tell of the demand of the British Chambers of
Commerce, under the leadership of the Chamber of Commerce of Edinburgh,
for lower charges on telegraphic messages; the appointment by the
Government of Mr. Scudamore, Second Secretary of the Post Office,
to report upon the relative merits of private telegraphs and State
telegraphs; the character of the report submitted by Mr. Scudamore; and
the reasons why that report--upon which rested the whole argument for
nationalization--was not adequately considered either by the Select
Committee of the House of Commons, to whom the Bill for the purchase
of the telegraphs was referred, or by the House of Commons itself. The
principal reason was that the agitation carried on by the Chambers of
Commerce and the newspaper press[1] proved so successful that both
political parties committed themselves to nationalization before Mr.
Scudamore's report had been submitted to searching criticism. Under
the circumstances, the Disraeli Ministry was unwilling to go into the
general election of 1868 without having made substantial progress
toward the nationalization of the telegraphs. In order to remove
opposition to its Bill in the House of Commons, the Disraeli Ministry
conceded practically everything asked by the telegraph companies, the
railway companies and the newspaper press.[2] The result was that the
Government paid a high price absolutely for the telegraphs. Whether
the price was too high, relatively speaking, is difficult to say. In
the first place, the price paid--about $40,000,000--was well within
the sum which the Government had said it could afford to pay, to
wit, $40,000,000 to $50,000,000. In the second place, the Government
acquired an industry "ready-made," with an established staff of
highly trained men educated in the school of competition--the only
school that thus far has proved itself capable of bringing out the
highest efficiency that is in men. In the second place, the Government
acquired the sole right to transmit messages by electricity--a right
which subsequent events have proved to cover all future inventions,
such as the transmission of messages by means of the telephone and
of wireless telegraphy. Finally, in spite of the wastefulness that
characterized the Government's operation of the telegraphs from the
day the telegraphs were taken over, the Telegraph Department in the
year 1880-81 became able to earn more than the interest upon the
large capital invested in the telegraphs. But from that year on the
Government not only became more and more wasteful, but also lost
control over the charges made to the public for the transmission of
messages. It is instructive to note, in this latter connection, that
the control over the rates to be charged to the public was taken out
of the hands of the Government by Dr. Cameron, who represented in
the House of Commons the people of Glasgow, and that another Scotch
city, Edinburgh, had initiated and maintained the campaign for the
nationalization of the telegraphs.
One of the most extraordinary of the astounding incidents of the
campaign and negotiations that resulted in the purchase of the
telegraphs, was the fact that in the debates in the House of Commons
was not even raised the question of the possibility of complications
and dangers arising out of the multiplication of the civil servants.
That fact is the more remarkable, since the leaders of both political
parties at the time apprehended so much danger from the existing civil
servants that they refused to take active steps to enfranchise the
civil servants employed in the so-called revenue departments--the
customs, inland revenue and Post Office departments--who had been
disfranchised since the close of the Eighteenth Century. The Bill of
1868, which gave the franchise to the civil servants in question, was
a Private Bill, introduced by Mr. Monk, a private Member of the House
of Commons; and it was carried against the protest of the Disraeli
Ministry, and without the active support of the leading men in the
Opposition.
In the debates upon Mr. Monk's Bill, Mr. Gladstone, sitting in
Opposition, said he was not afraid that either political party ever
would try to use the votes of the civil servants for the purpose of
promoting its political fortunes, "but he owned that he had some
apprehension of what might be called class influence in the House of
Commons, which in his opinion was the great reproach of the Reformed
Parliament, as he believed history would record. Whether they were
going to emerge into a new state of things in which class influence
would be weaker, he knew not; but that class influence had been in many
things evil and a scandal to them, especially for the last fifteen or
twenty years [since the Reform of Parliament]; and he was fearful of
its increase in consequence of the possession of the franchise, through
the power which men who, as members of a regular service, were already
organized, might bring to bear on Members of Parliament."
Chapters VII and following show that Mr. Gladstone's apprehensions
were well-founded; that the civil servants have become a class by
themselves, with interests so widely divergent from the interests of
the rest of the community that they do not distribute their allegiance
between the two great political parties on the merits of the respective
policies of those parties, as do an equal number of voters taken at
random. The civil servants have organized themselves in great civil
service unions, for the purpose of promoting their class interests
by bringing pressure to bear upon the House of Commons. At the
parliamentary elections they tend to vote solidly for the candidate who
promises them most. In one constituency they will vote for the Liberal
candidate, in another for the Conservative candidate.
Thus far neither Party appears to have made an open or definite
alliance with the civil servants. But in the recent years in which
the Conservative Party was in power, and year after year denied--"on
principle" of public policy--certain requests of the civil servants,
the rank and file, as well as some of the minor leaders of the Liberal,
or Opposition Party, evinced a strong tendency to vote rather solidly
in the House of Commons in support of those demands of the civil
servants.[3] At the same time the chiefs of the Liberal, or Opposition
Party, refrained from the debate as well as from the vote. It may be
that the Opposition Party discipline was not strong enough to enable
the Opposition chiefs to prevent the votes on the momentous issue
raised in the House of Commons by the civil servants from becoming for
all practical purposes Party votes; or, it may be that the Liberal
Party leaders did not deem it expedient to seek to control the voting
of their followers. Be that as it may, the fact remains that the
Conservative Ministry that was in power, repeatedly called in vain upon
the House of Commons to take out of the field of Party politics the
issue raised by the civil servants in the period from 1890 to 1905.
The Conservative Ministry year after year denied the request of the
Post Office employees for a House of Commons Select Committee on the
pay and position of the Post Office employees. On the other hand, the
support of that request came steadily from the Liberal Opposition.
In the General Election of January, 1906, the Post Office employees
threw their weight overwhelmingly on the side of the Liberal Party;
and immediately after the opening of the new Parliament, the newly
established Liberal Government announced that it would give the Post
Office employees the House of Commons Select Committee which the late
Conservative Ministry had "on principle" of public policy refused to
grant.
Shortly after the General Election of January, 1906, the President
of the Postal Telegraph Clerks' Association, a powerful political
organization, stated that nearly 450 of the 670 Members of the House of
Commons had pledged themselves, in the course of the campaign, to vote
for a House of Commons Select Committee. At about the same time, Lord
Balcarres, a Conservative whip in the late Balfour ministry, speaking
of the 281 members who entered Parliament for the first time in 1906,
said "he thought he was fairly accurate when he said that they had
given pretty specific pledges upon this matter [of a Select Committee]
to those who had sent them to the House." Sir Acland-Hood, chief whip
in the late Balfour Ministry, added: "... nearly the whole of the
supporters of the then [1905] Government voted against the appointment
of the Select Committee [in July, 1905]. No doubt many of them suffered
for it at the general election; they either lost their seats or had
their majorities reduced in consequence of the vote." And the new
Prime Minister, Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman, spoke of the "retroactive
effect of old promises extracted in moments of agony from candidates
at the general election." And finally, at the annual conference of the
Postal Telegraph Clerks' Association, held in March, 1906, Mr. R. S.
Davis, the representative of the Metropolitan London Telegraph Clerks,
said: "The new Postmaster General had made concessions which had
almost taken them [the postal clerks] off their feet by the rapidity
with which one had succeeded another and the manner in which they were
granted."
* * * * *
Chapters XIV to XVII describe the efforts made by the civil servants
to secure exemption from the ordinary vicissitudes of life, as well
as exemption from the necessity of submitting to those standards of
efficiency and those rules of discipline which prevail in private
employment. They show the hopelessly unbusinesslike spirit of the rank
and file of the public servants, a spirit fostered by the practice of
members of the House of Commons intervening, from the floor of the
House as well as behind the scenes, on behalf of public servants who
have not been promoted, have been disciplined or dismissed, or, have
failed to persuade the executive officers to observe one or more of the
peculiar claims of "implied contract" and "vested right" which make
the British public service so attractive to those men whose object in
life is not to secure full and untrammeled scope for their abilities
and ambitions, but a haven of refuge from the ordinary vicissitudes
of life. Members of the House of Commons intervene, in the manner
indicated, in mere matters of detail of administration, because they
have not the courage to refuse to obey the behests of the political
leaders of the civil service unions; they do not so interfere from
the mere desire to promote their political fortunes by championing
the interests of a class. They recognize the fact that the art of
government is the art of log-rolling, of effecting the best compromise
possible, under the given conditions of political intelligence and
public spirit, between the interests of a class and the interests of
the country as a whole. Their views were forcibly expressed, on a
recent occasion, by Captain Norton, who long has been one of the most
aggressive champions in the House of Commons, of the civil servants,
and who, at present, is a Junior Lord of the Treasury, in the Sir H.
Campbell-Bannerman Liberal Ministry. Said Captain Norton: "As regarded
what had been said about undue influence [being exercised by the civil
servants], his contention was that so long as the postal officials ...
were allowed to maintain a vote, they had precisely the same rights as
all other voters in the country to exercise their fullest influence in
the defense of their rights, privileges and interests. He might mention
that all classes of all communities, of all professions, all trades,
all combinations of individuals, such as anti-vaccinationists and so
forth, had invariably used their utmost pressure in defense of their
interests and views upon members of the House...."
The problem of government in every country--irrespectively of the form
which the political institutions may take in any given country--is to
avoid class legislation, and to make it impossible for any one class to
exploit the others. Some of us--who are old-fashioned and at present
in the minority--believe that the solution of that problem is to be
found only in the upbuilding of the character and the intelligence of
the individual citizen. Others believe that it is to be found largely,
if not mainly, in extending the functions of the State and the City.
To the writer, the experience of Great Britain under the experiment
of the extension of the functions of the State and the City, seems
to teach once more the essential soundness of the doctrine that the
nation that seeks refuge from the ills that appear under the policy of
_laissez-faire_, seeks refuge from such ills in the apparently easy,
and therefore tempting, device of merely changing the form of its
political institutions and political ideals, will but change the form
of the ills from which it suffers.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] The reason for the opposition of the newspaper press to the
telegraph companies is discussed in Chapter VIII.
[2] The concession made to the newspaper press is described in Chapter
VIII.
[3] The efforts of the civil servants culminated in the debate and vote
of July 5, 1905. Upon that occasion there voted for the demands of the
civil servants eighteen Liberalists who, in 1905-6, became Members
of the Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman Liberal Ministry. Two of them, Mr.
Herbert Gladstone and Mr. Lloyd George, became Members of the Cabinet,
or inner circle of the Ministry.