CHAPTER III

THE END OF THE QUARREL

[Sidenote: A momentary peace.]

It remained to be seen whether Gregory's failure implied Henry's

success. The Emperor returned to Germany, where a strong desire for

peace had grown up and was taking practical shape. In some dioceses

the Truce of God was proclaimed, which, under heavy ecclesiastical

penalties, forbade hostilities during certain days of the week and

certain seasons of the year. Henry took up this idea, which as yet was

too partial to be effective, and in 1085, in a Synod at Mainz under

his presidency, it was proclaimed for the whole kingdom. The

unfortunate anti-King Herman found himself deserted, and died, a

fugitive, in 1088. Henry's moderation concluded what the desire for

peace had begun, and even Saxony seemed to be reconciled to his rule.

[Sidenote: Urban II (1088-99).]

But his triumph was short-lived. Between him and any lasting peace

stood the anti-Pope Clement III; for all who had received consecration

at Clement's hands were bound at all hazards to maintain the

lawfulness of his election. Moreover, Clement's opponent now was a man

to be reckoned with. The first choice of the Gregorian party,

Desiderius, Abbot of Monte Cassino, could not be consecrated for a

year after his election, and four months later he was dead (September,

1087). The partisans of Clement were too strong in Rome, and the next

election was carried out with total disregard of the decree of

Nicholas II. It took place at Terracina in March, 1088, and was made

by a large number of clergy in addition to the Cardinals. The choice

fell upon Otto, Bishop of Ostia, a Frenchman of noble family and a

monk of Cluny; but it was some years before Urban II could regard Rome

as his headquarters.

[Sidenote: His policy against Henry.]

In some ways Urban was more uncompromising than his master Gregory. He

upheld the papal legates in their strict treatment of the French

bishops; he actually launched against Philip I of France the

excommunication which Gregory had only threatened; to the prohibition

of lay investiture he added an explicit command that bishops and

clergy should not do homage to any layman. But while he showed himself

thus in thorough sympathy with his predecessor, in his power of

dealing with circumstances he proved himself by far the superior. A

succession of clever if thoroughly unscrupulous measures restored the

fortunes of the papal party. Henry had succeeded for the moment in

dividing and isolating his enemies. Urban set himself to unite the

chief opponents of Henry on both sides of the Alps. He planned a

marriage between the middle-aged widow, the Countess Matilda of

Tuscany, and the eighteen-year-old son of Welf, Duke of Bavaria

(1089). Matilda was ready to sacrifice herself for the good of the

cause. The Welfs, ignorant of Matilda's gift of her lands to the

Papacy, eagerly accepted the bait; but soon discovering that they were

being used as tools, they ceased to give any help, and in fact became

reconciled to the Emperor. But meanwhile the Pope had discovered other

more deadly weapons with which to wound the Emperor. The deaths of the

anti-Kings had left the papal party without a leader in Germany.

Events had shown the firm hold of the hereditary claim and the Salian

House upon a large portion of the Empire. The only acceptable leader

would be a member of Henry's own house. Henry's actions played into

their hands. His eldest son, Conrad, had been crowned at Aachen in

1087 and sent into Italy to act as his father's representative. He is

described as a young man of studious and dreamy character, unpractical

and easily influenced. In 1087 Henry lost his faithful wife Bertha,

and a year later he married a Russian Princess, Praxedis, who was the

widow of the Count of the Northern March. The marriage was unhappy;

each accused the other of misconduct; and Henry, suspecting the

relations of Conrad with his stepmother, put them both in prison.

Perhaps Conrad had already been worked upon by the papal party. He

escaped, took refuge with the Countess Matilda, and was crowned King

of Italy (1093). But he was only the tool of others. Far more

immediately dangerous was the escape of Praxedis (1094), who laid

before the Pope the foulest charges against Henry. To her lasting

shame the Countess Matilda was the chief agent in these family

revolts. The effect on Henry's position in Italy was disastrous. Pope

Urban finally recovered Rome, and Conrad, having won the cities of

Lombardy, took an oath of fealty to the Papacy in return for a promise

of the Empire.

[Sidenote: Beginning of the Crusades.]

And just as if the success of these diabolical schemes was not a

sufficient triumph, fortune at this moment gave the Pope a chance of

superseding the Emperor in the eyes of all Europe, by inaugurating a

great popular movement of which under different circumstances the

Emperor would have been the natural leader. In 1085 the Eastern

Emperor Alexius had appealed to Henry against the Normans, but now

Henry was a negligible quantity--excommunicated, crowned Emperor by an

anti-pope, not likely to undertake a distant expedition. In 1095,

therefore, when Alexius needed aid against the Seljuk Turks, it was to

the Pope that he sent his envoys, who appeared at the Synod of

Piacenza. Those late converts to Mohammedanism had established their

kingdom of Roum over the greater part of Asia Minor with its capital

at the venerable city of Nicæa, and had captured Jerusalem, which thus

passed out of the hands of the tolerant Caliphs of Cairo into those of

the most fanatical section of Mohammedans. Pilgrims returning from

Jerusalem spread through Europe tales of the harsh treatment to which

they were subjected. Then in 1087 a new tribe of Saracens, the

Almoravides, crossed from Africa to Spain and inflicted a severe

defeat upon a Christian army. It seemed almost as if a combined

movement of the Mohammedan world had begun for the final extinction of

Christendom. If Gregory had been free he would have wished to promote

the reunion of the Churches by sending help to the Eastern Empire; so

that it was no novel idea that was suggested to the assembled magnates

at Piacenza. Urban II no doubt saw the opportunity offered for

asserting the leadership of the western world. Alexius' envoys were

heard with sympathy; but Urban felt the need of appeal to a larger

public, and summoned a great Council to Clermont-Ferrand in Auvergne,

where he would be among his own countrymen. Here in November, 1095, he

delivered before a vast concourse of persons assembled in the open air

an impassioned appeal on behalf of the suffering Christians of the

east. The result answered his utmost expectation, and the cry of the

assembled multitude, "God wills it," was the ratification of the papal

leadership. All methods were taken to stir the feelings of the west.

The vast ecclesiastical organisation was used in order to transmit

invitations to possible crusaders; the penitential system of the

Church was brought to bear on those already conscious of a sinful

life; popular preachers, such as Peter the Hermit, were employed to

rouse the interest of the masses; the Pope himself spent the

succeeding months in a tour through Southern France; and arrangements

were made for the start of the first expedition from the Italian ports

at the end of the summer of 1096, under the leadership of a legate

appointed by the Pope.

[Sidenote: The first Crusade.]

It is not possible here to follow the fortunes of the Crusaders.

Several unauthorised expeditions, which bore witness to the popular

enthusiasm, made their way through Southern Germany; but the

disorderly crowds which composed them perished either at the hands of

the inhabitants of the Eastern Empire, whom they treated as

schismatics, or among the Turks in Asia Minor. The real expedition

passed partly by land, partly by sea from the Italian ports to

Constantinople, whence the Crusaders set out across Asia Minor. Nicæa

was taken in June, 1097; the Sultan of Roum was overthrown in battle

at Dorylæum in July; Antioch detained the Crusaders from October,

1097, to June, 1098; and it was only in July, 1099, that after a siege

of forty days Jerusalem was captured from the Saracens of Egypt, who

had recently recovered it from the Turks.

[Sidenote: Its effect on the quarrel.]

But whatever may have been Urban's success in his own land of France

and elsewhere, in Germany, at any rate, his efforts to turn the

current against the Emperor had entirely failed. Of German lands

Lorraine alone sent warriors to the First Crusade. The movement did

not penetrate to the east of the Rhine, and the number of Germans who

helped to swell the multitude of crusaders who marched through

Southern Germany was inappreciable. At the same time the settlement of

the questions at issue between Papacy and Empire were indefinitely

postponed; for it would have been treason to the crusading cause to

press the papal claims against Henry at this moment. It was Henry's

turn to experience some good fortune. The proclamation of the Truce of

God under his auspices, the manifest interest of the German

ecclesiastics, and his own policy of favouring the rising cities

combined to strengthen his position. Thus in 1098 he was able to

obtain from the German nobles the deposition of his rebellious son

Conrad and the election of his younger son Henry as King, who was made

to promise that during his father's lifetime he would not act

politically against him. Then in 1099 Pope Urban died, and was

followed in 1100 by the anti-Pope Clement III, and in 1101 by Conrad.

All the personal causes of disunion were being removed. Moreover, the

success of the crusading policy made it impossible that Henry or

Germany should stand apart from it altogether. Although Jerusalem was

the capital of a Christian kingdom and other principalities centred

round Tripoli, Antioch, and the more distant Edessa, powerful

Mohammedan Princes lay close beside them at Damascus, Aleppo, and

Mossul, as well as to the south in Egypt. There was need of constant

reinforcement, for the fighting was continual. Under these inducements

Germany began to contribute crusaders to the cause. Duke Welf of

Bavaria led an army eastwards in 1101. In 1103 Henry's efforts in

favour of peace culminated in the proclamation at the Diet of Mainz of

the first imperial land peace sworn between King and nobles, which

bound the parties to it for four years to maintain the peace towards

all communities in the land. This was intended as a preliminary to

Henry's participation in an expedition to the east.

[Sidenote: Death of Henry IV.]

But this was the very last thing desired by Henry's enemies, and there

began a most unscrupulous attack which ended only with his death. Pope

Urban's successor, Pascal II, strengthened by the death of the

anti-Pope Clement and the failure of his party to maintain a

successor, renewed the excommunication against Henry, and did

everything deliberately to stir up strife in Germany. The nobles were

angry at the cessation of private war and at the favour shown by Henry

to the towns. But again they lacked a leader, and with diabolical

craft the papal party worked upon the young King Henry by threatening

to set up against him an anti-King who should rob him of the eventual

succession. The result was that the young King broke his solemn

promise, set up the standard of revolt, and was joined by nobles,

ecclesiastical as well as lay, and by the restless Saxon rebels. By a

trick he got his father into his power and forced him formally to

abdicate, while he himself was crowned King by the papal legate. But

the Emperor escaped, and with marvellous energy gathered adherents;

but a renewal of the struggle was staved off by his own death after a

few days' illness on August 6th, 1106.

[Sidenote: His justification.]

Henry never shook himself free from the difficulties of his own early

misdeeds; but the rights upon which he took his stand were those

exercised by his predecessors. The uncompromising attitude of his

opponents and their humiliation of him made it a life-long struggle

between them. Henry was no saint; but his opponents' tactics were

indefensible. Under less adverse circumstances he might have proved a

successful ruler. But he was the victim of a party which deliberately

subordinated means to ends in pursuit of an ideal which Henry could

scarcely be expected to understand or appreciate.

[Sidenote: Henry V.]

The papal party in its malice had overreached itself in selecting

Henry V as its champion. True, he had destroyed the most stubborn

enemy of the Papacy; but his own interests caused him to adopt his

father's policy. His one object was to recover the prestige which the

German King had lost in the struggles of the last twenty years. He was

undisputed King in Germany; he showed an unscrupulous and overbearing

demeanour which aroused opposition on all sides. He was not likely to

be content with less power than his father had demanded over the

German clergy, and at the first vacancies he invested the new bishops.

[Sidenote: Growth of a party of compromise on investiture.]

Henry's bold action was not altogether without reason. For some years

there had been growing up within the ranks of the advocates of reform

a moderate party which, while opposed to simony and clerical marriage,

saw in the continued and close union of Church and State an

indispensable guarantee of social order. They aimed therefore at

conserving the rights of the Crown no less than at recovering those of

the Church. This party is found especially among the French clergy.

One of its chief spokesmen, the Canonist Ivo, Bishop of Chartres, who

had suffered much for his enthusiasm for reform, insists in his

correspondence even with the Pope himself, that the prohibition passed

upon lay investiture is not among the class of matters which have been

settled by a law for ever binding, but among those which have been

enjoined or forbidden, as the case might be, for the honour or profit

of the Church, and he appropriately bids the papal legate beware lest

the Roman clergy should incur the charge of taking tithe of mint and

rue while they omit the weightier precepts of the law. Moreover, both

he and his friend Hugh of Fleury, in a treatise dealing with the

"Royal Power and Priestly Office," maintain that the King has the

power, "by the instigation of the Holy Spirit," of nominating bishops,

or at least of granting permission for their election; and that, while

the royal investiture, however made by word or act, pretends to bestow

no spiritual authority, but merely estates or other results of royal

munificence, it is for the archbishop to commit to a newly elected

prelate the cure of souls.

[Sidenote: Settlement in England.]

This distinction, repugnant as it was to the extremists, soon found

practical application. Lanfranc's successor in the See of Canterbury,

Anselm, was, like his predecessor, an Italian, transferred from

Normandy to England. He had to contend with the typical King of an

unrestrained feudalism in the person of William II. A succession of

quarrels ended in Anselm's retirement to Italy. Recalled by Henry I,

he took back with him the maxims of the reformers about investiture,

and refused to do the required homage to the new King. Henry was not

an unreasonable man, and he sent Anselm to bring about some

arrangement with the Pope. However, it was not until a rupture was

imminent that Pope Pascal was persuaded to acquiesce in an agreement

on the lines advocated by Ivo of Chartres and his party. By this

Concordat (1107) Henry I agreed to give up his claim to invest with

the ring and staff, while Archbishop Anselm allowed that the elected

bishop might do homage for his lands to the King.

[Sidenote: Pascal II (1099-1118).]

At present neither side in the Empire was sufficiently honest in its

intentions to be willing to accept so reasonable a settlement. But the

fact that the Pope had felt himself obliged to allow it in one case

sensibly weakened his position and correspondingly strengthened that

of the German King. It was typical of Pascal's position in general.

Though strongly Gregorian in principle, he was neither clever nor

courageous, and was inclined to take up a position which he could not

maintain. Intent on renewing the prohibition of lay investiture and

afraid of Henry, Pascal determined to support himself upon France.

Here, at any rate, Philip I had gradually dropped the practice of

investiture of bishops. The papal censures of his scandalous private

conduct uttered by Gregory and Urban had had no effect. Pascal

accepted professions of amendment and acts of humiliation, and ceased

to trouble himself further about Philip's private affairs. A Council

of French bishops was held at Troyes (1107), where the decrees against

lay investiture were renewed. The one gleam of hope for the future

appeared in Pascal's deliberate abstention from any pronouncement

against the King in person. Henry, occupied on the eastern border,

could not pay his first visit to Italy until the beginning of 1111,

and it was not without significance that on the eve of setting out he

betrothed himself to the daughter of Henry I of England. He was more

fortunate than his father had been in the moment of his visit. The

Lombard cities quarrelling among themselves were quickly forced to

submission; the Countess Matilda, grown old and tired of strife, sent

her envoys to do homage for the imperial fiefs; the Normans had just

lost their Duke. Pope Pascal, finding himself isolated, did not dare

to meet by a simple negative Henry's demand for the right of

investiture as well as for his coronation as Emperor.

[Sidenote: His proposal.]

By way of escaping from his difficulty he sent to the King an

astonishing proposal. The King was to renounce the right of

investiture and all interference in the elections, in return for which

the prelates should give up all imperial lands and rights with which

they were endowed, retaining merely the right to tithes, offerings,

and private gifts: the papal rights over the Patrimony of St. Peter

and the Norman lands were specially excepted. It has been pointed out

that this was the policy which Count Cavour made famous as "a free

Church in a free State." It seems almost impossible that Pascal should

have thought that the German bishops would accept this solution: he

may have hoped that they could be coerced into it. But in contracting

himself out of the obligations to be imposed on all other

ecclesiastical dignitaries, he practically renounced any claim to set

the policy of the Church. Henry may have aimed at digging an

impassable ditch between the Pope and the German bishops. It was an

impossible agreement; for neither bishops nor lay nobles would wish to

see so large an addition to the King's resources, while Henry himself

could not afford to surrender the right of investiture, since it would

stultify his claim to a voice in the election of the Pope.

[Sidenote: Henry's success.]

The publication of the agreement at Rome caused great tumults, Henry

contriving that all the odium should fall upon the Pope. Then, since

Pascal could not fulfil the part of the agreement which he had made on

behalf of the Church, Henry forced him, the successor of Gregory, to

acquiesce in the exercise by the German King of the right of

investiture with ring and staff. Henry was crowned Emperor, though

with very maimed ceremonial, and returned in triumph to Germany.

[Sidenote: Pascal's withdrawal.]

But his triumph was short, for he was immediately threatened with

danger from two quarters. On the one side the leaders of the

Ultramontane party were naturally most wrathful at this betrayal of

their cause, and Pascal, threatened with deposition, placed himself in

their hands. At the Lenten Synod of 1112 he confirmed all the decrees

of his predecessor against lay investiture, thus annulling his own

agreement with Henry. But he avoided issuing any sentence of

excommunication against Henry in person. His own legates, however, had

no such scruples, and in France Cardinal Conon took advantage of the

strong feeling among the clergy to launch excommunications against the

Emperor in several ecclesiastical Councils during 1114 and 1115.

Guido, Archbishop of Vienne, presiding over a Council of Henry's own

subjects at Vienne in 1112, had already condemned their sovereign and

forced Pascal to acquiesce in the resolution.

[Sidenote: Henry's difficulties.]

Henry's right policy would no doubt have been to compel the Pope to

observe the agreement. But it was more than three years before he

could return to Italy. For revolt had broken out again in Germany. The

nobles had their own grievances; the Saxons were always ready to take

arms; the Church was roused because Henry dealt with ecclesiastical

property as if the Pope's original proposal had been allowed to stand.

The royal bailiffs acted in such a manner with the cathedrals that of

a house of prayer they made a den of thieves.

Henry's forces were worsted in battle and he had recourse to his

father's tactics, seeking in Italy, by personal dealings with the

Pope, to recover the moral prestige which he had lost in Germany. He

had a pretext in the death of the Countess Matilda (1115); for the

Papacy was claiming not only her allodial lands, which she might have

a right to bequeath, but also her imperial fiefs, which were not hers

to dispose of. Henry occupied the dominions of Matilda without

opposition. His presence in Italy caused Pascal still to refrain from

personal condemnation of the Emperor, and a year later a party

friendly to Henry opened the gates of Rome to him. Pascal fled to

Albano, and only returned to Rome on Henry's departure, a dying man

(January, 1118). His successor, Gelasius II, refused Henry's advances,

and the Emperor resorted to the old and discredited policy of setting

up an anti-Pope in the person of the Archbishop of Braga, in Portugal,

who took the name of Gregory VIII. Gelasius excommunicated Henry and

his Pope; but finding himself threatened in Rome, fled to Burgundy,

and died at Cluny a year after his election (January, 1119). So far

Henry's attempts to deal with the Pope had failed, and the publication

of the new Pope's excommunication in Germany made the opposition so

strong that Henry found it advisable to return.

[Sidenote: Calixtus II (1119-24)]

Gelasius' successor chosen at Cluny was Archbishop of Vienne, who took

the title of Calixtus II. He was the first secular priest who had

occupied the papal chair since Alexander II, and he was related to the

royal families of France and England. Thus he had a wider outlook than

the monks who preceded him, and the nobles would be likely to listen

to a man of their own rank. He had been the most uncompromising of all

Henry's opponents; but this was a guarantee to the Church that her

position and power would not again be placed in jeopardy, for events

were at length tending towards a conclusion of the weary strife. The

views of the reformers had gained general acceptance as the doctrine

of the Church. The obligation of clerical celibacy was acknowledged:

simony had much diminished; Henry was the only King in Western Europe

who still claimed to invest his prelates. Although it was some time

before all the great French feudatories yielded to the spirit of

reform, the French King himself had abandoned the practice of

investiture for those bishops who were under his control. He retained,

however, certain of his rights. The election could not take place

without his permission, the newly elected bishop took an oath of

fealty to the King, and during the vacancy of the see the revenues

were paid to the Crown. It was more important still that in England

the question of investiture had been settled by a compromise which

recognised the twofold nature of the episcopal office, and that this

compromise had received the sanction of the Pope. Henceforth it was

practically impossible for the Church to maintain the position of the

extreme reformers. When Pope Pascal was forced to grant the right of

investiture to the Emperor, Henry I of England, as Anselm complained

to Pascal, threatened to resume the practice. Already William I of

England had defined the limits of papal power in his dominions without

a protest from Rome, and Urban II had actually found himself obliged

to endow Roger of Sicily and his successors with the authority of a

papal legate within their own dominions. It was clear that the papal

authority could do little against a really strong lay ruler. Moreover,

the influence of the Church had greatly diminished. There was scarcely

a see or abbey to which, during the last forty years, there had not

been rival claimants: King and nobles alike had not only ceased to

increase the endowments of the Church, but had caught at almost every

opportunity of encroaching on them.

[Sidenote: Concordat of Worms.]

The accommodation was very gradual, for much suspicion of insincerity

on both sides had to be overcome. The first step was taken in October,

1119. After the failure of direct negotiations between Pope and

Emperor, a Council at Rheims, presided over by the Pope, renewed the

anathema against Henry and his party, but only consented to a modified

prohibition of investitures, since the office alone was mentioned and

all reference to the property of bishop or abbot was omitted. It was

two years before the next stage was reached, and meanwhile the

anti-Pope had fallen into the hands of Calixtus, and Henry was still

in difficulties in Germany. Finally, in October, 1121, the German

nobles brought about a conference of envoys from both sides at

Wurzburg, where in addition to an universal peace it was arranged that

the investiture question should be settled at a General Council to be

held in Germany under papal auspices. The Council met at Worms in

September, 1122, and the papal legates were armed with full powers to

act. The result was a Concordat subsequently ratified at the first

Council of the Lateran in March, 1123, which is reckoned as the ninth

General Council by the Roman Church. By this agreement the Emperor

gave up all claim to invest ecclesiastics with the ring and staff. In

return it was allowed by the Church that the election of prelates

should take place in presence of the Emperor's representatives, and

that in case of any dispute the Emperor should confirm the decision

arrived at by the Metropolitan and his suffragans. The Emperor on his

part undertook that the prelate elect, whether bishop or abbot, should

be invested with the regalia or temporalities pertaining to his office

by the sceptre, in Germany the investiture preceding the

ecclesiastical consecration, whereas in Burgundy and the kingdom of

Italy the consecration should come first.

[Sidenote: Results of struggle in Empire.]

We are naturally tempted to enquire who was the gainer in this long

struggle? Writers on both sides have claimed the victory. It is clear,

however, that neither side got all that it demanded. Considering the

all-embracing character of the papal claim, the limitation of its

pretensions might seem to carry a decided diminution of its position.

Calixtus' advisers strongly urged that all over the imperial lands the

consecration of prelates should precede the investiture of

temporalities by the lay power. But the German nobles would not budge.

In Burgundy and Italy conditions were different: in the former the

power of the Crown had been almost in abeyance; in Italy the bishops

had found themselves deserted by the Crown and had submitted to the

Pope. The Crown had therefore to acquiesce in a merely nominal control

over appointments in those lands. But in Germany the King perhaps

gained rather than lost by the Concordat. His right of influence in

the choice was definitely acknowledged, and by refusing the regalia he

could practically prevent the consecration of any one obnoxious to

him. The prelates of Germany, therefore, remained vassals of the

Crown.

[Sidenote: on Papacy.]

On the other hand, the Papacy had definitely shaken itself free from

imperial control. Henry III was the last Emperor who could impose his

nominee Papacy upon the Church as Pope; the protégés of his successors

are all classed among the anti-Popes. At the same time the papal

privilege of crowning the Emperor and the papal weapon of

excommunication were very real checks upon the German King; while the

success of those principles for which the Cluniac party had striven

established the theoretical claim of the Pope to be the moral guide,

and the part which he played in starting the Crusades put him in the

practical position of the leader of Christendom in any common

movement. It was no slight loss to the Emperor that he had been the

chief opponent of the Pope and the reformers, and that in the matter

of the Crusades he and his whole nation had stood ostentatiously

aloof.

The Church and the Empire Being an Outline of the History of the Church from A.D. 1003 to A.D. 1304 · 第 3 / 17 章