Recapitulation.
The writer, in these pages, has shown by what must be conceded on all
sides, irrefragable evidence that school histories are in error in
saying the Battle of New Orleans was fought after peace, and was
therefore a needless battle.
The writer has also shown by evidence he considers conclusive, that
England held as invalid the title of the United States to Louisiana,
acquired by sale from Bonaparte to the United States in 1803; that
England deliberately planned the conquest of Louisiana (with the
resultant development, if successful, of a great dominion to the west of
the United States, like Canada on the North). That evidence is mainly
furnished by the British themselves. First in the British note to the
United States Peace Commissioners, criticizing the title of the United
States to Louisiana; and, second, in the fitting out and dispatching of
the expedition against New Orleans during the peace negotiations; in the
complete Civil Government staff, for Louisiana, carried by the
expedition; in the record of the peace negotiations, first in the
insistence by the British upon the Uti Possidetis principle, and,
second, when that failed, in the proposal of words to be inserted in the
Mutual Restoration clause, which proposal finally resulted in the word,
“Possessions” in that clause, under which England could hold that
Louisiana, having been taken, was not subject to return, not being a
possession of the United States; further in the letter of Prime Minister
Liverpool to Lord Castlereagh, assuming British occupation of New
Orleans, outlining purpose to “frighten Madison” into signing the Treaty
(thus leaving England in possession of Louisiana).
After close and careful study, the writer presents as a summary of his
conclusion as to the value of the Battle of New Orleans:
First, that it was a highly necessary battle on the part of the United
States, rendered so by British aggression;
Second, that the statement in school and other histories that it was
fought after peace is entirely false, the Peace Treaty itself being
evidence. (All historians, past, present, and to come, cannot change the
text of that Treaty);
Third, that it saved the Louisiana Purchase to the United States or
averted another war with England;
Fourth, that it settled forever the question of the title to Louisiana;
Fifth, that it created a profound impression on the world. Speaking, as
one orator has put it, in language all nations could understand, that
the young American Republic had the will to be free and the power to
enforce that will;
Sixth, that it marked the last time that the foot of a foreign foe has
been set on American soil, except when Mexico invaded Texas in 1846;
Seventh, that it practically added to the Peace Treaty that impressment
and orders in council would no longer be imposed by England, for these
obnoxious policies were never sought to be revived;
Eighth, that it saved this sorely harassed, nearly treason-torn country,
at a critical time in its life, from threatened and possible disunion,
and re-established national self-respect;
Ninth, that it made Andrew Jackson a national hero, resulting in his
election as President of the United States, and the establishment of
what is known as the Jackson era;
Tenth, that it resulted in mutual respect and friendship between the
United States and England, which has endured to this day, and which it
is hoped will perpetually endure.
Could any battle have had a greater or more varied effect?
School historians and other historians, in appraising the battle as a
needless and useless one, do violence to truth and grossly impose upon
Young America, as well as America in general.
The underlying American sentiment of honor, truth and justice demands
revision of these school histories, and that right speedily.
In conclusion, the writer recommends, as revision, in those histories
which desire to dispose of the Battle of New Orleans in a paragraph, the
following:
The Battle of New Orleans, fought January 8, 1815, was one of the most
brilliant defensive victories in history. Many historians have classed
it as a needless victory in that it was fought after peace. That is an
error, for the Peace Treaty, signed by the Commissioners of the two
countries, December 24, 1814, specifically provided that it should not
be effective until ratified by both sides. It was not ratified by the
United States until February 17, 1815, soon after its reception. The
news of the victory came at a critical time in the history of the
country, and was received with great enthusiasm everywhere. It settled
forever all question as to the title of the United States to Louisiana.
It saved Louisiana, or a least averted another war with England. It
resulted in lasting, solid peace with England, which should permanently
endure. As illustration of the character of that peace, it may be
pointed out that the boundary line between the United States and Canada
extending about three thousand miles, has not, on either side, a fort or
fortification. God help the English-speaking people if one should ever
be necessary!
_The End._
ADDENDA.
WORDING OF THE TREATY OF GHENT.
In addition to the references cited on pages 18 and 30 as to the full
text of the Treaty of Ghent reference may be given to volume compiled by
Hunter Miller entitled: “Treaties and Other International Acts of the
United States of America.” (See volume 2, pages 574-584.)
ENGLISH CRITICISM OF U. S. TITLE TO LOUISIANA.
The third and fourth paragraphs of the note of the British Commissioners
to the American Commissioners at Ghent October 8, 1814, read as follows:
In adverting for this purpose to the acquisition of Louisiana, the
undersigned must observe that the instrument by which the consent of His
Catholic Majesty is alleged to have been given to the cession of it has
never been made public. His Catholic Majesty was no party to the treaty
by which the cession was made, and if any sanction has been subsequently
obtained from him, it must have been, like other contemporaneous acts of
that monarch, involuntary, and, as such, cannot alter the character of
the transaction. The Marquis of Yrujo, the minister of His Catholic
Majesty at Washington, in a letter addressed to the President of the
United States, formally protested against the cession, and the right of
France to make it; yet in the face of this protestation, so strongly
evincing the decided opinion of Spain as to the illegality of the
proceeding, the President of the United States ratified the treaty. Can
it be contended that the annexation of Louisiana, under such
circumstances, did not mark a spirit of territorial aggrandizement?
His Britannic Majesty did certainly express satisfaction when the
American Government communicated the event that Louisiana, a valuable
colony in the possession of France, with whom the war had just been
renewed, instead of remaining in the hands of his enemy, had been ceded
to the United States, at that time professing the most friendly
disposition towards Great Britain, and an intention of providing for her
interest in the acquisition. But the conditions under which France had
acquired Louisiana from Spain were not communicated; the refusal of
Spain to consent to its alienation was not known; the protest of her
ambassador had not been made; and many other circumstances attending the
transaction, on which it is now unnecessary to dilate, were, as there is
good to believe, industriously concealed. (From American State Papers,
Foreign Relations, Volume III, page 721.)
The reply of the American Commissioners is quoted on page 26 of this
volume.
(Author’s note: From the foregoing we can better understand the refusal
of the British Commissioners to discuss the northern boundary of
Louisiana as proposed in American note of November 10. See page 26, this
volume.)
THE UTI POSSIDETIS PROPOSAL.
The note of the British Commissioners, October 21, 1814, contained the
following paragraph:
In regard to other boundaries, the American plenipotentiaries, in their
note of August 24, appeared in some measure to object to the
propositions then made by the undersigned, as not being on the basis of
uti possidetis. The undersigned are willing to treat on that basis,
subject to such modifications as mutual convenience may be found to
require; and they trust that the American plenipotentiaries will show,
by their ready acceptance of this basis, that they duly appreciate the
moderation of His Majesty’s Government in so far consulting the honor
and fair pretensions of the United States as, in the relative situation
of the two countries, to authorize such a proposition. (From American
State Papers, Foreign Relations, Volume III.)
(Author’s note: This is an adroit effort to put upon the Americans the
initial suggestion of the Uti Possidetis. The Americans, after seeing
the futility of any treaty agreement as to impressment and trade
restriction, adhered steadily to the Status Quo Ante Bellum basis. They
rejected the Uti Possidetis principle. It should be borne in mind that
at the time of the above note the secret expedition against Louisiana,
assembling in Nigril Bay, Jamaica, was nearing completion.)
TIME OF EFFECTIVENESS OF TREATY.
On November 10, 1814, the American Commissioners submitted a _projet_ of
a treaty containing in article one the statement that “All hostilities,
both by sea and land, shall immediately cease,” and in article fifteen
the statement that “This treaty, when the same shall have been ratified
on both sides, and the respective ratifications mutually exchanged,
shall be binding upon both parties, and the ratifications shall be
exchanged at ______ in the space of ______ months from this day, or
sooner if possible.”
On November 26 the British Commissioners returned the _projet_, altered
to read that “All hostilities, both by sea and land, shall cease after
the exchange of ratifications as hereafter mentioned,” and that “This
treaty, when the same shall have ratified on both sides, and the
ratifications mutually exchanged, shall be binding on both parties, and
the ratifications shall be exchanged at Washington with all practical
despatch, in the space of ______ months from this day, or sooner if
practicable.”
On November 30, 1814, the American Commissioners stated in a note to the
British Commissioners:
The undersigned consent that the day of the exchange of the
ratifications be substituted to that of the signature of the treaty as
the time for the cessation of hostilities, and for regulating the
periods after which prizes at sea shall be restored; it being understood
that measures shall be adopted for a speedy exchange of ratifications.
(American State Papers, Foreign Relations, Volume III.)
(Author’s note: It will thus be seen that the British proposed the date
of ratification as the time of the effectiveness of the treaty, and the
cessation of hostilities, and that the Americans consented, thus
carrying into the treaty the provision so uniformly overlooked by our
historians.)
PASSAMAQUODDY ISLANDS.
(Author’s note: There was towards the end of the negotiations at Ghent
much and voluminous correspondence, mainly on the part of the British,
concerning the question involved in the Passamaquoddy Islands situation;
it was magnified, admittedly, out of proportion to the subject involved,
especially in view of the fact that the final disposition of these
fisheries was relegated to a civil commission to meet after peace. The
British, while conceding the relative insignificance of the islands,
maintained that a question of honor was involved which might “prove an
insuperable bar to the conclusion of peace at the present time.” In
reading the mass of British correspondence on the subject of these
islands one is forced to the conclusion that there was an underlying
purpose.)
AS TO WORDING IN MUTUAL RESTORATION CLAUSE.
The American _projet_ of November 10 contained also the proposition that
all territory, places, and possessions “taken by either party from the
other during the war, or which may be taken after the signing of this
treaty, shall be restored.”
The _projet_ returned on November 26 by the British Commissioners was
altered to read all territory, places, and possessions, “belonging to
either party and taken by the other during the war, or which may be
taken after the signing of this treaty, shall be restored.”
The protocol of a conference of the American and British Commissioners,
held on December 1, contained the following statements:
At a conference held this day, the American plenipotentiaries proposed
the following alterations in their _projet_, as amended by the British
plenipotentiaries: 1st—In article I, strike out the alteration
consisting of the words “belonging to,” and “taken by,” and preserve the
original reading, viz: “taken by either party from the other.”
This alteration was objected to by the British plenipotentiaries, and,
after some discussion, reserved by them for the consideration of their
Government. (Ibid., pages 735, 742.)
(Author’s note: The American Commissioners stated in a note December 14,
to the British Commissioners that they agreed to accept the British
proposal to “omit the words originally offered by them,” provided that
the Passamaquoddy Islands should alone be excepted from the mutual
restoration of territory. See American State Papers, Volume III, pages
743, 744, for full text of note. Also for text of letter from British
Commissioners to British Government as of December 13, see Photostat in
Library of Congress from Public Record Office, London—Foreign Office 5,
Vol. 102. Thus in the mutual restoration clause of the treaty the words
“all places, points, and ‘possessions’ whatsoever,” went in, without the
clarifying term as to “possessions” proposed by the British. Did the
British Government deem the clarification essential? Evidence, too
strong for disbelief, shows it did not. The secret expedition against
Louisiana was then well on its way, and expected to be in possession of
New Orleans any day, with the full set of civil officers, carried on
Admiral Cochran’s fleet, installed and in control. Evidence has been
given showing the anxiety of British officials, after the signing of the
treaty, as to its ratification by President Madison. If the British
plans against Louisiana had succeeded would President Madison have
ratified the treaty? That is a fair question for College debate.)
Transcriber’s Notes
—Retained publication information from the printed edition: this eBook
is public-domain in the country of publication.
—Silently corrected palpable typos; left non-standard spellings and
dialect unchanged.
—In the text versions only, text in italics is delimited by
_underscores_.
End of Project Gutenberg's Battle of New Orleans, by Reau Estes Folk