Negotiations at Ghent.
A separate chapter is devoted to the joint conference at Ghent because
therein is shown the subtle, diplomatically concealed, purpose of the
then English Government. The record of the proceedings of the
conference, in order to be fully understood, should be read in the light
of the afterwards revealed fact that, at the same time these
negotiations were being conducted, the expedition against Louisiana was
secretly planned and dispatched. Things that are puzzling in the making
often become clear in the aftermath. And so it is in this case.
The defeat and resultant abdication of Napoleon (April 4, 1814) released
England’s European troops for pursuing the American war with greater
vigor, and to punish the United States for having declared war at
England’s most embarrassing moment. It would not be a violent assumption
to say that at least some members of the British Government felt that
the time was opportune at last to take Louisiana and thus redress a
grievance nurtured since 1803, when Bonaparte snatched that great domain
from England’s outstretched hands.
The exact date on which the Louisiana expedition was determined upon is
not material. Plain evidence discloses that during the joint peace
negotiation its details were arranged and the army sent forward to take
New Orleans. We now know that after the capture of Washington by the
British and the burning and sacking of the public buildings there
(August 24, 1814), the British invading forces, after being later
repulsed in an attack upon Baltimore, repaired under orders to Nigril
Bay, Jamaica, to await recruits for the expedition against New Orleans.
With the time then required for ocean travel, these orders must have
been given prior to, or about the time of the meeting of the Peace
Commissioners at Ghent, August 4, 1814.
Let us visualize the two groups assembled at Ghent. First, consider the
five Americans. They were earnestly desirous of a quick and honorable
peace. Their country was riven with dissatisfaction produced by a
powerful anti-administration and anti-war party, seemingly in control of
the northeastern states, making dire threats, unless hostilities were
soon ended.
The American Commissioners were prepared and authorized to forego the
questions of impressment and orders in council, which caused the war,
and conclude a peace pact on the basis of the status before the war. For
a month they had been waiting the coming of the British Commissioners.
It is evident there was a purpose on the part of the British Government
to delay.
The second group consisted of three suave English Commissioners, who
appeared at Ghent, as before stated, August 4th.
These English Commissioners began by making, on behalf of their
Government, demands objectionable and humiliating, the discussion of
which, often at long distance with the London Government officials,
consumed time. Finally the American Commissioners were forced to write
to Washington for further instructions.
From “The Diplomacy of the War of 1812,” by Frank A. Updyke, which is a
most valuable account of the Peace conference, quotation is given from
pages 220 and 221. “It was the unanimous opinion of the American
ministers that Great Britain’s policy was to consume as much time as
possible before the termination of negotiations, in order that some
decided victory might be gained in the war which would make it easier
for her to insist upon her demands.”
This quotation is given to show that our ministers recognized the
British tactics as sparring for time; but the record does not show that
any one of them thought of New Orleans as the objective point of British
design.
The records in connection with the negotiations are voluminous, and make
very interesting reading. But viewed in the after revealed facts, the
truth stands out so clearly that the proceedings of the Peace Conference
in English consideration and the secret expedition to capture New
Orleans were so closely inter-related that in arriving at the material
verity, much material in that conference should be disregarded as
intended by the English to delay and becloud, and so matters coming
before the Conference referring to Louisiana should only be considered
in connection with our mission.
Frank A. Updyke, Ph.D. of Dartmouth College, in his “The Diplomacy of
the War of 1812,” quoted from above, has given a condensed, fully
annotated, account of the proceedings of the Peace Conference. It is a
work, published in 1915, which deserves place as a supplementary
textbook in every college and high school. I have made liberal use of
Dr. Updyke’s volume, which merits high place for research effort and
reference.
The Joint Commission had been in session a little over two months when
the first note was struck significant of the British underlying purpose.
It was in the communication of the English Government through their
ministers to the American Commissioners. The document was dated October
8, 1814. (See American State papers.)
“The first paragraph,” says Updyke (page 269), “attempted to show the
illegality of the purchase of Louisiana and the spirit of territorial
aggrandisement on the part of the United States which this act
manifested.”
It might have been inferred that this attack upon the legality of the
title to Louisiana would be followed by a demand of some sort; but no
such demand was made. In fact, the treaty as finally adopted, contained
no mention of Louisiana.
It is highly pertinent to ask a question as to what was the purpose of
this attack upon the title of Louisiana. All such things have a purpose.
In the light of present knowledge that purpose is clear. The great
expedition against New Orleans being near completion, it is obvious that
the British Government recognized the good diplomatic position before
the world, after the capture of Louisiana, of showing a record of fair
warning as justification for retention.
The reply of the Americans to the note of October 8th was dated October
13th. (See American State papers.)
Quotation is given from Updyke, page 284:
“While endeavoring to make the reply brief, the American ministers could
not refrain from discussing some other topics adverted to by the British
in their note. The British ministers had made the charge that the
acquisition of Louisiana by the United States was illegal, Spain having
offered a remonstrance against its cession and the right of France to
make it. To this the American note responded that, although the Spanish
minister at Washington had made such remonstrance, at that very time
orders were given by Spain for the delivery of Louisiana to France. So
France was in actual possession of the territory when she disposed of it
to the United States.”
Another matter, although not in chronological turn, may be here
presented, as showing further the English attitude towards Louisiana. In
the course of the note of the Americans to the British, dated November
10, 1814 (see American State papers), Updyke says, page 307: “The
American note refused to consent to the British proposal to fix the
northwest boundary by the line from the lake of the Woods to the
Mississippi unless the boundaries of Louisiana should also be provided
for in the settlement.”
The British ministers in referring the note to their Government, said
they were unwilling to consent to a discussion of the Louisiana
boundary, for their doing so might be taken as a recognition of the
right of the United States to the occupation of the territory. (See
Updyke, page 310.)
What might be called the Uti Possidetis scheme was embraced in a British
note of October 21st (see American State papers). The British proposed
the Uti Possidetis principle, as a basis of settlement, under which each
side would keep what territory it should be possessed of at the
promulgation of peace.
The reason behind this proposal seems now very patent. The adoption of
this principle would have enabled England, by indisputable treaty right,
to retain Louisiana, which she confidently expected to take.
But the Americans opposed this principle and firmly insisted on a treaty
based upon conditions at the beginning of the war.
The English were very insistent and for a time there appeared a new
danger that the conference would break up. But, as will appear later,
British diplomacy, the most skilful in the world, found a way to
accomplish the main objective of the Uti Possidetis; that is to say, the
retention of Louisiana after the expected reduction of New Orleans.
While these peace negotiations were simmering at Ghent, the
well-planned, secret expedition against New Orleans was completed in
detail, and with confident feeling of assurance that, because of its
size and veteran fibre, it would be invincible, it was finally put on
its way to join the waiting troops at Nigril Bay, Jamaica. Sir Edward
Pakenham was appointed Commander of the Expeditionary forces. A. C.
Buell, in his “History of Andrew Jackson,” published in 1904, states
that Pakenham’s order was dated November 4, 1814, and read according to
English war office minute; that General Pakenham “shall proceed to
Plymouth and embark there for Louisiana to assume command of the forces
operating for the reduction of that province.” Buell cites as authority
Bathurst papers; State Paper Office, London.
On the assumption of the correctness of Buell’s citation, the term
“Province” as applied to Louisiana, in English official orders,
represents the radical difference of viewpoint as to Louisiana at the
time between the British Government and the American Union, of which the
English termed province was a fair possession from which already one
state had been carved. (Louisiana in 1812.)
While the British Expedition was ploughing the seas, unexpected
resistance was forming under an American general, who didn’t know what
defeat was.