_In the great naval Battle of Guadalcanal, 12-15 November, RAdm Daniel
J. Callaghan was killed when his flagship, the heavy cruiser_ San
Francisco _(CA 38) took 15 major hits and was forced to limp away in
the dark from the scene of action._]
The Americans had accomplished their purpose; they had forced the
Japanese to turn back. The cost was high. Two antiaircraft cruisers,
the _Atlanta_ and the _Juneau_ (CL 52), were sunk; four destroyers, the
_Barton_ (DD 599), _Cushing_ (DD 376), _Monssen_ (DD 436), and _Laffey_
(DD 459), also went to the bottom. In addition to the _San Francisco_,
the heavy cruiser _Portland_ (CA 33) and the destroyers _Sterret_ (DD
407) and _Aaron Ward_ (DD 483) were damaged. Only one destroyer of the
13 American ships engaged, the _Fletcher_ (DD 445), was unscathed when
the survivors retired to the New Hebrides.
With daylight came the Cactus bombers and fighters; they found the
crippled _Hiei_ and pounded it mercilessly. On the 14th the Japanese
were forced to scuttle it. Admiral Halsey ordered his only surviving
carrier, the _Enterprise_, out of the Guadalcanal area to get it out of
reach of Japanese aircraft and sent his battleships _Washington_ (BB
56) and _South Dakota_ (BB 55) with four escorting destroyers north
to meet the Japanese. Some of the _Enterprise_’s planes flew in to
Henderson Field to help even the odds.
On 14 November Cactus and _Enterprise_ flyers found a Japanese
cruiser-destroyer force that had pounded the island on the night of 13
November. They damaged four cruisers and a destroyer. After refueling
and rearming they went after the approaching Japanese troop convoy.
They hit several transports in one attack and sank one when they came
back again. Army B-17s up from Espiritu Santo scored one hit and
several near misses, bombing from 17,000 feet.
Moving in a continuous pattern of attack, return, refuel, rearm, and
attack again, the planes from Guadalcanal hit nine transports, sinking
seven. Many of the 5,000 troops on the stricken ships were rescued
by Tanaka’s destroyers, which were firing furiously and laying smoke
screens in an attempt to protect the transports. The admiral later
recalled that day as indelible in his mind, with memories of “bombs
wobbling down from high-flying B-17s; of carrier bombers roaring
towards targets as though to plunge full into the water, releasing
bombs and pulling out barely in time, each miss sending up towering
clouds of mist and spray, every hit raising clouds of smoke and fire.”
Despite the intensive aerial attack, Tanaka continued on to Guadalcanal
with four destroyers and four transports.
Japanese intelligence had picked up the approaching American battleship
force and warned Tanaka of its advent. In turn, the enemy admirals sent
their own battleship-cruiser force to intercept. The Americans, led by
Rear Admiral Willis A. Lee in the _Washington_, reached Sealark Channel
about 2100 on the 14th. An hour later, a Japanese cruiser was picked up
north of Savo. Battleship fire soon turned it away. The Japanese now
learned that their opponents would not be the cruisers they expected.
The resulting clash, fought in the glare of gunfire and Japanese
searchlights, was perhaps the most significant fought at sea for
Guadalcanal. When the melee was over, the American battleships’ 16-inch
guns had more than matched the Japanese. Both the _South Dakota_ and
the _Washington_ were damaged badly enough to force their retirement,
but the _Kirishima_ was punished to its abandonment and death. One
Japanese and three American destroyers, the _Benham_ (DD 796), the
_Walke_ (DD 416), and the _Preston_ (DD 379), were sunk. When the
Japanese attack force retired, Admiral Tanaka ran his four transports
onto the beach, knowing they would be sitting targets at daylight.
Most of the men on board, however, did manage to get ashore before the
inevitable pounding by American planes, warships, and artillery.
Ten thousand troops of the _38th Division_ had landed, but the Japanese
were in no shape to ever again attempt a massive reinforcement. The
horrific losses in the frequent naval clashes, which seemed at times
to favor the Japanese, did not really represent a standoff. Every
American ship lost or damaged could and would be replaced; every
Japanese ship lost meant a steadily diminishing fleet. In the air, the
losses on both sides were daunting, but the enemy naval air arm would
never recover from its losses of experienced carrier pilots. Two years
later, the Battle of the Philippine Sea between American and Japanese
carriers would aptly be called the “Marianas Turkey Shoot” because of
the ineptitude of the Japanese trainee pilots.
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