_Two other Marine aviators awarded the Medal of Honor for heroism and
intrepidity in the air were Capt Jefferson J. DeBlanc, left, and Maj
Robert E. Galer, right._]
As if the bombing was not enough grief, the Japanese opened on the
airfield with their 150mm howitzers also. Altogether the men of the
164th got a rude welcome to Guadalcanal. And on that night, 13-14
October, they shared a terrifying experience with the Marines that no
one would ever forget.
Determined to knock out Henderson Field and protect their soldiers
landing in strength west of Koli Point, the enemy commanders sent the
battleships _Kongo_ and _Haruna_ into Ironbottom Sound to bombard
the Marine positions. The usual Japanese flare planes heralded
the bombardment, 80 minutes of sheer hell which had 14-inch shells
exploding with such effect that the accompanying cruiser fire was
scarcely noticed. No one was safe; no place was safe. No dugout had
been built to withstand 14-inch shells. One witness, a seasoned veteran
demonstrably cool under enemy fire, opined that there was nothing worse
in war than helplessly being on the receiving end of naval gunfire.
He remembered “huge trees being cut apart and flying about like
toothpicks.” And he was on the frontlines, not the prime enemy target.
The airfield and its environs were a shambles when dawn broke. The
naval shelling, together with the night’s artillery fire and bombing,
had left Cactus Air Force’s commander, General Geiger, with a handful
of aircraft still flyable, an airfield thickly cratered by shells and
bombs, and a death toll of 41. Still, from Henderson or Fighter One,
which now became the main airstrip, the Cactus Flyers had to attack,
for the morning also revealed a shore and sea full of inviting targets.
The expected enemy convoy had gotten through and Japanese transports
and landing craft were everywhere near Tassafaronga. At sea the
escorting cruisers and destroyers provided a formidable antiaircraft
screen. Every American plane that could fly did. General Geiger’s aide,
Major Jack Cram, took off in the general’s PBY, hastily rigged to carry
two torpedoes, and put one of them into the side of an enemy transport
as it was unloading. He landed the lumbering flying boat with enemy
aircraft hot on his tail. A new squadron of F4Fs, VMF-212, commanded
by Major Harold W. Bauer, flew in during the day’s action, landed,
refueled, and took off to join the fighting. An hour later, Bauer
landed again, this time with four enemy bombers to his credit. Bauer,
who added to his score of Japanese aircraft kills in later air battles,
was subsequently lost in action. He was awarded the Medal of Honor, as
were four other Marine pilots of the early Cactus Air Force: Captain
Jefferson J. DeBlanc (VMF-112); Captain Joseph J. Foss (VMF-121); Major
Robert E. Galer (VMF-224); and Major John L. Smith (VMF-223).
The Japanese had landed more than enough troops to destroy the Marine
beachhead and seize the airfield. At least General Hyakutake thought
so, and he heartily approved General Maruyama’s plan to move most of
the _Sendai Division_ through the jungle, out of sight and out of
contact with the Marines, to strike from the south in the vicinity
of Edson’s Ridge. Roughly 7,000 men, each carrying a mortar or
artillery shell, started the trek along the Maruyama Trail which had
been partially hacked out of the jungle well inland from the Marine
positions. Maruyama, who had approved the trail’s name to indicate his
confidence, intended to support this attack with heavy mortars and
infantry guns (70mm pack howitzers). The men who had to lug, push, and
drag these supporting arms over the miles of broken ground, across
two major streams, the Mantanikau and the Lunga, and through heavy
underbrush, might have had another name for their commander’s path to
supposed glory.
[Illustration: _A Marine examines a Japanese 70mm howitzer captured at
the Battle of the Tenaru. Gen Maruyama’s troops “had to lug, push, and
drag these supporting arms over the miles of broken ground, across two
major streams and through heavy underbrush” to get them to the target
area--but they never did. The trail behind them was littered with the
supplies they carried._
Photo courtesy of Col James A. Donovan, Jr.
]
General Vandegrift knew the Japanese were going to attack. Patrols and
reconnaissance flights had clearly indicated the push would be from the
west, where the enemy reinforcements had landed. The American commander
changed his dispositions accordingly. There were Japanese troops east
of the perimeter, too, but not in any significant strength. The new
infantry regiment, the 164th, reinforced by Marine special weapons
units, was put into the line to hold the eastern flank along 6,600
yards, curving inland to join up with 7th Marines near Edson’s Ridge.
The 7th held 2,500 yards from the ridge to the Lunga. From the Lunga,
the 1st Marines had a 3,500-yard sector of jungle running west to the
point where the line curved back to the beach again in the 5th Marines’
sector. Since the attack was expected from the west, the 3d Battalions
of each of the 1st and 7th Marines held a strong outpost position
forward of the 5th Marines’ lines along the east bank of the Matanikau.
In the lull before the attack, if a time of patrol clashes, Japanese
cruiser-destroyer bombardments, bomber attacks, and artillery
harassment could properly be called a lull, Vandegrift was visited
by the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Lieutenant General Thomas
Holcomb. The Commandant flew in on 21 October to see for himself
how his Marines were faring. It also proved to be an occasion for
both senior Marines to meet the new ComSoPac, Vice Admiral William F.
“Bull” Halsey. Admiral Nimitz had announced Halsey’s appointment on 18
October and the news was welcome in Navy and Marine ranks throughout
the Pacific. Halsey’s deserved reputation for elan and aggressiveness
promised renewed attention to the situation on Guadalcanal. On the
22d, Holcomb and Vandegrift flew to Noumea to meet with Halsey and to
receive and give a round of briefings on the Allied situation. After
Vandegrift had described his position, he argued strongly against the
diversion of reinforcements intended for Cactus to any other South
Pacific venue, a sometime factor of Admiral Turner’s strategic vision.
He insisted that he needed all of the Americal Division and another 2d
Marine Division regiment to beef up his forces, and that more than half
of his veterans were worn out by three months’ fighting and the ravages
of jungle-incurred diseases. Admiral Halsey told the Marine general:
“You go back there, Vandegrift. I promise to get you everything I have.”
[Illustration: