This news was indeed welcome. The division intelligence officer (G-2),
Lieutenant Colonel Frank B. Goettge, had concluded that about 8,400
Japanese occupied Guadalcanal and Tulagi. Admiral Turner’s staff
figured that the Japanese amounted to 7,125 men. Admiral Ghormley’s
intelligence officer pegged the enemy strength at 3,100--closest to the
3,457 actual total of Japanese troops; 2,571 of these were stationed on
Guadalcanal and were mostly laborers working on the airfield.
To oppose the Japanese, the Marines had an overwhelming superiority
of men. At the time, the tables of organization for a Marine Corps
division indicated a total of 19,514 officers and enlisted men,
including naval medical and engineer (Seabee) units. Infantry
regiments numbered 3,168 and consisted of a headquarters company, a
weapons company, and three battalions. Each infantry battalion (933
Marines) was organized into a headquarters company (89), a weapons
company (273), and three rifle companies (183). The artillery regiment
had 2,581 officers and men organized into three 75mm pack howitzer
battalions and one 105mm howitzer battalion. A light tank battalion,
a special weapons battalion of antiaircraft and antitank guns, and a
parachute battalion added combat power. An engineer regiment (2,452
Marines) with battalions of engineers, pioneers, and Seabees, provided
a hefty combat and service element. The total was rounded out by
division headquarters battalion’s headquarters, signal, and military
police companies and the division’s service troops--service, motor
transport, amphibian tractor, and medical battalions. For Watchtower,
the 1st Raider Battalion and the 3d Defense Battalion had been added to
Vandegrift’s command to provide more infantrymen and much needed coast
defense and antiaircraft guns and crews.
Unfortunately, the division’s heaviest ordnance had been left behind
in New Zealand. Limited ship space and time meant that the division’s
big guns, a 155mm howitzer battalion, and all the motor transport
battalion’s two-and-a-half-ton trucks were not loaded. Colonel Pedro
A. del Valle, commanding the 11th Marines, was unhappy at the loss of
his heavy howitzers and equally distressed that essential sound and
flash-ranging equipment necessary for effective counterbattery fire was
left behind. Also failing to make the cut in the battle for shipping
space, were all spare clothing, bedding rolls, and supplies necessary
to support the reinforced division beyond 60 days of combat. Ten days
supply of ammunition for each of the division’s weapons remained in New
Zealand.
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