officers and men at the rate of pay for general service from the public
would be as follows. The rate of pay therein stated is subsistence pay:
the half-fees for every alteration made in a building would in most
cases suffice for the extra pay given to officers and men in active
service:—
£. _s._ _d._
1 Captain 0 11 1
2 First lieutenants 0 13 8
3 Second ditto 0 16 9
1 Colour-sergeant 0 3 0½
3 Sergeants, at 2_s._ 6½_d._ 0 7 7½
6 Corporals, at 2_s._ 2½_d._ 0 13 3
22 Privates, at 1_s._ 2½_d._ 1 6 7
—— —— ——
4 12 0
The high rates of remuneration ordinarily given for fragments of
practically irresponsible service, would not only serve to defray the
expense of direction by scientific officers, but of execution by trained
subordinate officers.
The following return will afford a display of the comparative rate of
emoluments in other towns from fees on the ordinary scale of surveyors’
fees:—
Rate of Rate of No. of New Rate of
Increase of Increase of Houses per Surveyors’ Fees
Families per Houses per Diem. per Diem for
Annum. Annum. Fourthclass
Houses.
£. _s._ _d._
Liverpool 1205 638 1‑7/10 3 8 0
Leeds 940 855 2‑3/10 4 12 0
Manchester 590 589 1‑6/10 3 4 0
Birmingham 561 474 1‑3/10 2 12 0
For the construction of efficient works for drainage, it is shown that
science is indispensable. If scientific officers be chosen for this one
purpose, if the objectionable mode of remuneration by fees be preserved,
since they are required to inspect the foundations of houses for the
purpose of drainage, they might for one-fourth of the proposed fee be
required to give inspection to the remainder of the work, and the
process of double certificates and divided responsibility be saved. Even
if the amount of work were in particular places too great to be
performed by one person, it would be better, and less expensive, that it
should be performed by him through an assistant, for whose defaults he
should be responsible. A reduction of the accustomed fees to one-fourth,
or of the aggregate emoluments obtainable under a general Building Act
to 15,000_l._ or 20,000_l._ per annum would still entail the loss of so
much money that might serve to secure superior scientific service;
whilst in the less populous districts the payment for the separate duty
of verifying the fact of compliance with the provisions of the Act would
be too small to ensure the service of competent and responsible
officers.
Besides the evils inherent in narrow districts, and the splitting of
connected functions which prevent the application of science by
preventing the appointment of scientific officers, there are other evils
attendant on such small jurisdictions and separation of functions,
namely, in the mode in which the money for such expenditure is levied.
The popular jealousy is excited by the further multiplication of
unnecessary offices, as of clerks and collectors, but real annoyance is
given by the consequent increased expense of separate collections. The
prevalent repugnance to direct taxation in any shape has hitherto been
greatly owing to the cause of grievances experienced in the number and
oppressiveness of the collections incidental to the ordinary local
taxation. Those collections confuse and obstruct the rate payers’
economy. Where there are a number of rates collected at different
periods, some are forgotten and not provided for; and when demanded,
they fall with the inconvenience and create the irritation of a new tax.
The householder may have paid the collector of his poor’s rates, then
the collector of his assessed taxes, then the collector of the land tax,
then the collector of the watch rates, then the collector of his paving
rates, then his lighting rates, then his water rates, and then he thinks
he has done, when a collector calls to demand the payment of the church
rates; he may have paid him, when another collector appears to demand
the payment of a sewers’ rate for two years, probably for the period of
a former tenant, and for which the tenant on whom the demand is levied
receives no apparent advantage. A witness says[45] (2231), “In Limehouse
there had not been a sewer built for 100 and odd years, and there are
2000 houses, and not a sewer to them.” Another states (2066), “In one
case a sewer rate of 6_d._ in the pound was levied for 10 years, without
even surface drainage;” and in that case the party paid another rate to
a trust for paving, lighting, and making drainage. “We could claim six
years,” says another witness (860); “three years’ rates in arrear, as
against former occupiers, were levied on the incoming tenants” (1798).
In a house receiving no benefit, the occupier, having refused to pay the
rate ten years, and having paid it but once in 1827, the commissioners,
when he left (1834) the house, “distrained on the new comer, and tore
down the corn-bin,” &c. His solicitor previously wrote to them that the
occupier was out of town, and wished them to abstain from taking any
violent measures, at the same time offering on his part to refer the
matter to any competent person (2328). In another case of aggravated
proceeding, Mr. William Baker, who was clerk to a like commission,
complained of the state of the sewerage, and of the rates in another
commission. He did not resist the rate, “for he knew very well what the
powers of the commissioners are, and it was not worth his while to
resist so strong a body.” The assessments of sewers’ rates are seldom
strictly legal.
Such rates, being small in amount, they are levied at long intervals,
for the collection at once of a sum sufficient to defray the expense of
collection; and because they are collected at long intervals, the
irritation and resistance and trouble is great, and an additional sum is
paid by the public for the collector’s share of the trouble of the
collection. For the collection of the assessed taxes 3_d._ in the pound
is paid; for the collection of the sewers’ rates from 6_d._ to 1_s._ in
the pound is usually paid. I venture to state, that by a consolidation
of the collection of such charges, enough may be saved of money
(independently of the saving of oppression and irritation) from the
collection of the one local tax, the sewers’ rate, to pay the expense of
the services of scientific officers throughout the country. At present
the high constable collects the county rate from every parish, and
carries it to the county treasurer, in the county town, and charges for
the expense of a journey. By an easy alteration, by payment by cheques
from the union treasurer to the county treasurer, in one county (Kent)
1000_l._ per annum might be saved, or enough to defray the immediate
expense of constructing permanent drains for upwards of 500 tenements.
What might be gained on this head for immediate expenditure, in most
towns, will be shown in the following extract, from the evidence of _Mr.
Simkiss_, the auditor of the Wolverhampton union:—
What are the amounts of the chief local rates collected, in round
numbers?—The poor’s rates are about 4000_l._, the highway rates about
2000_l._, and there are rates levied by commissioners under a local
Act for lighting, watching, and improving the town, amounting to about
3000_l._ in round numbers.
On his admission of the practicability of combining with advantage the
superintendence of all this expenditure by one Board in such a town, a
combination of which there are several examples, he observes:—
The greatest public advantage in having those duties united would be
the collection of the whole of the rates in one sum by the same
individual, and payment afterwards to the several purposes.
What are the present disadvantages of a separate collection of these
rates?—First, that there are three collectors to pay instead of one.
1_s._ in the pound is paid to the collector of the highway rates,
which is supposed to produce 100_l._ per annum. The collector of the
poor’s rates is paid by a fixed salary of 150_l._ per annum. The
collector of the commissioners’ rates is paid 8_d._ in the pound, and
he gets upwards of 100_l._ per annum. If the collection of the rates
were consolidated, they might be collected for 200_l._ per annum, and
upwards of 150_l._ per annum might be saved in salaries alone; but a
much larger sum might be saved by a more efficient collection of the
smaller rates. The surveyor’s rates and the commissioners’ rates not
being sufficient to occupy the whole time of separate individuals,
they attend to other things, and consequently much money is lost by
the delay in the operation. Parties remove, or die, or leave the town.
Three times the amount has been lost in Wolverhampton on the
collection of the highway rate as compared with the poor’s rates. The
highway rate and the commissioners’ rates, each being made for twelve
months, the collectors usually collect from the large rate payers
first; considerable time elapses before the smaller payers are called
upon, consequently much is lost by the delay. I have known it that the
highway rate has not been demanded in some parts of the town for seven
or eight months after it has been granted. The surveyors of highways,
and the commissioners of improvements, not taking so much care in
obtaining securities for the smaller rates, run greater risks of
defalcation. I do not advert to the collectors of the smaller rates in
our town, but the collectors of the smaller rates, being tradesmen,
usually use the public money in their trades, and there is frequently
much peculation. The accounts of the collection and expenditure of the
smaller rates are generally badly kept.
What I have already submitted will, I hope, suffice to sustain the
recommendation, that at the least nothing should be done to aggravate
the existing state of complication and waste, by new divisions of
service and the unnecessary additions of new and unqualified officers,
and that everything should be done to guard against the continued
reproduction of the evils in question in districts where there is clear
ground. It would, I apprehend, be practicable in the old districts to
superadd the appointments of officers, with proper qualifications,
without any diminution of the emoluments of the existing paid officers
or any material disturbance of them.
When the great importance of the general land drainage to the health of
those who labour upon it and to their most productive employment is
fully considered, it will, I conceive, be found entitled to all
collateral aid, to which an additional title would be conferred by equal
contribution of the owners and occupiers to the expenses of public
drainage. If officers of proper qualifications and responsibilities were
appointed, the works for sewerage branching from the towns, and the road
drainage, could not fail to aid, as indeed I conceive it should be
directed to aid, the private land drainage. The same surface levels and
sewerage, if made on the scale proposed by the Poor Law and Tithe
Commissioners (namely, of three chains to an inch) would serve for all
civil purposes, whether of towns or general land drainage, or road
drainage, for determining the descent of streams, for the application of
the water of which it is desirable to rid the upland wastes, and would
frequently be most beneficially applied for the use of the towns, and
for the use of the poorer districts.
The appointment of persons having the scientific qualifications and
position of civil engineers might serve to supply a want which is
generally found to be the chief impediment to the drainage of land
subdivided amongst numerous small holders, namely, the means of
reference or appeal to some authority deriving confidence from skill and
impartiality to determine on the need of works, and the mode of
executing them, or to arbitrate; and on the compensation due from damage
arising from them. Given such an authority, and in those small, but,
from their great number, most important cases, where the expense of an
application to Parliament is out of the question, it might, be safe to
say, by a general provision, that the inhabitants of a town may procure
springs of water, and make, deepen, and scour drains through the
circumjacent district; that regulations may be made for arching over or
covering the sewers to proper distances from the towns; for the purchase
of ground, and for the erection of works for rendering the refuse of the
towns available for agricultural purposes: power might also be given to
lay pipes in the highways, to put plugs for the supplies of water
against fires, and for watering the roads.
On referring to the experience of the efforts made in Ireland for the
drainage and reclaiming of bog lands, by which large tracts would be
obtained, it appears that the working of legislative measures for those
purposes have extensively failed, because the landowners had not
sufficient security that the work would be properly planned and
executed.[46]
I would here beg leave to guard myself from an apparent inconsistency.
In 1838, I was examined before a committee of the House of Commons on
their resolution, “That it is expedient that the parishes, townships,
and extra-parochial places should be united in districts for the repair
of the highways throughout England and Wales.” On that occasion I
adverted to the evil of the unnecessary multiplication of new
establishments as well as new officers, to their inevitable inefficiency
and to the expense and obstruction to improvement which they created;
and I submitted these, amongst other grounds, for proposing that the new
duties should devolve on the boards of guardians of the new unions, as
such duties had been in various instances combined under local Acts. The
committee recommended the proposal for adoption. On the premises then
placed before me, as to the expediency of establishing a new
administrative body with new clerks and officers for the collection and
management of the fund for repairs of the highways _alone_, and in small
districts for which even the areas of unions were thought large, I
should still adhere to the same conclusion.[47]
The present inquiry, however, has shown the general primary importance
of the works of sewerage and drainage throughout the country. The
execution of those works would properly devolve upon the commissioners
of sewers already in existence in the towns, or in the marsh districts,
or upon commissions of sewers which it will be found necessary to issue
to places where there has been no need of surface drainage, but which
stand in need of under-drainage. These being the primary works for
making the ground clear and keeping it clear for all other works, would
necessarily require the highest science and skill, and the strongest
establishment; and it would be only carrying farther the principle of
consolidation, as the only means of obtaining the most efficient
service, the most conveniently and at the lowest cost, now to recommend
that the care of the roads should, of all structural works, be made to
devolve upon that body which has the best means of executing them,
namely, the commissions of sewers, revised as to jurisdiction, and
amended and strengthened as to power and responsibility. What Colonel J.
F. Burgoyne, the experienced chairman of the Board of Works in Ireland,
stated in his evidence before the committee of the House Commons in
1836, (question 35,) on the consolidation of the turnpike trusts, may be
applied to the consolidation of other local works:—“One office and
account will then do for the whole; a superior superintendent could then
be employed, and more perfect machinery; the means will be more
generally available, and can be concentrated where required, by which
the works will be carried on with more advantage, and a system of
regular and rigid maintenance can be established so much more economical
and beneficial than that of occasional and periodical repairs.”
It is due to state that in petitions from ratepayers much
dissatisfaction is expressed with the proceedings of the commissions of
sewers, and their objectionable working is assigned to their
irresponsibility, and a favourite remedy proposed is to make them
elective; but if the administration of expenditure by elective vestries
be examined, it is found to be no better; and of entirely open vestries,
even worse; and the practical responsibility for injustice done to
individuals, or to any one who cannot get up a party, still less. It
may, however, be submitted for consideration, whether the commissions
for sewers might not be so far modified as to admit some infusion of the
representative principle in their composition, by including, as
ex-officio members of the commission, the chairman and vice-chairmen for
the time being of the Boards of Guardians of the poor law unions
included within the jurisdiction of the commission. These officers are
elected by the elected representatives of the ratepayers—the guardians.
It will be seen that much of the evil which the preventive measures
within the province of the commission of sewers must provide against, is
presented, in the first instance, to the Board of Guardians, in the
shape of claims to relief on the ground of destitution occasioned by
sickness. The chairman or the vice-chairman, before whom the cases are
thus brought, would form an efficient medium of communication. The
measures of drainage and structural improvement are permanent
improvements of the greatest importance to the labouring men, in common
with other classes; but it is matter of fact that such improvements are
the least supported by those who have the least permanent interest—the
smaller occupiers; or by those who have the least means and have the
greatest dread of immediate expenses—the smaller owners. The chairmen
and the vice-chairmen of the unions in the rural districts are, however,
the chief landed proprietors, who are elected by the guardians for the
interest they take in the improvement of local administration. The most
important improvements in the residences of the labouring classes that
have been brought to view by this inquiry have arisen from the
spontaneous benevolence of the larger proprietors; and so much
improvement must depend upon their voluntary exertion, that, for the
sake of the labouring classes, it recommends itself as an important
arrangement, that those who, as chairmen of the Boards, have the
distribution of relief to the destitution attendant on sickness, should
be placed in a position to represent the need of the means of
prevention, and urge forward their execution.
When the extent of the removable causes of sickness and mortality are
more clearly and extensively understood, as they will be, the Board of
Guardians will of necessity occupy much of the position of the Leet, as
a body fitted to act on complaints made, and to reclaim the execution of
the law against omissions and infractions which occasion illness or
injury to the most helpless classes.
_Boards of Health, or Public Officers for the Prevention of Disease._
In reports and communications, the institution of district Boards of
Health is frequently recommended, but in general terms, and they nowhere
specify what shall be their powers, how they shall seek out information
or receive it, and how act upon it. The recommendation is also
sanctioned by the committee which sat to inquire into the health of
large towns; and the committee state that “the principal duty and object
of these boards of health would be precautionary and preventive, to turn
the public attention to the causes of illness, and to suggest means by
which the sources of contagion might be removed.” “Such boards would
probably have a clerk, paid for his services, whose duty it would be to
make minutes of the proceedings, and give such returns in a short
tabular form as might be useful for reference, and important, as
affording easy information on a subject of such vital interest to the
people.”
I would submit that it is shown by the evidence collected in the present
inquiry, that the great preventives—drainage, street and house cleansing
by means of supplies of water and improved sewerage, and especially the
introduction of cheaper and more efficient modes of removing all noxious
refuse from the towns—are operations for which aid must be sought from
the science of the civil engineer, not from the physician, who has done
his work when he has pointed out the disease that results from the
neglect of proper administrative measures, and has alleviated the
sufferings of the victims. After the cholera had passed, several of the
local boards of health that were appointed on its appearance continued
their meetings and made representations; but the alarm had passed, and
although the evils represented were often much greater than the cholera,
the representations produced no effect, and the boards broke up. In
Paris a Board of Health has been in operation during several years, but
if their operations, as displayed in their reports, be considered, it
will be evident that, although they have examined many important
questions and have made representations, recommending for practical
application some of the principles developed in the course of the
present inquiry; still as they had no executive power, their
representations have produced no effect, and the labouring population of
Paris is shown to be, with all the advantages of climate, in a sanitary
condition even worse than the labouring population of London. In the
Appendix I have submitted a translation of a report descriptive of the
labours of the Conseil de Salubrité, in Paris. From this report it will
be seen that they have few or no initiative functions, and that they are
chiefly called into action by references made to them by the public
authorities to examine and give their opinion on medical questions that
may arise in the course of public administration as to what
manufacturing or other operations are or are not injurious to the public
health.
The action of a board of health upon such evils as those in question
must depend upon the arrangements for bringing under its notice the
evils to be remedied. A body of gentlemen sitting in a room will soon
find themselves with few means of action if there be no agency to bring
the subject matters before them; and an inquiring agency to seek out the
evils from house to house, wherever those evils may be found, to follow
on the footsteps of the private practitioner would be apparently
attended with much practical difficulty.
The statements of the condition of considerable proportions of the
labouring population of the towns into which the present inquiries have
been carried have been received with surprise by persons of the
wealthier classes living in the immediate vicinity, to whom the facts
were as strange as if they related to foreigners or the natives of an
unknown country. When Dr. Arnott with myself and others were examining
the abodes of the poorest classes in Glasgow and Edinburgh, we were
regarded with astonishment; and it was frequently declared by the
inmates, that they had never for many years witnessed the approach or
the presence of persons of that condition near them. We have found that
the inhabitants of the front houses in many of the main streets of those
towns and of the metropolis, have never entered the adjoining courts, or
seen the interior of any of the tenements, situate at the backs of their
own houses, in which their own workpeople or dependents reside.