“The first and second sections will move out under command of Lieutenant
X and will make a rush of 80 metres. Open fire after the rush.”
The movement should be simultaneous and without warning to the enemy;
the following suggestions are made:
“Prepare to rush, look toward Lieutenant X, hide your bayonets.”
The movement having been executed by the first echelon and fire opened,
the second echelon rushes in its turn, aligned at a quick pace, then at
double time, and carries along the first.
From the moment of the charge, each man rushes on the enemy and fires if
necessary.
_Second Case._—The units of the first line have been stopped at more
than 200 metres from the enemy, say at 500 metres.
Move forward, executing short, rapid rushes without firing, in thin
lines which are united at assaulting distance from the enemy.
The formation of successive lines for rushing is extremely simple. The
company having arrived at a sheltered line beyond which extends an open
space, the company commander commands:
“In thin lines by half section, at 100 metres distance by short rushes:
1st and 3d Sections, forward.”
He personally goes out with the first line to select the emplacement
where he will halt it.
Each of the 1st and 3d Sections sends out two squads (1, 3, 9, 11). The
men immediately take 6 pace intervals. This forms the first line, which
is followed by a second, and so on, the rushes of each line alternating
with those of the preceding one.
The construction of the parallel of departure is accomplished as has
been indicated above.
_Instruction of the Machine-Gun Sections._
The machine-gun sections should participate in the exercises with the
infantry. They should be accustomed to grasp the idea of the situation
rapidly and to replace the fire of the attacking infantry either by
taking a position in rear or on the flanks which will permit them to
fire up to the end of the action without being hindered by the movement
to the front, or by going squarely out in advance of the halted line.
This last case should be particularly studied; the Germans have shown it
to us, and it is therefore possible; I know that it is very effective
(25th of August at Crevic).
Therefore train them to get used to picking out cover, however
insignificant, as a position for a machine gun and to utilize the ground
skilfully and rush rapidly with the matériel in order to make themselves
invisible or indiscernible;
To arrange shelter rapidly, to create a mask in front, and arrange for
oblique fire, in order that the personnel may not be rapidly destroyed;
To keep still and try to be forgotten until the moment of assault.
The crews of the light guns should be attached to the infantry and learn
to cooperate with it instead of being independent.
_Exercises to Develop the Spirit of Decision in the Second Line._
In front of any resistance whatever, the units of the second line should
have but two ideas:
To take positions rapidly for the assault;
To assault.
The dispositions for the assault are:
The creation or adaptation of a line of a shelter at assaulting
distance;
The rapid gaining of superiority of fire.
All the work of maneuver is reduced to the realization of these two
ideas. It is a question of applying in slightly varying circumstances
the two classic studies above indicated, and one should know them
perfectly.
To develop presence of mind in the noncommissioned officers and
suppleness in the organization, situations analogous to those formerly
used on the drill ground such as, “Cavalry to the right—in rear” should
be devised.
Choose a parallel of departure and have the troops of the second line
take their formation and march on the objectives designated in advance.
Suddenly call out, “Enemy resistance on such a line, our first elements
are stopped at such a point ... hostile machine guns in such a region.”
Then everybody, infantry, machine guns, light canon, instantly take up
their dispositions.
By representing the enemy and having him fire blank cartridges, one
becomes accustomed to making rapid reconnaissance of resistances.
IV.
PREPARATION OF THE TROOPS FOR PENETRATION.
The battle of today, since the last evolution of the war, is only a
succession of assaults. The assault being the hardest and most murderous
phase of the combat, before which the attack generally breaks down, we
should only undertake it with assaulting troops. All troops are far from
being assaulting troops; they need a well established cohesion and a
special training.
In nine months of campaign, I have only twice had a company really
capable of delivering the assault: that of the active regiment, which
was eager to charge at whatever cost at Morhange, and that of
Neuville-Saint-Vaast, toward which during the assault, I turned but
twice—when we started and when I fell.