The new difficulty is to build up at assaulting distance from the enemy
a line of assault in a sort of parallel of departure.
To arrive at assaulting distance, advance by thin lines formed by
halving the skirmish lines already deployed; these lines, at least 100
metres apart, advance successively by alternate rushes, then unite on
the line designated as the starting point for the assault.
A natural parallel of departure may exist or may partially exist, or it
may not exist at all. In the second case, the line of shelters must be
adapted, and in the third case it must be created in order to be able to
stay a few moments at a short distance from the enemy without being
destroyed. To facilitate this extremely difficult and dangerous
construction, it is a good thing to have each man fill a sand bag at the
last shelter and put in some stones, which, while not bulky, stop the
bullets. Each man makes his rushes with his sand bag, which protects him
partially during the halts. Having reached the line fixed upon for the
parallel, this sand bag serves him as a cover, which he has only to
complete rapidly. Each man then enlarges his shelter so as to
accommodate near comrades.
The first wave, reformed at the assaulting distance, makes the assault
as before. At times, the losses and the confusion of units may lead to
an assault by entire companies.
The second and third waves follow and imitate the movements of the
first.
_Machine Guns and Light Cannon._
The artillery can only give the second line a support which is often
partial and not very effective; its action must be replaced at whatever
cost by other means, such as machine guns for sweeping the hostile
firing line and light cannon to instantly destroy the hostile machine
guns.
_Location of the Machine-Gun and Gun Crews during the Assault._—These
detachments follow the last waves of the first line, and they therefore
are not directly taken under fire and can profit by the indications of
the fight of the first line and so be in a way to act effectively when
the second line comes into action.
_Machine Guns._—The machine gun is an element of attack and the most
terrible arm of close fighting. However, it is employed in the attack
only to man the positions taken or to support the infantry elements from
a distance. This is nonsense: to give it such a rôle, one could never
have trembled with rage and impotence at a few paces from the enemy,
whom he could not get at.
The machine gun should be pushed as far as possible in front of the
halted line of fire. If it remains behind or abreast of the fighting
line, its field of fire is generally blocked or masked by the slightest
movement; in advance of the line, it will enable the infantry line to
advance for some time under the cover of its fire; it is the tooth of
the attack. It can move forward, its crew of a few men can creep along
the smallest pathway, and a shell hole is sufficient for its shelter; in
the skirmish chain a whole ditch is necessary. Will it lack ammunition,
having only the boxes that the gun crew carries sometimes incomplete?
No, for it has only to fire on rare occasions, for example, at the
moment of assault. If it is taken, what does that matter—we will take
ten from the enemy. The problem would be much simplified _with a few
automatic rifles_.
_Light Cannon._—We have spoken of the rôle of light cannon in the
paragraph relating to the destruction of machine guns.
_Instruction of Units of the Second Line._
This instruction proposes to create the reflex of immediately attacking
all resistance that appears and of developing presence of mind by
inventing sudden incidents requiring the taking of a rapid decision. In
a word, to add a spirit of prompt decision in the troops of the second
line to the irresistible _élan_ which one tries to develop in all
assaulting troops.
The troops of the second line when facing a resistance should have only
one idea: to assault as soon as possible and for that purpose to try to
bring about the two following conditions:
_To create a sort of parallel of departure at assaulting distance_;
_To obtain superiority of fire by all means at their disposal._
We will study by means of examples the two preceding cases cited. Troops
of the second line should know them by heart, because all cases resemble
them more or less.
_First Case._—We reach the first line, halted under cover at 150 metres
from the enemy; this is a case of organizing a long-distance assault.
Attention should be focussed on the following points: