THE TRAINING OF THE MAN
1. That soldiers should make it their function to exert themselves
to the utmost of their loyalty and patriotism.
2. That they should strictly observe decorum.
3. That they should prize courage and bravery.
4. That they should treasure faith and confidence.
5. That they should practise frugality.
(_Order issued by the Emperor of Japan in 1882._)
The standard of proficiency in cavalry work to which we wish to attain
is a very high one; our men must, in the first place, be taught--
(A) To ride well.
(B) To be able to look after their horses.
(C) Rifle-shooting and fire discipline.
(D) The use of at least one personal weapon, when mounted, with
good effect.
(E) Individuality, and to use their brains.
(F) Bodily and muscular development.
(A) RIDING
There is no doubt that our methods of teaching riding have greatly
improved of late years.[99] The recruit is not made afraid of his
horse, and of his work in the riding-school, as he often was under the
old régime. From the day he joins, no opportunity should be lost of
teaching the recruit that amongst his first duties is to love, honour,
and have a pride in his horse. He certainly will not recognize this
duty, if, as under the old “cast-iron” system, his horse becomes the
means of applying an unpleasant discipline to him.
Further, he is now taught to ride in the open, and over a natural
country in many cases, picking his own line. In fact he is taught
campaign riding, rather than as formerly the elements of _haute école_;
the latter plan was by no means unsuitable if the man had the previous
knowledge of riding which many men, brought up in the country, joined
with forty or fifty years ago.
(B) SOLDIER’S CARE OF HORSES
Of all instructions to be given to the young soldier the most difficult
is that in campaigning horse-management.
It should be explained that the care of his own horse in a campaign
is quite a different matter in the cavalry from what it is in the
artillery; in the latter the horses are always under the master’s eye
in the first place, and in the second they are kept at a uniform pace,
whereas in the cavalry men are detached here and there, and it is only
by the individual’s care of his mount that the latter can win through
a campaign. In fact the difference is as great as if, instead of
carrying on his business under one roof, Mr. Whiteley had to send out
all his young men and women in troops and sections and as individuals
to effect sales. It would certainly lead to a very great diminution of
profits, and just as in any great business the profits are effected by
small and seemingly petty economies, so in a regiment it is the small
economies of horse-flesh which mount up to a great sum in a month or
so of campaigning. It is the regiment or squadron, in which, from the
start, the man has been taught always to dismount at every opportunity,
always to off-saddle and massage his horse’s back when a spare quarter
of an hour affords him time to do so, always to give his horse a chance
to nibble the short grass, or drink a few go-downs of water, always to
report without fail a loose clinch or a swelling on the back, even if
the latter is only the size of a shilling, that will constantly show a
good return of sound horses. A bad system of horse-management will in a
week incapacitate as many horses from work as will a general engagement.
As a rule great things are expected of cavalry in the first week of
a campaign; these great things are often to be carried out _at all
costs_--all costs in this case meaning in many instances half the
horses overridden and a crop of sore backs[100] and incipient injuries
incurred which the cavalry will not get over for months after. There
is also another difficult matter to cope with in the cavalry; it is as
follows:--
The ordinary soldier has no idea of the limit of his horse’s capacity
for work such as that soon gained by the hunting man or traveller on
horseback. In peace-time he will not once in one thousand times be
given a task which can possibly injure or cause him to override his
horse; further, the latter invariably gets back to his stable, gets the
best of food and a rest, or goes to the sick lines if he is evidently
out of sorts; the responsibility of overriding his horse is thus not
fixed, and the man escapes any punishment. As the man is riding a
Government horse and not his own animal, he does not suffer pecuniarily.
We believe that enough has been shown to warrant our saying that
the cavalry of an army where (1) a good system of campaigning
horse-management[101] has been instilled into the individual, and
where (2) the officers, from those who order the task to those who
superintend it, have the knowledge to do so with a sense of the horse’s
capacity as affected by work, food, and drink, weight carried, nature
of terrain, will, at the end of one month’s work, possibly have lost 15
per cent of its horses; whereas in the cavalry where these matters are
not understood, only 15 per cent of the horses will remain available.
What was the case in Napoleon’s invasion of Russia? A statement called
for by the emperor at Witebsk on the 29th July, twenty-five days after
the river Niemen had been crossed, gave the loss as follows: Murat’s
cavalry[102] reduced from 22,000 to 14,000 horses, the cavalry of army
corps by half, Latour Maubourg’s from 10,000 to 6000. Later, on the 9th
November, only 1900 horses were left to this immense force of cavalry.
The loss by fatigue in the campaign of Ulm, lasting little more than
a fortnight, was less, 46 per regiment. One campaign resulted in a
victory within eighteen days, whereas the other went on long enough to
bring the loss and criminal waste of horses home to those responsible.
In campaigns brought to a close in a few days by desperate though
successful strategy, these matters, like many matters which occur in
small campaigns against natives, never come to notice.
This subject has been gone into at some length under the training of
the man, because without his co-operation in the individual care of
his horse no cavalry general can hope to be successful. His best-laid
schemes “gang aft agley.” The cavalry soldier should feel that he will
get a horse, good, bad, or indifferent, accordingly as he shows himself
a good, bad, or indifferent horseman and horsemaster, and should
be made perfectly aware that he will be punished with the greatest
severity for every act of carelessness, neglect, or ill-treatment of
his horse. Whilst, on the other hand, a well-cared-for horse should be
a certain passport to the good graces of his leader. A squadron leader,
careless of this mode of procedure, never has good and well-cared-for
horses on service.
A very successful way of teaching the soldier to care for his horse
is to let it form part of the test before he passes from the recruit
stage to that of the trained soldier, that he should by himself ride
his horse to a place 70 to 100 miles away, report on some bridge or
other topographical feature, and return, enough money being given him
for the subsistence of himself and his horse for the necessary number
of days--the condition of the latter being carefully scrutinized on his
return.
Other forms of long-distance rides and patrols (as distinct from
long-distance races, a cruel form of competition with which no
horse-lover can have any sympathy) are most useful, as they teach the
men how to regulate their paces, spare their horses, and judge distance
by time and pace.
Often arrangements have been made to take some N.C.O.’s out with
the regimental pack of hounds, local pack, or on a drag-hunt or
paper-chase; all these forms of instruction teach the men to ride fast
in a reasoned fashion and not in the Johnny Gilpin and “making the
running” style of the amateur horseman or horsewoman, and to think
properly of their horse, and not as the old lady, who said to the
coachman, when he had reported the brougham horse was lame, “He is a
horse and he _must go_.”
That the care of the horse is the weak link in the cavalry chain, and
the most difficult one in which to give such instruction as may render
it strong and reliable, is clear. Every day we get fewer men accustomed
before they are recruited, to work with horses, and the use of the
horse as a means of locomotion, by all ranks in Great Britain, is
quickly dying out. Strong measures are needed to counteract our daily
growing ignorance of horsemastership.[103]
(C) SHOOTING AND FIRE DISCIPLINE
The cavalry are now armed with a rifle equal to that of the infantry,
and can hold their own in rifle-shooting. The greatest interest is
taken in this exercise; tests similar in all respects to those in
vogue in the infantry are exacted before the man is entitled to get
his full rate of pay. Practically all officers and many N.C.O.’s of
cavalry now possess Hythe certificates,[104] and there is no reason
why fire discipline in the cavalry should not be equal to that in the
infantry. In many cavalry regiments it undoubtedly is so. In others
there is too much talking and the Jack ashore kind of behaviour, which
renders difficult the control of the larger parties. If the officers
recognize that good fire discipline is essential in order to kill their
enemy, they will take more trouble to instil it. As our cavalry are
undoubtedly the best shooting cavalry in the world, it is a pity to
spoil the ship for this ha’porth of tar (fire discipline).
(D) THE PERSONAL WEAPON
Fencing and single stick (and other exercises such as boxing,
non-essential in themselves, but which quicken the eye and make the man
cool in combat) will do a great deal towards teaching men the use of
the sword, while a little tent-pegging and a great deal of work at the
dummies will teach the unrivalled value of the queen of weapons.
In many cavalry training-grounds can now be seen an acre of ground in
which are a score or more of self-adjusting dummies of varying heights,
and representing horse and foot; there is no better practice than to
send half-a-dozen horsemen into this tilting ground at a sharp gallop,
and let them practise for the mêlée for a minute or so.
The French cavalry lay great stress on these pointing exercises; they
do not expect to turn out many real swordsmen in a squadron, but they
want every man to be able to ride his horse at an enemy, and run him
through.
(E AND F) MENS SANA IN CORPORE SANO
In addition to the four headings mentioned above, there is the
preparation requisite to meet the hundred-and-one eventualities of
detached work and miscellaneous duties.
Whilst it is quite impossible to foresee or delimitate these, there
are a number of exercises and sports which tend to make a young man
(and keep an old man) not only supple in his body and sound in wind
and limb, but also alert in mind: to put it shortly, they make him
more “handy,” more able when left to himself or with a few others to
carry out his duty; they give him more confidence in himself; they
make the town-bred man approximate more to the pioneer. The ordinary
lad of eighteen brought up in a town knows nothing of the country in
which his soldiering and scouting will be done, and is not able to do
a great many things which a country-bred lad has learnt as a matter of
course. On the other hand, the town-bred lad is undoubtedly quicker at
picking up and assimilating knowledge. Both have their good qualities,
and both can be made into excellent cavalry soldiers by training in the
particular points in which they are by breeding deficient.[105]
Let us now glance at the sports which tend to make men handy and useful.
Every cavalryman should learn to swim, since, unless he can do so, he
may either not attempt to cross a swollen river, or he may get drowned
in doing so. Not only this, but he should be able to make his horse
cross a deep and rapid river whether he can swim or not himself. Some
of us still remember the disaster to a cavalry regiment when crossing a
river on the frontier.
Many sports and exercises--to be able to swim, to row a boat, and so
on--are not essentials in the training of a cavalryman, but they are
very desirable; and when an opportunity of practising them occurs,
every commanding officer should make his men take advantage of it.
Again, in the _Manual of Military Engineering_ there is a great deal
which may be said to be more suited to pioneers, and a knowledge of
which cannot be expected from every cavalry soldier. Knotting and
lashing, construction of rafts, scientific demolitions of railways
and telegraph lines come under this heading. A certain number of men
in each squadron are detailed to act as pioneers, but since in most
cavalry operations there is a very good chance of these not being
available at the critical moment, it is well that every man should be
brought up to a good standard of knowledge in all forms of pioneering,
rough field fortifications, and in tapping a wire, blowing up a
culvert, etc., etc.
Another point over which too much time must not be spent, but which is
for the benefit of the soldier, especially in his first few trying days
of active service, is a slight knowledge of cooking, and especially how
to make use of flour; otherwise you may find the men throwing away the
flour because they do not know how to cook it. The poorer classes in
Great Britain nowadays nearly all buy bread instead of making it from
flour once a week, on baking day, as in the old days.
It will obviously be for the good of a regiment or brigade of cavalry
that it should leave its barracks for a month in the summer, and go for
choice to some seaside place where there is an estuary, and practise
exhaustively the various non-essential items of instruction indicated
above. Such a change of scene is immensely appreciated by the men,
who get very tired of barrack routine, and it gives the officers
opportunities for instruction which they do not usually possess in
barracks.
New ground is worked over, practice in camping duties and expedients
takes place, and, last of all, there is time and opportunity to carry
out thoroughly and practically the instruction; there is time for
the men, because they are freed from many duties which are necessary
in barracks, and for the officers, because they have the whole day
before them, and do not go on leave. If a whole cavalry brigade has
gone to such a camp of instruction, the element of competition may be
introduced in many ways, which will help to stir the most sluggish. The
desire of the distinction of being the best swimming squadron in the
brigade will make his comrades hurry up many a slow, inert lout, who
could do better if he tried, and this will, indirectly, cause him to
have more confidence later in himself.
Again, if two rival squadrons are marched down to a river, and
find, a hundred yards apart, for each squadron a similar amount of
rafting and bridging material, and instructions are given to them
to prepare means for a small column to cross the river, the interest
excited by the competition will be considerable. In a case like this
marks may be given for (1) the most thorough arrangements for the
crossing, including orders by the commanding officer; (2) the best and
most workmanlike construction of boats, rafts, etc.; (3) the speed
in carrying out the work; (4) silence; (5) tidiness, such as, for
instance, all arms, extra clothing, etc., being placed in an orderly
manner, so that they can be resumed, if necessary, after dark, or at a
moment’s notice.
In the sands, usually to be found at any seaside place, good practice
can be gained in digging hasty field fortifications without the labour
involved in doing so in the stiffer soils.
In the late South African War one might sum up the situation in a few
words: our regular soldiers had need to be more like colonials, and
our colonials more like regular soldiers. Some of our soldiers lost
their way a mile from camp; our colonials never did this, but their
views of military discipline were curiously lax. Our soldiers were the
victims of routine, and it cost them their lives often enough; our
colonials could hardly be trusted to lay sufficient stress on an order
to carry it out, but they were never at a loss for an expedient. Both
looked after their own interests at the expense of the enemy, or even
their own side.[106] Both were very brave; both fought and scouted
cunningly; but it came first and naturally to the colonial, who gave
his enemy credit for slimness, and had a more cultivated imagination
and better appreciation of the value of ground. In rearguards both
“stuck it out,” if anything, too long, rather than give the enemy an
idea that they could be hustled.
It is suggested that instruction should never stop short of the actual
and practical. Few educated people are able to understand how very
little words convey to the ordinary untrained intelligence, and for how
short a time, even if understood, theory is retained in the mind.[107]
Anything which is worth learning must be learnt as a well-known amateur
billiard player and game shot taught himself. In billiards he first
placed the balls again and again till he could make the difficult
cannon; he then went on till he could make it twenty times running.
Similarly, in regard to a difficult kind of shot, he went to a shooting
school and had clay pigeons shot out in a particular way; at length
having hit, he went on till he practically could not miss.
THEORY
The theoretical instruction given by our officers to the men in
lectures benefits, we verily believe, the former quite as much as the
latter. It benefits the officer, in the first place, because it compels
him, if he is anxious to do his work well, to look up his subject
thoroughly beforehand; and in the second place, because it accustoms
him to speak in public more readily; and this may be of value not only
to him but to the army and nation later. But his instruction should
not be devoted entirely to professional subjects. It is a part of his
duty to attend to the education of his subordinates in the subject of
_moral_, and to develop by every means in his power their sentiments
of bravery, straightforwardness, confidence in their leaders, and
devotion to duty and patriotism. Without these as a foundation there
are few who will adhere to the requirements of that discipline, without
which, in the absence of religious fanaticism,[108] no difficult task
in war will be carried through. There are sound grounds for saying that
“if we examine the condition of the people we shall find that _moral_
deteriorates in inverse proportion to advance in education.”[109]
Officers who have to deal with such conditions must not only know
how to teach thoroughly, minutely, and convincingly, but must also
study all branches of their profession in such a way that by their
intellectual ability they may earnestly and loyally interpret the true
spirit that should animate a soldier.
In all the professions, trades, and handicrafts nowadays, with
increased facilities for reading and book-learning, theory is
overriding practice, apprenticeship is shortened or even dispensed
with, the boy of to-day has read about and thinks he understands what
the man of yesterday has been through and is still pondering over; and
it is chiefly because we see so much weight being laid on theory, to
the detriment of practice in the profession of arms, that we register
this protest.
That we cavalry have learnt that parrot-like instruction cannot replace
demonstration is evidenced by our _Method of Instruction in Riding in
Cavalry_; in it we find first “that the instructor, after describing
fully and clearly what he requires, should _illustrate_ it,” and
later, “these instructions _carefully illustrated_ by the instructor
and understood by the recruit,” etc., etc. At present in most cavalry
regiments each squadron has a sand table, on which models of country
are made, and map-reading is taught in a most practical manner.
The more the officers see of the men the better, and the horse gives an
invaluable mutual ground of interest. We read in _The Truth about Port
Arthur_:
The battle for these hills was severe, and the coolness of our men
was remarkable. If any of them ran away, or if any panic set in, it
was the fault of the officers, for any officer whom the men respect
and love in peace-time can rely on their steadiness in war.
How many Russian officers know and care for their men? For some
reason or other they rarely mix with or among them, and know
nothing of them or their habits, and bitter are the fruits they
reap in war.
This is plain speaking, but it is in accordance with the dictates of
common-sense that the superior and inferior must become of one mind in
order to carry out their duties adequately.
By whatever means it may be done, it is the duty of every officer to
check cynicism and grumbling amongst his subordinates, and to develop
a high _moral_. It has been said that it is the “soldier’s privilege
to grumble.” This is an absolutely wrong view; it is, instead, his
glory not to grumble, but to face every kind of danger and trouble
unflinchingly, and to make the best of it. Small worries overcome
prepare the mind for facing great emergencies.[110]
With such a feeling throughout a regiment, what may it not do? Every
man becomes a hero and a leader. The conduct of 500 heroes may temper
the mind of an army.
INDEX
Abd-el-Kader, 23
Abdur-Rahman, 2
Afghan War, officers of the 9th Lancers in the, 14
Afghans, Sir Montague Gerard and the, 11
Aids, conventional, 194;
natural, 195
Alexander the Great, 1
Alexander, General, 26, 145
Amateur officers entirely out of place in war, 97
American Civil War, 73, 135
American view of British cavalry in South African operations, 8
Arab horses, a type bred for war, 23;
proverb, 52
Arabs’ old-world wisdom as regards the horse, 23
Aristocracy in the armies of the French Republic, 97
Armament, 10
Artillery fire, relative effect of, 46
Artillery, horse, 26, 41
Atlanta campaign, 149
Attachment to other arms on the part of officers, 159
Attila with his Hunnish squadrons, 2
_Australian Commonwealth, Manual of_, 55
Australians as horsemen, 13
Ballistics from horseback, 5
Basuto pony, 21
Batteries of horse artillery, 5
Bayonet of German cavalry, 10
Bernhardi, Von, on bayonet, 11, 147;
cavalry literature by, 17;
_Cavalry in Future Wars_, 52, 77, 90, 94, 99, 169, 187;
_Cavalry in War and Peace_, 62, 66, 95, 208;
on fundamental principles of action, 101
Birch, Major Noel, 192
Boers, 71, 75, 82, 99, 133, 134
Boer system of training a horse, 197
Bloch, De, 5, 113
Blücher, 3, 85, 128
Bonie, Colonel, 6, 7
Botha, General, 75
“Boy Scouts,” 142
Brack, De, 7, 35, 37, 126, 135, 147, 171, 173
Brigade, the, 41-48
British cavalry ahead of continental cavalry in fire tactics, 17;
ignorance of horses, 18;
inflation of idea as to size of horse required, 21;
horse bred for size, speed, etc., 23
Campaigning, horse-management in, 24
Canadians as horsemen, 13
Canterbury system of horse training, 196
Cape Colony as a source of horse-supply, 21
Carrago nose-band, 201
“Casse cou,” 87
Cavalry, expense of, 8;
leader, 8, 73;
brigade in action, 59;
in the general engagement, 69;
disposition of, in a campaign, 86;
masses of, 99, 109;
screen, 135;
shooting and fire discipline of, 208
_Cavalry Training, Manual of_, 111
Cavalry _v._ Cavalry, 37
“Charge,” the, 2, 4
Cherfils, 69, 98
Chest measurement as sign of stamina of horse, 20
Chivalry, 2;
Norman, 2
Colonials in the South African War, 75
Competition of squadrons, 212
Convoy duty, 144
Cooking, knowledge of, 211
Cossacks, 75, 150;
activity of the, 135
Cost of horse-flesh in South African operations, 18
Country-bred men, 210
Cromwell, 3, 6, 34, 69
Cronje, General, 84
Culverwell, Professor, on teaching, 214
Curély, 3, 7, 134
Cyclists, 94, 96
Cynic, 143;
cynicism, 217
Daumas, General, book on Arab horses by, 23
Delarey, 75
Denison on cavalry recruits, 208
Despatch-riding, 139
Detached duties of cavalry, 139
De Wet, raids of, 147
Direction of cavalry by higher leaders, 88
Dismounted action of cavalry, 57;
work, 11, 73, 186
Disposition of cavalry in a campaign, 86
Dissemination of squadrons, 68
Divisional cavalry, 91
Doctrine, Langlois’, 171;
Napoleon’s, 172
Dogger Bank, 131
Dragoons of Napoleon, 11
Drives in South Africa, 93
Drying tent, 125
Dundonald, Lord, Preface to his _Cavalry Training_, 55
Duty, sense of, 160
Echelon attack, advantages of the, 39
Elliot, on the possibilities of cavalry, 6;
inspiriting regulation mentioned by, 178
_En bondes_, to work towards the enemy, 59
Enemy, in contact with the, 122
_Engineering, Manual of Military_, 211
English cavalry, 59
Europe, supply of food for horses when campaigning in, 21
Expenses in cavalry, 154, 155
Expensive, want of cavalry is, American view, 8
Exploration, cavalry of, 90
Fanaticism, religious, 215
Field Service Regulations, 90, 94
Fire action in tactics, 50;
action by cavalry, German opinion on, 57;
effect, horse artillery, compared with rifle fire, 117
Fixed principles of the great cavalry leaders, 3
Flags, use of, 78
Flank, forming to the, 37
Forage supply and its carriage, 95, 96
Forming to the flank, 37
Frederick the Great, 3, 6, 90;
sayings of, 25, 105, 177;
his horses duly considered, 27;
on the rapid rallying of squadrons, 33;
success of the cavalry of, 81;
horse artillery and cavalry of, 102, 103;
and his officer Seydlitz, 193
Free-jumping lane, 198
French, General Sir John, 84
French cavalry, 7, 209;
regulations, 90, 134, 136, 159, 171
French dragoons in the Peninsular War, 15;
nation and the war of 1870, 7;
Republic, the armies of the, 97;
_Manuel du gradé de cavalerie_, 160, 217
Frossard, General, and the episode at Vionville, 73
Galliffet, General, 6, 31, 88
Gambling spirit necessary in cavalry leader, 9
Gerard, Sir Montague, 11
German cavalry, bayonet substituted for the sword in, 10;
and the lance, 16;
rifle and fire tactics, 16;
at Loigny-Poupry, 72;
regulations, 70, 71, 79, 80, 92, 107, 109, 115, 170;
considered too weak, 95
German officers in the 1870 war, 139;
opinion on mounted infantry, 56;
opinion on fire action by cavalry, 57
Goltz, Von der, his _Nation in Arms_, 10, 69, 93, 97, 161, 162, 167
Gordon, Lindsay, poem by, 32
Gourko, General, his raid across the Balkans, 146
Grumbling--the soldier’s privilege to grumble, 217
Gustavus Adolphus, 3
Haig, General Sir D., 35, 38, 51, 67, 71, 78, 113
_Haute école_, 196, 197, 203
Henderson, Colonel, in _Science of War_, 56, 117, 118, 128
Hood, General, and Wheeler’s raid, 149
Horse, the, 18;
Arab, 23;
in South African operations, 82;
what will the cavalry horse live on? 86;
despatch-riding, 139;
loss of many overriden, 149;
exhaustion of, 151;
Frederick the Great and his, 178;
efficiency for war in, 181;
training of the, 191
Horse artillery, 26, 41, 76, 78, 93, 101;
batteries of, 5;
German, 72;
and cavalry, 101;
co-operation of, with cavalry, 108;
fire effect compared with rifle fire, 117
Horse-management, good system of campaigning, 205;
theory of, 25, 26
Horse, training of the, 191;
economy in, 204
Hunting as an exercise for a cavalry officer, 159, 168, 197
Hutton, General Sir E., 55
Imagination, want of, 165
Inaction, 61
Independent cavalry, 94
India, cavalrymen in, 184
Infantry attack, cavalry practising the rôle of, 57
_Infantry Training, Manual of_, 114
Information and security, the two functions of cavalry, 87-88
Instruction, general, 140;
theoretical, 214
Instructional rides, manœuvres, etc., 77
Irish horse, beau-ideal for cavalry, 19
Japan, Emperor of, order by, 202
Japanese, 8, 75, 146, 149-51, 173
Jena, campaign of, 89
Katzbach, pursuit after battle of, 85
Kleber, General, and cowardice, 217
Kraft, Prince, on cavalry dismounting, 58;
_Letters on Cavalry_, 108, 119;
on expenses of cavalry officer, 157
Lance, 13, 14, 16
Lancers, 9th, in the Afghan War, 14
Langlois, General, in _Lessons from Two Recent Wars_, 69, 71, 76,
88, 102, 165, 171, 175
Lasalle, 3, 131, 169
Leading, sticky, condoned in the past, 78
Lewal, 78
Liberty of manœuvre, 98, 100
Lindsay Gordon, poem by, 32
Line of communication, raid on a, 152
Liubavin, General, 76
Lloyd’s Maxims, extract from, 179
Loigny-Poupry, German cavalry at, in 1870, 72
Lonsdale Hale, Colonel, 72
McClellan, General, 145
Machine guns, 103, 109
Makarov, Admiral, 132
Mamelukes, 15, 193
Man, training of the, 202
Manchuria, Russians in, 7
Manchurian War, 75, 146
Map-reading, 184
Masses of cavalry, 99, 109;
column of, 46
Maude, Colonel, _Cavalry: Its Past and Future_, 110, 112, 148
May, General, _Guns and Cavalry_, 114
Mêlée, 14, 209
Michel’s brigade at the battle of Woerth, 112
Mischenko, General, 149, 150
Moltke, Yon, sayings of, 8, 155
_Moral_, 1, 5, 30, 49, 217
Mosby, 7
Mounted infantry, 56, 73, 75, 117, 205
Mounted infantry horse see finish of campaign, 22
Mukden, battle of, 110, 146
Murat, 3, 24, 82, 98, 141, 206
Nansouty and Murat, 24
Napier, on sword, 14
Napoleon and his dragoons of 1805, 11;
the mamelukes formidable antagonists to, 15;
light cavalry horse of, 20;
in Russian campaign, 24;
his lack of consideration for the horse, 27;
maxims of, 71, 88, 122, 167;
discerns the impossibility of co-ordinating the two functions of
cavalry--information and security, 88;
horse artillery and cavalry of, 102, 103;
sayings of, 108, 112, 167, 190;
and Lasalle, 131;
information easily gained by the French cavalry for, 135;
extensive use of despatch-riders in several of his campaigns, 141;
his doctrine of _moral_, 172;
on the mamelukes, 193;
his loss of horse in the invasion of Russia, 206
Napoleonic era, 3
New Zealanders as horsemen, 13
Ney, “the bravest of the brave,” 84
Napoleon’s appreciation of, 167
Night attack, a, 124
Norman chivalry, 2
Officer, cavalry, the training of the, 154, 167
Officers, amateur, 97
Officers’ want of experience in horse-flesh on joining a regiment, 18
Paardeberg, 82, 149
Pace, exercise in, 140
Pamirs, horse food in the, 25
Parthian tactics, 1, 82
Patriotism, 6, 97
Peace-time theorists, 79
Pelet Narbonne, Von, 111, 151
Peninsular War, 15, 135, 159
“Pepper-box” system, 93
Personal weapon, 209. _See also_ Armament
Personnel, 82
Petersburg, 27
Picard, 89, 206, 214
“Picket the enemy,” 133
Picq, Ardant du, 29, 49, 80, 87, 174
Pioneering, every man should possess a good knowledge of, in all its
forms, 211
Polo-playing as an exercise for cavalry officers, 168, 197
Polo pony, 20, 192
Pompom, use of the, 68
Pony, the, as adjunct to squadrons, 20-21
Preuil, General de, 73
Prince Imperial, death of, in Zululand, 191
Principles of cavalry leading, 3
Prisoners, Spanish, 10,000 captured by the French, 85;
the taking of, very desirable, 128;
as a means of obtaining information, 143
Problems, practical, and their proposed solutions, 188
Protective cavalry, their duty to secure positions for infantry
columns following them, 92
Punchestown, training horses, 198
Pursuit, 83;
parallel, 84
Rafts, 211
Raids, 145
Rally, the, 32;
instantaneous, 14
Rearguards, 1, 144, 189, 214
Recruits, 136, 207
Reich, Emil, 169
Rennenkampf, his reconnaissance to Kuan-tien-cheng, 150
Resolute offensive, 78
Revolver as a weapon in place of a sword, 15
Riding, methods of teaching, 202
Rifle, the, 16;
magazine, cavalry armed with, 50
Rifle fire compared with horse artillery fire effect, 117
Romer, General, 204
Royal Artillery Mounted Rifles, 12
Rozhestvenski, fleet of, 131
Rupert, his defeat, 34
Ruskin, sayings of, 25, 155
Russian successes in Central Asia, 7;
officers, 76, 217;
campaign of 1812, 89
Russians, 146, 149-51
Saddles, General Romer on, 204
St. Cyr, General, 85
Samsonov, General, 8
Sands, seaside, digging hasty field fortifications at, 213
Scabbard, steel, 10
Schmidt, Von, his _Instructions for Cavalry_, 4, 5, 29, 33, 38, 41,
108, 164, 177, 178
Scouts, 127, 130, 142
Section leaders, competition of, 184-185
Seydlitz, 3, 80, 193
Shaikh Sadi, sayings of, 128, 154
Shakespeare, 128, 167
Sherman, General, 149
Shock action, 4;
tactics, 4, 13, 52
Shooting of cavalry, 208
“Show” teams, 182
Small horse for war, 20;
wars distract attention from essentials, 18
South Africa, cost of horse-flesh in, 18;
mounting of our cavalry in, 21
South African War, 59, 74, 81, 97, 106, 134, 147, 161, 213;
operations, 1899-1902, erroneous conclusions from, 8
South Africans, 13
Sowars, 12
Spaits, Captain, 110
Squadron, the training of a, 177;
leader, 179-80, 200
Squadrons, competition of, 212
Stamina of horse essential, 22
Sticky leading, 78;
action, 80
Stuart, General, 145, 146
Swimming as an exercise for cavalrymen, 210-11
Sword, 10-16
Tactics of Cavalry _v._ Cavalry, 29
Tactics, Parthian, 1, 82;
Zulu, 4
Tax-payer of Great Britain and lessons from war, 8
Telissu, cavalry at battle of, 8
Theoretical instruction, 214
Tracking, etc., 141
Ulm, campaign of, 98, 141;
despatch-riding in, 141
Union of arms, 88
Unison of arms, 50
Verdy du Vernois on the possibilities of cavalry, 6;
on the sword, 12
Veterinary Department and their book, _Animal Management_, 25
Volley firing, 17
Von der Goltz, 10, 69, 93, 97, 161, 162, 167
Walers (Australian), horses, bred for size, speed, etc., 23
Waterloo, battle of, 3
Weaker cavalry, rôle of, 95
Wellington, Duke of, 42, 185
Wet saddle-blankets to be carefully avoided, 204
Wheeler’s raid, 149
Wolseley, Lord, 122
Wood and Edmonds, their _Civil War in the United States_, 149
Wrangel, in _Cavalry in the Japanese War_, 135
Xenophon, advice _re_ stable management, 1;
on purchasing of horse, 23;
and Argesilaus, 208
Yeomanry as a national and imperial asset, 97
Yinkov, raid to, 150
Ziethen, 3, 80
Zulu tactics, 4
Zulus, _modus operandi_ of the, 190
THE END
_Printed by_ R. & R. CLARK, LIMITED, _Edinburgh_
FOOTNOTES
[1] Blücher, two days before Waterloo and then seventy years of age,
but as hard as nails and quite indefatigable, was charging at the head
of the Treskow Brigade, when his horse fell on him and he was left at
the mercy of the French cuirassiers. Luckily he was not recognized, and
when his own side again charged, he was pulled from under his horse and
got away on that of a sergeant.
[2] Von Schmidt, p. 229.
[3] Von Schmidt, p. 188.
[4] All the principal students of war of the type of Von Hoenig,
“A. A.,” Lewal, Von Schmidt, Galliffet, Kaehler, Prince Kraft, Verdy du
Vernois, Cherfils, Meckel, Waldor de Heusch, Von Schell, and others in
a minor degree, express unlimited confidence in the possibilities of
cavalry if trained according to a sufficiently high standard.--Elliot,
_Cavalry Literature_, Preface.
To preserve the superiority of an army in war, the system of tactics
must be changed every ten years.--Colonel BONIE.
[5] Colonel Bonie, speaking of the French cavalry before the war of
1870-71, says: “In the midst of this indifference war suddenly broke
out and we were obliged to appear on the field with our old ideas and
our old mistakes.”
[6] This is written with the reservation that experience shows that
much of the best and most useful work rendered to an army by its
cavalry is never known and certainly not recorded. The effectual
manner in which General Samsonov, after the battle of Telissu, checked
pursuit, held off, and at the same time kept touch with the Japanese
for three weeks or more, is dismissed in a few lines of history.
[7] An American, writing in 1899, delivered the following prophecy:
“Cavalry may be an expensive arm to organize, equip, and subsist,
but if it comes to a matter of dollars and cents the security of the
British Army in recent reverses would have been worth a million times
what an effective cavalry screen might have cost. From the moral
effect of the recent defeats the war in South Africa is expected
to cost the British Government between 100 million and 300 million
dollars.” Later he adds: “Let not our legislators forget in the coming
reorganization of our army the importance, nay the economy in money and
lives which cannot be measured by money, of maintaining an adequate
force of cavalry. Cavalry cannot be made in a month from militia. The
transformation process is slow. Given brave and fearless men, well-bred
horses, expert marksmen, improved arms and equipments, it is not
necessarily cavalry. Training is necessary and training takes time, but
when war begins, time is the one element which is most in demand.”
[8] A cavalry reformer, writing sixty or more years ago, says: “What is
the use of trying to get the authorities to abolish the steel scabbard,
when no attention was paid to a similar request fifty years ago?”
[9] _Cavalry in War and Peace_, p. 175.
[10] Though it is said that the Afghans point very effectively by means
of an upward prod.
[11] _Leaves from the Diary of a Soldier and Sportsman_, p. 256.
[12] _Studies in Troop Leading_, p. 196, _note_.
[13] For the very good reason that they possessed nothing better for
the purpose.
[14] The disadvantages of the lance, that it is conspicuous in detached
and scouting work and is in the way to some extent on dismounted work,
are defects easily got over.
[15] _The Campaign of Fredericksburg_, p. 129.
[16] It has been remarked that in Napoleon’s army the light cavalry,
though they did more work, lost fewer horses than the heavy cavalry.
This is attributed to the horses being better bred.
[17] Most interesting deductions are to be found in General Daumas’s
book, _The Horses of the Sahara_, in which conversations with the
celebrated Chief Abd-el-Kader are related.
[18] Von Schmidt, p. 72. But by cohesion is not meant that the men
are to be jammed together, for this only produces disorder, men being
forced out of their places, the number of ranks increased.
[19] The reader who desires full information, examples, and proof of
this well-ascertained fact should consult Colonel Ardant du Picq’s
book, one of the most interesting military works ever written and one
constantly referred to by French writers on cavalry.
[20] Von Schmidt’s _Instructions for Cavalry_, p. 159. The great
Frederick attached the greatest importance to the rapid rallying of
squadrons from the most complete confusion. “It must be impressed upon
the Hussar that he must be most attentive to the sound ‘Appell,’ on
hearing which each man will join his squadron and rank with the utmost
rapidity possible,” etc. And again: _N.B._--“His Majesty will most
particularly observe that the squadrons learn to rally rapidly.” And
also p. 77: “An acknowledged authority on our army says: ‘That cavalry
remains master of the field and gains the victory which can most
quickly rally and reform.’”
[21] _Cromwell_, by Captain P. A. Charrier, p. 11: “After Rupert’s
defeat Cromwell rallied and re-formed ready for the next job at hand.
The pursuit of Rupert’s troopers was entrusted to the smallest fraction
sufficient to do the work efficiently.... After each attack he re-forms
quickly and in good order ready for the next effort ... attacks the
royal infantry.... Towards the end of the battle he is rallied and
ready to meet yet another effort; ready to meet Lucas and Goring’s
squadrons.”
[22] “The rally after an action, mounted or dismounted, and against an
enemy mounted or dismounted, requires careful thinking out and constant
practice. During peace training, operations are rarely worked out to a
logical conclusion, and too often cease with a final charge; so that
the problem is not faced of what is to happen _after_ the enemy has
been routed, or the position captured or galloped through, or what is
to happen should the attack fail.”--General Sir D. Haig’s _Report on
the Cavalry Divisional Training_, 1909, p. 14.
[23] De Brack, Chapter on Charges, p. 252.
[24] Acrimonious discussion with officers of other branches of the
service as to their relative powers is to be deprecated as not
conducive to “the unison of arms.” Good cavalry will beat bad infantry,
and _vice versa_. An officer of artillery or infantry should believe
that he and his men cannot be ridden over so long as they keep
steady and in good heart, whilst a cavalry officer should, on the
contrary, believe that he and his men can ride over anything. These
two propositions, speaking in a logical sense, it is impossible to
bring into agreement. Officers on the staff and general officers have
by their training risen superior to the petty jealousies between the
various arms; but experience shows that this can never be the case
throughout the army.
[25] _Cavalry in Future Wars_, Von Bernardi, page 115: “It is never
permissible to wait until driven into action by superior commands, but
one must always endeavour to reap, on one’s own initiative, the utmost
possibilities the situation holds out.”
[26] Langlois, _Lessons from Two Recent Wars_, p. 97: “Let us consider
them (mounted infantry) next in the fight. They attack like infantry
and leave their horses some way behind them. How easily could these
groups of horses, held by a few men, be scattered by some squadrons of
cavalry. But the squadrons, it is said, will be checked by the fire of
dismounted men. To begin with, this will mean so many less carbines in
the firing line. But can these moderate or at most ordinary shots--for
they are not Boers--stop a resolute charge? Will it not be sufficient
in any case to dismount a few men with carbines and so contain the few
dismounted men who have to defend these herds of horses? And if needs
be, would not fire alone be good enough to disperse the troops of
riderless animals and reduce the men who are fighting some way off on
foot to infantry without valises, without food, and soon even without
cartridges?” And on page 98: “Does this mean that cavalry are never to
use their carbines? No one has, I believe, and no one ever will, uphold
such a theory. Improvements in firearms have rendered this particular
weapon more and more useful, one may even say indispensable. Its
employment has become more frequent and more justified in every phase
of the engagement.”
[27] In Germany it is held that mounted infantry cannot hold the field
against a highly trained cavalry, for sooner or later they would be
caught when in the saddle, and then before they had time to dismount
and fire it would be all over with them (Elliot, p. 31).
[28] The sword in its scabbard may be put through the shoulder cord,
and so down the back and through the belt.
[29] A lesson taught us by our South African experiences, of which
there is a danger of our losing sight, is the possible result of
bringing large bodies of troops in close formation under the effective
fire of modern guns and rifles.
[30] I altogether disagree with General von Bernardi where he says, p.
157, _Cavalry in War and Peace_: “It is at the same time advisable that
a specially detailed cavalry escort should be _dismounted_ for this
object.”
[31] This is still more applicable in the fight of the cavalry
division, since two horse artillery brigades in action occupy a front
of 475 yards, and once the guns are in position the direction in which
this front faces can only be altered to any appreciable extent by
limbering up.
[32] General Sir D. Haig’s _2nd Staff Ride_, p. 11: “With a force of
greater strength than half a squadron, defiles should never be passed
at a faster pace than the trot in order that each unit of the force
may keep well closed up and the column be not unduly lengthened. After
passing through, deployment should be made at a gallop so as to make
room for units in rear.”
[33] The use of the pompom, as a hint to a flank guard not to spend too
long in a specially attractive farmhouse, is an extremist’s view of
this question.
[34] Cf. Langlois, _Lessons from Two Recent Wars_. Speaking of the
battle of Colenso, he says: “The cavalry _received no orders_, and
did nothing. In the whole day’s fighting the cavalry brigade (six
squadrons) lost two men altogether.” May not this want of direction
have been due in some degree to the well-known prejudice of the
generalissimo against the cavalry arm?
[35] Cf. p. 206, Von der Goltz, _Nation in Arms_: “It is not sufficient
to have good cavalry, it must also be well handled by the superior
authorities. These latter are really responsible for many mistakes
unfairly laid at the door of the cavalry. Cavalry divisions must be
allowed a proper liberty of action, without entirely slipping out of
the hands of the commander-in-chief; whilst the masses of cavalry were
formerly kept back to be employed in reserves or in the pursuit, the
tendency now exists to send them forward at once, on the first day,
to a great distance in a certain direction. This, again, may produce
the inconvenience of cavalry being wanting one day when most urgently
required. The despatch of squadrons to the front, and the choice of
the direction in which they are to proceed, must also be in accordance
with a definite plan. Moreover, the commander-in-chief must not only be
clear as to his real intentions, but must also communicate them with
perfect clearness to the cavalry.”
_German Cavalry Regulations_, 1909, para. 395: “Attempts on the more
distant hostile communication may produce valuable results; but they
must not distract the cavalry from its true battle objectives. In the
event of an engagement, co-operation with a zest for victory must be
the watchword for every formation, whether great or small.” See also
section 104, para. 4, section 110, para. 4, of the British F.S.R.
[36] _German Cavalry Regulations_, 1909, para. 393: “During the battle
decisive intervention, whether to support or ward off the hostile
attack, is possible only by throwing in large masses of cavalry.”
Also see p. 33 of the _Report on 2nd Cavalry Staff Ride_, by General
Sir D. Haig, where the co-operation of a cavalry division in ground
to some extent obstructed by obstacles is described, and attention is
drawn to the historical instances of Salamanca and Austerlitz, in which
the co-operation of cavalry was a special feature.
[37] See Langlois, _Lessons from Two Recent Wars_, where the greatest
stress is laid throughout on the depth of modern dispositions of troops
on the battlefield.
[38] [This battle will be found well described by Colonel Lonsdale
Hale, vol. liv., March 1910, _Journal of R.U.S.I._]
It was afternoon on this occasion before the twenty-four guns rightly
belonging to the cavalry mass were released from employment alongside
the batteries of the general defence and allocated to work with the
cavalry.
[39] There are few more striking instances of this than the episode at
Vionville, where General Frossard, who had desired General de Preuil
to make a charge, replied to the latter when he pointed out that the
charge was sure to result in failure, “Attack at once, or we are all
lost.”
[40] The cavalry attack _en route_ to the relief of Kimberley and
several other occasions, when General French galvanized the squadrons
into action, afford us certain proof that energetic action on the
part of one combatant compels the other to take similar action or, as
happened in these cases, decamp.
[41] “The greatest error that the Russians made before even the
outbreak of hostilities, and which continued throughout the course
of the campaign, was, notoriously, the underrating of their
opponents. It is said that the most influential authorities could
not bring themselves, and did not deem it necessary, to detail a
sufficient proportion of the good regular cavalry present in European
Russia--guards and dragoons--for the theatre of war in Asia. Only
three regiments were sent out, of which it may be added the 51st and
52nd Dragoons only reached their destination in the 17th Army Corps
area at the end of July 1904. How blameworthy the action of the army
leaders was in not devoting more attention to the employment of their
best-trained and most reliable cavalry was most conclusively proved
by both these regiments of dragoons. For they succeeded, in what the
Cossacks up till then had had extremely limited success, namely, in
thoroughly clearing up the situation as regards their opponents,...”
etc., etc.--Supplement No. 86, _Internationale Revue über die gesammten
Armeen und Flotten_.
[42] Von Bernardi, _Cavalry in Future Wars_, p. 81: “The cavalry should
be forward and sideward to the line of battle.”
[43] General Sir D. Haig’s _Report on 2nd Cavalry Staff Ride_, p.
33: “The main lessons are that the cavalry leader must be in close
communication with the commander-in-chief, that the staff and all
leaders must be carefully prepared for this kind of work, and the
troops trained to take advantage of ground.”
[44] Ardant du Picq gives an account of how two parties of infantry,
suddenly meeting each other as they advanced over a hill-crest, _both_
turned and ran away.
[45] Ney, “the bravest of the brave,” found riding alone in rear of the
retreating French army, was asked, “Where is the rearguard?” “I am the
rearguard,” was the reply.
[46] After the action at the bridge of El Rey, St. Cyr sent his cavalry
in pursuit of the Spanish forces who were making for the defiles of
Montserrat. The French cavalry, gaining ground at a gallop on the left
flank of the column of fugitives, took up a position at the entrance to
the defile, and captured the whole of the enemy’s supplies and baggage
as well as 10,000 prisoners and twenty-five guns.
[47] “Casse cou,” a rare plant, and much smothered in Great Britain
in the twenty-five years previous to the South African War with the
inevitable effect.
[48] Un corps de réserve de cavalerie qui devait, à la fois, éclairer,
couvrir et seconder l’armée.--Picard, vol. i. p. 257.
[49] In the campaign of Jena, 1806, the Prussian cavalry still
maintained the Ziethen and Seydlitz tradition; they were well horsed,
well trained, and extraordinarily exact in their evolutions; but
the squadrons were mixed up with infantry divisions by groups of
ten squadrons, and commanded by the aged lieutenants of the Great
Frederick, still living on the traditions of their youthful successes.
Direction was entirely wanting in the disposition of the cavalry,
though it is said that at no time was military literature in a more
flourishing condition than in the years following the death of
Frederick the Great, and mathematical science was especially held in
honour.
[50] Von Bernardi, _Cavalry in Future Wars_, p. 32 of Goldman’s
translation.
[51] Von Bernardi, _Cavalry in Future War_, p. 28.
[52] In a well-reasoned article on “Cavalry in the Russo-Japanese War”
in the _Internationale Revue über die gesammten Armeen und Flotten_, it
is said: “So it is seen that in this war it has been proved once again,
and that to a high degree, that nothing great can be accomplished
with improvisations of cavalry, and that cavalry, especially when
incorporated in divisions, if it wishes to be led to high aims, cannot
be stamped out of the ground immediately before great events.”
[53] Von der Goltz, _The Nation in Arms_, p. 168, says: “The armies of
the French Republic numbered many members of the highest aristocracy
in the lower ranks, and there was no lack of intelligence, but it was
an undisciplined intelligence wanting in uniform training--hence also
an absence of unity of action. This latter is guaranteed by certain
principles being engrafted into the flesh and blood of the commanders
of troops by teaching and practice. The idea of utilizing our numerical
superiority and the efficiency of our troops in a vigorous and rapid
offensive pervaded all our minds, this principle having been imbibed
with the very air of our military school. If such discipline of the
intelligence exists, the commander may, with composure, leave much to
the initiative of the individual.”
[54] Nor does the effect of the victory of masses end there. “It
intensifies and invigorates the sense of superiority in individual
combats, and is essential if the patrols are to carry out their duties
in the true cavalry spirit.”--Von Bernardi, _Cavalry in Future Wars_,
p. 31.
[55] Extract from Von Pelet Narbonne’s _Lectures on and Cavalry Lessons
from the Manchurian War_.
[56] A general-in-chief should ask himself frequently in the day,
What should I do if the enemy’s army appeared now in my front, or on
my right, or on my left? If he have any difficulty in answering these
questions, he is ill-posted and should seek to remedy it.--Napoleon’s
Maxims, No. 8.
[57] In continuous heavy rain one tent should be made into a “drying”
tent by putting a fire on a stone fireplace in it, and thus bringing
the heat up to 120°, to 130°, or more. The wettest clothes hung up in
it will dry in about twenty minutes.
[58] Blücher on one occasion shouted to a tottering regiment: “You
scoundrels, do you then want to live for ever?”
[59] Napoleon considered it necessary, in 1807, to write to Lasalle as
follows: “Be very careful to send out frequent reconnoitring parties,
but do not let them go out each day by the same way and at the same
time, and return in similar fashion, _so that what happened to you at
Wischau occurs again_”!
[60] The French cavalry regulations state that between the service of
_sûreté_ and exploration in the cases of small forces ill-provided
with cavalry, the line is not drawn so clearly as in the case of large
forces with their normal establishment of cavalry.--_Service de la
cavalerie en campagne_, p. 58.
[61] Wrangel, in _Cavalry in the Japanese War_, puts tersely the true
line to take:--“The idea of a thin cavalry screen surrounding their own
army for protection against view of the enemy is very fallacious. An
energetic enemy, full of enterprise, will easily pierce this thin web
with his scouts. Only an active screen can be of any use, which really
in practice is no longer a screen only, but is coincident with the true
offensive reconnaissance. He who advances regardlessly into the hostile
reconnaissance zone, and attacks the cavalry detachments of the enemy
with determination wherever they are found, gives the death-blow to the
information apparatus of the enemy. His patrols and detachments robbed
of these supports are soon useless. They, like their reports, only in
the fewest cases are able to reach their destination.”
[62] A regulation in the French army is as follows: “One of the most
important missions on which young officers should be sent is the
conduct of reconnaissance of discovery. Opportunity should be taken to
give them practice in this, by sending them to reconnoitre the movement
of troops of another garrison. These exercises where the officer stays
out for two or three days at the head of his troop are extremely
useful.”--_Service de la cavalerie_, p. 190.
[63] Plain English words should always be used, if possible, in
instruction.
[64] Curély, in 1812, at Pultusk, with 100 men of the 20th Chasseurs,
captured from the enemy twenty pieces of artillery, and took the
general-in-chief of the Russian army a prisoner.
[65] Maude, _Cavalry: Its Past and Future_, p. 185.
[66] The Atlanta Campaign, p. 389 of Wood and Edmonds’ _Civil War in
the United States_.
[67] Undoubtedly the press wrote against the cavalry and the medical
departments far more than against other arms and departments during the
late South African War. Both have made great progress since the war.
_Sic itur ad astra!_
[68] True nobility is seen in the reply of Von Moltke, who, asked
why he was so economical, as far as his person was concerned, whilst
generous to others, replied, that it was in the hope that the officers
of the army might be persuaded to follow his example, for that he knew
how many families grudged themselves all possible luxuries to keep
their sons in their position of officers of the army. “The less a man
requires the greater he is,” he added.
[69] We like to call to mind Ruskin’s saying in _The Future of
England_: “Riches, so far from being necessary to _noblesse_, are
adverse to it. So utterly that the first character of all the nobility,
who have founded past dynasties in the world, is to be poor; poor
often by oath, always by generosity, and of every true knight in the
chivalric age the first thing that history tells you is that he never
kept treasure himself.”
[70] Prince Kraft points out how great a price a German officer pays
for the swagger of belonging to a cavalry regiment. He enlarges on the
trials to health entailed thereby, the long work in the riding school,
with the shakes and jars given to the bowels and spine, which in many
cases have sown the seeds of chronic illness, even during their first
year of service as lieutenants, owing to which some of them have been
invalided before their time. Then he goes on to point out the expenses
entailed by good chargers and their upkeep. Finally, he says that in
the German cavalry in no regiment can an officer live unless he can
afford to pay £100 a year out of his own pocket, and so he reckons that
a cavalry officer before he has twenty years’ service has expended
£2000, that is, has sacrificed that sum to the Fatherland.
[71] The French rightly lay stress on ability to cross an intricate
country. Their _Service de la cavalerie en campagne_, p. 191, says: “To
ride hard across country and particularly over a steeplechase course is
an excellent preparation for reconnaissance work. An officer accustomed
to long gallops, not only at ordinary, but also at racing pace, may
defy pursuit by one who has not had the same experience of leaping, and
especially of leaping at full speed, and of the powers of his horse.”
Our British cavalry officers had justly a great reputation for their
abilities in this respect in the Peninsular War.
[72] After a sharp fight one day in South Africa, a colonial officer
remarked to his column commander, “We did not think there would be
anything on to-day, because you were wearing your slacks and riding the
black horse!” The column commander felt, though he did not acknowledge,
the justice of the remark.
[73] In _Before Port Arthur in a Torpedo Boat_ the Japanese officer
reflects: “Is there any situation which can happen for which I and my
men have not been practised?”
[74] Cf. Langlois, _Lessons from Two Recent Wars_, p. 144: “The manner
in which troops are to be employed in the different situations which
arise must be left to the initiative of those in command in every
degree of rank.”
[75] _Germany’s Swelled Head_, p. 165.
[76] Note the strong measures which Lasalle, one of Napoleon’s best
cavalry leaders, is said to have taken at Pultusk in 1807. His brigade
was about to attack the Russian artillery, and about 2 P.M. had hardly
advanced twenty paces before the cry of “Halt!” was heard and at once
passed down the line without any one knowing where it had started.
The two regiments turned and began to retire at a gallop, though the
Russian guns had not fired a shot. Rallied after seven or eight minutes
and brought back, their brigadier-general, in a furious rage, kept
them in line until midnight under the enemy’s fire. So heavy was this
that the general had two horses killed under him. Men and horses fell
at every minute, but it is said not a man stirred, nor was a murmur
heard.--PICARD.
[77] On one occasion in the operations in South Africa, 1899-1902,
a troop, ordered to gallop a kopje, halted at 700 yards from it,
dismounted, and began to shoot; a troop of a rival corps was at once
sent to gallop through them and did what they had been told to do--took
the kopje; a salutary and effective lesson.
Another time a squadron attacking was held up by wire whilst under
fire, and began to come back; another squadron was led at a gallop
through them. The irresolute squadron at once turned and followed
them. The art is to loose the support at the right moment and with due
emphasis.
[78] _German Cavalry Regulations_, 1909, par. 398.
[79] The French _Service de la cavalerie en campagne_, 1909, at page
190, thus lays down the rôle of the commanding officer: “To direct
his officers towards a common doctrine, that of resolves which are
determined, even rash, but well considered; to develop in them
initiative and personality, and to make them not merely carriers-out
of orders, but leaders who know how to reflect, decide, and take
responsibility on themselves.”
[80] Supplement No. 86 to the _International Revue über die gesammten
Armeen und Flotten_, May 1907.
[81] Curély, the hero of countless brave deeds and daring
reconnaissances in Napoleon’s campaigns, had by 1814 got as far as
the command of a regiment, the 10th Hussars. On the 12th February at
Château-Thierry he got an opportunity, and successfully threw his
regiment at the flank of thirty squadrons of Landwehr. This gave an
opportunity to Letort with the Dragoons of the Guard to charge the
front. Napoleon in his bulletin only put: “Colonel Curély made himself
conspicuous”; but he at once promoted him to the rank of general for
this feat of arms.
[82] Langlois, _Lessons from Two Recent Wars_, p. 70.
[83] Von Schmidt, _Instructions for Cavalry_, p. 7.
[84] Von Schmidt, p. 227.
[85] _Ibid._ p. 73.
[86] _Ibid._ p. 13.
[87] Every manœuvre which is not founded upon the nature of the ground
is absurd and ridiculous.--Lloyd’s Maxims.
[88] The tests in map-reading for a field officer for tactical fitness
for command and for a cavalry trooper for service pay were at one time
almost identical.
[89] There is an additional reason for this, in that, if one horse
refuses, the next two or three who have seen him do so will probably do
the same. Horses are extremely impressionable.
[90] Von Bernhardi, _Cavalry in Future Wars_, p. 90.
[91] Taking an instance which comes to mind: a troop of cavalry on
outpost duty at Colesberg found themselves cut off at dawn by some 500
Boers; instantly they rode at the enemy, and, with small loss and doing
some execution with their lances, came out.
[92] The cavalry soldier is often required to perform independent
duties and penetrate far into the enemy’s lines under conditions
entailing danger and hardship. He should, therefore, not only be brave,
strong, and determined, but also intelligent, enthusiastic, deliberate,
and calm. He must be able to act on his own initiative in accordance
with the orders he receives and the situation of the moment. His horse
is the cavalryman’s best weapon. The soldier should prize his horse
more than his own body, and thus in an emergency he will be able to
rely without fail upon this weapon. It is only when the foregoing
qualities have been acquired by training and experience in the field
that a man can call himself a true cavalry soldier.--_Japanese, Cavalry
Drill Regulations_, 1907, 44 (trans.).
[93] For practical riding, however, turning on the forehand is not
advocated.
[94] At the same time these natural movements are not all that we
demand of a horse; we must therefore add the proviso that with the
weight of a rider on the horse’s back, some of the natural turns, and
twists, and bearings can be, and need be, improved on. For instance,
by means of the bit and legs, we pull a polo pony on to his haunches,
and then turn him with the snaffle in order that on slippery ground we
may save a slip, slide, or fall, which would very probably occur if we
let him turn on the forehand in his own natural and easiest way. Nor
does every horse, as he moves along at the walk, trot, or gallop, or as
he jumps, necessarily do so in the best or safest way; he will often
slouch, as we would describe it in a man, in doing so. We then use the
aid of bit, leg, spur, or whip to make him go up to his bit, which
we know by experience is a better fashion than his natural mode of
carrying himself.
Many a slack rider has let his horse, when he was wearily plodding his
way home after a long day’s hunting, fall and break his knees; whereas,
if the animal had been well balanced by the strong pressure of the legs
and warning spurs, and light hand on the curb, of a good and alert
horseman, he would have reached home safely.
[95] The Boer system of training a horse not to fall in the antbear and
porcupine holes was to put a native on the animal and lunge it where
there were nests of these holes.
[96] The pose, however, of decrying _haute école_ methods is a totally
mistaken one. The finest all-round horsemen in the world are the
masters of _haute école_, whilst some of the worst horsemen are the
butchering hard-riders to hounds, who bunch up their reins in their
mutton fists, and hold on by them till their mount stops pulling and
going. They are little better than, though of another class to, the
viceroy who said to his A.D.C., “Don’t talk to me now; don’t you see I
am busy riding?”
[97] _Cavalry Journal_, July 1910.
[98] Experience shows that the noisiest instructors are almost
invariably the worst; they are usually trying to appeal by means of
their lungs to the rider’s ears instead of demonstrating their meaning
by an appeal to his sense of sight.
[99] The material common-sense changes made in regard to the comfort,
amusements, health, and pay of the cavalryman, in common with the other
arms, is one of the most marked advances in the army of to-day.
[100] General Romer, after the American Civil War, wrote as follows:
“Bad saddles destroy more horses than are lost in action.”
It is certain that _wet_ horse blankets put on under a saddle will
give more sore backs in one day’s march than will occur in a month of
ordinary marching.
[101] It has been said that “it is a peace theory that mounted infantry
are as good as trained cavalry; it is a war fact that their ignorance
of horse-management makes them five times as costly at the commencement
of a war.” However that may be, we know that under first-rate officers,
a proportion of whom have since joined the cavalry to its advantage,
there was exemplary horse-management in some corps of mounted infantry,
not only in the late South African War of 1899-1902 but long ago in the
eighties.
[102] Picard, _Cavalry of the Revolution and Empire_, vol. ii. p. 94.
[103] “The idea of drawing cavalry recruits from the best
horse-breeding districts,” says Denison, “is not original. Zenophon
says that Argesilaus did so” (p. 41). It is certain that our best
cavalry soldiers come from Ireland now.
[104] Von Bernhardi, _Cavalry in Peace and War_, p. 273, says,
speaking of German cavalry: “In the cavalry there is a want of trained
instruction, and most regiments are even reduced to borrowing infantry
under-officers and officers to assist in their musketry training, who
are then also employed to teach the rudiments of the cavalry fight.”
[105] The Japanese realize how far strength and activity go to make up
for the unsuitability of the race for cavalry work, and from the moment
a recruit enters barracks, every effort is made to render him active
and energetic.--_Education and Training of the Japanese Divisional
Cavalry_, p. 13.
[106] Les Hussards étaient d’ailleurs les maraudeurs par excellence;
ils se sentaient encore de leur premier recrutement. On respectait ce
penchant des troupes légères pour leur donner plus de mordant dans la
poursuite à laquelle elles se trouvaient ainsi plus particulièrement
intéressées.--Picard, _La Cavalerie dans les guerres de la Revolution
et de l’Empire_, p. 201.
[107] “In teaching it is not sufficient for the teacher to express
clearly what he means--the words may be to him quite clear, but the
real question is, are they clear to the pupil, do they put his mind
into a condition in which he follows and grasps the idea that the
teacher would emphasize?”--Professor Culverwell on the Herbartian
Psychology.
[108] May not a trace of this religious fanaticism, however, be seen in
the letter of an Irish soldier, who wrote home during the South African
War of 1899-1902 as follows:--
“Dear mother, we are having a lovely time of it, shooting Protestants
all day long, and no one to stop us.”
[109] This view was expressed in 1907 by the commander of the 1st
Japanese cavalry regiment.
[110] General Kleber, when his men, overcome by fatigue, refused to
move a step farther, called them cowards. As they protested that they
were at any rate always brave in a fight, he replied, “Yes, you are
brave men, but you are not soldiers. To be a soldier is not to eat when
you are hungry, not to drink when you are thirsty, and to carry your
comrade when you cannot drag yourself along.”--_Manuel du gradé de
cavalerie._
Transcriber’s Notes
Punctuation, hyphenation, and spelling were made consistent when a
predominant preference was found in this book; otherwise they were not
changed.
Simple typographical errors were corrected.
Ambiguous hyphens at the ends of lines were retained.
Some illustrations were moved closer to the text that referenced them.
The spelling of non-English words was not checked.
Index not checked for proper alphabetization or correct page references.
In the Table of Contents, one of the page numbers for Chapter IX was
missing and the other was incorrect. Both remedied here.
Page 84: Transcriber added a closing quotation mark at the end of the
paragraph ending with “a crossing of the Modder River.”
Footnote 62, originally on page 136: Transcriber added a closing
quotation mark after “troop are extremely useful.”