RAIDS
The very idea of a cavalry raid is attractive and carries with it a
certain romance.
It is impossible to do otherwise than admire the boldness of the
conception of Stuart’s raid in 1862, when, with 1200 men and two
guns, he rode right round the Federal lines, alarmed McClellan, and
caused him to withdraw troops to cover his line of cavalry and thus
weaken his first line. Yet even this raid, brilliant as it was and
tactically successful, is said to be strategically a mistake. For, to
quote General Alexander’s _American Civil War_, it “seriously alarmed
McClellan for his rear. But for it the probabilities are he would never
have given the subject any thought, and he certainly would not have
been prepared with a fleet of loaded transports on hand when he was,
soon after, forced to change his base to Harrison’s landing on the
James River.... On the whole, therefore, the _éclat_ of our brilliant
raid lost us much more than its results were worth. Where important
strategy is on foot, too great care can scarcely be used to avoid
making any such powerful suggestion to the enemy as resulted in this
case.”
Similarly the raid in 1863, by the same general, had disastrous results
for the Confederates. Lee was then preparing for his campaign north of
the Potomac. Stuart proposed moving with the cavalry in between the
Federal army and Washington, and rejoining the main army when north of
the Potomac. Lee, unfortunately, sanctioned it, and Stuart set out on
the 24th June, did some minor damage to the Federals, but lost Lee, not
rejoining him till late in the afternoon of the 2nd July, the second
day of the battle of Gettysburg. Had Lee had his cavalry with him, that
campaign might have had a very different ending. Therefore, in this
case, the timing of the raid was wrong, and of benefit only to the
enemy.
The value of Gourko’s raid across the Balkans in July 1877, when in
eight days he carried dismay into the heart of Turkey, destroyed parts
of the railroad and telegraph on the principal lines, and gained a
great deal of information as to Turkish movements, appears to be
undoubted. His force, however, was not entirely a cavalry one.
Coming to a more recent date, in the Manchurian War, the Japanese, only
a few days before the battle of Mukden, by means of an undertaking
against the rear of the Russians, which was carried out by two Japanese
squadrons (280 men), marching as quickly as possible by night and
hiding by day, succeeded in reaching an important railway bridge 200
kilometres north of Tieh-ling and in rear of the Russians. The troops
covering the bridge were surprised at night, and their attention
was thus drawn away from the bridge, which a skilfully-led patrol
succeeded in blowing up. The railway service was interrupted for
several days. A regular panic set in among the Russian Headquarter
Staff. The immediate result was that 8000 Russian troops were diverted
for the defence of the line and were unable to take part in the
decisive battle at Mukden: an instance of most admirable timing of a
raid.
It is true that cavalry raids may disorganize the lines of
communication “which in the case of large armies,” as Bernhardi says,
“have increased in importance.” But, on the other hand, we must
remember that well-organized lines of communication are now almost
invariably railways. On these there is a most efficient engineer
service, with a breakdown train and gang of trained road-layers and
menders always ready. These are able to mend a railway in approximately
the same time that it takes to break it up. It is only badly organized
lines of communication which are really vulnerable,--though we must
not forget that the blowing up of a French bridge near the frontier in
1870, during the siege of Paris, very nearly caused the siege to be
raised.
The pages of De Brack’s _Light Cavalry Outposts_ are full of instances
of successful raids, those of which Curély was the hero being specially
attractive and effective.[64] In our own knowledge are the raids of
De Wet and others on our line of communication in South Africa, which
entailed a large number of troops being allotted to the defence of
the railway; whilst little less effective were the operations of our
columns against the Boers when, hiding by day and riding by night,
they swooped down upon the Boers and captured their herds of cattle
and horses. The Boers suffered little inconvenience from those columns
which had not recourse to methods combining speed with avoidance of
observation, and with secrecy in their preparation.
All these operations are obviously those which are favoured by
“conditions of sparsely-settled terrain and very partially-developed
telegraphic communication, and few roads and railways,” and the success
of many of the American raids forms no basis for the assumption, so
often made, that equal results would attend their employment in Europe
outside Russia.[65]
The other side of the question may be seen in some of the unsuccessful
raids entered upon by both sides in the American War, when raids became
“the fashion”--raids, which were not only unsuccessful, but which even
had the effect of depriving their own side of their cavalry at a most
important juncture, quite apart from the number of cavalry horses
rendered useless.
A typical instance of this is seen in Wheeler’s raid on the Federal
lines of communications. When beaten off at Dalton he made his way
into East Tennessee; his subsequent operations in that region had no
effect upon the fortune of the two armies battling round Atlanta.
Hood, deprived of Wheeler’s cavalry--“the eyes of his army”--found
himself in the dark as to Sherman’s movements. On the evening of the
27th he jumped hastily to the conclusion that Wheeler’s raid had been
successful, and that Sherman’s army was retiring from lack of supplies
to the other side of the Chattahoochee. For forty-eight hours he
adhered to this strange delusion, and by that time the Federals had
gained a position from which it was impossible to dislodge them.[66]
Quite without permanent result were the big raids by De Wet into the
Cape Colony and by Botha into Natal, both of which caused the loss of
many overridden horses, and had a bad moral effect on the Boers, who
were hunted from pillar to post; but the attack on our mule transport
in rear of the columns moving on Kimberley and Paardeberg was an
excellent piece of work and far-reaching in its effect.
Again, the Russian raids against the Japanese were strangely
unfortunate in their results, but it is probable that sufficient
secrecy was not observed prior to these raids moving off.
Taking Mischenko’s raid or reconnaissance into Northern Korea early in
the Russo-Japanese War as an instance, it is interesting to see the
manner, first, in which it was met by the Japanese; second, in which
it allowed itself to be distracted from the main object. This raid was
sent to find out what force of Japanese was in front of the Russians,
and, arriving at Chon Chou at 11 A.M., “tumbled upon” a town garrison,
deployed five sotnias in all, keeping one in reserve, thus voluntarily
renouncing its mobility to attack a town. The result might have been
foretold. The force was held in front by two squadrons dismounted and
attacked by one squadron mounted on the flank, meanwhile a Japanese
infantry battalion is brought up at the double. Result: retirement of
the Russians, reconnaissance practically valueless.
In the case of General Mischenko’s long ride to Yinkov with fifty-three
sotnias of Cossacks, four commandos of mounted scouts, twenty-two guns,
and four machine guns, the primary object of the raid, and a notable
one, was to interrupt the junction of the Japanese troops, freed by
the fall of Port Arthur, with those on the Shaho, a quite secondary
objective being the stores at Yinkov. 1500 pack-horses accompanied
the column. 30 kilometres were covered in two days. On the third day
the garrisons of Hai-cheng (1500) and Ta-shih-chiao, somewhat larger
(the distance between these towns being 20 miles), sufficed to turn
the leader of 9000 cavalry from his first objective, and to send him
towards Yinkov. Here he dismounted sixteen sotnias for a night attack,
but, meeting with wire entanglements and a vigorous resistance, retired.
Nothing had been effected.
Rennenkampf’s reconnaissance on the 9th May to Kuan-tien-cheng. Force
at his disposal one battalion, ten sotnias, and eight guns. We read
that, making “two very trying marches,” he reaches Kuan-tien-cheng
with six sotnias. “The remainder of the detachment had been left behind
at various points on the line of communication, partly on account of
the exhaustion of the men and horses, partly to secure its line of
retreat. As the march had been carried out without any regard to the
pace of the various arms, the detachment was completely scattered.”
A Japanese force of 400 infantry left the town, but shortly returned
reinforced by a battalion, which unexpectedly attacked and drove the
Russians away. The result of the reconnaissance was nil. And so on....
Rennenkampf was indefatigable. But the work “though so fruitless had
exhausted the sotnias, which were now considerably under strength, and
most of the horses had sore backs,” and so it will always be. Those who
have seen the state of men and horses after four, three, or even two
nights in the saddle will not need assurance on this subject.
Von Pelet Narbonne puts down the general failure of Russian raids to
the small value of the Cossacks, who were not trained in offensive
dismounted action, nor possessed with a keen desire to use the sword.
He then compares the method of the Japanese, whose tactics were more
suited in his opinion to the intricate and mountainous nature of the
country. They sent infantry with their cavalry, who carried out the
unavoidable reconnaissance combat. This method certainly economized the
cavalry, an arm in which the Japanese were very deficient. Again, the
Japanese cavalry frequently met the Russian cavalry by dismounted fire
from the mud walls of villages, and were mistaken by them for infantry.
What, then, are the general conclusions at which we arrive?--
1st. That big raids seldom have results which justify the loss and wear
and tear of the horses and men.
2nd. That a raid must not be entered upon except with a special and
adequate purpose and as a result of careful reconnaissance by spies and
others.
3rd. That once entered upon, the leader must devote himself to carrying
out his mission and not allow himself to be turned aside on any account
whatever.
4th. That a small, swift, well-hidden raid on a line of communication
made at a favourable moment may cause the detachment of a large number
of troops, whose absence will be felt in the decisive battle.
5th. That raids against which the enemy has made preparations are
purposeless, but are nevertheless often made by cavalry leaders, lest
they should incur the reproach of having done nothing.
6th. That the first raids in a war are often successful.
7th. That a friendly country favours raids, and conversely an enemy’s
country renders them difficult to the verge of impracticability.
8th. That cavalry should not be sent off on raids when required for
action on a battlefield.
9th. That a raid is like any other detachment, _i.e._ if it succeeds in
drawing away from the decisive point at the right time a stronger force
than itself, it is justified; and therefore the chief point to consider
in planning a raid is its timing.