FIRE ACTION IN TACTICS OF CAVALRY _V._ CAVALRY
A very frequent question, also quite a justifiable one and one which
cavalry soldiers must not shirk, but must on the other hand thoroughly
understand and thresh out in their own minds, both by practical
experiment and theoretical discussion,[24] is the following:--
Since cavalry are armed with an excellent magazine rifle, may they not
more easily and effectually inflict loss and defeat on the enemy’s
cavalry by that means rather than by employing shock action, with its
gambling uncertainty, its losses in men and horses, its need of intense
resolution or complete absence of _arrière pensée_ on the part of the
leader?
Those cavalry soldiers who have had experience in such affairs,
who have thought the matter out and thus obtained certain guiding
principles, will reply: “There are certainly many occasions when the
conditions of terrain or the nature of the combat favour such action.
We have only to mention a rearguard or a running fight and many
instances come to mind at once in the case of those pursued.”
Intricate ground always favours fire action, and in small affairs, as a
sequel to a dash at the flank of an enemy holding a position on a rough
and unrideable kopje, it is obviously the right course.
Of all these occasions it is our intention to take full advantage;
never to miss an opportunity. At the same time, practical experience
has convinced us that we must guard against such action being adopted
to the prejudice of shock action in cases where the latter is of
supreme value, and we must also recognize the “inherent weakness of
mounted troops who attempt to force a decision with fire action without
combining it with shock action.”
In the _Report on the Cavalry Division Training_, 1909, by General Sir
D. Haig, we find the following:--
The principles which should determine the choice between mounted
and dismounted action require to be more thoroughly considered.
Small units have been seen on several occasions to dismount on open
ground when mounted action was the only sound course to adopt.
On the other hand, squadrons have been seen to remain mounted in
enclosed country when under fire at close range of dismounted men.
Further, we feel that the very fact that there are many more occasions
suitable for fire action than for shock action must not make us lose
sight of this, namely, that though we may use fire action when we meet
the enemy nine times out of ten, it is on the tenth occasion, and then
because shock action takes place, that something definite, something
which affects the result of the campaign, is seen to happen. Therefore
we must not let our future leaders be brought up with distorted views.
We have to recognize that whilst recourse to shock action demands great
resolution, fire action on each successive occasion at an increased
distance is always the easy course; whilst the former decides battles
and increases our _moral_, the latter is a sign in many cases of
the leader weakening, temporizing, or waiting for orders which will
never--and _he knows it_--come.[25]
We desire to face this question squarely, and with a just appreciation
of human nature and its many weaknesses and failings. Nor do we forget
the Arab proverb that victory is gained not so much by the numbers
killed as by the numbers frightened. It is in view of this that we
adopt certain lines in our cavalry training.
It appears desirable to give an instance of a case where shock action
is decisive. Imagine two brigades of cavalry each with their H.A.
Battery meeting on an open plain. Each wishes to get forward. One, Red,
determining to use rifle action only, adopts the best formation he can
think of, a double echelon formation with his guns either on the flanks
well drawn back or in the centre. Dismounting, he prepares to attack.
Blue, leaving a fraction of his force in guns and rifles to hold Red
to his ground (and cavalry will credit how difficult it is for Red to
break off from such an attack), moves round Red’s flank, out of easy
range and at speed, and with the remainder of his brigade attacks Red’s
flank, choosing the angle at which he will “go in.”
Red has of his own accord rendered his mobile force to a great extent
immobile; he suffers accordingly. Blue, using gun fire just in advance
of his shock action, rolls Red up.
It is the fact, that the leaders of both sides instinctively feel that
they should not immobilize their commands, which will lead to “mounted
combats of cavalry forces.” Scores of actual happenings have convinced
those who have been present at them that there is nothing harder to hit
than a galloping man and horse; further, that if the mark is men and
horses approaching, the fire will be still less effectual. Whether the
men firing are under shell fire and their own horses are near them,
whether the enemy are armed with a personal weapon, especially a lance
or long rapier, each of these factors reduces the number of hits in a
way which can only have been seen to be believed.
In the case of Red, their own and the enemy’s movements are
disconcerting and inimical to accuracy of fire. In the case of Blue,
movement every moment is conferring increased advantages on him, and
not the least of these liberty of action.
Red, since he must send his horses to some distance back, takes a long
time to mount and move; and would give opportunities to Blue during his
movement.[26]
As regards the difficulty of hitting a galloping horseman, the
following incident in South Africa may be of interest. An officer
and four good shots, with their horses close at hand, remained to
observe after the squadron had been withdrawn from a debatable kopje.
Occasionally they took long shots at the Boers, who in twos and threes
rode strung out across the front, almost out of range. Without any
warning, suddenly about seventy Boers turned and galloped straight at
the kopje. “Fire steadily till I tell you to mount,” was the order
given by the officer, who then fired at a man in the centre on a white
horse and well in advance. No Boers were seen to fall, and with 100
yards start the five raced back to their squadron. When they came to
compare notes, it was found that all had fired at the same man on
a white horse, at whom some forty rounds had been discharged. The
conclusion arrived at was that rifle fire is not effective against
galloping individual horsemen, a conclusion which was duly acted upon.
Cavalry must have space to manœuvre and fight. Without these, cavalry
lose the advantages conferred on them by mobility, and become at a
disadvantage compared with infantry.
That there are very diverse opinions on the power of rifle fire
against cavalry must be evident from the fact that instructions so
very different in their import as the following were issued in Mounted
Troops’ Manuals shortly after the war in South Africa:--
“This Memorandum is not meant for cavalry who turn their backs,
but for those who, when they see the enemy preparing to charge
with sabre and lance, will coolly dismount, form up, and when he
gets within reach, pour in such a withering fire as will in five
minutes kill as many of the enemy as the same enemy with sword and
lance would kill in five hours on active service.”--Preface to Lord
Dundonald’s _Cavalry Training_, Canada, 1904.
“If an attack of cavalry is imminent, mounted troops should, if
time admits, gallop to cover or enclosed or broken ground and there
repel and retaliate.”--General Hutton’s _Mounted Service Manual,
Australian Commonwealth_.
The method is illustrated on an opposite page and shows the formation
of square, horses inside. This formation offers a splendid target to
H.A. or machine-gun fire for preparation of the attack which would
undoubtedly be made by cavalry from a direction at right angles to that
fire.
Colonel Henderson, in _Science of War_, page 160, sums up the situation
as follows:--
It is beyond question that dealing with a dismounted force,
whatever may be the amount of fire with which it is endowed, shock
tactics may play an important part.
The opportunities of effective outflanking and surprise may
possibly be few; but the very fact that the enemy has both the
power and the will to seek out such opportunities and to charge
home is bound to hamper the movements and to affect the _moral_ of
any force of horsemen which depends on fire alone.
Such a force, even if it could hold on to its position, would be
unable, except under favourable conditions of ground, to make any
forward progress, for directly it mounted it would be at the mercy
of its antagonist,[27] and it would thus be absolutely prevented
from bursting through the hostile cavalry and from acquiring the
information which it is its main object to obtain.
In the valley of the Shenandoah in 1864 the Confederate squadrons
were armed only with rifles, while the Federals under Sheridan were
trained both to fire and charge. The result is significant. The
southerners, though admirable horsemen, were worsted at every turn,
and their commander had at last to report that his mounted infantry
were absolutely useless against the Union cavalry.
DISMOUNTED ACTION OF CAVALRY
Objection is often raised to cavalry practising the rôle of the
infantry attack, and generally with reason, for, where there is any
other better plan for cavalry, it is obviously wrong for them to
dismount, leave their horses far behind, and immobilize themselves in
order to carry out this form of attack. But on the other hand, and
especially in rearguard affairs, it is quite possible that a weak
rearguard or detached force well posted in a gorge or other unturnable
position will hold out till such an attack is made. Then take plenty
of cartridges, carry your swords with you,[28] and “go in.” But do
not imagine that this costly mode of attack should be adopted on all
occasions.
It may be taken as a general rule that full value is not obtained
from cavalry who are far distant or long separated from their horses.
In the latest German cavalry regulations there is an important
modification. It is laid down that the decisive dismounted action
should only be attempted when the leader is convinced of possessing
numerical superiority, and very rarely over ground giving the enemy a
prepared field of fire. It is fatal, they say, to commit your forces
with numbers insufficient for success. They further say (para. 452):
“Half-hearted dismounted action contains the germs of failure”; and
evidently disapprove of the view that the extent of the rôle of
cavalry dismounted should be delimitated, as there is a tendency to do
in our army by those who expect the cavalryman to protest if they ask
him to dismount, and to argue how far he should go in attack--whereas
he must be, and will be, ready to accept any rôle which aids victory.
Prince Kraft’s contribution to the discussion which followed the war
of 1870-71 should be regarded, by the British army at any rate, as out
of date. He wrote: “A blow is given to the true spirit of cavalry if a
trooper once believes that he can fight without his horse.” This blow,
duly received by the British cavalry, has proved innocuous; they have
learnt to _reculer pour mieux sauter_, with an additional power, in the
form of the rifle, of the greatest value to them, whilst at the same
time they will retain the tradition that their
IDEAL IS SHOCK ACTION.