TACTICS OF CAVALRY _V._ CAVALRY
For the purposes of making this subject plain, the Squadron, the
tactical unit, will be first considered.
Let us picture, then, a squadron led at a trot with absolute cohesion
(that is, every man’s knees close against those of the next man,[18]
but not so as to prevent the pace being increased to such a gallop
as is compatible with that of the slower horses in the squadron).
This squadron being led till they are within 50 to 100 yards of their
opponents, and then at a command breaking into the full pace of the
charge with a crashing, ear-splitting yell rather than a cheer, will,
it is universally allowed, go through, break up, and cause to turn an
opposing squadron which has any intervals in its ranks.[19] In the
latter, men and horses can, since there is room, turn or pull round;
and they will do so. Your men and horses cannot turn; there is no room.
Weapons in this case may be ignored, the horses’ weight and momentum
is the weapon. Horse and man total upwards of a thousand pounds in
weight, they represent 9 feet in height by 3 feet in width. The front
extends for, say, 70 or 80 yards. The pace is 10 yards per second. It
is a rushing wall, there is nowhere any gap.
The opposing squadron has started out with equally gallant intentions,
but before they reached the charging point, or even later, something
has occurred to prevent them appearing like a wall; more often than
not their direction has been changed, and, whilst shouldering, these
on the hand turned to may be closed up well enough, but those on the
outer flank have not had time to gain the direction; pace may not
have been uniform; a direction may not have been given by the leader;
or his order may have been mistaken. No matter what it is: fifty
things may happen. It is just enough to prevent that squadron being
the more compact, well-built wall of the two. And what follows? They
are defeated and disgraced. They will not, as a squadron, again face
the cavalry of the enemy whose squadron defeated them. Better, far
better draft the squadron and send the leader to another arm or work
if, unfortunately, he has survived. Why be so severe? Why treat them
thus? Because the heart, the _moral_ of the defeated squadron has lost
two-thirds, whilst the winning squadron is elated, believes in itself
and its leader, and despises the enemy. It will charge three squadrons
next time and will not turn. Still keeping before us the idea of a
wall moving at speed, let us consider what better fortune it may have;
it may catch the enemy on a half flank, or full in flank.
Place a row of books standing quite an inch or two apart from each
other, hurl a spare book at the end book, and see what happens. At
least four or five will fall down. “Ten men on the flanks and rear (of
the enemy) do more than one hundred riding in front.”
Trusting that this idea of a knee-to-knee charge, the cardinal point,
has been made clear, let us consider the other matters which a squadron
leader should keep before him when opposed to cavalry. He must utilize
surprise, what Galliffet refers to as “the horrible and unexpected”; he
should always be “the first to attack, always take the initiative, and
charge resolutely.” Again, our leader must utilize the ground: first,
its hollows and ridges must be accommodated to his tactics; secondly,
he should try to give the enemy bad ground, ground which will tire
or disintegrate them whilst he himself uses the best, since a ditch,
narrow drain, or small nullah diagonal to his front, a fallen tree, a
patch of boggy land, a few rabbit holes, some thorns or rocks may mean
two or three men and horses down or out of place.
It is certain that an enemy who sees your squadron disappear in a
hollow, as you advance towards him, will, nine times out of ten, expect
it to continue its direction towards him; here, then, a wheel to the
flank, a gallop of a hundred yards or so, followed by a change of
direction, and later a wheel into line, may give the opportunity of a
lifetime.
These may appear small things, but they must be second nature to a
cavalry leader as they are to some, and those the most dangerous, wild
animals; for in the skilled utilization of these small things lies his
honour and hopes of success.
Watch the cat tribe: deliberate preparations, every advantage taken
of cover in the stealthy advance, then the gathering of the limbs
under--for the rush. From a fighting point of view we want every
instinct of this kind; with the cavalry there is no place for
“Gentlemen of the Guard, fire first”--cunning, nerve, unflinching
resolution, reckless, bloody-minded intrepidity, and with all this
the power to inspire your command, even those of doubtful courage,
with the certainty of success; though they must know some cannot come
back, still they like to be deceived, to die, or to be maimed, fierce,
high-hearted, happy, and elated. The sight of the enemy’s backs makes
them all brave.
And then we re-formed and went at them once more,
And ere they had rightly closed up the old track,
We broke through the lane we had opened before,
And as we went forward e’en so we came back.
LINDSAY GORDON.
THE RALLY
An endeavour has been made, then, to show that the success of the
charge lies: first, in the ordered momentum of the unit; second, in the
suitable application of this by the leader. Disciplined experience
turns the scale. First, the impact, lessened in degree as one side
turns sooner or later. Then the mêlée. These beaten back, the others
victorious; these looking for safety, the others for victims. Now,
at this moment the wild man’s first instinct is to pursue “all out,”
without a reserve, to kill, perhaps, a weaker instinct, to capture, or
to plunder. A new element of disorder follows on this mad desire to
cast prudence to the winds and pursue, _l’épée dans les reins_.
Once more the governing mind of the leader must assert itself, his
foresight and knowledge must reign supreme and repress the natural
instinct of the many; he by voice and example must rally his squadron.
Failing this, or a portion of his squadron held in reserve, his
horsemen are a prey to the first formed body which attacks them, though
of inferior strength.[20] “That side which is able to throw in the
last-formed body will win.” So excited is his command and so irregular
their course of action, that he will have great difficulty in getting
them to obey him. _Cavalry Training_, p. 128, realizes this:
As the pursuers will be in disorder and consequently at the mercy
of any fresh body of the enemy’s cavalry, the necessity of
organizing a support without delay is imperative.
Here let us remember that we have glorious traditions. The name of
Cromwell inspires very diverse thoughts in the British Isles. To the
Irish, battered walls; to the Scots, ruthless discipline; to the
English, a constitution upheld or a monarchy overturned. Suitable
memories of our great cavalry leader.[21] To the cavalryman what does
this man, who can still inspire such diverse thoughts in nations,
represent?
The highest attribute in a general is that he should be able to order
the elements of disorder. War is the acme of disorder. The instant
conversion of the available remnants out of disorder, chaos, a hundred
wishes, shouts and orders, broken legs, loose horses, dead or wounded,
men fierce and reckless, constitutes the triumph of discipline and the
guiding foreseeing mind.
In minutes, perhaps seconds, the enemy’s support or reserve, taking
advantage in turn of our disorder, will be upon us; we who have ceased
to be a wall, and are now scattered masonry, must be built up, so as
at any rate to _look_ formidable and to make those of the enemy, who
as individuals still bravely dispute the ground, turn and fly, and
perhaps throw into disorder the ranks of those who are coming to their
support. More than this, we must move in the direction of the enemy,
as though we still wished to fight. As wind is caught, stunned men
regain their senses, disabled horses exchanged for sound ones captured
at hazard, broken weapons replaced, the ranks refill, order at last
prevails.
We have laid stress on the rally of the squadron,[22] but hardly less
important is the maxim that the victory rests with those who can last
throw a formed body into the combat. This may be the support of which
De Brack says:[23]
Almost all the failures of charges are due to the slowness or
ignorance of the supports. A charge badly supported, no matter
how bravely begun, becomes only a bloody affray, whilst one well
supported is always victorious and decisive.
Let us, then, for our guidance, and before considering larger forces,
formed of many squadrons and supplied with another element of offence
in their horse artillery, consider what conclusions are arrived at from
the fight of squadron _v._ squadron. They appear to be:--
1. Provided that there is space to manœuvre and fight, that
cavalry which can manœuvre with cohesion at the greatest pace will
win.
2. The element of surprise affects the result.
3. The utilization of terrain is a _sine qua non_.
4. A flank attack is the object to be aimed at.
5. On the quickness with which the rally is carried out much
depends.
6. A skilled direction of the support influences the action.