THE ACADIANS BECOME THE FOOTBALL OF FORTUNE.
As time went on the Acadians became impatient at the delay in settling
the limits of Acadia. In vain they were annually told the boundaries
would soon be determined, all negotiation proved fruitless. Those who
had crossed the isthmus into what is now the County of Westmorland
found themselves undecided as to their future course. Their
inclination--a very natural one--seems to have been to return to the
fields they had abandoned, but the Abbe Le Loutre urged them to remain
under French rule as the only way of enjoying unmolested the
privileges of their religion. For their encouragement and protection
Fort Beausejour was erected.
In the month of January, 1754, Lieut.-Governor Lawrence informed the
Lords of Trade that the French were hard at work making settlements on
the St. John and were offering great inducements to the Acadians of
the peninsula to join them. He could not prevent some families from
going, but the greater part were too much attached to their lands to
leave them. In the opinion of Lawrence it was absolutely necessary,
for the development and control of Acadia as an English colony, that
the forts of Beausejour and the mouth of the River St. John should be
destroyed, and the French driven from the settlements they were
establishing north of the Bay of Fundy. Although the Indians had
committed no hostilities for two years, he believed no dependence
could be placed on their quietude so long as the French were allowed
to exercise their disturbing influence among them.
Lawrence now began to consult with the Governor of Massachusetts, Sir
William Shirley, about the removal of the Acadians from Chignecto and
the River St. John. He proposed that two thousand troops should be
raised in New England, which with the regular troops already in Nova
Scotia would be sufficient for the business, the command of the
expedition to be given to Colonel Robert Monckton. It was intended the
expedition should sail from Boston about the 20th of April, but it was
delayed more than a month awaiting the arrival of arms from England,
and it was not until early in June that it arrived at Chignecto. To
aid the expedition Captain Rous[32] was sent with a small squadron to
the Bay of Fundy. The details of the seige of Fort Beausejour need not
here be given, suffice it to say that after four days' bombardment the
Sieur de Vergor was obliged, on the 16th June, to surrender to Colonel
Monckton.
[32] Capt. John Rous in his early career commanded a Boston
privateer. Having distinguished himself in several minor
expeditions, he commanded the Massachusetts galley "Shirley,"
of 24 guns, at the first seige of Louisbourg, and bore the
news of the surrender to England, where as a reward for his
gallant services he was made a captain in the Royal Navy. He
commanded the Sutherland of 50 guns, at the second seige of
Louisbourg, and was with Wolfe in 1759 at the seige of Quebec.
It was from his ship Wolfe issued his last order before
storming the heights. Capt. Rous died at
Captain Rous, with three twenty-gun ships and a sloop, immediately
sailed for St. John, where it was reported the French had two ships of
thirty-six guns each. He anchored outside the harbor and sent his
boats to reconnoitre. They found no French ships and on their
appearance Boishebert, the officer in command of the fort, burst his
cannon, blew up his magazine, burned everything he could and marched
off. The next morning the Indians invited Captain Rous ashore and gave
him the strongest assurances of their desire to make peace with the
English, saying that they had refused to assist the French.
A few weeks after Boishebert had been thus obliged to abandon Fort
Menagouche there occurred the tragic event known as the "Acadian
Expulsion." The active agents employed by Lawrence and Shirley in this
transaction were Colonel Monckton and his subordinates, of whom
Lieut.-Colonel John Winslow and Capt. Murray were the most actively
engaged. These officers evidently had little relish for the task
imposed on them. Winslow in his proclamation to the inhabitants of
Grand Pre, Minas, etc., says: "The duty I am now upon, though
necessary, is very disagreeable to my natural make and temper." The
hostility of the New England troops to the Acadians added to the
difficulties of their officers. Murray wrote to Winslow: "You know our
soldiers hate them, and if they can find a pretence to kill them they
will."
Of recent years there has been much controversy concerning the
expulsion of the Acadians and widely differing opinions have been
expressed on the one hand by Parkman, Murdoch, Hannay, Hind and Aikins
and on the other by Casgrain, Richard, Porier, Gaudet and Savary. Upon
the merits of this controversy it is not necessary to enter, and it
will be more in keeping with our present subject to refer to the
Acadian Expulsion only as it concerns the history of events on the
River St. John.
The position of the Sieur de Boishebert after the capture of
Beausejour and the fort at St. John was a very embarassing one. His
letter to the Chevalier de Drucour, who commanded at Louisbourg, is of
interest in this connection.
"At the River St. John, 10 October, 1755.
"Monsieur,--As the enemy has constantly occupied the route of
communication since the fall of Beausejour, I have not had the
honor of informing you of the state of affairs at this place.
"I was compelled to abandon the fort--or rather the buildings--that
I occupied on the lower part of the river in accordance with
orders that I had received in case of being attacked. I have beaten
a retreat as far as the narrows (detroits) of the river, from
which the enemy has retired, not seeing any advantage sufficient
to warrant an attempt to drive me from thence.
"I have succeeded, sir, in preventing the inhabitants of this
place from falling under the domination of the English.
"Monsieur de Vaudreuil, approving this manoeuvre, has directed me
to establish a temporary camp (camp volant) sit such place as I
may deem most suitable. Even were I now to go to Quebec he could
not give me any assistance, all the troops and militia being in
the field.
"I received on the 16th of August a letter from the principal
inhabitants living in the vicinity of Beausejour beseeching me to
come to their assistance. I set out the 20th with a detachment of
125 men, French and Indians."
Shortly after his arrival at the French settlements on the Petitcodiac,
Boishebert had a sharp engagement with a party of New England troops
who had been sent there to burn the houses of the Acadians and who
were about to set fire to their chapel. The conflict occurred near
Hillsboro, the shiretown of Albert county, and resulted in a loss to
the English of one officer and five or six soldiers killed, and a
lieutenant and ten soldiers wounded, while Boishebert's loss was one
Indian killed and three wounded. He returned shortly afterwards to
the River St. John accompanied by thirty destitute families with whom
he was obliged to share the provisions sent him from Quebec.
Evidently the Marquis de Vaudreuil relied much upon the sagacity and
courage of his lieutenant on the St. John river in the crisis that had
arisen in Acadia. In his letter to the French colonial minister, dated
the 18th October, 1755, he writes that the English were now masters of
Fort Beausejour and that Boishebert, the commander of the River St.
John, had burnt his fort, not being able to oppose the descent of the
enemy. He had given him orders to hold his position on the river and
supplies had been sent him for the winter. He hoped that Father
Germain, then at Quebec, would return without delay to his Indian
mission and act in concert with Boishebert. The marquis summarises his
reasons for wishing to maintain the post on the River St. John as
follows:--
"1. As long as I hold this river and have a detachment of troops
there I retain some hold upon Acadia for the King, and the English
cannot say that they have forced the French to abandon it.
2. I am assured of the fidelity of the Acadians and the Indians,
who otherwise might think themselves abandoned and might yield to
the English.
3. Mon. de Boishebert will rally the Acadians from far and near
and will try to unite them and their families in one body. These
Acadians, so reunited, will be compelled for their own security
actively to resist the enemy if he presents himself.
4. Mon. de Boishebert will in like manner be engaged rallying the
savages and forming of them a body equally important, and by
corresponding with M. Manach, the missionary at Miramichi, will be
able, in case of necessity, to unite the savages of that mission
to his own in opposing the advance of the enemy.
5. He will be able constantly to have spies at Beausejour and
Halifax, and to take some prisoners who will inform him of the
situation and strength of the English.
6. He will be able to organize parties of Acadians and savages to
harras the enemy continually and hinder his obtaining firewood for
the garrison at Beausejour (Fort Cumberland).
7. By holding the River St. John I can at all times have news from
Louisbourg."
The Marquis adds that even if France failed to establish her claim to
the territory north of the Bay of Fundy and should be forced to
abandon it he hoped, by the aid of Boishebert and the missionaries, to
withdraw the Acadians and their Indian allies to Canada. The Acadians
north of the isthmus he estimated were about two thousand (perhaps
3,000 would have been nearer the truth) of whom seven hundred were
capable of bearing arms. "It would be vexatious," adds the Marquis,
"if they should pass to the English."
After Boishebert was forced to retire from the mouth of the River St.
John he established himself at a "detroit," or "narrows," up the
river, where he constructed a small battery, two guns of a calibre of
2L., and twelve swivel guns. The following summer he entertained no
fears as to his security. He had made an intrenchment in a favorable
situation and hoped if the English should venture an attack to have
the best of it. "I have particularly recommended him," writes the
governor, "not to erect any fortifications which might in case of some
unfortunate event be hurtful to us, to retain always a way of retreat
and to use every effort to harass the enemy ceaselessly, day and
night, until he shall have reduced him to the stern necessity of
re-embarking."
There are but two places on the lower St. John to which the word
"detroit" could apply, namely the "Narrows" just above Indiantown,
near the mouth of the river, and the narrows at "Evandale," a little
above the mouth of the Bellisle[33]; the latter is the more
probable location. The situation as a point of observation and for
defence of the settlements above could not be excelled, while at the
same time it was not sufficiently near the sea to attract attention on
the part of an English cruiser. It is therefore quite probable that
the old fort at Worden's, erected during the war of 1812, the remains
of which are in a fair state of preservation and are often visited by
tourists, was built on the site occupied by Boishebert's "Camp
Volant" of 1755, afterwards fortified by him and for some little time
his headquarters.
[33] See under "Nid d'Aigle," Ganong's Place-Nomenclature of New
Brunswick, p. 257. D'Anville's map of 1755 shows here
"Etabliss't. Francois," signifying French Post or Settlement.
See observations already made at page 91.
From the month of October to the end of December, 1755, nearly seven
thousand of the unfortunate Acadians were removed from their homes and
dispersed amongst the American colonies along the Atlantic seaboard as
far south as Georgia and the Carolinas. A fleet of two ships, three
snows, and a brigantine, under convoy of the "Baltimore" sloop of war,
sailed from Annapolis Royal on the morning of the 8th December. On
board the fleet were 1,664 exiles of all ages whose destinations were
Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York and South Carolina. One of the
snows[34] had her mainmast broken in a heavy gale just before her
arrival at Annapolis and Charles Belliveau, a ship-builder and
navigator of experience, was employed to replace the broken mast,
which he did in a workmanlike manner; but upon his claiming payment
for the job the captain laughed in his face. Belliveau, indignant at
such treatment, seized his axe to cut down the mast and this brought
the captain to terms.
[34] A snow was a vessel similar to a brig; the Marquis de Vaudreull
says the one above referred to was a Portuguese vessel.
It chanced that shortly afterwards Belliveau and a number of his
unfortunate compatriots (32 families, 225 persons in all) were placed
on board this vessel to be transported to South Carolina. The
"Baltimore" only went as far as New York and the snow, with Belliveau
and his friends on board, was left to pursue the rest of her voyage
unattended; not, however, without a parting caution on the part of the
commander of the "Baltimore" to her captain to be careful, for amongst
his captives were same good seamen. This advice was not heeded as the
sequel will show.
The voyage proved a tedious one and from time to time small parties of
the Acadians were allowed on deck for air and exercise. A plot was
laid to seize the ship. Accordingly six of the stoutest and boldest
lay in readiness, and when those on deck were ordered below and the
hatchway opened to allow them to descend, Belliveau and his friends
sprang from the hold and in the twinkling of an eye were engaged in a
desperate struggle with the crew. Reinforced by those who followed,
the master of the vessel and his crew of eight men were soon
overpowered and tied fast.
Belliveau, the leader of the spirited encounter, now took the helm and
the course of the ship was reversed. Under full sail she careened to
the wind until her former master cried to Belliveau that he would
certainly break the main mast. He replied: "No fear of that; I made it
and it is a good one."
In due time the vessel reached the Bay of Fundy without other
adventure than a trifling conflict with an English privateer, which
was beaten off without loss. The French soon after released and put on
shore the English captain and his crew, and on the 8th day of January
anchored safely in the harbor of St John.[35]
[35] The incident related above is mentioned by several writers,
French and English, but the details were gathered by Placide
P. Gaudet about twenty years ago from an old Acadian of
remarkable memory and intelligence, whose grandfather was a
brother of Charles Belliveau.
The names of most of the families who arrived at St. John in this ship
have been preserved, including those of Charles Belliveau, Charles
Dugas, Denis St. Sceine, Joseph Guilbault, Pierre Gaudreau, Denis St.
Sceine, jr., M. Boudrault and two families of Grangers.
Charles Belliveau, the hero of the adventure just related, was born at
the Cape at Port Royal about 1696; he married in 1717 Marie Madeleine
Granger and had eight children whose descendants today are numerous.
On the 8th of February, 1756, an English schooner entered the harbor
of St. John, under French colors, having on board a party of Rangers
disguised as French soldiers. Governor Lawrence writes to Shirley: "I
had hopes by such a deceit, not only to discover what was doing there
but to bring off some of the St. John's Indians. The officer found
there an English ship, one of our transports that sailed from
Annapolis Royal with French Inhabitants aboard bound for the continent
(America), but the inhabitants had risen upon the master and crew and
carried the ship into that harbor; our people would have brought her
off, but by an accident they discovered themselves too soon, upon
which the French set fire to the ship."
We learn from French sources that on this occasion the captain of the
English vessel made some French signals and sent his shallop on shore
with four French deserters, who announced that they had come from
Louisbourg with supplies and that other ships were on their way with
the design of re-establishing the fort at the mouth of the river and
so frustrating a similar design on the part of the English. The story
seemed so plausible that an unlucky Acadian went on board the ship to
pilot her to her anchorage, but no sooner was he on board than the
captain hoisted his own proper flag and discharged his artillery upon
the people collected on shore. Belliveau and the people who had lately
escaped transportation to South Carolina were living in huts on shore
and perceiving that the English were approaching with the design of
carrying off the vessel in which they had escaped, they succeeded in
landing some swivel guns and having placed them in a good position
made so lively a fire upon the enemy that they soon abandoned the idea
of a descent and returned to Annapolis Royal.
The sole result, of this bit of strategy seems to have been the
capture of one poor Frenchman from whom the English learned that the
Indians had gone, some to Passamaquoddy and others with Boishebert to
Cocagne, also that there was "a French officer and about 20 men
twenty-three miles up the River at a place called St. Anns."
The Indians who had gone to Passamaquoddy managed to surprise at night
a large schooner lying at anchor in Harbor L'Elang, bound from Boston
to Annapolis Royal with provisions for the garrison. The schooner
carried six guns and had on board a crew of ten men besides her
captain and an artillery officer of the Annapolis garrison. The vessel
was carried to St. John and hidden on the lower part of the river. The
savages pillaged her so completely that on her arrival there remained
only a small quantity of bacon and a little rum. The prisoners were
sent by Boishebert to Canada along with others captured on various
occasions.
The Acadian refugees continued to come to the River St. John in
increasing numbers, and Boishebert and the missionaries soon found
themselves reduced to sore straits in their endeavors to supply them
with the necessaries of life. The Marquis de Vaudreuil was determined
to hold the St. John river country as long as possible. He wrote the
French minister, June 1, 1756: "I shall not recall M. de Boishebert
nor the missionaries, nor withdraw the Acadians into the heart of the
colony until the last extremity, and when it shall be morally
impossible to do better." It was his intention to send provisions and
munitions of war to the Acadians and Indians.
Boishebert was endeavoring at this time, with the approval of the
Marquis de Vaudreuil, to draw as many of the Acadians as possible to
the River St. John and to induce them to oppose any advance on the
part of the English. The French commander, however, soon found his
position an exceedingly difficult one. After sending many families to
Quebec and to the Island of St. John he had still six hundred people,
besides the Indians, to provide for during the winter, and many
refugees from Port Royal and elsewhere desired to come to the River
St. John. The number of Acadians dependent on him received additions
from time to time by the arrival of exiles returning from the south.
In the month of June five families numbering fifty persons, arrived
from Carolina and told Boishebert that eighty others were yet to
arrive.
The difficulties surmounted by these poor people in the pathetic
endeavor to return to their old firesides seem almost incredible. A
small party of Acadians of the district of Beaubassin, at the head of
the Bay of Fundy, were transported to South Carolina. They traveled
thence on foot to Fort Du Quesne (now Pittsburg) from which place they
were transported to Quebec. One might have thought they would have
been well satisfied to have remained there, but no, so great was their
attachment to their beloved Acadia that they would not rest content
until they had arrived at the River St. John.
The idea that dominated the Marquis de Vaudreuil in providing these
unfortunates with the necessaries of life seems to have been to
utilize their services for the defence of Canada. "It would not be
proper," he says, "that they should be at the charges of the King
without giving tangible proof of their zeal for the service of his
majesty." The governor not being able to provide for all the refugees
at the River St. John, on account of the difficulty of transporting
supplies by way of Temiscouata, gave directions to the Sieur de
Boishebert to send to Miramichi the families he could not subsist on
the St. John. The number of Acadians at Miramichi soon amounted to
3,500 persons.
The ensuing winter proved most trying to the destitute Acadians. The
harvest had been extremely poor. In some cases the old inhabitants had
nothing to live upon but the grain needed for seeding in the spring
time. The conditions at Miramichi were probably not more wretched than
on the River St. John. Of the former the Marquis de Vaudreuil writes
in the following plaintive terms:----
"This part of Acadia holds out for the King although reduced to the
most wretched state. Although ourselves in want, M. Bigot has sent a
vessel with provisions to Miramichi, but she has unfortunately been
delayed on the way by head winds. The misery of the Acadians there is
so great that Boishebert has been compelled to reduce their allowance
to ten pounds of peas and twelve pounds of meat per month, and it
would have been further reduced had not forty bullocks been brought
from Petitcodiac. This was the allowance for the month of January and,
the fishery being exhausted, he could not hope to have the same
resource the months following. In a word the Acadian mothers see their
babes die at the breast not having wherewith to nourish them. The
majority of the people cannot appear abroad for want of clothes to
cover their nakedness. Many have died. The number of the sick is
considerable, and those convalescent cannot regain their strength on
account of the wretched quality of their food, being often under the
necessity of eating horse meat extremely lean, sea-cow, and skins of
oxen. Such is the state of the Acadians.
"The intendant, M. Bigot, is going to send a ship, as soon as the ice
breaks, to carry such supplies as we can furnish them. Unless some
assistance is sent by sea, the lands, cattle, and effects hidden in
the woods must all be sacrificed, and the Acadians obliged to go
elsewhere."
At the beginning of the year 1756, the governors of Massachusetts and
Nova Scotia discussed the situation of affairs on the St. John river,
and agreed that steps must be taken as soon as possible to dislodge
the French.
In one of his letters to Governor Lawrence, Shirley observes, "I look
upon dispossessing the French of the St. John River, and fortifying
it, to be necessary for securing the Bay of Fundy and the Peninsula
against attempts from Canada. * * * If I am rightly informed, nothing
hath yet been done towards it, except making a visit up the River as
far as the lower Fort, near the mouth of it, upon which the French
abandoned it, having first destroyed the stores and burst the cannon,
and there still remain the settlements they have above that Fort, by
means of which they keep the Indians inhabiting it in a dependence
upon them, and have a passage across a carrying place into the River
Patcotyeak (Petitcodiac) whereby a communication may be maintained
between St. John's River and Cape Breton across the Gulf of St.
Lawrence." In another letter Shirley wrote that it was essential the
French should be dislodged from the St. John and their settlements
broken up, since, if suffered to remain, they would soon be very
strong and able to maintain communication by the river with Canada,
depriving the English of the fur trade upon it and maintaining
absolute control of the Indians.
The Indians were at this time decidedly hostile to the English and
Lawrence determined to wage against them a merciless warfare.
Accordingly, with the advice and approval of his council, he issued a
proclamation offering a reward of L30 for every Indian warrior brought
in alive, a reward of L25 for the scalp of every male Indian above the
age of sixteen years, and for every woman or child brought in alive
the sum of L25; these rewards to be paid by the commanding officer at
any of His Majesty's Forts in the Province on receiving the prisoners
or scalps.
This cold-blooded and deliberately issued proclamation of the chief
magistrate of Nova Scotia and his council can scarcely be excused on
the plea that the Abbe Le Loutre and other French leaders had at
various times rewarded their savage allies for bringing in the scalps
of Englishmen. As for the savages, they had, at least, the apology
that they made war in accordance with the manner of their race,
whereas the proclamation of the Governor of Nova Scotia was unworthy
of an enlightened people. Nothing could be better calculated to lower
and brutalize the character of a soldier than the offer of L25 for a
human scalp.
About this time, two of the New England regiments were disbanded and
returned to their homes, their period of enlistment having expired,
and the difficulty of obtaining other troops prevented anything being
attempted on the St. John for a year or two. Lawrence and Shirley,
however, continued to discuss the details of the proposed expedition.
Both governors seem to have had rather vague ideas of the number of
the Acadians on the river and the situation of their settlements.
Shirley says he learned from the eastern Indians and New England
traders that their principal settlement was about ninety miles up the
river at a place called St. Annes, six miles below the old Indian town
of Aukpaque. He thought that 800 or 1,000 men would be a force
sufficient to clear the river of the enemy and that after they were
driven from their haunts the English would do well to establish a
garrison of 150 men at St. Annes, in order to prevent the return of
the French and to overawe the Indians. He also recommended that the
fort at the mouth of the river, lately abandoned by Boishebert, should
be rebuilt and a garrison of 50 men placed there.
During the years that followed the expulsion of the Acadians
occasional parties of the exiles, returning from the south, arrived at
the River St. John, where they waited to see what the course of
events might be. Their condition was truly pitiable. Some had
journeyed on foot or by canoe through an unexplored wilderness;
others, from the far away Carolinas, having procured small vessels,
succeeded in creeping furtively along the Atlantic coast from one
colony to another until they reached the Bay of Fundy; and thus the
number of the Acadians continued to increase until Boishebert had more
than a thousand people under his care. Some of them he sent to Canada,
for his forces were insufficient for their protection, and his
supplies were scanty.
The locations of the French settlements on the river at this period
are described in detail in Dr. Ganong's "Historic Sites in New
Brunswick." The largest settlement, and that farthest up the St. John,
was at St. Annes Point, where the City of Fredericton stands today.
Here the Acadians had cleared 600 or 700 acres of land and built a
thriving village with a little chapel (near the site of Government
House) and probably there was a sprinkling of houses along the river
as far up as the Indian village of Aukpaque, six miles above. Their
next settlement was at the mouth of the Oromocto, where 300 acres of
land had been cleared. A very old settlement existed near the
abandoned fort at the mouth of the Jemseg, but its growth had been
retarded by the annoyances of the spring freshets and many of the
inhabitants had been obliged to remove. There was an important
settlement on the site now occupied by the village of Gagetown and
houses were scattered along the river for several miles below. Another
small settlement existed above the mouth of the Bellisle, and there
may have been a few inhabitants at the mouth of the Nerepis where
stood Fort Boishebert. At St. John the French had cleared some land on
the west side of the harbor, and in Bruce's map of 1761 the places
cleared are marked as "gardens," but it is probable that the
inhabitants abandoned them and fled up the river in 1755 when their
fort, "Menagoueche," was destroyed by Captain Rous.
In the year 1756 England declared war against France and the capture
of Louisbourg was proposed. The governor of Canada ordered Boishebert
to hold himself in readiness to aid in its defence, and he accordingly
proceeded to Cape Breton with a force of 100 Acadians and Canadians
and about 250 Indians, many of them Maliseets of the River St. John.
The latter did not go very willingly, for they had been reduced to so
great a state of misery in consequence of not receiving the supplies
they had expected from the French that they had entered into peace
negotiations with the English. However by means of harangues and
promises Boishebert contrived to bring them with him.
The Chevalier de Drucour, the commander at Louisbourg, urged the
French minister to send at once presents and supplies for the savages.
"These people," he observes, "are very useful in the kind of warfare
we are making, but unless we act towards them as they have been led to
expect I will not answer that we shall have them with us next year."
He urges the French minister to send him some medals for distribution.
The distinction of possessing one was very highly prized and often
retained the fidelity of a whole village of the savages.
The expected assault of Louisbourg did not take place until 1758 and
Boishebert, who had retired to Canada, was ordered to repair thither.
The Marquis de Montcalm wrote from Montreal to the French minister,
April 10th, "Monsieur Boishebert, captain of troops of the colony,
leaves in the course of a few days, if the navigation of the St.
Lawrence is open, to proceed to the River St. John and thence to
Louisbourg with a party of 600 men, including Canadians, Acadians and
savages of Acadia."
The governor and other officials at Quebec seem to have placed every
confidence in the courage and capacity of Boishebert, who, it may be
here mentioned received this year the Cross of St. Louis in
recognition of his services in Acadia. "It is certain," writes the
Marquis de Vaudreuil, "that if, when the former siege of Louisbourg
took place, the governor there had agreed to the proposal to send
Marin thither with a force of Canadians and Indians the place would
not have fallen, and if Boishebert were now to collect 200 Acadians
and 200 St. John river Indians and the Micmacs he would be able to
form a camp of 600 or 700 men, and Drucour could frequently place the
besiegers between two fires."
The expectations of Montcalm and de Vaudreuil as to the usefulness of
Boishebert's detachment in the defence of Louisbourg were doomed to
disappointment, for Boishebert did not arrive at Louisbourg until near
the end of the siege and with forces not one-third of the number that
Drucour had been led to expect. Two depots of provisions had been
placed in the woods for the use of the detachment, but the fact that
Boishebert had only about 120 Acadians and a few Indians in addition
to a handful of regulars, entirely frustrated Drucour's design of
harrassing the attacking English by a strong demonstration in their
rear. About twenty of Boishebert's Indians were engaged in a skirmish
with the English and two of their chiefs having fallen the rest were
so discouraged that they returned to their villages. Boishebert
himself had a few unimportant skirmishes with outlying parties of the
English, and then came the news of the surrender of Louisbourg. He
immediately sent away the sick of his detachment, set fire to a
thousand cords of wood and a quantity of coal to prevent its falling
into the hands of the enemy, and on the 29th July set out on his
return to the St. John river. The English made a lively but fruitless
pursuit.
Boishebert left his sick at Miramichi, and having sent sixty
prisoners, whom he had taken on various occasions, to Quebec, he then
took part in an expedition against Fort George, on the coast of Maine,
where he gained more honor than at the seige of Louisbourg.[36] He
returned to Quebec in November, and about the same time there was an
exodus from the River St. John, both of Acadians and Indians, the
reason for which the next chapter will explain. From this time the
Sieur de Boishebert ceases to be an actor in the events on the St.
John, and becomes merely an on-looker.
[36] The Chevalier Johnson writes, "Boishebert came early in the
Spring to Louisbourg with several hundred men, 12 Canadian
Officers and 6 others from the garrison of Louisbourg; and he
kept his detachment with such prudence so concealed at Miry
during the siege, five leagues from Louisbourg, that neither
the English nor the garrison had ever any news of them."
[Illustration: MAJOR GENERAL ROBERT MONCKTON.]