2. Our strategy must be primarily offensive in nature. Given the
dynamic, revolutionary character of the enemy’s challenge, we cannot
win merely by trying to hold our own. In addition to parrying his
blows, we must strike our own. In addition to guarding our frontiers,
we must try to puncture his. In addition to keeping the free world
free, we must try to make the Communist world free. To these ends,
we must always try to engage the enemy at times and places, and with
weapons, of our own choosing.
3. We must strive to achieve and maintain military superiority.
Mere parity will not do. Since we can never match the Communists
in manpower, our equipment and weapons must more than offset his
advantage in numbers. We must also develop a limited war capacity. For
this latter purpose, we should make every effort to achieve decisive
superiority in small, clean nuclear weapons.
4. We must make America economically strong. We have already seen why
economic energy must be released from government strangulation if
individual freedom is to survive. Economic emancipation is equally
imperative if the nation is to survive. America’s maximum economic
power will be forged, not under bureaucratic direction, but in freedom.
5. In all of our dealings with foreign nations, we must behave like a
great power. Our national posture must reflect strength and confidence
and purpose, as well as good will. We need not be bellicose, but
neither should we encourage others to believe that American rights
can be violated with impunity. We must protect American nationals and
American property and American honor--everywhere. We may not make
foreign peoples love us--no nation has ever succeeded in that--but
we can make _them respect us_. And _respect_ is the stuff of which
enduring friendships and firm alliances are made.
6. We should adopt a discriminating foreign aid policy. American aid
should be furnished only to friendly, anti-Communist nations that are
willing to join with us in the struggle for freedom. Moreover, our aid
should take the form of loans or technical assistance, not gifts. And
we should insist, moreover, that such nations contribute their fair
share to the common cause.
7. We should declare the world Communist movement an outlaw in the
community of civilized nations. Accordingly, we should withdraw
diplomatic recognition from all Communist governments including that of
the Soviet Union, thereby serving notice on the world that we regard
such governments as neither legitimate nor permanent.
8. We should encourage the captive peoples to revolt against their
Communist rulers. This policy must be pursued with caution and
prudence, as well as courage. For while our enslaved friends must
be told we are anxious to help them, we should discourage premature
uprisings that have no chance of success. The freedom fighters must
understand that the time and place and method of such uprisings will
be dictated by the needs of an overall world strategy. To this end we
should establish close liaison with underground leaders behind the
Iron Curtain, furnishing them with printing presses, radios, weapons,
instructors: the paraphernalia of a full-fledged Resistance.
9. We should encourage friendly peoples that have the means and desire
to do so to undertake offensive operations for the recovery of their
homelands. For example, should a revolt occur inside Red China, we
should encourage and support guerrilla operations on the mainland by
the Free Chinese. Should the situation develop favorably, we should
encourage the South Koreans and the South Vietnamese to join Free
Chinese forces in a combined effort to liberate the enslaved peoples of
Asia.
10. We must--ourselves--be prepared to undertake military operations
against vulnerable Communist regimes. Assume we have developed nuclear
weapons that can be used in land warfare, and that we have equipped our
European divisions accordingly. Assume also a major uprising in Eastern
Europe, such as occurred in Budapest in 1956. In such a situation,
we ought to present the Kremlin with an ultimatum forbidding Soviet
intervention, and be prepared, if the ultimatum is rejected, to move a
highly mobile task force equipped with appropriate nuclear weapons to
the scene of the revolt. Our objective would be to confront the Soviet
Union with superior force in the immediate vicinity of the uprising and
to compel a Soviet withdrawal. An actual clash between American and
Soviet armies would be unlikely; the mere threat of American action,
coupled with the Kremlin’s knowledge that the fighting would occur amid
a hostile population and could easily spread to other areas, would
probably result in Soviet acceptance of the ultimatum. The Kremlin
would also be put on notice, of course, that resort to long-range
bombers and missiles would prompt automatic retaliation in kind. On
this level, we would invite the Communist leaders to choose between
total destruction of the Soviet Union, and accepting a local defeat....
Had we the will and the means for it in 1956, such a policy would have
saved the Hungarian Revolution.
This is hard counsel. But it is hard, I think, not for what it says,
but for saying it openly. Such a policy involves the risk of war? Of
course; but any policy, short of surrender, does that. Any policy that
successfully frustrates the Communists’ aim of world domination runs
the risk that the Kremlin will choose to lose in a kamikaze-finish. It
is hard counsel because it frankly acknowledges that war may be the
price of freedom, and thus intrudes on our national complacency. But is
it really so hard when it goes on to search for the most likely means
of safeguarding both our lives _and_ our freedom? Is it so hard when
we think of the risks that were taken to create our country?--risks on
which our ancestors openly and proudly staked their “lives, fortunes,
and sacred honor.” Will we do less to _save_ our country?
The risks I speak of are risks on our terms, instead of on Communist
terms. _We_, not they, would select the time and place for a test
of wills. _We_, not they, would have the opportunity to bring
maximum strength to bear on that test. _They_, not we, would have to
decide between fighting for limited objectives under unfavorable
circumstances, or backing down. And these are immense advantages.
The future, as I see it, will unfold along one of two paths. Either
the Communists will retain the offensive; will lay down one challenge
after another; will invite us in local crisis after local crisis to
choose between all-out war and limited retreat; and will force us,
ultimately, to surrender or accept war under the most disadvantageous
circumstances. Or _we_ will summon the will and the means for taking
the initiative, and wage a war of attrition against them--and hope,
thereby, to bring about the internal disintegration of the Communist
empire. One course runs the risk of war, and leads, in any case, to
probable defeat. The other runs the risk of war, and holds forth the
promise of victory. For Americans who cherish their lives, but their
freedom more, the choice cannot be difficult.
* * * * *
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Transcriber’s Notes:
Footnotes have been moved to the end of each chapter and relabeled
consecutively through the document.
Punctuation has been made consistent.
Variations in spelling and hyphenation were retained as they appear in
the original publication, except that obvious typographical errors have
been corrected.
The following changes were made:
p. 46: is changed to are (conceived, are an)
p. 118: paring changed to parrying (to parrying his)