There is one aspect of our policy that _is_ offensive-minded--in the
minds of its authors, anyway. Its effect, unfortunately, is exactly
opposite to the one intended.
Some time ago our leaders advanced the theory that Communist satellite
regimes would, with our help, gradually break their ties with the
Soviet Union and “evolve” political systems more in keeping with our
notions of freedom and justice. Accordingly, America adopted the policy
of giving aid to Communist governments whose relations with Moscow
seemed to be strained. And that policy gave birth to a slogan: “America
seeks the liberation of enslaved peoples--not by revolution--but
through evolution.” Under the aegis of this slogan, we are sending
hundreds of millions of dollars to the Communist government of Poland,
having already given more than a billion dollars to the Communist
government of Yugoslavia.
In my view, this money has not only been wasted; it has positively
promoted the Communist cause. It has _not_ made Communist governments
less Communist. It has _not_ caused Communist governments to
change sides in the Cold War. It _has_ made it easier for Communist
governments to keep their subjects enslaved. And none of these results
should have come as a surprise.
One does not have to take the view that a Communist regime will never
“evolve” into a non-Communist one (though I tend to it) in order to
see that this is practically impossible as long as the Soviet Union
possesses the military and political power to prevent it. The Kremlin
may, for its own purposes, permit certain “liberalization” tendencies
in satellite countries; it may even permit small deviations from the
approved Soviet foreign policy line. It will do so sometimes to confuse
the West, sometimes as a prudent means of relieving internal pressures.
But it will never let things go too far. Hungary proved that. The
moment a Communist government threatens to become a non-Communist one,
or threatens to align itself with the West against the Soviet Union,
the Kremlin will take steps to bring the defecting government into line.
Hungary proved this truth, and Poland has proved that dissident
Communists learned it. Western leaders, unfortunately, were much
less perceptive. In the Fall of 1956, there appeared to be a breach
between Gomulka’s government and the Kremlin. Many Westerners joyfully
proclaimed that Poland was pulling away from Communism, and hoping
to hasten this movement, our government began to send the Gomulka
regime American aid. The succeeding years witnessed two facts: 1. Our
money made it easier for Gomulka’s regime to deal with its economic
problems; 2. Gomulka moved into an even closer relationship with the
Soviet government. Gomulka knew, as American policy-makers ought to
have known, that the price of abandoning Communism is a Budapest-type
blood bath. This, of course, need not be the case were America prepared
to come to the aid of people who want to strike out for freedom. But as
long as we give Soviet military forces a free hand in Eastern Europe,
it is the height of folly to try to bribe Communist governments into
becoming our friends.
We must realize that the captive _peoples_ are our friends and
potential allies--not their rulers. A truly offensive-minded strategy
would recognize that the captive peoples are our strongest weapon in
the war against Communism, and would encourage them to overthrow their
captors. A policy of strengthening their captors can only postpone that
upheaval within the Communist Empire that is our best hope of defeating
Communism without resorting to nuclear war.