Through NATO, SEATO and the Central Treaty Organization in mid-Asia,
we have served notice on the Kremlin that overt Communist aggression
in certain areas of the world will be opposed by American arms. It is
likely that the existence of these alliances has helped discourage
military adventurism by the Communists.
Still, we should not overestimate the value of the alliances. Though
they play a significant role in safeguarding American freedom, there
are a number of reasons why it is a limited role.
First, the alliance system is not co-extensive with the line that
must be held if enemy expansion is to be prevented. There are huge
areas of the non-Communist world that the alliances do not touch.
Nor--even assuming America is strong enough to guard a world-wide
defense perimeter--is there any prospect of bringing these areas
into the system. The so-called neutral countries of the Middle East,
Africa and Southern Asia have refused to align themselves with the
anti-Communist cause, and it is in those areas, as we might expect,
that the Communists are making significant strides. This is a critical
weakness. If all of those areas should fall under Communist rule, the
alliances would be outflanked everywhere: the system would be reduced
to a series of outposts, and probably indefensible ones at that, in a
wholly hostile world.
Secondly, the alliance system does not protect even its members against
the most prevalent kind of Communist aggression: political penetration
and internal subversion. Iraq is a case in point. We had pledged
ourselves to support the Iraqi against overt Soviet aggression--not
only under the Baghdad Pact of which Iraq was the cornerstone, but also
under the Eisenhower Doctrine. Iraq fell victim to a pro-Communist
coup without an American or Russian shot being fired. Cuba is another
example. If the Red Army had landed in Havana, we would have come to
Cuba’s aid. Castro’s forces, however, were native Cubans; as a result,
a pro-Communist regime has become entrenched on our very doorstep
through the technique of internal subversion. And so it will always be
with an enemy that lays even more emphasis on political warfare than on
military warfare. So it will be until we learn to meet the enemy on his
own grounds.
But thirdly, the alliance system cannot adequately protect its members
even against _overt_ aggression. In the past, the Communists have been
kept in check by America’s strategic air arm. Indeed, in the light of
the weakness of the allied nations’ conventional military forces, our
nuclear superiority has been the alliances’ only real weapon. But as
the Soviet Union draws abreast of us in nuclear strength, that weakness
could prove our undoing. In a nuclear stalemate, where neither side is
prepared to go “all out” over local issues, the side with the superior
conventional forces has an obvious advantage. Moreover, it is clear
that we cannot hope to match the Communist world man for man, nor are
we capable of furnishing the guns and tanks necessary to defend thirty
nations scattered over the face of the globe. The long-overdue answer,
as we will see later on, lies in the development of a nuclear capacity
for limited wars.
Finally--and I consider this the most serious defect of all--the
alliance system is completely defensive in nature and outlook. This
fact, in the light of the Communists’ dynamic, offensive strategy,
ultimately dooms it to failure. No nation at war, employing an
exclusively defensive strategy, can hope to survive for long. Like the
boxer who refuses to throw a punch, the defense-bound nation will be
cut down sooner or later. As long as every encounter with the enemy is
fought on his initiative, on grounds of his choosing and with weapons
of his choosing, we shall keep on losing the Cold War.