THE MARCH ON PETERSBURG.
In camp at Cold Harbor--Grant's opinion of Lee--Trouble with
newspaper correspondents--Moving south of the James River--The great
pontoon bridge--The fighting of the colored troops--Failure to take
Petersburg at first attack--Lee loses Grant and Beauregard finds
him--Beauregard's service to the Confederacy.
The affair of June 3d at Cold Harbor showed that Lee was not to be
driven from his position without a great sacrifice of life. A left flank
movement south of the James River was accordingly decided upon by Grant.
This was no new idea; that eventuality had been part of the original
plan of campaign, and preparations for bridging the James had been
ordered as early as the 15th of April, three weeks before the battle of
the Wilderness. One object of the movement across the James was to cut
off Richmond's line of supplies from the south. But before this could be
done another matter had to be attended to.
In General Grant's plan of campaign the effectual destruction of the
Virginia Central Railroad was an indispensable feature. In moving from
Culpeper he had expected that before reaching the Chickahominy he would
have a chance to crush Lee's army by fighting. This would have allowed
him an undisturbed opportunity to destroy that road, as well as the
Fredericksburg road from the Chickahominy to the North Anna. The
expectation had been disappointed by Lee's success in avoiding a
decisive battle. Before moving farther in accomplishing the great object
of the campaign, these roads must be so thoroughly destroyed that when
Richmond was cut off from other lines of communication with the south
the attempt to repair and use the line through Gordonsville and
Lynchburg would be hopeless. The work was first to be attempted by
Sheridan with cavalry. If he was not able to complete it, the whole army
was to be swung around for the purpose, even should it be necessary to
abandon temporarily our communications with White House.
This necessity, as well as that of making thorough preparations for the
difficult march south of the James and for the perfect co-operation of
Butler at Bermuda Hundred, detained Grant at Cold Harbor until June
12th. Two officers of his staff, Colonel Comstock and Colonel Porter,
had been sent to General Butler to arrange for co-operation in the
movement of the army to Bermuda Hundred, and to look over the ground to
be traversed and the means of crossing the river. Grant would not order
the movement until they returned. They did not get back until the 12th.
During this time the opposing lines of Grant and Lee were very close
together, and on our side the troops made regular siege approaches to
the Confederate works. The days passed quietly, with no fighting except
an occasional rattle of musketry and now and then a cannon shot. There
was occasionally a scare on the line. On the evening of June 5th
Wright's and Hancock's line responded to a stiff assault; the firing
lasted for twenty minutes, and it was very loud, but it was all about
nothing and no harm was done. The enemy were so near that in the dark
our men thought they were coming out to attack. On June 6th there was an
onslaught on Burnside just after midnight, which was successfully
repulsed, and in the afternoon a rush was made by a party of a hundred
picked men of the enemy, who came to find out what was the meaning of
Hancock's advancing siege lines. As a rule, everything was quiet except
the picket firing, which could not be prevented when the men were so
close together. The picket firing ceased only during the occasional
truces to bury the dead.
The operations around Cold Harbor, the close proximity of the two lines,
the unceasing firing, with no hour in the day or night when one could
not hear the sound of musketry and cannon, were precisely like the
conditions at Spottsylvania and those on the North Anna. It was a
constant feeling for the weak spot in Lee's armor. There was far less
maneuvering at Cold Harbor after the first efforts than during the long
struggle at Spottsylvania. We were merely waiting for the proper moment
to withdraw toward the James. Grant, Meade, and all the leading officers
were certain of ultimate success; although the fighting had been more
severe and continuous than anything in the previous history of the army,
I must say a cheerful, confident tone generally prevailed. All acted as
if they were at a job which required only time to finish.
Grant was disappointed, and talked to me a good deal about the failure
to get at Lee in an open battle which would wind up the Confederacy. The
general was constantly revolving plans to turn Lee out of his
intrenchments. The old-time fear of Lee's superior ability that was rife
among the officers of the Army of the Potomac had entirely disappeared.
They had begun to look upon him as an ordinary mortal, making a fairly
good effort to ward off fate, and nothing more. I think Grant respected
Lee's military ability and character, yet the boldness with which he
maneuvered in Lee's presence is proof that he was not overawed by Lee's
prestige as a strategist and tactician. He thought Lee's great forte was
as a defensive fighter, a quality displayed at Antietam and
Fredericksburg; but held no high opinion of his Chancellorsville
operations, where he had recklessly laid himself open to ruin. To me the
views of the military men at the different headquarters were interesting
and instructive.
While we were encamped at Cold Harbor, General Meade was very much
disturbed by a letter published in a Cincinnati paper, saying that after
the battle of the Wilderness he counselled retreat--a course which would
have destroyed the nation, but which Grant prohibited. This was entirely
untrue. Meade had not shown any weakness since moving from Culpeper, nor
once intimated doubt as to the successful issue of the campaign. Nor had
he intimated that any other plan or line would be more likely to win.
The newspaper correspondent who was responsible for the misstatement was
with us, and Meade ordered that, as a punishment, he should be paraded
through the lines and afterward expelled from the army. This was done
on June 8th, the correspondent being led through the army on horseback
by the provost-marshal guard. On his back and breast were tacked
placards inscribed, "Libeller of the Press."
It was not often, considering the conditions, that correspondents got
into trouble in the army. As a rule, they were discreet. Besides this
case of Meade, I remember now only one other in which I was actively
interested; that was a few months later, after I had returned to the
department. Mr. Stanton had been annoyed by a telegram which had been
published about Sherman's movements, and he ordered me to send it to the
general, so that we might know how much truth there was in it. I wired
him as follows:
WAR DEPARTMENT, _November 9, 1864_.
Major-General SHERMAN, Kingston, Ga.:
Following, copied from evening papers, is sent for your
information:
CINCINNATI, _November 9, 1864_.
"Yesterday's Indianapolis Journal says: 'Officers from Chattanooga
report that Sherman returned to Atlanta early last week with five
corps of his army, leaving two corps in Tennessee to watch Hood. He
destroyed the railroad from Chattanooga to Atlanta, and is sending
the iron into the former place. Atlanta was burned, and Sherman is
now marching for Charleston, S.C.'"
Sherman sent back two characteristic dispatches. The first ran:
KINGSTON, GA., _November 10, 1864_.
Hon. C. A. DANA:
Dispatch of 9th read. Can't you send to Indianapolis and catch
that fool and have him sent to me to work on the forts? All well.
W. T. SHERMAN, _Major General_.
The second:
KINGSTON, GA., _November 10, 1864_.
Hon. C. A. DANA, Assistant Secretary of War:
If indiscreet newspaper men publish information too near the truth,
counteract its effect by publishing other paragraphs calculated to
mislead the enemy, such as "Sherman's army has been re-enforced,
especially in the cavalry, and he will soon move several columns in
circuit, so as to catch Hood's army"; "Sherman's destination is not
Charleston, but Selma, where he will meet an army from the Gulf,"
etc.
W. T. SHERMAN, _Major General_.
So I telegraphed to Indianapolis to General A. P. Hovey, who was
stationed there:
WAR DEPARTMENT, _November 10, 1864_.
Major-General A. P. HOVEY, Indianapolis:
In compliance with the request of Major-General Sherman, the
Secretary of War directs that you ascertain what persons furnished
the information respecting Sherman's alleged movement published in
the Indianapolis Journal of the 8th inst. You will arrest them and
send them under guard to such point in the Department of the
Cumberland as Major-General Thomas may prefer, where they will be
employed in hard labor upon the fortifications until General
Sherman shall otherwise order.
General Hovey never found the man, however.
By the morning of the 12th of June Grant was ready for his last flank
movement of the campaign. Our army at that time, including Sheridan's
cavalry, consisted of approximately one hundred and fifteen thousand
fighting men. The plan for moving this great body was as follows: The
Eighteenth Corps was to move to White House without baggage or
artillery, and there embark for City Point. The Fifth Corps was to cross
the Chickahominy at Long Bridge, and take a position to secure the
passage of the remainder of the army, after which it was to cover the
rear. The Second, Sixth, and Ninth Corps were to cross in two columns at
Long Bridge and Jones's Bridge. At first it had been hoped, if not
opposed by the enemy in force, to strike James River immediately
opposite Bermuda Hundred; if resisted, then lower down, where General
Butler had been ordered to throw a bridge across and to corduroy the
approaches.
The Fifth Corps having prepared the way, the whole army left the lines
about Cold Harbor on schedule time, just as soon after nightfall on the
12th as its movements could be concealed from the observation of the
enemy. It was in drawing orders for such complicated movements as these,
along different roads and by different crossings, that the ability of
General Humphreys, the chief of staff, was displayed. Everything went
perfectly from the start. That evening at seven o'clock, when I reached
Moody's, four miles from Long Bridge, the Fifth Corps (Warren's) was
moving rapidly past us. Our cavalry advance, under General Wilson, who
had also been transferred to the East, had previously taken Long Bridge
and laid a pontoon bridge in readiness for the crossing, so that by nine
o'clock that evening the Fifth Corps was south of the Chickahominy, well
out toward the approaches from Richmond, and covering them. All day,
the 13th, the army was hurrying toward the James. By night the Sixth
Corps had reached the river, and the rest of the troops were on the
march between there and the Chickahominy, which was our rear.
When I reached the James early the next day, the 14th, large numbers of
men were hard at work on the pontoon bridge and its approaches, by which
it was intended that the artillery and trains should cross. It was a
pretty heavy job to corduroy the marsh, which was fully half a mile wide
and quite deep. The bridge itself was unprecedented in military annals,
except, perhaps, by that of Xerxes, being nearly seven hundred yards
long.
All day on the 14th everything went like a miracle. The pontoon bridge
was finished at two o'clock the next morning, and the cavalry of
Wilson's leading brigade, followed by the artillery trains, instantly
began crossing. By ten o'clock on the 15th Hancock's corps had been
ferried over, and he was off toward Petersburg to support Smith, who had
taken the Eighteenth Corps around by water from the White House, and had
been ordered to attack Petersburg that morning. All the news we had that
night at City Point, where headquarters had been set up, was that Smith
had assaulted and carried the principal line of the enemy before
Petersburg.
The next morning early I was off for the heights southeast of the town.
Smith's success appeared to be of the most important kind. He had
carried heights which were defended by very formidable works. He
thought--and, indeed, we all thought for the moment--that his success
gave us perfect command of the city and railroad. I went over the
conquered lines with General Grant and the engineer officers, and they
all agreed that the works were of the very strongest kind, more
difficult even to take than Missionary Ridge at Chattanooga.
General Smith told us that the negro troops fought magnificently, the
hardest fighting being done by them. The forts they stormed were, I
think, the worst of all. After the affair was over, General Smith went
to thank them, and tell them he was proud of their courage and dash. He
said they had no superiors as soldiers, and that hereafter he should
send them into a difficult place as readily as the best white troops.
They captured six out of the sixteen cannons which he took.
It soon appeared, however, that Smith was far from having captured
points which commanded Petersburg. His success had but little effect in
determining the final result. He had stopped his advance a few minutes
and a considerable space too soon, because, as he subsequently alleged,
it was too dark and his men were too much fatigued for further
operations; and he feared Lee had already re-enforced the town. This
turned out not to be so; Lee did not know until the 17th that Grant had
crossed the James. And up to that date Lee's position was a mystery to
us; we could hardly suppose he had remained at Cold Harbor.
When Grant discovered exactly how much had been gained and lost, he was
very much dissatisfied. There was a controversy between Hancock and
Smith subsequently about the responsibility for this failure.
On June 16th, the day after Smith's attack, more of the troops arrived
before Petersburg. General Meade also arrived on the ground, and the job
of capturing Petersburg was now taken up in earnest by the whole Army of
the Potomac. It was no longer a mere matter of advancing eighty or one
hundred rods, as on the night previous, for meanwhile the enemy had been
largely and rapidly re-enforced. Much time and many thousands of
valuable lives were to be expended in getting possession of this vital
point, which had really been in our grasp on the evening of the 15th.
That afternoon there began a series of assaults on the works of the
enemy. The fighting lasted all night, the moonlight being very clear.
Our loss was heavy.
The next day, the 17th, another attack was made at Petersburg. It was
persistent, but Meade found that his men were so worn out with marching,
fighting, and digging that they must have rest, and so laid off until
noon of the 18th, when, all of the army being up, a general assault was
ordered. Nothing important was gained, and General Grant directed that
no more assaults should be made. He said that after this he should
maneuver to get possession of Petersburg.
I saw nothing of the fighting of June 16th and 17th, being ill in camp,
but the members of Grant's staff told me that our operations were
unsatisfactory, owing to our previous heavy loss in superior officers.
The men fought as well as ever, Colonel Comstock told me, but they were
not directed with the same skill and enthusiasm.
While these operations were going on, I made two or three trips to the
river to watch the crossing of the troops. It was an animated and
inspiring sight, for the great mass of men, animals, and baggage was
handled with the greatest intelligence. By the 17th our entire army was
south of the James, and the bridge over the river by which the trains
had crossed was taken up.
During all this period, from Cold Harbor to Petersburg, we knew nothing
of Lee. In making the disposition for this great and successful
movement--a far more brilliant evolution than McClellan's "change of
base" two years before over almost the same roads--the purpose was, of
course, to deceive Lee as to the ultimate direction of the army. The
design succeeded far beyond Grant's most sanguine hopes. As soon, on the
morning of the 13th, as the Confederate chieftain discovered our
withdrawal, he moved his army across the Chickahominy in hot haste,
flinging it between his capital and the foe, supposed to be advancing on
a new line between the James and the Chickahominy. He held and fortified
a line from White Oak swamp to Malvern Hill, and here he remained stock
still for four days, wondering what had become of Grant.
Lee had been completely deceived, and could not be made to believe by
Beauregard, on the 15th, 16th, and 17th, that Grant's whole army had
turned up before Petersburg. His troops, as we know now, did not cross
the James, to go to the relief of Beauregard until the 17th. He was
caught napping, and, but for mistakes by subordinates in carrying out
Grant's plans, Lee's cause would have been lost. In the operations from
the night of the 12th, when Grant changed his line and base with an army
of one hundred and fifteen thousand men, and all its vast trains of
artillery, crossing a wide and deep river on a temporary bridge, until
June 18th, when at last Lee awoke to the situation, General Beauregard
shines out on the Confederate side far more brilliantly than the general
in chief. He unquestionably saved Petersburg, and for the time the
Confederacy; but for him Lee had at that time lost the game.