AT THE FRONT WITH GRANT'S ARMY.
War speculation in cotton--In business partnership with Roscoe
Conkling--Appointed special commissioner to Grant's army--The story
of a cipher code--From Memphis to Milliken's Bend--The various plans
for taking Vicksburg--At Grant's headquarters--The beginning of
trouble with McClernand.
As Mr. Stanton had no immediate need of my services, I returned in
August to New York, where I was occupied with various private affairs
until the middle of November, when I received a telegram from
Assistant-Secretary-of-War P. H. Watson, asking me to go immediately to
Washington to enter upon another investigation. I went, and was received
by Mr. Stanton, who offered me the place of Assistant Secretary of War.
I said I would accept.
"All right," said he; "consider it settled."
As I went out from the War Department into the street I met Major
Charles G. Halpine--"Miles O'Reilly"--of the Sixty-ninth New York
Infantry. I had known Halpine well as a newspaper man in New York, and I
told him of my appointment as Mr. Stanton's assistant. He immediately
repeated what I had told him to some newspaper people. It was reported
in the New York papers the next morning. The Secretary was greatly
offended and withdrew the appointment. When I told Halpine I had, of
course, no idea he was going to repeat it; besides, I did not think
there was any harm in telling.
Immediately after this episode I formed a partnership with Roscoe
Conkling and George W. Chadwick to buy cotton. The outcry which the
manufacturers had raised over the inability to get cotton for their
industries had induced the Government to permit trading through the
lines of the army, and the business looked profitable. Conkling and I
each put ten thousand dollars into the firm, and Chadwick gave his
services, which, as he was an expert in cotton, was considered equal to
our capital. To facilitate our operations, I went to Washington to ask
Mr. Stanton for letters of recommendation to the generals on and near
the Mississippi, where we proposed to begin our purchases. Mr. Stanton
and I had several conversations about the advisability of allowing such
traffic, but he did not hesitate about giving me the letters I asked.
There were several of them: one to General Hurlbut, then at Memphis;
another to General Grant, who had begun his movement against Vicksburg;
and another to General Curtis, who commanded in Arkansas. The general
purport of them was: "Mr. Dana is my friend; you can rely upon what he
says, and if you can be kind to him in any way you will oblige me."
It was in January, 1863, that Chadwick and I went to Memphis, where we
stayed at the Gayoso House, at that time the swell hotel of the town and
the headquarters of several officers.
It was not long after I began to study the trade in cotton before I saw
it was a bad business and ought to be stopped. I at once wrote Mr.
Stanton the following letter, which embodied my observations and gave my
opinion as to what should be done:
MEMPHIS, _January 21, 1863_.
DEAR SIR: You will remember our conversations on the subject of
excluding cotton speculators from the regions occupied by our
armies in the South. I now write to urge the matter upon your
attention as a measure of military necessity.
The mania for sudden fortunes made in cotton, raging in a vast
population of Jews and Yankees scattered throughout this whole
country, and in this town almost exceeding the numbers of the
regular residents, has to an alarming extent corrupted and
demoralized the army. Every colonel, captain, or quartermaster is
in secret partnership with some operator in cotton; every soldier
dreams of adding a bale of cotton to his monthly pay. I had no
conception of the extent of this evil until I came and saw for
myself.
Besides, the resources of the rebels are inordinately increased
from this source. Plenty of cotton is brought in from beyond our
lines, especially by the agency of Jewish traders, who pay for it
ostensibly in Treasury notes, but really in gold.
What I would propose is that no private purchaser of cotton shall
be allowed in any part of the occupied region.
Let quartermasters buy the article at a fixed price, say twenty or
twenty-five cents per pound, and forward it by army transportation
to proper centers, say Helena, Memphis, or Cincinnati, to be sold
at public auction on Government account. Let the sales take place
on regular fixed days, so that all parties desirous of buying can
be sure when to be present.
But little capital will be required for such an operation. The
sales being frequent and for cash, will constantly replace the
amount employed for the purpose. I should say that two hundred
thousand dollars would be sufficient to conduct the movement.
I have no doubt that this two hundred thousand dollars so employed
would be more than equal to thirty thousand men added to the
national armies.
My pecuniary interest is in the continuance of the present state of
things, for while it lasts there are occasional opportunities of
profit to be made by a daring operator; but I should be false to my
duty did I, on that account, fail to implore you to put an end to
an evil so enormous, so insidious, and so full of peril to the
country.
My first impulse was to hurry to Washington to represent these
things to you in person; but my engagements here with other persons
will not allow me to return East so speedily. I beg you, however,
to act without delay, if possible. An excellent man to put at the
head of the business would be General Strong. I make this
suggestion without any idea whether the employment would be
agreeable to him.
Yours faithfully, CHARLES A. DANA.
Mr. STANTON.
P.S.--Since writing the above I have seen General Grant, who fully
agrees with all my statements and suggestions, except that imputing
corruption to every officer, which of course I did not intend to be
taken literally.
I have also just attended a public sale by the quartermaster here
of five hundred bales of cotton confiscated by General Grant at
Oxford and Holly Springs. It belonged to Jacob Thompson and other
notorious rebels. This cotton brought to-day over a million and a
half of dollars, cash. This sum alone would be five times enough to
set on foot the system I recommend, without drawing upon the
Treasury at all. In fact, there can be no question that by adopting
this system the quartermaster's department in this valley _would
become self-supporting_, while the army would become honest again,
and the slaveholders would no longer find that the rebellion had
quadrupled the price of their great staple, but only doubled it.
As soon as I could get away from Memphis I went to Washington, where I
had many conversations with Mr. Lincoln and Mr. Stanton about
restricting the trade in cotton. They were deeply interested in my
observations, and questioned me closely about what I had seen. My
opinion that the trade should be stopped had the more weight because I
was able to say, "General Grant and every general officer whom I have
seen hopes it will be done."
The result of these consultations was that on March 31, 1863, Mr.
Lincoln issued a proclamation declaring unlawful all commercial
intercourse with the States in insurrection, except when carried on
according to the regulations prescribed by the Secretary of the
Treasury. These regulations Mr. Chase prepared at once. At the same time
that Mr. Lincoln issued his proclamation, Mr. Stanton issued an order
forbidding officers and all members of the army to have anything to do
with the trade. In spite of all these regulations, however, and the
modifications of them which experience brought, there was throughout the
war more or less difficulty over cotton trading.
From Washington I went back to New York. I had not been there long
before Mr. Stanton sent for me to come to Washington. He wanted some one
to go to Grant's army, he said, to report daily to him the military
proceedings, and to give such information as would enable Mr. Lincoln
and himself to settle their minds as to Grant, about whom at that time
there were many doubts, and against whom there was some complaint.
"Will you go?" Mr. Stanton asked. "Yes," I said. "Very well," he
replied. "The ostensible function I shall give you will be that of
special commissioner of the War Department to investigate the pay
service of the Western armies, but your real duty will be to report to
me every day what you see."
On March 12th Mr. Stanton wrote me the following letter:
WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON CITY, _March 12, 1863_.
DEAR SIR: I inclose you a copy of your order of appointment and the
order fixing your compensation, with a letter to Generals
Sumner,[B] Grant, and Rosecrans, and a draft for one thousand
dollars. Having explained the purposes of your appointment to you
personally, no further instructions will be given unless specially
required. Please acknowledge the receipt of this, and proceed as
early as possible to your duties.
Yours truly, EDWIN M. STANTON.
C. A. DANA, Esq., New York.
My commission read:
ORDERED, That C. A. Dana, Esq., be and he is hereby appointed
special commissioner of the War Department to investigate and report
upon the condition of the pay service in the Western armies. All
paymasters and assistant paymasters will furnish to the said
commissioner for the Secretary of War information upon any matters
concerning which he may make inquiry of them as fully and
completely and promptly as if directly called for by the Secretary
of War. Railroad agents, quartermasters, and commissioners will give
him transportation and subsistence. All officers and persons in the
service will aid him in the performance of his duties, and will
afford him assistance, courtesy, and protection. The said
commissioner will make report to this department as occasion may
require.
The letters of introduction and explanation to the generals were
identical:
GENERAL: Charles A. Dana, Esq., has been appointed a special
commissioner of this department to investigate and report upon the
condition of the pay service in the Western armies. You will please
aid him in the performance of his duties, and communicate to him
fully your views and wishes in respect to that branch of the service
in your command, and also give to him such information as you may
deem beneficial to the service. He is specially commended to your
courtesy and protection. Yours truly,
EDWIN M. STANTON.
I started at once for Memphis, going by way of Cairo and Columbus.
I sent my first dispatch to the War Department from Columbus, on March
20th. It was sent by a secret cipher furnished by the War Department,
which I used myself, for throughout the war I was my own cipher clerk.
The ordinary method at the various headquarters was for the sender to
write out the dispatch in full, after which it was translated from plain
English into the agreed cipher by a telegraph operator or clerk retained
for that exclusive purpose, who understood it, and by another it was
retranslated back again at the other end of the line. So whatever
military secret was transmitted was at the mercy always of at least two
outside persons, besides running the gantlet of other prying eyes.
Dispatches written in complex cipher codes were often difficult to
unravel, unless transmitted by the operator with the greatest precision.
A wrong word sometimes destroyed the sense of an entire dispatch, and
important movements were delayed thereby. This explains the oft-repeated
"I do not understand your telegram" found in the official correspondence
of the war period.
I have become familiar since the war with a great many ciphers, but I
never found one which was more satisfactory than that which I used in my
messages to Mr. Stanton. In preparing my message I first wrote it out in
lines of a given number of words, spaced regularly so as to form five,
six, seven, eight, nine, and ten columns. My key contained various
"routes," to be followed in writing out the messages for transmission.
Thus, a five-column message had one route, a six-column another, and so
on. The route was indicated by a "commencement word." If I had put my
message into five columns, I would write at the beginning the word
"Army," or any one in a list of nine words. The receiver, on looking for
that word in his key, would see that he was to write out what he had
received in lines of five words, thus forming five columns; and then he
was to read it down the fifth column, up the third, down the fourth, up
the second, down the first. At the end of each column an "extra" or
"check" word was added as a blind. A list of "blind" words was also
printed in the key, with each route, which could be inserted, if wished,
at the end of each line so as still further to deceive curious people
who did not have the key. The key contained also a large number of
cipher words. Thus, P. H. Sheridan was "soap" or "Somerset"; President
was "Pembroke" or "Penfield." Instead of writing "there has been," I
wrote "maroon"; instead of secession, "mint"; instead of Vicksburg,
"Cupid." My own cipher was "spunky" or "squad." The days, months, hours,
numerals, and alphabet all had ciphers.
The only message sent by this cipher to be translated by an outsider on
the route, so far as I know, was that one of 4 P.M., September 20, 1863,
in which I reported the Union defeat at Chickamauga. General R. S.
Granger, who was then at Nashville, was at the telegraph office waiting
for news when my dispatch passed through. The operator guessed out the
dispatch, as he afterward confessed, and it was passed around Nashville.
The agent of the Associated Press at Louisville sent out a private
printed circular quoting me as an authority for reporting the battle as
a total defeat, and in Cincinnati Horace Maynard repeated, the same day
of the battle, the entire second sentence of the dispatch, "Chickamauga
is as fatal a name in our history as Bull Run."
This premature disclosure to the public of what was only the truth, well
known at the front, caused a great deal of trouble. I immediately set on
foot an investigation to discover who had penetrated our cipher code,
and soon arrived at a satisfactory understanding of the matter, of which
Mr. Stanton was duly informed. No blame could attach to me, as was
manifest upon the inquiry; nevertheless, the sensation resulted in
considerable annoyance all along the line from Chattanooga to
Washington. I suggested to Mr. Stanton the advisability of concocting a
new and more difficult cipher, but it was never changed, so far as I now
remember.
It was from Columbus, Ky., on March 20, 1863, that I sent my first
telegram to the War Department. I did not remain in Columbus long, for
there was absolutely no trustworthy information there respecting affairs
down the river, but took a boat to Memphis, where I arrived on March
23d. I found General Hurlbut in command. I had met Hurlbut in January,
when on my cotton business, and he gave me every opportunity to gather
information concerning the operations against Vicksburg. Four different
plans for reaching the city were then on foot, the essential element of
all of them being to secure for the army on the high ground behind the
city a foothold whence it could strike, and at the same time be supplied
from a river base. The first and oldest and apparently most promising of
these plans was that of the canal across the neck of the peninsula
facing Vicksburg, on the Louisiana side. When I reached Memphis this
canal was thought to be nearly done.
The second route was by Lake Providence, about forty miles north of
Vicksburg, in Louisiana. It was close to the western bank of the
Mississippi, with which it was proposed to connect it by means of a
canal. The Bayou Macon connected Lake Providence with the Tensas River.
By descending the Tensas to the Washita, the Washita to the Red, the
Red to the Mississippi, the army could be landed on the east bank of the
Mississippi about one hundred and fifty miles south of Vicksburg, and
thence could be marched north. McPherson, with his Seventeenth Corps,
had been ordered by Grant on January 30th to open this route. It was
reported at Memphis when I arrived there that the cutting of Lake
Providence was perfectly successful, but that Bayou Macon was full of
snags, which must be got out before the Tensas would be accessible.
The third and fourth routes proposed for getting behind
Vicksburg--namely, by Yazoo Pass and Steele's Bayou--were attracting the
chief attention when I reached Memphis. Yazoo Pass opened from the
eastern bank of the Mississippi at a point about one hundred and fifty
miles above Vicksburg into Moon Lake, and thence into the Coldwater
River. Through the Coldwater and the Tallahatchie the Yazoo River was
reached. If troops could follow this route and capture Haynes's Bluff,
fourteen miles from the mouth of the Yazoo, Vicksburg at once became
untenable. The Yazoo Pass operation had begun in February, but the
detachment had had bad luck, and on my arrival at Memphis was lying up
the Yallabusha waiting for re-enforcements and supplies.
An attempt was being made also to reach the Yazoo by a roundabout route
through Steele's Bayou, Deer Creek, the Rolling Fork, and the Big
Sunflower. Grant had learned of this route only a short time before my
arrival, and had at once sent Sherman with troops and Admiral Porter
with gunboats to attempt to reach the Yazoo. On March 27th reports came
to Memphis that Sherman had landed twenty regiments on the east bank of
the Yazoo above Haynes's Bluff, and that the gunboats were there to
support him. Reports from other points also were so encouraging that the
greatest enthusiasm prevailed throughout the army, and General Grant was
said to be dead sure he would have Vicksburg within a fortnight.
Five days later, however, we heard at Memphis that there had been a
series of disasters in these different operations, that the Yazoo Pass
expedition was definitely abandoned, and that General Grant had an
entirely new plan of campaign.
I had not been long at Memphis before I decided that it was impossible
to gather trustworthy news there. I had to rely for most of my
information on the reports brought up the river by occasional officers,
not all of whom were sure of what they told, and on the stories of
persons coming from the vicinity of the different operations.
Occasionally an intelligent planter arrived whom I was inclined to
believe, but on the whole I found that my sources of information were
few and uncertain. I accordingly suggested to Mr. Stanton, three days
after my arrival, that I would be more useful farther down the river. In
reply he telegraphed:
WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON CITY, _March 30, 1863_.
C. A. DANA, Esq., Memphis, Tenn., via Cairo:
Your telegrams have been received, and although the information has
been meager and unsatisfactory, I am conscious that arises from no
fault of yours. You will proceed to General Grant's headquarters,
or wherever you may be best able to accomplish the purposes
designated by this department. You will consider your movements to
be governed by your own discretion, without any restriction.
EDWIN M. STANTON,
_Secretary of War_.
As soon after receiving his telegram as I could get a boat I left
Memphis for Milliken's Bend, where General Grant had his headquarters. I
reached there at noon on April 6th.
The Mississippi at Milliken's Bend was a mile wide, and the sight as we
came down the river by boat was most imposing. Grant's big army was
stretched up and down the river bank over the plantations, its white
tents affording a new decoration to the natural magnificence of the
broad plains. These plains, which stretch far back from the river, were
divided into rich and old plantations by blooming hedges of rose and
Osage orange, the mansions of the owners being inclosed in roses,
myrtles, magnolias, oaks, and every other sort of beautiful and noble
trees. The negroes whose work made all this wealth and magnificence were
gone, and there was nothing growing in the fields.
For some days after my arrival I lived in a steamboat tied up to the
shore, for though my tent was pitched and ready, I was not able to get a
mattress and pillow. From the deck of the steamer I saw in those days
many a wonderful and to me novel sight. One I remember still. I was
standing out on the upper deck with a group of officers, when we saw far
away, close to the other shore of the river, a long line of something
white floating in the water. We thought it was foam, but it was too long
and white, and that it was cotton which had been thrown into the river,
but it was too straight and regular. Presently we heard a gun fired,
then another, and then we saw it was an enormous flock of swans. They
arose from the water one after the other, and sailed away up the river
in long, curving, silver lines, bending and floating almost like clouds,
and finally disappearing high up in the air above the green woods on the
Mississippi shore. I suppose there were a thousand of them.
I had not been long at Milliken's Bend before I was on friendly terms
with all the generals, big and little, and one or two of them I found
were very rare men. Sherman especially impressed me as a man of genius
and of the widest intellectual acquisitions. Every day I rode in one
direction or another with an officer, inspecting the operations going
on. From what I saw on my rides over the country I got a new insight
into slavery, which made me no more a friend to that institution than I
was before. I had seen slavery in Maryland, Kentucky, Virginia, and
Missouri, but it was not till I saw these great Louisiana plantations
with all their apparatus for living and working that I really felt the
aristocratic nature of the institution, and the infernal baseness of
that aristocracy. Every day my conviction was intensified that the
territorial and political integrity of the nation must be preserved at
all costs, no matter how long it took; that it was better to keep up the
existing war as long as was necessary, rather than to make arrangement
for indefinite wars hereafter and for other disruptions; that we must
have it out then, and settle forever the question, so that our children
would be able to attend to other matters. For my own part, I preferred
one nation and one country, with a military government afterward, if
such should follow, rather than two or three nations and countries with
the semblance of the old Constitution in each of them, ending in wars
and despotisms everywhere.
As soon as I arrived at Milliken's Bend, on April 6th, I had hunted up
Grant and explained my mission. He received me cordially. Indeed, I
think Grant was always glad to have me with his army. He did not like
letter writing, and my daily dispatches to Mr. Stanton relieved him from
the necessity of describing every day what was going on in the army.
From the first neither he nor any of his staff or corps commanders
evinced any unwillingness to show me the inside of things. In this first
interview at Milliken's Bend, for instance, Grant explained to me so
fully his new plan of campaign--for there was now but one--that by three
o'clock I was able to send an outline of it to Mr. Stanton. From that
time I saw and knew all the interior operations of that toughest of
tough jobs, the reopening of the Mississippi.
The new project, so Grant told me, was to transfer his army to New
Carthage, and from there carry it over the Mississippi, landing it at or
about Grand Gulf; to capture this point, and then to operate rapidly on
the southern and eastern shore of the Big Black River, threatening at
the same time both Vicksburg and Jackson, and confusing the Confederates
as to his real objective. If this could be done he believed the enemy
would come out of Vicksburg and fight.
The first element in this plan was to open a passage from the
Mississippi near Milliken's Bend, above Vicksburg, to the bayou on the
west side, which led around to New Carthage below. The length of
navigation in this cut-off was about thirty-seven miles, and the plan
was to take through with small tugs perhaps fifty barges, enough, at
least, to transfer the whole army, with artillery and baggage, to the
other side of the Mississippi in twenty-four hours. If necessary, troops
were to be transported by the canal, though Grant hoped to march them by
the road along its bank. Part of McClernand's corps had already reached
New Carthage overland, and Grant was hurrying other troops forward. The
canal to the bayou was already half completed, thirty-five hundred men
being at work on it when I arrived.
The second part of the plan was to float down the river, past the
Vicksburg batteries, half a dozen steamboats protected by defenses of
bales of cotton and wet hay; these steamboats were to serve as
transports of supplies after the army had crossed the Mississippi.
Perhaps the best evidence of the feasibility of the project was found in
the fact that the river men pronounced its success certain. General
Sherman, who commanded one of the three corps in Grant's army, and with
whom I conversed at length upon the subject, thought there was no
difficulty in opening the passage, but that the line would be a
precarious one for supplies after the army was thrown across the
Mississippi. Sherman's preference was for a movement by way of Yazoo
Pass, or Lake Providence, but it was not long before I saw in our daily
talks that his mind was tending to the conclusion of General Grant. As
for General Grant, his purpose was dead set on the new scheme. Admiral
Porter cordially agreed with him.
An important modification was made a few days after my arrival in the
plan of operations. It was determined that after the occupation of Grand
Gulf the main army, instead of operating up the Big Black toward
Jackson, should proceed down the river against Port Hudson, co-operating
with General Banks against that point, and that after the capture of
Port Hudson the two united forces should proceed against Vicksburg.
There seemed to be only one hitch in the campaign. Grant had intrusted
the attack on Grand Gulf to McClernand. Sherman, Porter, and other
leading officers believed this a mistake, and talked frankly with me
about it. One night when we had all gathered at Grant's headquarters and
were talking over the campaign very freely, as we were accustomed to do,
both Sherman and Porter protested against the arrangement. But Grant
would not be changed. McClernand, he said, was exceedingly desirous of
the command. He was the senior of the other corps commanders. He was an
especial favorite of the President, and the position which his corps
occupied on the ground when the movement was first projected was such
that the advance naturally fell to its lot; besides, he had entered
zealously into the plan from the first, while Sherman had doubted and
criticised, and McPherson, whom Grant said he would really have much
preferred, was away at Lake Providence, and though he had approved of
the scheme, he had taken no active part in it.
I believed the assignment of this duty to McClernand to be so dangerous
that I added my expostulation to those of the generals, and in reporting
the case to Mr. Stanton I wrote: "I have remonstrated so far as I could
properly do so against intrusting so momentous an operation to
McClernand."
Mr. Stanton replied: "Allow me to suggest that you carefully avoid
giving any advice in respect to commands that may be assigned, as it may
lead to misunderstanding and troublesome complications." Of course,
after that I scrupulously observed his directions, even in extreme
cases.
As the days went on everybody, in spite of this hitch, became more
sanguine that the new project would succeed. For my part I had not a
doubt of it, as one can see from this fragment written from Milliken's
Bend on April 13th to one of my friends:
"Like all who really know the facts, I feel no sort of doubt that we
shall before long get the nut cracked. Probably before this letter
reaches New York on its way to you the telegraph will get ahead of it
with the news that Grant, masking Vicksburg, deemed impregnable by its
defenders, has carried the bulk of his army down the river through a
cut-off which he has opened without the enemy believing it could be
done; has occupied Grand Gulf, taken Port Hudson, and, effecting a
junction with the forces of Banks, has returned up the river to
threaten Jackson and compel the enemy to come out of Vicksburg and fight
him on ground of his own choosing. Of course this scheme may miscarry in
whole or in parts, but as yet the chances all favor its execution, which
is now just ready to begin."
FOOTNOTE:
[B] General E. V. Sumner, who had just been relieved, at his own
request, from the Army of the Potomac and appointed to the Department of
the Missouri. He was on his way thither when he died, on March 21st.