The eminent statesman, Baron Suyematsu, kindly dictated in English to
one of our editors answers relating to certain questions with regard to
the relation between Japan and Europe, especially France and Germany.
With the disclosure of the alleged Kodama report in view, how far
may one give credit to the alleged Japanese plan of invasion of
Indo-China?
I know all that has been written in France on the subject. All those
rumours appear to me to have come originally from Russia, and to have
been put into circulation in order to excite French opinion against
Japan, in other words, it is nothing else than a mere repetition of the
Yellow Peril cry.
Japan does not covet Indo-China. I have shown elsewhere that the French
colonies in the Far East have no perceptible influence upon the
situation of Japan, either from a political or an economical point of
view. Japan has sufficient to do at home, she does not want to plunge
into external adventures, such as meddling with Indo-China or picking a
quarrel with a country like France. You may be sure that it would be
more politic for France to cultivate amicable relations with Japan than
irritate her by such accusations. Even if those accusations honestly
represent the true sentiment of the French, the Japanese would only take
them for malicious manœuvres directed to aid Russia, and they could
not produce any good impression on the minds of the Japanese.
Is there any reason to believe that the so-called Kodama report was
forged in Russia rather than in France?
I have demonstrated elsewhere that the document which was recently made
public and attributed to Kodama containing some military indications on
the plan of an invasion of Indo-China is a perfect forgery. I have
exposed elsewhere several technical errors therein which would never
appear in an authentic official document. But whether it is authentic or
not, I do not attach any importance to the matter, from a political
point of view at least. It is the duty of all the military and naval
authorities to keep themselves ready for any emergency. For example,
France ought to keep herself always prepared for any possible
difficulties which may arise on her frontiers in the east, and in the
south, and on the western coasts; the same with Germany, with Austria,
with Italy, even with the United States.
It appears to me that, if the general staff-office of France or of
Germany, or the military or naval authorities of any country whatever,
were to remain without the least knowledge as to what measure should be
taken in case of a danger, they would be neglecting their duty to their
country. I can then say that all the Japanese officers, both in the army
and in the navy ought to study constantly the measures which Japan
should take in any emergency. I believe it is the same in every country
in Europe. This, however, does not belong to the sphere of practical
politics. It is the duty of statesmen and politicians to maintain a
friendly relationship with all other countries as far as possible; and,
consequently, to keep absolute control over their armies and navies. The
army and navy ought to serve as instruments and machines in their hands,
and not they, the civilians, become the instruments of the army and
navy. You may be quite assured that in Japan the army and navy are the
machines of the statesmen, and that the statesmen are not their
machines.
Can the fabrication of the so-called Kodama report be demonstrated
by a precise fact?
I shall not say whence the document emanated. I believe it was composed
by some one who does not lack a certain knowledge of Japan, but who has
drawn false deductions from his knowledge of similar matters of other
countries. Here is the best example. The document speaks of the native
contingents of Formosa. Now there exist no such forces in Formosa. The
garrisons of Formosa are sent there from Japan. On the other hand, in
the colonies belonging to other countries there are generally troops
formed of native contingents. It is notably so in French colonies. The
author of the document in question, reasoning from these facts, thought
that it ought to be the same with Formosa.
Has Japan any fear of another alteration of the Treaty of
Shimonoseki being imposed upon her?
The combined action of Russia, Germany and France, for imposing on
Japan an alteration of the Treaty of Shimonoseki appears to us to have
been a great error on their parts. I can positively say that there are
many eminent persons in Germany and in France who regret that action.
Even in Russia, in certain quarters, a belief seems to be entertained
that, but for the fault then committed, the present misfortunes would
not have happened. As to ourselves, we are not hypnotised by the errors
then committed by those three powers. We intend to remain friends of
France, of Germany, and even of Russia, in spite of the injustice we
have suffered, provided, of course, those powers wish to keep
friendship.
We do not overlook the possibility of another combination which those
powers may have an idea of forming against us, and it behoves us to be
watchful. Nevertheless, to tell you my candid opinion, it is scarcely
possible that a similar intervention should be renewed. I do not think
France would push her docility so far as to follow Germany a second
time. It would be necessary that Germany should set the example, aided
by Russia and France, to come out to the Far East, especially because
the Russian fleets have ceased to exist. I admit that the German fleet
is strong, but I do not believe it is powerful enough for one to say
with certainty that it can easily crush Japan. At all events, what
pretext has Germany to enter into war in the Far East? Among other
things also she would have to count on the opinion and sentiments of two
countries at least, I mean England and the United States. I do not,
therefore, consider a new combination possible. Japan cannot be
intimidated by mere barking.
If, however, Europe should choose to take such a course, we should
gravely reflect. I do not believe your country for example would ever
undertake an expedition against Japan. You have disapproved a small
expedition to Tonkin and we are a little more serious than the
Tonkinese. France might no doubt, if her honour demanded it, judge it
worth the pain to engage in a war with Japan, but under no other
circumstance do I believe her disposed to take such a part.
Japan will always continue to advance on the lines of occidental
civilisation. I do not see the reason which will prevent Japan from
acting in concert with France or Germany, provided of course these
powers do not enter upon an action which may appear to her altogether
unjust or iniquitous, in which case she may not be able to march with
them hand-in-hand.
Would Japan be offended by France introducing civilisation into
Indo-China?
We are not at all opposed to your introducing Western civilisation into
your colonies. On the contrary we shall be quite contented, but in
introducing your civilisation into your colonies you have to be prepared
that it signifies an amelioration of the condition of the natives. If it
were so, why should we make the least objection? But in the hypothesis
that the introduction of civilisation has in view neither amelioration
of the condition of the natives nor progress of commerce and industry,
we might then conceive a sort of suspicion. Supposing that you augment
the garrisons, the fortifications, the naval forces, one would see in it
nothing but an expansion of your military power and not an introduction
of civilisation in the sense understood in France. Even in that case we
would not raise objections, unless it were done with a view to menace
us; but here I shall offer you a suggestion. Is it really worth your
while to develop there incessantly your military and naval forces in
order to oppose Japan? Would not the enterprise be rather costly? Would
it not be infinitely better to employ your energy in cultivating a good
understanding between your country and ours instead of rivalling each
other by crossing armaments?
[1] _L'Européen_, August 5, 1905.