The French and the Japanese have some sort of resemblance in their
character, and therefore they are not wholly antagonistic to each other
by nature. France once committed a great error, it is true, together
with another country, in backing Russia against Japan after the
Sino-Japanese war, but Japan has forgiven her for it, and has even
forgotten it long since. It therefore mainly depends on France if the
friendly relationship subsisting between her and Japan shall be
maintained.
There are two things which we have to examine in this connection: first,
the question of Indo-China; second, the effect of the Franco-Russian
alliance upon Far Eastern affairs.
Much has been talked about Japan's having designs upon Indo-China. It
is, in truth, nothing more than a resuscitation in part of the old bogey
of the Yellow Peril. According to that bogey, Japan is to pick quarrels
with every civilised nation, and is ultimately to swallow up the whole
world. Nothing can be more absurd than that; but at times it has been
made use of by the Russians and Russophiles with a certain amount of
success. To me it appears almost amazing that so great a psychological
incongruity should exist simultaneously in the minds of some of the
Occidentals, in that, while they exhibit almost unreasonable contempt of
the Orientals on the one hand, they give credit for almost superhuman
potentiality to the same people on the other. Whatever this may be, the
question of Indo-China resolves itself into this:
The yellow peril alarmists began to talk about Japan as being intent
upon seizing Indo-China. The Colonial party of France has utilised this
theme for the promotion of its own object, and the Russophiles have
utilised it for inciting the public to hate and detest Japan in favour
of Russia. Surely an act of gross injustice and cowardice! For, as a
matter of fact, on the part of Japan there is no such intention
whatever. Indo-China is very different from Korea and Manchuria in
respect of its relative position to Japan. There is nothing worth
mentioning politically, strategically, historically, or economically in
the mutual relations between Japan and Indo-China. All this I have shown
in the utmost detail in an article which I have contributed and
published in a well-known French review. Sensible French people have now
begun to see the truth of it, so that they have almost ceased to pay
serious attention to the false alarms of the yellow peril agitators.
Indeed, the France of to-day appears to be very different from the
France of this time last year. The lapse of one year has been sufficient
to disclose many falsehoods by which the public was once taken in. It
has also disclosed the relative merit of Russia and Japan in many
things. Which government--the Russian or the Japanese--is the more
enlightened? Which troops--the Russian or the Japanese--are more humane
and orderly? Which people--Russia or Japan--is more compact as a nation?
Which of them--Russia or Japan--has better ethics and morality? In which
of them--Russia or Japan--are laws better administered and more loyally
adhered to? In which of them--Russia or Japan--are philanthropical
works, such as the Red Cross Society, better organised and more honestly
carried out? Above all, in which of them--Russia or Japan--does the
justice of its cause in the present war lie? All these things have now
become very widely known to the public, hence the difference of their
attitude. I do not think France ever will be foolish enough to stretch
forward her fists against Japan on account of the yellow peril bogey
concerning Indo-China. I am rather in hope that the day will come when
those Russophiles will repent the mistake they made when they abused
Japan contrary to the dictates of justice and equity.
The second question, namely, the effect of the Franco-Russian alliance
upon Far Eastern affairs, is rather a delicate one to discuss. On the
whole, however, I can say this:
Considering the delicate position in which she is placed, France has
managed things well to the extent that we have not much to complain of
(except one important matter, which I will elucidate presently). True it
is that she has made many unfair accusations against us with regard to
the commencement of the war and also with regard to the yellow peril
bogey, but then the same, if not a harsher thing, has also been done or
said in some other quarters where we might have expected more
impartiality. Her general conduct as a neutral has not been very
satisfactory. But then we remember that in some other quarters also very
bitter pills were given us to swallow, altogether beyond our reasonable
anticipation. We put up with all this unfairness, because we are quite
confident that sooner or later the time will come when the world will
clearly see how undeserving we are of such calumny.
The important exception I made above is the question of French
neutrality concerning the treatment of the Baltic Fleet. In this respect
Japan has grave reasons to complain of what France has been doing. As
the whole world knows, the Russian Fleet has been obtaining abundant
facilities from France all the way along from European waters to those
of the Far East. It was abusing French hospitality in Madagascar for a
very long period. Japan repeated her protest, or at least called French
attention from time to time. When France pleaded her innocence at
Madagascar on the pretext that the fleet was outside the territorial
waters of France, Japan, relying on incontestable proof to the contrary,
remonstrated. France was very tardy in executing what she said she would
do, but Japan showed much patience, almost beyond common endurance. The
same thing began to be repeated in the waters of Indo-China, the very
door of the seat of the war. However moderate and good-natured Japan may
be, this was more than she could endure. This was the real cause of the
strain of an event which has been recently threatening the continuance
of friendly relations between France and Japan.
According to some French papers, the view is held that France has not
infringed her duty as a neutral, but Japan does not coincide. The French
contention is that, according to the French law of neutrality, there is
no time limit for affording asylum to a belligerent ship, and therefore,
whatever length of time Russian ships may spend in French waters, France
is under no obligation to tell them to quit the place (so long as they
are not accompanied by prizes), and also they may be supplied with
victuals and even coals. Japan contends that this is not a just
interpretation of the laws of nations. Japan's view may be formulated as
follows:
1. The twenty-four hours rule may not be a condition universally
accepted, but justice and equity demand that in its spirit it should be
followed by all nations. It has already been adopted by many nations,
including Russia herself; as a matter of fact, the world has come to
view it as though it were already a rule universally accepted, and it
behoves every civilised nation to promote its adoption, or at least a
practice similar to it in spirit, for the sake of consolidating
international morality, viz. justice and equity. At the time when
Russian ships, after the sea-battle of August 10th last year, sought
asylum in the waters of Kiao-Chow and Saigon, both the German and French
authorities respectively hastened to dismantle them, because the ships
would not leave the place indicated at the prescribed time; this was
done in exact accordance with the spirit of international law, and in
reality it amounted almost to the same thing as observing the
twenty-four hours rule. Why should France now say that no time limit can
be made in the case of the Baltic Fleet, which requires all the more
vigilance than would the case of a few solitary ships?
2. The so-called French law of neutrality is not in fact a law in the
strict sense of the term. It is a sort of an instruction issued in the
beginning of the present war by the French Minister of Marine, although
based upon a similar document issued at the time of the Spanish-American
war. It is immaterial whether or not it is a law in the strict sense,
but we cannot deem it has a just rule if it were to be interpreted as
has been done by some of the French papers. True it is that in that
document no time is mentioned, but does it mean that France has to or
must allow all belligerent ships to stay in her waters whatever length
of time they like? Certainly not, I should think. If it is so, why
should France adhere to that sort of interpretation even when its
adherence is obviously contrary to justice and equity?
3. Even if we admit for a moment that the French rule as interpreted by
those papers be applicable to the cases of some solitary ships seeking
asylum; it is certainly not applicable to cases like that which we now
have in view, because no such case as that of the Baltic Fleet has ever
been within the contemplation of those who framed such a rule. As a
matter of fact, however, it would be inapplicable even to the cases of a
few solitary ships if it were to be interpreted in the way that was done
by those journals.
4. Even admitting for a moment that the interpretation of those French
journals is correct as far as the strict letter of the rule is
concerned, it does not give them the right to say that their doings are
_internationally_ correct. It must be known that in the laws of nations
the spirit of international morality, namely, justice and equity, has
greater weight than municipal laws, _lex loci_. If this were not so, how
was it that England had to apologise to Russia a long time ago for an
act--personal seizure of an ambassador--which had been done in a civil
matter perfectly in accordance with her law? Therefore the mere fact
that France has her own law of neutrality (in fact no law in a strict
sense) is no defence for her doings unless its justice and equity can be
maintained in the eyes of the law of nations. I may further add that the
above is the _raison d'être_ why prize courts of different countries
make it their theory, unlike ordinary civil or criminal courts, that
they administer _prima facie_ the law of nations and not _lex loci_. It
is another _raison d'être_ why matters relating to neutrality, prizes,
and cognate matters are generally dealt with in the shape of
instructions (in other words, interpretations of the law of nations),
and not in the shape of a law of the land in the strict sense. Japan,
therefore, cannot submit to the ruling of those French instructions as
interpreted by those journals, inasmuch as she does not think it
internationally just and equitable.
5. And, moreover, that part of the French instruction which those
journals so habitually quote is not the only part which has an important
bearing on the question. In the instruction it is also mentioned that no
belligerent may use a French port for purposes of war (_dans un but de
guerre_); and also that belligerents sojourning in such ports may not
make use of them as the base of operations of any kind against the
enemy. Japan's insistence is that France should adhere to that spirit.
My wonder is why those French papers which try to uphold one part of the
instruction should totally ignore other parts of the same instruction.
6. The theory of asylum in the case of the ships is not so rigid as the
case of an army. I admit it. Japan does not demand that it should be
made on the seas as rigid as it is on land. But it must never be allowed
to go beyond the limit which justice and equity allow. I take the theory
of asylum on the seas to be this: No neutral is justified in helping
either of the combatants, but the nature of the seas is such that the
neutral may give a certain grace of time to combatant vessels which seek
shelter in its neutral waters, before it proceeds to dismantle,--(no
immediate internment as in the case of the land force),--and it may also
give them certain victuals--even a certain amount of coals--as it would
also be contrary to humanity if they were to hang about, or to cause
starvation of the men on board in mid-voyage on account of the mere lack
of coal or food. Beyond this, the spirit of the law of nations is that a
neutral ought to allow nothing. Can any one boldly assert that the
theory of asylum can be applied with fairness to a case like that of the
Baltic Fleet, which is far from seeking asylum, but is deliberately
endeavouring to administer coups to its adversary and proceeding to the
very seat of war. If he can do so, where is the justice and equity of
the so-called law of nations, which the Occidentals boast of, not
without just title, and claim that it forms one of the essential parts
of Christian morality?
7. As to the talk about the three-mile limit of the territorial waters,
there is already much divergency of opinion even amongst the jurists. To
put it forth as a defence in a case like that of the Baltic Fleet
affairs seems to me too puerile. The matter, however, becomes all the
more grave when even that limit is not observed, and it has been
constantly ignored by the Baltic Fleet.
Such are the views which we Japanese have taken in the matter. Some
French journals (erroneously basing their assertions on the views I have
personally expressed) say that Japan has taken up English views of
international law in opposition to the Continental views, so that France
ought not to yield to Japan's protest. This contention is not correct.
We do not hold these views because they are English ones: we do so
because they are in our opinion the only views which are
_internationally_ just and equitable. We are now fighting against a foe
so formidable, as the whole world knows, that to us it is a matter of
life and death. We have sufficient patience and fortitude, but we cannot
run the risk of sacrificing our very existence without some protest when
we think that we are not being treated with justice and equity.
I am glad to add that the views we hold seem to have come at last to be
shared by the more responsible part of the French amongst the
governmental circle, as well as by the general public. The newspapers
which are still sticking to their old contention are very few in number,
and they seem to have some particular reasons of their own. I can never
think a nation like France could consciously and wilfully offend against
justice and equity, and the only thing we anxiously hope for is that the
declaration of the French Government may be honestly and effectually
followed up. Whatever may be one's intention, the drift of events often
creates unlooked-for incidents, and that too often against one's will,
when it is too late to avoid the consequences. Let all parties concerned
be careful in this matter of vital importance.
[1] The _Deutsche Revue_, June 1905.
X