VII

Some talk on superstition--A remark on earrings--Japanese troops after

the war; no fear of Chauvinism--Generals and officers--How the system of

the hereditary military service was abolished and the new system was

introduced--Its history--Japan after the war--Views given to the

American press--Mr. Seppings-Wright and his views on the Japanese

character--The Japanese navy and its history--Origin of the shipbuilding

yards--The difficulty of a thorough reform in China and Russia--How

Japan managed to bring about the consummation of the great reform--The

feudal system was a great help--Explanation of the Japanese feudal

system and the clans--The re-shuffling of the feudatories under the

Tokugawa régime--Difference of grandeur of the feudatories--Exceptional

formation of the Satsuma clan--Financial system of the Shogunate

--Finance of the Imperial Government at the beginning of the Great

Change--How the affairs of the governments of the feudatories were

wound up--The old system of taxation--Thorough reform--The old notion of

land tenure

I found myself once more in a very incongruous group of people whom I

had met on various occasions. I noticed a number of them engaged in a

lively conversation.

--'Ah! Monsieur A.,' said a lady, 'you are acquainted with many

Japanese, and have been in contact with them for many years, so that you

will be able to explain to me. Some say the Japanese are superstitious,

others again say they are not. Which do you think true?'

--'I have known,' said Monsieur A., 'some hundreds of the Japanese,

mostly young men, of course. They are extremely free from any sort of

bias or superstition. I have never known people so unbiassed and so

little superstitious.'

--'But,' said the lady, 'I have heard from a gentleman who was resident

in Japan for some years that there existed in that country some sort of

superstition. He told me, for example, that "some people disliked the

number "four," because _shi_, which is four in Japanese, means also

death, as far as the pronunciation is concerned. Consequently when, for

instance, one gives a tip, he would give either threepence or fivepence,

and not fourpence, even in the case where fourpence may be more

appropriate; in other words, either less or more, to avoid the number

four. And the same is generally the case when one makes a present of a

number of articles which are identical, unless they are two pairs; is

not that funny? In the whole world there can be nothing more natural

than numbers. No one can make the four cardinal points of the compass

less or more because he dislikes the number "four." The same reasoning

holds good with everything.'

--'I do not think,' answered Monsieur A., 'the superstition of four is

very widely believed in. But what do you say to our dislike for the

number thirteen.'

--'But,' said she, 'that is a different matter. That originated with

religion.'

--'Is it so?' said Monsieur A. 'I wouldn't dispute it. But let me tell

you an incident I met with some time ago. I was present at a meeting of

a literary association. There was a good deal of conversation on the

subject of the superstition of less civilised peoples. At the

refreshment-table I had to sit next an elderly lady. I placed,

accidentally or not I don't remember, my knife and fork crosswise. The

lady immediately noticed this, and told me quickly to alter them. I

remarked that the dislike of that position of knife and fork was perhaps

also a sort of superstition, whereupon the lady told me that it was not

a superstition, but a tradition, and therefore it differed very much

from the superstitions practised by less civilised peoples.'

--'She was right, of course,' said the lady.

--'Well, I can scarcely see any difference,' observed Monsieur A.

--'I can tell you another incident,' remarked a different gentleman.

'When an occidental missionary was once telling some women of savage

tribes that their wearing rings in their noses was barbarous and

unhealthy, he was asked by them how it was that his wife and daughters

were wearing rings in their ears, and he had great difficulty in

explaining to them that the method adopted by the civilised races for

wearing rings in their ears was very different from their wearing rings

in the nose.'

--'Oh!' exclaimed some ladies.

--'But stay,' said another, 'let us have some more serious talk. I wish

to ask Baron Suyematsu his opinion on a few important points of which I

am anxious to be informed.'

Turning to me, he said:

--'I do not entertain any wild notion of the "Yellow Peril" cry. One

thing is certain, however, that your country has been winning all this

time brilliant victories unprecedented in history, and there is no doubt

that your success will continue to the end of the war. Don't you think

after the fighting is over your army will become chauvinistic, or, in

plain language, unruly, and constantly ready to pick quarrels with

foreign countries.'

--'I do not think so,' I answered. 'In the first place, the discipline

of our men is very good, and they are most orderly and obedient to the

emperor and his government. Then, too, the very nature of the

organisation of our troops makes such matters differ greatly from

hereditary troops or volunteers of long service. You see by the

universal system, which we have adopted, men serve in the ranks only for

a limited time, and therefore in the course of a few years the old

soldiers retire, and go back to their original avocations in the country

or the town, as the case may be, and the new ones fill their places.

While the newcomers would be inspired by the traditions of their

regiments, they could not, at the same time, be personally bombastic on

account of the deeds of their predecessors.'

--'But what of the generals and officers?'

--'Of them I entertain no fear of their becoming jingoes. After having

undergone all the hard work, and having achieved many brilliant

victories, it is only natural that generals and other officers, indeed

the army itself, should win greater popularity and higher estimation in

the people's minds, and it is possible that their weight may be felt

indirectly in internal politics. But it would never go so far as to make

any difference in our external relations with foreign countries. As a

matter of fact, our generals and officers are as little inclined to

meddle with general politics as they are intent on fulfilling their

professional duties. Above all, as I have so often said, it is a great

misconception on the part of some Occidentals to suppose the Japanese at

large to be an aggressive and bellicose nation.'

--'Your army is now organised under the universal service system,' said

another. 'Before the present Imperial régime came into existence you

had, as I understand, a very deep-rooted hereditary system of military

service. It must have been very difficult to abolish the old and

substitute the new. Your Bushi were regarded as the flower of the land,

and surely it was a most bold conception to substitute sons of peasants

and tradesmen in their place, and to believe they would do service

equally well, or better. Your statesmen must have had strong convictions

to induce them to make such a radical change as the new régime. Please

let us have some explanation on that point.'

--'Well, roughly speaking,' I replied, 'I can only say that it was an

outcome of the changed conditions of the time, but there were, of

course, some circumstances which facilitated its formation. The Samurai,

our hereditary military class, was the pick of the Japanese population,

more refined and more intellectual than any other. Nevertheless, the

long-continued peace and the effects of inheriting their occupation made

them somewhat inclined towards effeminacy--in other words, less martial

than their ancestors. Besides, as I have explained elsewhere, the

hereditary military system has one very weak point. Such shortcomings as

these were already felt before the inauguration of the new régime, and

it was noticed that the best soldiers who engaged in battles before the

Restoration were those organised under methods differing from the old

system. Let me explain it more in detail. Chosiu was the clan which

fought more battles than any other. The Chosiu troops which fought best

were different kinds of voluntary regiments, consisting of bands of

adventurous young men enlisted from the lowest classes of Samurai, as

well as peasants and tradesmen. There was even a band which consisted of

Yeta, who were afterwards emancipated and became new commoners, as I

have explained elsewhere. At the time when an internal dissension broke

out in Chosiu and its government was overthrown by the more radical

elements under the leadership of such men as Takasugi, Kawasé, Ito,

Yamagata, Inouyé and others, it was those voluntary bands just mentioned

that sided with them against the troops of the government, who mostly

belonged to the higher classes of the hereditary military families.

Shortly after that event Kido, who was a participator of the same idea

and the Senior of those men, had returned to Chosiu after an absence of

about ten months as a fugitive, and had become the moving spirit of

Chosiu. It was just at the time when Chosiu was on the eve of being

surrounded a second time by the Shogunate troops, and it was a very

critical period for the Chosiu, who had to make every preparation for

fighting against great odds. At Kido's recommendation, Murata was

intrusted by the prince to organise in the European style all the troops

of Chosiu, including those bands. Murata (who afterwards changed his

name into Omura) was originally a medical student, and had studied the

Dutch language and subsequently the Dutch military system. In the early

days of the new Imperial régime he occupied a high post in the Imperial

Army Department, and his bronze statue is standing high in Tokio, before

the shrine of warriors. But to return to my subject. Chosiu defeated the

Shogunate troops on all sides. Thus in Chosiu the weakness of the

hereditary military system had been practically seen very early. Most of

the Shogunate troops were organised according to the old system of the

Middle Ages. Many of them, being clad in heavy armour, were no match for

the Chosiu troops with their light equipments. On the Shogunate side

there were also some regiments which fought well, but they were those

which had been organised and drilled after the European style. In that

war, and the subsequent ones, it was well known that the best troops on

the anti-imperialist side were also those which had been organised

something like volunteer regiments and drilled after the European

system. These facts will show that even before the Restoration the

credit of the hereditary military system had already considerably

declined. Marshal Yamagata was originally a person belonging to an

insignificant class of the Chosiu Samurai, and was the leader of the

most powerful band of Chosiu I have just mentioned. You may well imagine

that he would not be a man to advocate the continuation of the

hereditary military system. The introduction of the system of universal

service founded upon the European Continental system is due to him.'

--'That goes a long way to explain the matter,' said one.

--'But do you conscientiously believe,' said another, 'that Japan will

not suffer from "swollen head," and will continue to have sufficient

control of herself?'

--'I do. Why not? I know it. No sooner had I landed on the American soil

last year, having left Japan immediately after the outbreak of the war,

than I gave my views to the American press on the then existing

situation, as well as on our probable future, showing the true motives

and aspirations of my country. They were widely circulated. My meaning

was identical in every case, though the words and matters touched upon

were not necessarily identical. I will recite you one specimen which was

then published in an American weekly.

'As to our fight with Russia, we are as able to meet her army on

land as we are her fleets on the sea. We have just the same

confidence in our army as in the navy. But we would be very sorry

to be regarded by the world as only fighting men. We have been for

many years striving for the assimilation of everything materially

and mentally good that belongs to the best type of the American and

European civilisation. We aspire to be a nation, but our endeavour

for the realisation of that idea is based on a larger peaceful

acquisition of intellectual culture. We have no ambition for

territorial aggrandisement. We have not the least idea of making

any difference on account of race. We desire to govern ourselves

and advance in the world in peace--not to conquer and tyrannise

over another people. We come into the comity of nations, but that

entirely on the occidental basis of civilisation. Some people speak

of us as pagan, but the conscience of the people is perfectly free

in our country, and it is guaranteed by our constitution. We

believe in toleration and absolute liberty of religious conviction,

and I may safely say that religion is many times freer in our

country than it is in the country which is now our foe. We are

disposed to be, and earnestly wish and strive to be, liberal and

tolerant in all things. This fact, I am glad to see, is already so

widely recognised by those Americans and Europeans who are

connected with and know about such matters. We hope to advance to

that place in the world where our beautiful little country will be

a leader among the nations of the world in science, industry, arts,

and intellectual achievements, and an example of peace and harmony

towards all races, all nations, and all men.

--'I still hold the same views. I have no reason to fear that I shall

have to change them after the war. It might perhaps be more interesting

and convincing if you were to see what some people, other than

ourselves, who are capable of giving an idea on the point, say. Mr.

Seppings Wright, an English ex-naval officer and an artist, is one. He

was on board one or other of the ships of Admiral Togo's fleet for many

months under exceptional circumstances. He returned to England quite

recently. An interesting interview with him was published in a recent

number of the English press. Here is the part bearing on the subject:

'THE MOST WONDERFUL PEOPLE IN THE WORLD.

'"I gather that you formed a very high opinion of the Japanese

character?"

'"They are," said Mr. Seppings-Wright, with animation, "the most

wonderful people in the world. I make no exception. Neither the

statesmen nor the peoples of Europe have yet learned to estimate

the Japanese at their true value. They are destined to play a

magnificent rôle in the future development of the world. At present

people are talking of their courage, their great military

qualities. These are, indeed, now sufficiently self-evident. I rate

the Japanese army above any other army in the world. As for the

navy, I cannot use language too strong to express my admiration for

it. Yet what most impressed me was not the personal bravery of the

Japanese soldier and sailor, or the splendid organisation of their

naval and military forces, it was the character of the

people--their unique simplicity, their chivalrous courtesy, their

kindness of heart, their sweetness of disposition, their

unaggressiveness. They have none of the lust of conquest for

conquest's sake. They have never fought save to protect their

territory or their vital interests--but they have never been

beaten. Chinese, Koreans, and now Russians--they have resisted all,

and beaten all in turn; and now that they have proved their right

to be regarded as one of the Great Powers of the world, their

influence will, I am convinced, be all on the side of peace and

peaceful development."

'"You make the Japanese out to be a new variety of the human race?"

'"No, not a new variety--an old variety--a variety untainted by the

commercialism of European civilisation. They have not yet learned

the creed of individualism--of every man for himself. They will lay

down their lives cheerfully and willingly for their country--for

their emperor, who is almost a god in their eyes, since he embodies

their fatherland. What new traits they may develop I cannot pretend

to say."

'WHAT JAPAN CAN STILL DO.

'"It would be strange," I interrupted, "if, after the unbroken

series of victories they have won on land and sea, they did not

develop some symptom of 'swelled head'?"

--'I saw not the slightest sign of that. Very rarely you see even

incipient symptoms in an individual. Their great successes have not

apparently turned their heads in the least. They began this war in

the most absolute confidence of victory. They can, if need be, do

much more than they have done. No one knows the number of men Oyama

has in Manchuria--no one, that is, outside the Government and the

Headquarters' Staff.'"

--'Of the navy,' said another, 'it is truly amazing that you should

have such an efficient one, which you have built up in the course of no

more than two or three decades. Assiduous and energetic as you must have

been, there must have been some other circumstances which have helped

you in arriving at that result, or at least I cannot think otherwise

when I reflect calmly on the matter.'

--'Your views are not far from fact,' I answered. 'It would be

certainly amazing if a people who had only known perhaps canoes in a

small stream, having no seafaring experience or tradition, built up a

new navy as we have done. Many people have carelessly looked upon Japan

as such, hence the misconception. Japan abounds in history and

traditions of the sea from the dawn of her history. Our fleets often

made distant expeditions, and fought battles far out of our own waters.

The ships were, no doubt, rude and primitive compared with the modern

ones. From the model of a warship made about three hundred years ago,

which I have seen in a temple not far from Tokio, I think that our ships

of those days were not much inferior to those of the West of a

corresponding time. From the period when foreign intercourse was

suspended, the construction of large ships was prohibited, be it a

warship or a merchantman. The country was in perfect peace, and the navy

was in use even less than the army, and this, therefore, is why such an

enormous difference between the European system and ours had come into

existence. Nevertheless, some feudal lords whose seats were situated on

the sea-coast had a certain number of retainers specially destined for

seafaring purposes. And, moreover, Japan being a country surrounded by

the sea on all sides, merchantmen and fishing boats, rude as they were,

were abundant; hence the stock of sailors has never been wanting. With

the new advent of the Western nations to the Far East some fifty years

ago, with their "black ships," the country awoke to the necessity of

having strong ships, and the Shogunate, jealous as it was in the

ascendency of the feudal lords, abolished the prohibition against

building large ships. Towards the later years of the Shogunate it

possessed a small but creditable navy in the European style. Many feudal

lords also possessed some kind of Western ships, several of them

possessing eight or nine ships. Of course, many of these ships were only

corvettes, or schooners, or ordinary commercial steamers, but they were

all used by those lords and manned chiefly by their retainers, and were

called their navy. They differed from ordinary merchantmen. These ships

were mostly bought from Western merchants; a few were the presents of

the Western monarchs to the Shogun; some were constructed in Japan. The

earliest steamship constructed in Japan was a steam-launch built about

1862 in the province of Ise for the Prince of Chosiu. It was navigated

from there to Hagi, the old capital of Chosiu, on the coast of the Japan

Sea. I do not know what became of it after that, but the fact that it

navigated that distance would show that the Japanese were already

gaining some capacity for building steamships after the European style.

When the Shogun submitted to the Imperial order and vacated the castle

of Tokio, the navy of the Shogunate, declining to share the fate of the

Shogun, raised anchor and fled to Hakodate under the leadership of

Yenomoto. Several of the best ships were lost by storm and some in

fighting, and practically no ship was left of the revolting fleets. With

the submission of Yenomoto and his participators, the country regained a

complete peace. Then began the construction of the new navy. The feudal

lords presented to the Imperial government their ships, most of which

had already done their service during the preceding war. Most of the

officers and sailors took service under the Imperial government just as

they were. Many men who were engaged in naval affairs under the

Shogunate were given suitable positions under the new government; even

Yenomoto, the chief of the rebel fleet, was made an admiral after he had

been pardoned. The navy being more expensive in every way than the army,

we had more difficulty in its development; but in one way or another the

Imperial government has exerted its energy until we have obtained the

navy of the present moment. It has required much patience and ingenuity

from both technical and political points of view, but somehow or other

we have managed so far. I may add a few words more. In the early days of

the Imperial government a large number of English naval officers were

engaged by our government, who did much service in the organisation of

our navy, for which we feel much indebtedness. I may also add that later

on Monsieur Bertin of France, whom we have engaged for some years, has

also done much service in the matter.'

--'You now have several shipbuilding yards, both governmental and

private,' said one, 'and you can construct big ships yourselves. How was

it brought about at first?'

--'Yokosuka is our oldest dockyard. It was begun when the Shogunate was

already tottering. Oguri, an able man, was the finance minister of the

Shogunate at the time. It was due to his efforts that the Yokosuka

dockyard was constructed. It is said Oguri told his friend one day,

"When one becomes a bankrupt it is desirable he should leave behind a

Dozo, so Yokosuka will be the Dozo of the Shogunate when it comes to an

end." "Dozo" is the name for a storehouse, constructed very solidly;

with us almost every house, excepting those of the lower classes, has

one or more such buildings, and it was considered an additional disgrace

to a man of better class if he became a bankrupt without any such

storehouse for the creditors. Oguri evidently foresaw the downfall of

the Shogunate, and yet ordered the construction of the dockyard, so that

it would be useful for the future rulers of Japan. Such is the early

history of our dockyards on the European style, which has expanded

itself in the course of time, so that we now have several shipbuilding

yards, as you know.'

--'What do you say about the future of China?' said another. 'Don't you

think she will also renovate herself like your country and become a

formidable power.'

--'She may do so,' I answered, 'in one way or other in the course of

time, but I do not think a sudden and thorough transformation of the

kind that has taken place in Japan is possible in China. I do not think

it is possible even in Russia, where so much movement for internal

reform is going on. To begin with, they have no feudal system in

existence.'

--'That sounds very odd,' said he: 'I must be enlightened on the point.'

--'Well, Japan has been swayed by a feudal system before the great

change of the present régime. That fact helped our success to an extent

that one cannot easily imagine. Of course, there was a possibility of

procrastination of the old system, if the reform movements had

miscarried; but when the winds blew in the right direction, that very

fact became the most important factor in conveying our ship of state to

the harbour where it wished to go. To explain in less metaphorical

language: the introduction of a great political reform in a country

against an existing government is most difficult. A revolution with a

tremendous force like that of France must be regarded as an exceptional

case, but ordinary revolutionists seldom succeed in overthrowing

existing governments and introducing better and more progressive ones on

a firmer basis. When, on the other hand, the existing government is only

obliged to introduce some reform by external influence, the reform it

introduces cannot be very radical and thorough. With our great movements

previous to 1867 the matter was taken up by several powerful feudal

lords. Naturally, there had been several precursory movements against

the Shogunate by the bands of zealous patriots gathered here and there,

but the Shogunate had no difficulty in suppressing them. The revolt

against the Shogunate became grave only when some powerful feudal lords

with their clans assumed an antagonistic attitude. As you know, our

clans were, in fact, autonomic principalities, as far as our own country

was concerned, and therefore, when a prince and his government decided

to take a certain step in one way or other, it was an act of state,

however small it may have been, and not the act of a gathering of

private individuals. It follows, therefore, that when a great feudal

lord became an open enemy of the Shogunate, his opposition was an

organised power. When, therefore, Chosiu took up the cudgels against the

Shogunate, the latter found a formidable foe; and when, further, Satsuma

and others began to sympathise with Chosiu, the Shogunate began to

totter, and in the course of a few years came to an end. If it had not

been on account of the existence of a feudal system, such phenomenal

change would have been most difficult. Of course, there were several

other causes which gave facility to that great change. The system of the

Shogunate had existed in Japan over seven hundred years, but the family

which held in its hands the authority of the Shogun changed from time to

time. The family which ruled Japan as Shogun for the longest time before

the Tokugawa, viz. the last Shogunate, was the Ashikaga family, which

lasted two hundred and forty years, with sixteen Shoguns in succession.

Next to the Ashikaga family was the Hojio family, which, though not

actual Shoguns, exercised the actual power of the Shogunate for one

hundred and thirty-four years, with nine representatives in succession.

Now Tokugawa lasted as Shogun two hundred and sixty-four years, with

fifteen Shoguns; therefore Tokugawa ruled as the Shogunate longer than

any other family. In the natural course of events popular imagination

had already begun to think, that the time was approaching for Tokugawa

to cease to be the Shogunate.

'Then, again, public opinion and sentiment were fast growing in favour

of the restoration of the Imperial authority. It was a perfectly

legitimate movement; it differed very widely from those cries which are

generally raised in other countries at the time of revolution by the

lower classes, based on the mere dissatisfaction of the conditions of

existence. Add to this the great shock given by the advent to the

country of the Western black ships one after the other. It was

sufficient to stir up the heart and soul of the whole nation, and to

prepare the way for any change or reform, provided they were good for

the preservation of self-existence. Such was the tide which occasioned

the convulsion of the Japanese, previous to the great change of 1867. No

country, neither China nor Russia, would ever get such a splendid

opportunity as this for a radical and thorough reform.

'Then again, the fact that the Imperial court had existed, and yet had

had no intricate organisation, was also a great help in assisting the

completion of the task. Because the Imperial court had existed, and that

too from time immemorial, and it had always commanded the greatest

possible reverence of the people, all the new movements knew where to

rally; and because the court had not an intricate and crystallised

organisation before the restoration, as the administrative government of

the country, the tablet was almost blank, so that nearly all

institutions could be introduced with greater facility than they would

have been otherwise, the only requirements being the capacity and

forethought with which the matter was to be executed.'

--'Viewed in the light you have just represented to us,' said another,

'the prospects appear to have been very bright; but there must have been

a great danger of the matter miscarrying, and the anxiety felt by

responsible statesmen must have been very great.'

--'Certainly it was so. But we were very fortunate. Patriotism and

loyalty went far to do the greater part of the work. Suppose the

different princes and their clans had been more selfish, and had begun

to quarrel among themselves, perhaps with some latent intention of

placing themselves in the position of the Shogunate, the country would

have indeed fared very badly, and great hindrance would have been placed

in the path of reform. In that respect, however, the two most powerful

clans, Satsuma and Chosiu, who had the best rights to covet the

Shogunate, if such a right were permissible at all, were determined

above all others not to embark on such an enterprise. Their princes and

statesmen all directed their whole energies to the revivification and

consolidation of the Imperial authority. Satsuma and Chosiu being so

disposed, all others had to follow their examples. Indeed, they had no

thought of doing otherwise.'

--'It was the general spirit of the time,' said one, 'but in what way

was the new Imperial government organised, and how did it begin to work?

Surely the spirit of the time cannot work itself out alone; political

wisdom must have played a great part in leading that spirit to the right

goal.'

--'When the last Shogun resigned his authority,' I continued, 'the

Imperial government on a new and firmer basis was immediately organised.

In it were gathered the ablest men of the empire from all sources. Able

court nobles, able feudal lords, and able Samurai of different clans,

were all given suitable places side by side. There were many court

nobles, with Sanjio and Iwakura at their head, who had done much in

bringing about the great change. The Imperial court before the change

had no military power, as you know, but the court, including the nobles,

always stood in high social estimation. For that reason, as well as for

their personal distinction, they were given high places in different

branches of the government. Side by side with them, several feudal

lords, who were endowed with personal ability, were also given high

positions. After them came distinguished Samurai of different clans, to

whom various positions, high and low, were assigned, according to their

fame and ability. At that time there existed two appellations

designating those Samurai who became officials of the Imperial

government: Choshi (summoned Samurai) and Koshi (tributed Samurai)--the

former meaning those Samurai who were specially summoned by the emperor

to serve in his government; the latter meaning those who were taken into

the Imperial service at the recommendation of the feudal lord, whose

retainers they had been. Thus you can see the intelligence and ability

of the different clans were gathered together around the Imperial

throne, beneath which all of them, court nobles, feudal lords, and

ordinary Samurai, worked together for the common good of the empire, a

sight never seen before. Such disinterestedness and such avidity for

ability were subsequently extended even to the men of those clans and of

the fleet who had fought against the Imperialists.'

--'Very fine,' said one; 'but I should think it must have been very

difficult for them to get on well together.'

--'True,' I answered; 'but when men with a vital common aim work

together, putting aside self-interests, they can achieve great things.

Besides, there was a centre of gravity in the political force, resulting

from a combination of the preponderant influences of Satcho, viz.

Satsuma and Chosiu. That centre of gravity acted the part of a pendulum

or regulator in the new government, and kept all the forces working in

unison. You know already that the Satcho were two powerful clans which

were the chief factors in bringing about the Great Change. In addition

to their natural claim to influence, they produced men of ability, far

greater in number than any other clans. Naturally, therefore, Satcho men

occupied more important positions than men of other clans. Next to

Satcho, the clan having similar influence was Tosa. Next to Tosa, Saga

came to share influence under the new government. Satcho kept their

mutual harmony well together, and Tosa and Saga joined in the concert.

There could be no other clans able to beat their own drums separately.

Of course there was a possibility of the Satcho themselves coming into

conflict, but for that the statesmen of the clans in question understood

each other, and each felt a great responsibility, and accordingly did

their best not to produce any discord between them. The chief

representative of the Chosiu statesmen was Kido, whilst there were two

such on the side of Satsuma, Saigo the elder, and Okubo. These three

were popularly called the three great men of the restoration. The types

of Okubo and Saigo somewhat differed one from the other, for Saigo,

unlike Okubo, was more of a soldier, and represented more the military

elements of Satsuma, and therefore we may say that the reins of

statesmanship in the new government, as represented by the Satcho, were

in the hands of Kido and Okubo. It was chiefly through their efforts

that the abolition of the feudal system was ultimately brought about.'

'That part of your history,' said one, 'is a most important and

interesting point for us to know. Let us be further enlightened by some

of your own observations.'

'Well, the inauguration of the Imperial régime took place in 1867. In

the course of a few years a disinterested opinion was mooted and soon

spread amongst the lords themselves to the effect that, now that the

Shogun had resigned his function and had restored his administrative

authority to the Imperial government, it also behoved the lords of all

the clans similarly to resign and to give up to the Imperial court the

administrative authority of their clan governments, together with the

lands and people they governed. With such reasoning all the feudal

lords, headed by the lords of Satcho, vied one with another in

voluntarily taking that step. The offer was accepted, and the lords were

duly nominated the governors of the different clans. Thus the nature of

the position of the lords was changed. They now became mere officials

appointed by the new Imperial government, and delegated to carry out its

administrative measures. This was an event which took place in 1869. In

the course of another few years, viz. in 1871, the clan system was

finally abolished, and the prefecture system was introduced in its

place. The former lords were ordered by the emperor to reside near him

in the capital, and new governors were nominated in their places,

chiefly from amongst the Samurai, who were already in the government

service. Of course those perfectural governments were newly organised,

with suitable subordinates nominated either from amongst those who were

already in government service, or from amongst local celebrities. Thus

was abolished our feudal system without any murmur.'

--'That is the official history,' said one, 'but there must be also some

inner history which you know of in connection with it.'

--'Well,' I answered, 'the new Imperial government was inaugurated as

you have already seen. It had no regular revenue as yet; it had neither

army nor navy properly belonging to it. Okubo was planning a scheme for

Satsuma, by which a portion of its revenue or territory was to be given

up to the Imperial government, and that other clans might also be

induced to follow the example. Simultaneously with Okubo, Kido was also

meditating a project for making the new Imperial administration

effective. He schemed the total abolition of the feudal system, the

initiation of the idea having been impressed on him by Ito. He returned

from Kioto to Chosiu, and presented his views to the Prince of Chosiu,

who being a person of extreme loyalty, willingly gave his assent to

Kido's proposal. On the return of Kido to Kioto, Okubo gave up his own

plan and immediately accepted that of Kido. The matter having been thus

agreed upon between the two most influential statesmen, it soon became a

question of practical politics, and was successfully carried into effect

in no time, as I have already told you.'

--'Can you give me,' said one, 'some idea of the clans of the Japanese

feudal system? You make use of that word, as do other writers on Japan,

but to me, somehow or other, it does not appear to give a clear idea.'

'The word "clan,"' I replied, 'which is used in place of the Japanese

word "Han," does not convey the exact meaning, as you imagine. The word

"clan" in English signifies "men," whereas our word "Han" signifies more

"a territorial community with its government," including lands and

population, somewhat in the same sense as the word "principality" or

"duchy." Then, too, the word "clan," strictly speaking, implies the

meaning of a collection of families bearing the same surname, and

supposed to have descended from a common ancestor, but with our word

"Han" no such meaning is implied in the word itself. Every feudal lord

of Japan had a large number of retainers, and it was natural that a

certain number among them were descended from the same ancestors as the

lord himself; but those were, after all, in a very small minority, and

the overwhelming number were in nowise connected with their lord, as far

as blood relationship was concerned. Thus, you can see, the word "clan"

does not represent the exact meaning of the word "Han." The technical

term for the acts of giving up and restoring the clan governments to the

Imperial government was "Han-seki Hokwan," which meant "restoring the

Han records," whereby the giving up of the territory and its population

was implied.'

--'I see the difference between the term "clan" and the term "Han,"'

said one, 'but I wish to know something more about the process by which

the "Han" came to be formed.'

--'That question requires a long answer, because to explain in detail

would amount to writing a history of the feudal system of Japan, but I

will give you a succinct answer. Feudal lords originally were local

celebrities, with some landed property and retainers. In the sixteenth

century the country had reached the height of disorder: it was then that

countless warriors appeared in the arena, all fighting their way to

distinction, some on their own account, and some under the leadership of

greater men. The leaders as they became greater had to enlist more

followers, and the greater of those followers had in turn to enlist

their own followers. These followers were generally enlisted from all

sources, some being fortunate sons of mere peasants, some being

masterless fighters of a former lord, whose house had become extinct,

either through war, or from some other reason. Those who offered service

and those who accepted it necessarily entered upon a new relationship of

master and servant. The best example of this was the famous Hideyoshi

and his followers. Of course, there were many who had better antecedents

and pedigrees, but the process by which the cadre of their military

organisation had become enlarged was similar. After the country had

returned to its normal condition of peace, and those leaders became

feudal lords, those followers, viz. retainers, formed their cadre of

Samurai. Each lord established his government in his province, to govern

the land and people under his authority, and the executive officials

were appointed by him from amongst those retainers. All those feudal

governments enjoyed autonomy, subject to the general control of the

central government of the Shogun. There were also several feudal lords

who were made such by virtue of their close relationship with the

Shogun, or for their distinguished services, other than military, but

the method by which their government and military cadre were formed was

much the same. I may add that the word "Han" was originally Chinese, and

its literal meaning is a "fence." It was used figuratively to signify an

idea of protection or defence, as a fence serves to protect a house, for

the central government against external aggressors.'

--'That explains very clearly,' said one, 'the difference between your

"Han" and the Western "clans," but I should like to know more about the

evolution of your feudal system from its earliest stage.'

--'Very well,' I answered, 'under the ancient Imperial régime, local

governors were despatched from the central government. Imperial guards

were taken from amongst the provincial youth, there were also several

military stations, at different strategic points of the country; the

soldiers having been similarly taken from the neighbouring provinces. In

the course of time, first with the growth of luxury in the capital, then

with the decay of the Imperial authority, the governors themselves

ceased to go to their respective provinces, and deputies came to be

appointed to discharge their provincial affairs for them. These deputies

began to settle in the provinces and to make their functions hereditary,

or local celebrities came to be appointed as deputies, often by heredity

also. In the meantime, as I told you once before, a sort of hereditary

warrior families gradually sprang up in the provinces. The more

enfeebled the Imperial court became, the less effective the

administrative authority of the Imperial government became in the

distant provinces, where fighting between those warrior families was

often waged without any knowledge or any recognition of the Imperial

government. When, towards the end of the twelfth century, Yoritomo

defeated his foes, the Taira, and made himself master of the situation,

he established his seat of government at Kamakura, and began to control

the whole empire. At first he did so on the pretext of keeping peace and

order with Imperial sanction. He called himself, in that respect,

Sotsuibushi, which means nothing else than police-master-general. He

appointed new local governors, chiefly from amongst the leaders of the

warrior families. The official names for these new governors differed

from those instituted formerly by the Imperial government. He did not

try to do away with the Imperial official organisation, which had become

almost nominal, but, in fact, he introduced a new organisation in the

provinces. Needless to say, these new governors soon became the real

governors in all respects, though their ostensible duties at first were

for police affairs in its broad sense. This was the beginning of our

system of the military governments. Although there were several

vicissitudes, that system in the main lasted down to the great reform of

our own days. This period of the system of military power is the period

called by the writers in the Western languages the "feudal period," and

the system is called the "feudal system." There was, of course, much

resemblance in customs and manners, and even institutions, between the

European feudal system and our military system, but I do not think the

words themselves convey exactly the meaning of our appellation for the

system. We call the system "Hoken," which was originally Chinese. That

term, which is a combination of two words, means to "create and install"

and signifies an act by which some particular person is created a

hereditary prince of certain districts. Thus the idea that the persons

so created were only made so by the favour of the central government is

implied in the term itself. I have already told you that in the

sixteenth century, Japan laboured under a condition of the greatest

disorder. Many feudal lords rose and fell. When the Tokugawa family

assumed the Shogunate, the country was brought to a perfect peace, and

that system of "Hoken" was brought to a state of perfection. It was then

that a total re-shuffling, so to say, not of the cards but of the feudal

lords, was effected. Many old lords retained their positions by

acknowledging the supremacy of Tokugawa, but many who were the followers

of Tokugawa itself, were newly created lords. The former were called

"Tozama" (exterior) Daimio, and the latter were called "Fudai"

(adherents) Daimio. Those who had been created, on account of blood

relationship to Tokugawa, formed a somewhat different category. The

tenure of the lords was not looked upon in the light of private property

in its strict sense. The Shogunate freely exercised its authority, to

confiscate or to transfer to another place, when political expediency

demanded it, though of course such steps were taken only when some

blamable action had been committed, or on the offer of some higher and

better position. The feudal lords had no right to sell or alienate any

portion of the land. In the early part of the Tokugawa régime, the

tenure was confiscated in case of default of male heir to a deceased

lord, though later on the system of adoption came to the rescue and an

adopted heir was allowed to succeed.'

--'I understand now the nature of your feudal system,' said one; 'but it

must have been a great sacrifice for the feudal lords to give up all

their possessions.'

'It was so in one sense, no doubt,' I answered, 'but, as I have already

told you, the lands of our feudal lords were never regarded as private

properties. The Shogun had the power to dispose of those tenures, but

the Shogun was supposed to have possessed that authority by the

delegation of the Imperial prerogative. "Even the remotest sea coast is

the emperor's land, and even the humblest creature is the emperor's

subject." This was the politico-ethical maxim of China, so also in

Japan. This notion had been brought into special prominence, in recent

centuries, and patriotic lords and statesmen kept the maxim very vividly

in their minds, especially at the time of the great change. The lords

had their feudal governments in their locality. They regarded themselves

as being the heads of those governments, acting for the emperor. They

did not, therefore, feel so much pain as when one gives up a property

which is one's own private possession in the strictest sense. Besides,

the deep sentiments of loyalty and patriotism swayed them and animated

them to adopt the step without any hesitation. I may also add that all

the lords used to be invested with some titles of distinction, which

were names of some official function of the Imperial court, and also

personal ranks, resembling Western orders. These they received through

the Shogunate, but the giver was the emperor. Thus you can see that the

fountain of honour had always remained with the Imperial court, nay

more, the Shogun himself received his function and title from the

emperor.'

--'What do you mean by the re-shuffling of the feudal lords?' asked one.

--'I mean that in the early stage of the Tokugawa régime a complete

rearrangement of that system, which is generally called feudal, was

effected, by transferring all the old lords from one place to another

and by creating new lords, to whom new localities were given to govern,

whilst many of the older lords lost their possessions. By removal also,

some lords were made greater and some smaller. In making that

rearrangement, the Shogunate took great care to distribute the lands

among the lords in such a way that a combination of several lords

against the Shogunate might be impossible. Smaller lords were placed

round large ones, and the more trustworthy against less trustworthy, and

so on. This rearrangement or shifting I called "re-shuffling." The same

thing was done even down to the last days of the Shogunate, though on a

limited scale and less frequently. I can therefore say that there was no

feudal lord who continued to possess the same seat from the pre-Tokugawa

period. There were, however, a few exceptions, and Satsuma was the most

significant example. In the earlier state of the feudal system, the

lords and retainers did not necessarily reside side by side. The lords

had their chief seats where they resided, but the custom of building

strong castles had not yet come into existence, and their retainers

lived here and there on their domains. From the middle of the sixteenth

century, the custom of constructing large castles came into existence.

The lords resided in the castles and the retainers lived in houses

around them. This became more markedly the case when the re-shuffling of

the lords was made and the lords removed, together with their retainers,

from one place to another like swarms of bees. It was also at that time

that the separation of the Samurai, that is, the retainers, from the

ordinary avocations of the people became more thoroughly distinct. The

Samurai received their annual allowance from their lords, and did not

carry on any commercial business nor trouble themselves about

agricultural pursuits. There was great difference of grandeur between

the different feudal lords. Our usual way of estimating their relative

grandeur was by measuring the reputed quantity of rice produced on their

land. According to that method, the degree varied from ten thousand to

one million koku. There were some two hundred and seventy lords, and

their grandeur varied between those quantities. There were also many

petty lords, whose produce of rice from their lands did not amount to

ten thousand koku. They were called quasi-lords. Such being the variety

of grandeur of the lords, large retainers of great lords often exceeded

in grandeur the smaller lords.'

--'You said Satsuma was an exception. Will you explain how it was?'

--'Well, Prince Shimazu was the lord of Satsuma. The greater parts of

the provinces Hiuga and Osumi were also included in his dominion. His

family had been great lords in that part of the country for some seven

hundred years. When the famous Hideyoshi invaded Kiusiu, and reached

Satsuma, the prince, namely, the lord of Satsuma, surrendered to that

great hero after several battles. Hideyoshi did not consider it politic

to push the matter to extremes, so the prince retained his former

position. When Tokugawa assumed the Shogunate, the prince was left

undisturbed in spite of his having once taken up cudgels against

Tokugawa at the famous battle of Sekigahara. His seat of government was

Kagoshima, but there was scarcely any establishment worth calling a

castle. A certain number of his retainers lived around his residence,

but a large number of them lived in different parts of his territory,

their lives being partly devoted to agriculture. Satsuma was one of the

few strong clans, and its combination with Chosiu resulted, as I said

before, in the restoration of the Imperial régime.'

--'Will you please explain in outline the financial system of the

Shogunate, and how it was transferred to the Imperial government?' asked

one.

'The Shogunate had under its immediate control territorial possessions

which were roughly reckoned, in the terms of rice, eight million koku.

The Shogunate was clever enough to have the lions share of the landed

possessions, which included the best parts of the country, generally

comprising prosperous towns, as, for instance, the city of Osaka. The

expenditure of the Shogunate was maintained by the income from those

territories. No feudal lord had to contribute anything to the exchequer

of the Shogunate, except that they were at times ordered to undertake

some public works allotted to them; for example, the reparation of some

river banks or damage done to the Shogun's castle. The revenue of the

Shogunate was scarcely sufficient for maintaining the Shogunate in its

normal state, and towards its latter days, when the external relations

and internal disturbances began to press heavily, the financial

difficulty was much felt. As to the Imperial court, it had no regular

revenue at all, except a comparatively trifling sum contributed by the

Shogunate, which was supposed to be the equivalent to the taxes

collected by the Shogun's officials in the provinces in the immediate

vicinity of the Imperial seat. There was no land under the direct

control of the court; even the city of Kioto itself was under the

administration of the officials of the Shogunate. Consequently the

Imperial court was always in a needy condition. It follows, also, that

the court nobles were also in an extremely needy condition, though high

in personal rank. They only received paltry annual allowances out of the

Shogun's contribution, though a very few high court nobles had small

landed possessions. Such being the case, it was natural that the

Imperial government, when it first came into a renewed existence, should

have met with much financial difficulty.'

--' But how did you manage to tide over the transitory period?' asked

one.

--'The troops,' I answered, 'which fought for the Imperial cause were

generally supported at the expense of their own feudal clan-governments.

For the current expenses, some rich merchants either contributed or

advanced the necessary sum of money, and also new paper money was

issued. By such means as these the government managed to carry on its

affairs, and in the course of time some revenue began to accrue to the

Imperial treasury from the regions which had been under the control of

the Shogunate, but the sum was insignificant. It follows, therefore,

that for financial reasons only some great change was necessary, and

thus a double impetus was given to the idea of such men as Kido and

Okubo for the abolition of the feudal system.'

--'Let us assume that the feudal system had already been abolished,'

said another, 'the winding-up of the affairs of the different feudal

governments, and the consolidation under a uniform system of central

government must have been a very difficult and delicate matter.'

--'Yes, it was so,' I answered. 'To begin with, most of those

governments had debts of all kinds which had to be liquidated, above

all, their obligations for paper money floated by them. The coinage of

gold and silver was the monopoly of the central government, but all the

feudal lords had the privilege of circulating paper money under

different forms in different clans. The actual value of this paper money

in gold and silver varied according to the financial condition of the

feudal government by whom it was issued, and that money was legal only

in the districts which were under the jurisdiction of the lords by whose

governments they were issued. You can therefore easily imagine how

troublesome and inconvenient the matter must have been to travellers and

traders in localities where those feudal governments stood in close

proximity to each other. Then again, the lords and their retainers could

not be made penniless immediately on the abolition of the feudal system.

To them, therefore, certain means of support were given, in proportion

to their former rank and income; that support was ultimately converted

into the form of government bonds. The income thus given was not enough

for many of the Samurai to support themselves and their families, and

they, therefore, had to seek some new occupation to which they were not

accustomed. A large number of them even lost the bonds thus given,

through their incautious or incompetent management. The government had

to prevent things getting into a worse condition, and to make the

transition state a smooth one, if possible. For that purpose the

government often had to organise for them some kind of common work, for

which sometimes some special funds were given. Somehow or other, we have

got through those trying times. The credit of winding-up the affairs of

the feudal governments is chiefly due to Count Inouyé, who was the

acting Minister of Finance at the time.

--'How did matters stand at the time with regard to the system of

taxation?' asked one.

--'It was also one of the most difficult problems which the Imperial

government had to solve,' I answered. 'Perhaps you know that the

economical theory of the Far East had always been essentially

physiocratic. Agriculture was the foundation of national existence.

Commerce and industry were very little considered. Curiously enough, on

that account the land had to bear public expenses almost entirely, and

commerce and industry contributed almost nothing; in other words, taxes

on land were the main source of public revenue. People engaged in

industry and commerce paid no tax, except perhaps some trifling amount

in the form of licences occasionally, and except that they were often

ordered by their lords to contribute irregular sums of money to relieve

their financial difficulty. The land taxes were paid, as a rule, in

kind, namely, rice, but the burden of the tax-payers was by no means

uniform throughout the country. There was a vague measurement expressed

by the words "four public, six private," that is to say, four tenth

parts of the produce was to go to the government, and the remaining six,

together with any supplementary produce, was to remain in the hands of

the producers. But this was by no means uniformly practised. Roughly

speaking, the burden of the lands under the direct control of the

Shogunate was lighter than that on the lands under the different lords.

But there was much difference in the burden on the lands held by the

different lords. As a matter of fact, all sorts of additional burdens,

besides the pure land taxes, were instituted and levied on most lands.

It was necessary for the Imperial government to unify these burdens and

equalise them, as much as possible, throughout the whole country. It was

also desirable to change the whole system of paying taxes in kind into a

uniform system of money payment, because, in the case of the former,

revenue is subject to variation on account of the condition of the

harvest and the market price, besides, that system is more liable to

abuse. The Imperial government undertook this tremendous work of reform.

The valuation of all lands was carried out, and the system of payment in

money was effected. I may here mention that, under the ancient Imperial

régime, no proprietary rights were recognised in lands. The tillers of

land obtained the allotments of them for life, and new allotments were

made from time to time. That system, however, was not strictly enforced

in the case of newly reclaimed lands, especially so in the far-off

provinces. As time went on, the system entirely fell through, and

hereditary proprietorship of the tillers came tacitly into existence.

Nevertheless, the idea of the supreme domain of the sovereign from the

points of public law and proprietary rights of the possessors from

points of private law had not been brought into a very distinct light,

and the vague notion had still remained that the possessors held the

lands only by favour of the sovereign. As a matter of fact, in most

parts of the country no rights of sale of lands were legally recognised,

though the matter was widely affected by some fictitious means, such as

long mortgages or long leases. This state of things was entirely changed

by the reform made when the nature of the land tax was changed, as I

have just described, because by that reform the full proprietary rights

from the point of private law were completely recognised. I said that

industrial and commercial people contributed almost nothing to the

public expenses, and yet the denominations under which they had to pay

something were various. Add to this numerous other miscellaneous

contributions; there were several hundred different kinds of

contributions, but each of these separately amounted to a very small

sum, and was not worth the trouble it involved. These, therefore, were

altogether abolished. Of course the government had, as time went on, to

introduce some new taxes, such as the business tax, the income tax,

etc., but these are the results of the progress made in our economical

and financial conditions, and based on broader and more universal lines,

so as to fit the altered state of the country. The annual budget, which

amounted to seventy or eighty million yen before the Sino-Japanese war,

amounted to some five or six hundred million yen before the

Russo-Japanese war: that will perhaps show the expansion of the

financial system of the country.'

--'It is very interesting,' said one; 'but let us have a cup of tea,

and then continue the discussion.'