The contract to be valid must be for the benefit of one having an

insurable interest, otherwise the contract is a wager, which the law

condemns. This is sufficient if the person taking the insurance has

such an interest arising from his relation to the insured as creditor

and surety, or from the ties of blood or marriage that will justify a

reasonable expectation of advantage or benefit from the continuation

of his life. It is not needful that this expectation or benefit should

possess a pecuniary valuation. The mutual legal rights and liabilities

of father and minor child are sufficient to create an insurable

interest on the part of each in the life of the other; also the

relationship of brother and sister, and that of husband and wife.

Likewise a man and a woman who are engaged to be married; and a

creditor has an insurable interest in the life of his debtor. And this

interest covers not only the amount of the indebtedness, but also

future advances, and the cost of taking out and keeping up the

insurance. A partner who has advanced the capital of the business has

an insurable interest in the life of his partner. More generally any

person who invests money relying on the efforts of another to produce

a return has an insurable interest in such person's life. A surety

therefore has an insurable interest in the life of his principal; an

executor in the life of a person who has granted an annuity to the

testator; a common carrier even may insure against loss from injuries

to passengers. But the relationship between uncle or aunt, nephew and

niece and that of cousin is not sufficient to support a policy taken

by one in the life of the other.

A policy may be assigned to one who has no insurable interest if made

in good faith, and not as a cloak for the procuring of insurance by

one having no insurable interest. This rule does not prevail

everywhere, but the courts which do not accept this rule usually

protect the assignee who has paid the premiums to the amount of his

payments, while the estate of the insured takes the balance that may

come from the insurer, whenever the assignment of the policy is not

invalid. An assignment to one who has an insurable interest as

relative, creditor and the like, is always valid.

A general agent, says Justice McClain, "may bind the company by an

agreement as to rate of premiums, or other terms of the contract, even

as against the express provisions of a policy subsequently issued,

there being no negligence on the part of the insured in failing to

advise himself as to the terms of the policy; but if the want of

authority of the agent to vary the terms of the application is brought

home to the applicant, oral communications of the insured to the agent

are not to be considered in determining the validity of the insurance.

If the agent has exceeded his authority as to the terms of the

proposed contract, the company cannot reject that part which the

agent was without authority to make and enforce the rest, but must

accept or reject in toto."

Until a proposition for insurance has been accepted by the company

there is no contract. Delay in accepting an application which is

subject to approval does not effect an acceptance. There may be a

binding contract of insurance as soon as the company has accepted the

application, or on the delivery and acceptance of it by the company's

agent, when he has authority to do so. In order to complete the

contract before issuing the policy there must be an agreement to this

effect, and before the death of the applicant. The receipt by an agent

for the first premium, or of a note therefor, subject to the approval

of the application by the company, does not effect a contract between

insurer and insured.

Some states have enacted statutes prescribing requirements for life

insurance policies, or standard forms. Delivery to a third person for

the insured may be sufficient. The contract becomes complete when the

policy is put in the mail, postage prepaid, for delivery in due course

to the insured. Delivery to the insured for examination of course does

not effect any engagement on the part of the insurer, nor does a

delivery on condition.

It is often stated that the delivery shall not be effectual to create

a contract unless the insured is alive and in good health when the

policy is delivered and the first premium is paid. Indeed, how could

it be valid if the insurer is dead? And if the contract is with a

person other than the insured as beneficiary, it would be void on the

ground of mistake. Likewise, under such a condition, a policy does not

become effective, without a waiver, if the insured is in ill health at

the time of its delivery or payment of the premium.

Unless waived by the company, there is usually a stipulation to the

effect that the company shall not become bound until the first premium

has been actually paid and accepted by the company or its authorized

agent. But if the premium is actually paid by the agent of the company

for the insured by virtue of an agreement between them, this will bind

the company. The payment of the premium by a third person without the

knowledge of the insured does not have the same effect.

A general agent has authority to waive the stipulation, that the

policy shall not take effect until the first premium is paid, though

of course he may be restricted in this regard, but a special agent

cannot waive this stipulation; though if he acts otherwise and the

company ratifies his act, it is bound. A provision also that a policy

shall not be valid unless the premium is paid when the insured is in

good health may be waived by an agent who has authority to take

applications, collect premiums and deliver policies.

Passing to the nature of the contract, if made in violation of a

statute, or if contrary to public policy and this is known by both

parties, it is void. Thus a stipulation that a policy shall be payable

though the insured may be executed for a crime is contrary to public

policy and is therefore void. The same is true of a stipulation

insuring against death by suicide while sane. It is against public

policy to allow one person to have insurance on the life of another

without his knowledge. A policy issued on a person beyond a specified

age is prohibited by statute.

What is the effect of fraud in negotiating and issuing policies? If

the company or its agent perpetrates a fraud whereby one is induced to

take out a policy, he can at his option declare it void, unless so

negligent in acting as to work an acquiescence of it. But if acting in

a proper way and time he can set up fraud as a defense in an action to

get the premium for which the contract has stipulated; or he may sue

to have the policy declared void and his premiums returned to him; or

he may bring an action against the company or its agent, or both, to

recover the damages he may have sustained by the fraud that has been

practiced on him.

On the other hand, if the insured has been wronged, the courts furnish

relief, and perhaps may set the policy aside. Mistake is a common

ground of relief; it must in all cases be clearly proved. And if a

policy is susceptible of two constructions, the ambiguity is to be

resolved in favor of the insured. As the company framed the policy all

of its provisions in its favor are strictly construed. It may be added

that the construction which the parties themselves have put upon a

contract of life insurance will be generally followed in determining

their intention. Again, the entire contract is to be construed

together for the purpose of giving effect to each clause and as

between general and specific provisions relating to the same matter

the specific provisions control.

In determining who is the beneficiary under the terms of a policy of

life insurance the courts are governed by the intentions of the

parties. They need not be named if they can be otherwise identified,

and may be designated in a separate paper prepared for that purpose.

The amount named in the policy generally fixes the liability of the

company. To obviate the wager feature, the amount of insurance

effected for a creditor on the life of his debtor ought to be limited

to the amount of the debt with interest and premiums during the

expectancy of the life insured.

The risk is presumed to begin from the date of the policy and to

continue until the happening of the contingency or time when payment

is to be made by the insured. It may be added that words or figures

written or printed on the margin of a policy of life insurance, on its

back, or on a slip, with reference to the terms and conditions of the

contract, constitute a part of it and must be considered in deciding

its meaning. But representations made in a prospectus or circular

issued by a life insurance company are no part of a contract.

The payment of premiums to a general agent without notice of any

limitation of his authority to receive payments will bind the company,

but a different rule applies to a special agent. The premiums may be

paid by the insured, or the beneficiary, or by the agent of the

company whenever he has agreed to pay them for the insuring party. A

discount allowed by the company for the punctual payment of premiums

belongs not to the agent, but to the insured. Cash is usually paid,

though other arrangements also exist for taking notes, that are

ultimately paid in cash or from the earnings of the company, and

belong to the insured and would be paid to him. In mutual life

insurance companies a portion of the premium is often paid in this

manner.

A policy of life insurance payable to the insured, or in the event of

his death to his personal representatives, may be assigned unless

forbidden by statute, therefore a policy payable to the wife of the

insured, or another may be assigned by the united act of the insured

and the beneficiary. Thus a policy taken out for a wife's benefit is

often assigned by her and her husband to his creditors to secure

their debts. In some states statutes forbid the assignment of such

policies for the benefit of creditors. The written assignment must be

delivered to the assignee to be effective. On some occasions

assignments have been declared valid where the intention was clearly

proved though both the written assignment and the policy remained in

the possession of the assignor. An assignee who holds a policy as

security is entitled on its payment only to the amount of his claim

and advances with interest, including premiums paid to keep the policy

alive and thus preserve his security. More generally premiums paid for

this purpose are chargeable on the proceeds of the insurance, but a

mere volunteer who pays the premiums acquires no lien on the proceeds

of the policy when it is paid. Nor can one who ought to pay the

premiums give a lien on the policy to another for money advanced by

him to pay them; and an assignee who has promised to pay the premiums

may be liable should he fail to keep the policy alive.

Contracts of reinsurance are often made by all insurance companies. In

some states the reinsuring company becomes liable to an action by the

beneficiary named in the original policy. Where the reinsuring

company, by agreement, undertakes to reinsure the members of the other

company should they execute applications for that purpose, any member

who does this is not required to be reexamined or comply with other

conditions respecting his age or health.

A policy may be canceled or surrendered by mutual agreement. After the

death of the insured the rights of the parties become fixed, and there

can be no cancellation. During his lifetime the insured may abandon

his contract by refusing to pay the premiums, but an intention to

abandon will not be presumed, nor will the taking out of a second

policy before his failure to pay the premiums on the other establish

an abandonment. If both parties treat the contract as void, neither

can revive it without the consent of the other. As the beneficiary has

a vested or definite interest in the contract, the insured cannot, by

surrendering the policy, cut off the rights of the beneficiary without

his or her consent unless permitted to do so by the contract itself.

A surrender or cancellation of a policy may be avoided on the ground

of mutual mistake. But the insured cannot seek cancellation on the

ground that he thought it was something else when his mistake was

simply his own in not reading the release.

A policy may be rescinded whenever fraud has been practiced by either

party. Thus, should a greater premium be demanded than that stated in

the contract this would be a good reason for rescinding on the part of

the part of the insured. Likewise, if he was induced to take out the

insurance by the fraud of the company or its agent, unless he has lost

his right to rescind through inaction or negligence. Likewise, the

company may rescind for fraud practiced by the insured by

misrepresentation or other fraudulent acts concerning his age, health,

etc. Concealment of facts may and often does operate as a fraud on the

company. Says Justice McClain: "If the applicant has answered the

questions asked in the application he is justified in assuming that no

other information is desired. On the other hand if he wholly fails to

answer questions the company waives information as to matters thus

asked for by accepting the application without objection. If,

however, the applicant purports to answer a question by giving only an

incomplete answer, concealing facts which should properly be stated in

response to the question, and these concealed facts are material, the

policy is voidable." If a material change for the worse in the health

of the applicant takes place after the application and medical

examination, it is the duty of the applicant to disclose it. The

failure to disclose facts of which the applicant is ignorant, or which

are immaterial to the risk, is not ground for avoiding the policy.

When a policy is surrendered or canceled by the contract or by

statute, the insured may be entitled to the surrender value of his

policy. The amount is to be determined by the period for which the

policy has to run, the amount of the annual premium, the age of the

insured, and the probability of the continuance of his life stated in

the usual life tables. The value of an immatured paid-up policy is the

unearned premium called the reserve and is to be computed in the same

manner as that of a policy on which annual premiums are paid. The

beneficiary is entitled to the surrender value as against the insured,

as well as the creditors, unless the beneficiary has consented to

giving them the preference.

By a clause in the contract of insurance or by statute, the insured

can convert his policy into a paid-up policy for such an amount as the

premiums would have secured. These conversions often happen where the

insured is unable or unwilling to continue to pay the premiums

required to maintain the policy. Formerly on the failure of the

insured to pay, policies lapsed or were forfeited, and the insurance

companies gained large sums from this source. This led to legislation

and to the creation of paid-up policies. These are issued on somewhat

different terms, but the principle in all of them is the same.

=Minor.=--The contracts of a minor are of two kinds, those for

necessaries and other things. Contracts for necessaries made by him

the law will uphold. They are really implied contracts which the law

will sustain for his benefit and protection. What are necessaries is a

question of fact, not always easily answered. Much depends on a

minor's place in society and condition. The question is for a jury to

decide, also whether the prices for them are reasonable or not. One of

the well-known cases occurred many years ago. The bill against the

minor was for more than a thousand dollars for twelve coats, seventeen

vests, twenty-three pairs of trousers, five canes, fur caps, chip hats

and other things, in less than six months. The jury rendered a verdict

for almost the entire amount, but the reviewing court remarked that

the bill made the members shudder, that the seller must have known

that all these things were not needed for the minor's comfort within

that short period, and the verdict was therefore set aside.

The question is constantly arising, what are necessaries? A thing

might be to one and not to another. Thus a bicycle merely for pleasure

would not be a necessity; one that is used to go to and from an

individual's daily work would be. A dentist's bill for repairing one's

teeth has been disputed, the law, though, generally favors the

preservation of human teeth. Education furnished to a minor may be a

necessary thing, yet only when it is suitable to his wants and

condition. Should a minor repudiate a contract, the law is observed

if he restores all that he has received, or that is capable of

restoration.

With respect to contracts for other things, they are not always void,

but may be avoided. If they have not been executed, he can disavow

them at any time. If nothing is done during infancy inaction operates

generally as an affirmation. If he disaffirms a contract, he must

return the thing purchased or received, or make the best restitution

he can, for it would not be just to retain possession and refuse

payment.

A different rule applies to a minor who makes a fraudulent contract.

Suppose he buys goods assuring the seller that he is twenty-one years

of age when in fact he is not, though nearly so. Can the seller

recover on his contract? No, but the law has another way of reaching

him. He is liable in an action of deceit, and the amount or damage

that may be recovered is that of the goods sold to him.

A minor who has a parent or guardian cannot make a contract even for

necessaries, nor is he under any obligation to pay his bills for them.

Should he be in need of such things and his guardian or parent be

unwilling to furnish them, they can be compelled by law if having the

means to provide him with whatever he requires.

=Mortgage.=--Two kinds of mortgages are given, one kind is secured by

real estate, the other kind by personal property. In both the borrower

of money pledges his property as security while the money remains

unpaid. During this period he usually remains in possession and

control of the property, though not always. The borrower is called the

mortgagor, the lender the mortgagee. The contract is in writing

sealed, is in fact a deed. Sometimes the contract is in two writings,

the conveyance of the land and security in one, and the conditions or

defeasance on which the conveyance is made in another. It is more

usual, however, to set forth the transaction in a single writing or

conveyance.

A mortgage may be so made as to cover future advances, but it will not

cover them in preference to advances or loans made by another without

any knowledge of them. Nor need another person who makes such a loan

inquire whether a mortgagor has made any other loan, or for a larger

amount than that stated on the public record, where the mortgage deed

is recorded. For, it should be added, a mortgage deed is recorded like

any other for the benefit of all parties, not only to secure the

mortgagee from a later purchaser who might buy if knowing nothing of

the prior mortgage, but from another who might be willing to lend on

such security like himself; or from a creditor of the mortgagor who

might attach the property as belonging to him, if he did not know of

the existence of the mortgage. As the record is public, and may be

examined by everyone, all who are interested in the property are

supposed to examine it and thus find out whether it has been

mortgaged, and if it has been, the conditions of the mortgage, and if

they do not, their neglect is their own.

Improvements, additions of every kind to property after it has been

mortgaged, become a part of it, and if the mortgagee takes future

possession, they pass to him. But a difficult question arises

sometimes, what additions or improvements are included? We have

learned what they are whenever a tenancy relation exists. The law does

not favor a mortgagor to the same extent. The test to apply is that

of intention. If a mill has been mortgaged, the rule is very broad and

the mortgage covers machinery attached by bolts and screws though

removable without injury to the premises. If a mortgage has been

given, by no evidence can it be shown that the deed was intended as an

absolute or entire conveyance of the property. On the other hand by

proper evidence it can be shown that an absolute conveyance was

intended to be only a mortgage. This has been often done. One may ask,

why does the rule not work both ways? There is a much stronger

probability of making a mistake in the second case than in the other.

One of the facts of great importance in such a dispute is the amount

of the consideration or money paid. Suppose a piece of land was worth

$1000 and the deed mentioned only $100, unless there was some other

explanation, there would be a strong probability that the parties

intended only a mortgage which for some reason or other was not

completed.

Again, it is a rule of law that an agreement which is in fact a

mortgage cannot be changed in character by any other agreement made at

the time between the parties relating to the repayment of the money

and the return of the property. The law presumes that the entire

transaction was embodied in the agreement. "Once a mortgage always a

mortgage." Of course this rule does not prevent the parties from

making any later arrangement they please about the property.

A mortgage may be made with a power of sale whereby, should the debt

be not paid at the time fixed, a valid title may be acquired by a

purchase from the mortgagee. The mortgagee thus becomes a kind of

trustee or agent for the debtor. This is a great responsibility to

repose in the mortgagee, and he must perform the trust in good faith

in every respect. He must proceed in a way that will best serve the

interest of the mortgagor, and strictly observe the terms stated in

the mortgage, otherwise the sale will not be valid and the mortgagor

can recover his property. If there is a surplus after satisfying the

mortgage debt it must be paid to the mortgagor, or, if he is dead, to

his heir. Such deeds of trust are made by large corporations to secure

loans, and may be made to secure future advances as well as present

ones.

If the property is sold to satisfy the mortgage debt, the mortgagee

cannot purchase it, unless authorized by statute, or by the terms of

the mortgage; but if it is sold by an officer of the law, the

mortgagee is as free to purchase it as any other individual. This

rule, though, is denied by some courts, which hold he cannot because

the officer is acting as the mortgagee's agent.

A vendor or seller of property, may have for the money he is to

receive a lien, which is nearly the same thing as a mortgage. A

subsequent purchaser would be affected by this lien, however innocent

he might be of its existence. But if the purchaser should mortgage the

property to a third person, who should put his deed on record, he

would gain a valid lien over the vendor. This lien is founded on the

idea that the vendor holds the land in trust for the purchaser until

he has paid for it, but is not recognized in every state. It is

reasonable to suppose that the owner will not sell his land until he

has been paid, or the purchase money has been secured. The lien will

also prevail against any assignment that the vendor may make for the

benefit of creditors, provided he enforces his lien before the

assignee begins to execute his trust.

Much has been said about the notice of the vendor's lien. Any

reasonable notice will suffice, but what is such a notice to charge,

for example, a second purchaser with knowledge? Payment of a part of

the money is held to be knowledge of the lien. Again, a vendee who has

paid any part of the purchase money before the delivery of the deed to

him has a lien for the amount advanced. A third party who pays the

purchase money to the vendor for the purchaser and takes a note for

the amount does not have such a lien.

Putnam's Handy Law Book for the Layman · 第 12 / 24 段