Are benefit societies charities? This question is important from the

taxpayer's view, as charitable associations are taxed less than others

or perhaps entirely relieved. An Indiana court has decided that a

corporation which promises to pay a fixed sum as a benefit during a

member's illness--he of course paying his dues--is not a purely

benevolent organization, and therefore not exempt from taxation.

Masonic lodges on the other hand, are generally regarded as charitable

institutions. "The true test," says a judicial tribunal, "is to be

found in the objects of the institution."

Again, a voluntary association may conduct in such a way as to create

the impression or belief that it is a corporation, and is forbidden

from denying its corporate liability for an injury or loss to a third

person. It is a familiar rule that a person who transacts business

with a partnership in the partnership name may hold all the members

liable as partners, though he did not know all their names. This rule

has sometimes been applied to a voluntary association, making it

responsible as a corporation.

The articles of association regulate the admission of members. A

physician who applied for membership in a medical society was rejected

because of unprofessional conduct. A code of medical ethics adopted by

the society was declared to be binding only on the members, and

therefore did not touch the conduct of one prior to his becoming a

member of the society. If the membership of a society is confined to

persons having the same occupation, a false representation concerning

one's occupation would be a good reason for his expulsion. In

admitting a member, if no form of election has been prescribed, each

candidate must be elected separately. This must also be done at a

regular meeting or at one properly called for that purpose. A call

therefore to transact any business that may be legally presented is

not sufficient.

If a society requires a ceremony of initiation, is the election of a

member so complete that he is entitled to benefits without proper

initiation? In one of the cases the court said: "The entire system,

its existence and objects, are based upon initiation. We think, there

can be no membership without it, and no benefit, pecuniary or

otherwise, without it."

Controversies concerning property rights of religious societies are

generally decided by one of three rules: (1) "was the property a fund

which is in question devoted to the express terms of the gift, grant

or sale by which it was acquired, to the support of any specific

religious doctrine or belief or was it acquired for the general use of

the society for religious purposes with no other limitation; (2) is

the society which owned it of the strictly independent or

congregational form of church government, owing no submission to any

organization outside of the congregation; (3) or is it one of a number

of such societies, united to form a more general body of churches,

with ecclesiastical control in the general association over the

members and societies of which it is composed."

Many benefit societies provide for the payment of money to their sick

members. The rules providing for the payment of these may be changed

at any time as the constitution or articles of association of a

society may prescribe. Consequently an amendment may be made

diminishing the weekly allowance to a member who is sick, and also the

time of allowing it. Of course in applying for the benefits a member

must follow the modes prescribed.

The power to expel members is incident to every society or association

unless organized primarily for gain. Gainful corporations have no such

power unless it has been granted by their charter or by statute. The

revision of the list of members by dropping names is equivalent to the

expulsion of those whose names are dropped, and by a majority vote or

larger one as the rules of the society may require. Nor can the power

of expulsion be transferred from the general body to a committee or

officer. The power to expel must be exercised in good faith, not

arbitrarily or maliciously, and its sentence is conclusive like that

of a judicial tribunal. Nor will a court interfere with the decision

of a society except: first, when the decision was contrary to natural

justice and the member had no opportunity to explain the charge

against him; secondly, when the rules of the association expelling him

were not observed; thirdly, when its action against him was malicious.

Nor will a court interfere because there have been irregularities in

the proceedings, unless these were of a grave character.

The charges must be serious, a violation of a reasonable by-law is a

sufficient charge. To obtain, by feigning a qualification which did

not exist, membership in a trades-union is sufficient cause for

expulsion; so is fraud in representing one's self in his application

for membership when in fact he has an incurable disease. On the other

hand, the following charges are not sufficient to justify expulsion or

suspension: slander against the society, illegally drawing aid in

time of sickness, defrauding the society out of a small sum of money,

villifying a member, disrespectful and contemptuous language to

associates, saying the lodge would not pay and never intended to pay,

ungentlemanly conduct. In harmony with a fundamental rule of law, a

member who has once been acquitted cannot be tried again for the same

offense.

As subordinate lodges of a benefit society are constituent parts of

the superior governing body, there may be an expulsion from membership

in a subordinate lodge for violating laws which generally caused

expulsion from the society itself, and there may be a conditional

expulsion or suspension. If an assessment is not paid at the fixed

time, its non-payment, by the laws of the order, works a suspension,

though a member may be restored by complying with the laws of the

order.

An appeal by a member of a subordinate lodge from a vote of expulsion

does not abate by his death while the appeal is pending. If,

therefore, the judgment of the lodge is reversed, the beneficiary of

the member is entitled to the benefits due on the member's death. A

member who has been wrongfully expelled may be restored by a mandamus

proceeding issued by a court. Before making the order the court will

inquire into the facts and satisfy itself whether in expelling the

applicant the society has properly acted in accord with its rules.

Unless some rule or statute forbids, a member of a voluntary

association may withdraw at any time. When doing so, however, he

cannot avoid any obligations incurred by him to the association. On

the other hand, it cannot, after his withdrawal, impose any other

obligations on him.

It has often been attempted to hold the members of an association

liable personally for a promised benefit in time of sickness. Says

Bacon: "It may be a question of construction in each particular case

whether the members are personally liable or not. The better rule

seems to be that the members are not held personally liable."

An association cannot by its constitution or by-laws confer judicial

powers on its officers to adjudge a forfeiture of property rights, or

to deprive lodges or members of their property and give it to another,

or to other members. To allow associations to do this is contrary to

public policy. For the same reason an agreement to refer future

controversies to arbitration cannot be enforced; it in effect deprives

a party of his rights under the law. He may do this in a known case,

this indeed is constantly done, but one cannot bar himself in advance

from a resort to the courts for some future controversy of which he

has no knowledge at the time of the agreement. This is a rule of law

of the widest application.

=Broker.=--A broker, unlike an auctioneer, usually has no special

property in the goods he is authorized to sell. Ordinarily also he

must sell them in the name of the principal, and his sales are

private. He receives a commission usually called brokerage. He can act

only as the agent of the other party when the terms of the contract

are settled and he is instructed to finish it. Brokers are of many

kinds. They relate to bills and notes, stocks, shipping, insurance,

real estate, pawned goods, merchandise, etc. A bill and note broker

who does not disclose the principal's name is liable like other agents

as a principal. He is also held to an implied authority, not only to

sell, but that the signatures of all the parties thereon are genuine.

Unless he indorses it he does not warrant their solvency.

An insurance broker is ordinarily employed by the person seeking

insurance, and is therefore unlike an insurance agent, who is a

representative of an insurance company, and usually has the authority

of a general agent. A delivery of a policy therefore, to an insurance

broker, would be a delivery to his principal. He is a special agent.

Unless employed generally to keep up his principal's insurance, he has

no implied authority to return a policy to be cancelled, and notice to

him that a policy had ceased, would not be notice to his principal.

An insurance broker must exercise reasonable care and diligence in

selecting none but reliable companies, and in securing proper and

sufficient policies to cover the risks placed to be covered by

insurance; and if he selects companies which are then in good standing

he would not be liable should they afterward become insolvent.

Merchandise brokers, unless factors, negotiate for the sale of

merchandise without having possession or control of it. Like other

agents they must serve faithfully and cannot act for both parties,

seller and buyer, in the same transaction, without the knowledge and

consent of both. In many transactions he does thus represent both by

their express or implied authority, and therefore binding both when

signing for them.

A real estate broker in the employ of his principal is bound to act

for his principal alone, using his utmost good faith in his behalf.

And a promise by one of the principals in an exchange of real estate,

after the completion of the negotiations, to pay a commission to the

other party's broker, to whom he owed nothing, is void for lack of a

consideration.

To gain his commission a broker must produce a person who was ready,

able and willing both to accept and live up to the terms offered by

the owner of the property. Nor can a property owner escape payment of

a broker's commission by selling the land himself and at a price less

than the limit put on the broker.

The business of a pawnbroker is legally regulated by statute, and the

states usually require him to get a license. As the business may be

prohibited, a municipality or other power may regulate and control his

business. The rate of interest that he may charge is fixed by statute.

The pawnee may lose his right by exacting unlawful interest. Nor has

the pawnee the right to retain possession against the true owner of

any article that has been pawned without his consent or authority. If

the true owner has entrusted it to someone to sell, who, instead of

selling, pawns it, the pawner is protected in taking it as security.

The sale of pawned goods is usually regulated by statute. If none

exists, and there is no agreement between the parties, the sale must

be public after due notice of the time and place of sale. If there is

any surplus, arising from the sale, he must pay it to the pawner, and

not apply it on another debt that he may owe the pawnee. The pawner,

or an assignee or purchaser of the pawn ticket may redeem it within

the time fixed by law or agreement, or even beyond the agreed time if

the pawnee has not exercised his right of sale. Subject to the

pawnee's claim, the pawner has the same right over the article pawned

as he had after pawning it, and may therefore sell and transfer his

interest as before. Lastly the pawner is liable for any deficiency

after the sale of the thing pawned, unless released by statute. See

_Agency_.

=Carrier.=--Carriers are of two kinds, private and public. A private

carrier may contract orally or in writing, and must use such care in

carrying the goods entrusted to him as a man of ordinary intelligence

would of his own property. If he carries these gratuitously his

obligation is still less, nevertheless he must even then take some

care of them. Suppose he agreed to carry a package for another to the

latter's home, and on the way, being weary or sleepy, should sit down

by the wayside where people often pass and fall asleep and on

awakening should find the package missing, would he be responsible?

Authorities differ. Suppose the package was a very valuable one. A

court might hold that the man who gave it to him was a fool for

entrusting such a package voluntarily with him. Suppose however that

he was a highly trustworthy man, well known throughout the

neighborhood, then no fault could be imputed to either, and the owner

would be obliged to bear the loss.

Common carriers are far more numerous and important. Receiving a

reward they are required to exercise more care in the business. The

old rule of the common law was very strict, but this has been greatly

modified. A carrier may modify the rule by contract, and the bill of

lading received by the shipper is regarded as one, and sets forth his

liability. In a general way he can relieve himself from all liability

except from his own negligence, and there are cases which hold that he

can relieve himself even from that if the shipper, for the sake of

having his goods carried at a lower price, is willing to relieve him,

in other words is willing to assume all the risk himself.

A carrier can limit his liability for the loss of baggage entrusted to

his care and when one receives a receipt describing the amount of the

carrier's liability in the event of loss. Nor can he hold the company

on the plea of ignorance by declaring he has not read it, for it is

his duty to read the receipt. Again, a carrier is thus liable only

when a traveler's baggage is entrusted to his care; if therefore he

keeps his grip or umbrella and on looking around makes the painful

discovery that he has been relieved of them, he cannot look to the

carrier for compensation.

The law requires carriers to carry all who pay their fare, and are in

a sufficiently intelligent condition to take care of themselves. In

like manner the law requires them to take all freight that may be

offered, though it may make reasonable rules with regard to the time

of receiving it, mode of packing, etc. A regulation therefore that

furniture must be crated is reasonable, and a carrier may refuse to

take it unless it is thus prepared for shipment. So also is a rule

requiring glass to be boxed though the distance may be short for

carrying it. A carrier may also object to carrying things out of

season, potatoes or fruit for example in the winter in the northern

states where there is great danger of freezing, unless the shipper

assumes the risk. Vast quantities of perishable goods are carried, but

usually under definite regulations and contracts. So, too, the shipper

must declare the nature of the thing carried. Should he put diamonds

in his trunk, he could not recover for their loss, for he has no

business to carry such a valuable thing in that way. He must make

known the contents for the carrier's protection. He cannot carry an

explosive in secrecy. To attempt to do such a thing is a manifest

wrong to the carrier.

A carrier has a lien or right to hold the freight until the charge

for transporting it is paid, but if it is delivered, the lien ceases

and cannot be restored. If the carrier keeps it until the freight

charge is paid discretion must be used, and unnecessary and

unreasonable expense must not be incurred in so doing.

A different rule applies to carrying passengers than applies to

freight, because the latter is under its complete control, while

passengers are not. Nevertheless the law requires a high degree of

care in carrying passengers, and is responsible in money damages

should injury occur through the carrier's negligence. In many states

statutes exist limiting the amount that a carrier must pay when life

is lost through its negligence to five thousand dollars or other sum,

while a much larger sum is often recovered for an injury, loss of a

leg, arm or the like. From the carrier's point of view therefore it is

often obliged to pay less for killing than for injuring people; this

is one of the strange anomalies of the law.

When a passenger is injured and no agreement can be made with the

carrier for compensation, a suit is the result and the chief question

is one of fact, the extent of the injury, and the degree of negligence

of the carrier. If, on the other hand, the passenger was in fault

himself and contributed to the injury then the more general rule is he

can recover nothing. In some states the courts attempt to ascertain

the negligence of both parties, when both are at fault, and then award

a verdict in favor of the one least in fault. This is a difficult rule

to apply however just it may seem to be.

A passenger who stands on a platform or on the steps of a street car,

when there is room inside, assumes all the risks himself. But if there

is no room within and the conductor knows he is outside, and permits

him to ride, he is under the same protection as other passengers. An

interurban car had stopped and A who was carrying two valises

attempted to board it. The act of the conductor, who was on the rear

platform, in reaching down and taking one of the valises amounted to

an invitation to A to board the car. In signaling to the motorman to

start the car when A was stepping to the vestibule from the lower

step, thus causing the injury to him, was negligence for which the

company was liable.

A sleeping car company operating in connection with ordinary trains is

not a common carrier, nor an innkeeper as to the baggage of a

passenger. Yet it is liable for ordinary negligence in protecting

passengers from loss by theft. In a well-considered case the judge

said: "Where a passenger does not deliver his property to a carrier,

but retains the exclusive possession and control of it himself, the

carrier is not liable in case of a loss, as for instance, where a

passenger's pocket is picked, or his overcoat taken. A person asleep

cannot retain manual possession or control of anything. The invitation

to make use of the bed carries with it an invitation to sleep, and an

implied agreement to take reasonable care of the guest's effects while

he is in such a state that care upon his own part is impossible. I

think it should keep a watch during the night, see to it that no

unauthorized persons intrude themselves into the car, and take

reasonable care to prevent thefts by occupants."

There is a distinction between the great express companies of the

country and local express companies receiving baggage from travelers

for transportation to their immediate destination. In the latter case

there is nothing in the nature of the transaction or the custom of the

trade which should naturally lead the shipper to suppose that he was

receiving and accepting the written evidence of a contract, and

therefore he is not bound by the terms of the receipt received, unless

there is other evidence that he assented thereto.

Though the United States is a common carrier for carrying mails, it

cannot be held liable because it is a branch of the government. Mail

matter may be carried by private persons, but this is limited to

special trips. By statute no person can establish any private express

for carrying letters or packets by regular trips or at stated periods

over any post route, or between towns, cities or other places where

the mail is regularly carried.

A public officer in performing his duties is exempt from all

liability. But a postmaster is liable to a person injured by his

negligence or misconduct and for the acts of a clerk or deputy

authorized by him. The assistant unless thus shielded must answer for

his own misconduct. A rider or driver employed by a contractor for

carrying the mails is an assistant in the business of the government.

Although employed and paid, and liable to be discharged at pleasure by

the contractor, the rider or driver is not engaged in his private

service; he is employed in the public service and therefore the

contractor is not liable for his conduct.

=Chattel Mortgage.=--A chattel mortgage is a conveyance of personal

property, as distinguished from real property, to secure the debt of

the lender or mortgagor. The essence of the agreement is, if the

mortgagor does not repay the money as he has agreed to do, the

mortgagee becomes the owner of the property. Until the mortgagor

fails to execute his part of the agreement, he retains possession of

the property. By statutes that have been enacted everywhere, the

mortgagee's interest, or conditional title in the property conveyed to

him, is secure by recording the deed even though the mortgagor still

retains possession.

The usual form of a chattel mortgage is a bill of sale with a

conditional clause, stating the terms of the loan and that, on the

mortgagor's failure to pay, the mortgagee may take possession of the

property. Any persons who are competent to make a contract may make a

chattel mortgage, and an agent may act for another as in many other

cases. When thus acting his authority may be either verbal, or

written, or may be shown by ratification. Persons also who have a

common ownership in chattels, tenants in common or partners for

example, may mortgage either their common or individual interests. A

husband may give a chattel mortgage to his wife, and she in turn can

give one to him. Likewise a corporation may make such a mortgage.

The law is broader in the way of permitting a minor, married woman, or

corporation to be mortgagees when they cannot act as mortgagors of

their property. Two or more creditors may join in such a mortgage to

secure their separate debts. If the debt of one of them is fraudulent,

his fraud, while rendering the mortgage fraudulent as to him, will not

affect its validity as to the other.

How must the mortgaged property be described? With sufficient

clearness to enable third persons to identify the property. The

description must contain reasonable details and suggest inquiries

which if followed will result in ascertaining the precise thing

conveyed. A description of a baker's stock "stock on hand," would be

too meager, so would be a description of "our books of account, and

accounts due and to become due," but cattle described by their age,

sex and location will satisfy the law, though the cattle of other

owners should form part of the same herd, when they can be ascertained

by following out the inquiries suggested by the mortgage. Again, a

description that is wholly false avoids the mortgage, but if it is

false only in part, this may be rejected and the mortgage remain valid

for the remainder.

More generally the nature of the chattels conveyed determine largely

the character of the description. Thus animals may be described by

weight, age, height, color and breed; vehicles by their style and

manufacturer's name; furniture by piece or set; crops growing or to be

grown by their location and year. A general claim of "all" articles in

a stated place is regarded as sufficient. Oral evidence is admissible

to aid the description in identifying the subject-matter of the

mortgage, and to explain the meaning and extent of the terms of the

description.

A mortgage may be given for a future advance of money. Nor need the

mortgage state that it is thus given; and the fact may be proved

orally. But when the right of third parties are affected, such a

mortgage is not valid against them unless the specific sum that is to

be secured is set forth. Likewise to render a mortgage secure against

attaching creditors of the mortgagor, there must be a distinct

statement of the condition or terms of the mortgage; in other words

the creditors have a right to know what interest the mortgagee really

has in the property that secures to him rights superior to their own.

The rule should also be stated that where the rights of third parties

are in issue, it must appear that the mortgagee acquired the mortgage

before they had any rights to the property.

The statutes require that chattel mortgages should be acknowledged and

recorded. In some states the requirements are strict in respect to the

disinterestedness of the official who takes the acknowledgment. An

affidavit is another requirement. This must state several things,

especially that the mortgage was given in good faith, and the nature

and amount of the consideration.

Putnam's Handy Law Book for the Layman · 第 3 / 24 段