1883--SIRDAR
I receive £200,000 to create an Army--First Ceremonial Parade in
ten weeks--Lord Dufferin’s recognition of work--Cholera--Three
Britons administer Egypt--Devotion to duty shown by British
Officers--Chinese Gordon--Roubi Tewhari--Turks Mutiny--Two
shot--Determined conduct of Major Grant.
My first week in Cairo was spent in conferences with His Highness the
Khedive, Lord Dufferin, the principal Ministers of the Khedive who had
interests in the Army, and with Sir Auckland Colvin, the Financial
adviser of the Government.
As regards the creation of an Army I had an absolutely free hand, being
informed by Lord Dufferin that I might do anything I liked, provided
I did not spend more than £200,000. This sum, however, was to include
the pay of officers, Europeans and Turks, or Egyptians, and the pay
and rations of the men, but not the upkeep of barracks and hospital
arrangements, which were provided by other Departments. I was told to
select uniforms, and was later given a sum to buy Field artillery, and
to replace the Remington rifle, by the pattern in use in the British
Army.
I had put the conscription arrangements in motion immediately on my
arrival, and within a fortnight got the first recruits, and had set
the officers to work in creating and training the Force which has
since proved to be a satisfactory instrument for war. I had obtained
the services of 25 officers, of whom the following have risen in
the Army:--Major Fraser, Royal Engineers,[242] Chief Staff officer;
Captain Slade,[243] as Aide-de-Camp, replacing him on arrival by Stuart
Wortley,[244] when Slade went to work under Fraser. Somewhat later
I got Lieutenant Wingate,[245] Royal Artillery; Major Grenfell[246]
commanded a brigade of four battalions, each of which had three British
officers. The first battalion was organised and commanded by Captain
Chermside;[247] the 2nd Battalion by Captain Holled Smith;[248] the 3rd
Battalion by Captain Parr;[249] the 4th, by Major Wynne.[250] Major
Duncan[251] commanded the Artillery, the English Batteries of which
were commanded by Lieutenant Wodehouse,[252] Lieutenant Rundle,[253]
and somewhat later by Lieutenant Parsons.[254] Captain Kitchener[255]
was second in command of the Cavalry Regiment. Captains H. S.
Smith-Dorrien[256] and Archibald Hunter[257] joined later.
There was an Infantry Brigade under a Turkish General, Schudi Pasha.
There were no Engineers, and no Departmental Corps.
The men conscripted were in physique superior to any European army, and
their aptitude for the perfunctory parts of drill was remarkable. Their
progress was indeed so rapid that the Khedive’s guard at the Abdin
Palace was taken over from British troops on the 14th February. Two
days later, on parade of all troops then available, I returned £9 which
had been given to a doctor to induce him to say a recruit was unfit for
the service, and awarded the recruit twenty-one days’ imprisonment for
offering bribes.
On the 31st March we had our first parade, before the Khedive, Lord
Dufferin, all the Ministers, and a large crowd, including all the
European residents in Cairo. The cavalry were not fit to do more than
“keep the ground,” which was done by some of the men who had learned
enough to remain on their horses. The artillery had made most progress,
but that Arm was the best before Arabi’s rebellion, and we had kept
several of the officers, and some of the non-commissioned officers came
back voluntarily; moreover, the men were conscripted in Upper Egypt,
and all such are more virile than the Delta Fellaheen. I showed eight
battalions, and four batteries after six weeks’ instruction, and they
marched past in the stereotyped Aldershot fashion.
Schudi Pasha, the Egyptian Brigadier, had been educated in Berlin, and
as Major Grenfell knew some German, it happened that the few orders I,
as Commander of the Force, had to give on the ceremonial parade were
spoken in the one language common to my Brigadiers, _i.e._ German;
Schudi giving his words in Arabic; Grenfell, in English; and the four
English Commanders in Turkish, as was the custom in the Egyptian Army.
This I endeavoured to alter, but the Arabic language does not lend
itself to the sharp monosyllables, which are most suitable for getting
men to move with clock-like regularity.
Major Wynne not only compiled a Clothing warrant and Signalling manual,
but also took in hand our Drill book, and Lieutenant Mantle, Royal
Engineers, who was an accomplished Arabic scholar, put as much of it
as I thought necessary into Arabic. By a strange coincidence, in 1887,
Wynne, then in the War Office, followed my precedent and reduced the
English Drill book by cutting out many superfluous exercises, which
were appropriate to the movements practised before rifles were used.
The Code Napoleon put into Arabic did not deal with some crimes common
in the East, and so the Army Discipline Act of 1881, with the Khedive’s
name substituted for our Queen’s, became in Arabic, our penal Code.
Lord Dufferin supported me most thoroughly, but while fully satisfied,
warned me before he left, early in May, that I was working the officers
too hard, and this was probably accurate.[258] Before his lordship
departed he asked me to hand back £10,000 in the first instance, and
then another £10,000, but this latter sum I gave up provisionally on
the understanding that I could reclaim it if necessary. I did not do
so, spending thus in my first year only £180,000.
Colonel Hicks, who arrived at Cairo from India in January, had
gone to Khartoum, and the following June, having telegraphed for
reinforcements, the Ministers collected soldiers who had served in
and prior to the Egyptian outbreak in 1882, and I was directed by the
Premier, Cherif Pasha, to inspect them, and pass for service only such
as I considered fit. Out of the first thousand I felt bound to reject
over six hundred, and those who were not rejected, being aware that few
Egyptians ever returned from Khartoum, were most unwilling to go, two
men actually putting lime into their eyes to destroy their sight while
on parade. These poor creatures who preferred life without eyesight in
the Delta to probable death in the Sudan, were the fathers and uncles
of those whom we were to teach to take a pride in themselves, and in
the Army.
I limited the term of service, and gave every soldier a furlough as
soon as he was reported to be efficient. When the first contingent of
2000 men received railway passes to their villages, I was assured by
the Cairenes that few would return, but every man returned punctually.
I introduced a postal order system, and the soldiers remitted home a
portion of their pay, 2½d. a day. Later, when Hallam Parr asked for
six soldiers to go with him to the Sudan, his whole battalion stepped
forward.
We drilled five days a week, for the Moslems kept Friday as their Day
of Rest, and I insisted on Sunday being kept as such. My action was
based on the firm conviction formed in India, twenty years earlier,
from my intimate knowledge of natives, that, putting one’s own feelings
aside, it is an error to allow any soldiers to believe that their
officers are without Religion.
I worked from daylight to 5 p.m. every week-day, when I played polo
three times a week, and on the other days lawn tennis, one hour a day
being devoted to the study of the Arabic language. Being an interpreter
in Hindustani the characters presented no difficulty, but my desire
to learn Arabic grammatically was damped when I saw there were seven
hundred irregular conjugations.
I kept myself by regular exercise in tolerable health, but in June
slight attacks of fever became more frequent, and His Highness the
Khedive gave me leave to proceed to England for two months. In the
middle of July I left for Suez, to catch a homeward-bound steamer;
Grenfell and the officers commanding units saw me off, and out of
mistaken kindness forbore to mention there had been a case of cholera
in the barracks at Abbassieh the previous night. When I got to Zagazig
the stationmaster told me there were several cases in Cairo, so I
telegraphed to the Khedive, that I should not be out of the canal
for three days, and trusted he would recall me if the cholera became
Epidemic in the army, adding that whether he telegraphed or not, if I
were not satisfied, I should return from Port Said. I was intercepted,
however, by a launch sent after me, shortly after we passed Ismailia,
and finding a special train waiting for me, reached Cairo twenty-four
hours after leaving it.
The Khedive and his Ministers went to Alexandria, and Sir Edward
Malet, Valentine Baker Pasha, and I practically ruled Egypt during the
Epidemic. Strong measures were necessary, for some of the Egyptian
authorities had established a cholera camp on the Nile, immediately
above the intake of the Cairo waterworks, and it was difficult to
induce adequate sanitary arrangements amongst a people who are by
religion, and by inclination, Fatalists. The losses in the army were
not very great, and they had the inestimable advantage of attaching the
Fellaheen soldiery to the British officer. The Egyptian officer, except
in some few instances, did not show to advantage.
His Highness the Khedive returned from Alexandria without his
Ministers when the cholera became serious, and calling at my
house at six o’clock in the morning, asked me to take him over the
hospitals. These were under Dr. T. Dyke Ackland, on whom fell the
responsibility of dealing with the epidemic, for Captain Rogers,[259]
the principal medical officer, had been recalled to the British Army
for the emergency. The Khedive, whatever he felt, behaved well, but
the senior Egyptian officers would not go near the hospitals, much
less the patients, except with a surrounding of drugs, supposed to be
prophylactics, and an Egyptian resented my rebuke for his sending a
soldier still alive to the mortuary, saying, “He will be dead in a few
minutes.”
The British officer not only nursed the cholera-stricken patients day
and night, performing every menial service, but in many cases washed
the corpses prior to interment. Lieutenant Chamley Turner, in spite of
having only slight colloquial knowledge of the language, so endeared
himself to the stricken men of his camel Company that several of them
when dying threw their arms round his neck. He must have infused some
of his spirit into his men, for General Brackenbury wrote, dated
4.2.85, “The Egyptian Company is doing invaluable service.”
When the Epidemic was nearly over, Turner[260] contracted the disease,
and I had him brought to my house, where he soon recovered under the
skilled attention of Dr. Rogers and the careful nursing of Walkinshaw.
From the cholera time, on, the Fellaheen soldier trusted the British
Officer.[261]
By the middle of August the cholera had died out, and I went to
England for two months, keeping up my study of Arabic on the voyage,
assisted by Mrs. Watson, the wife of an officer whom I had got out as
Surveyor-General, or Chief business man. His wife knew the language
well, although mainly self-taught.
Her Majesty the Queen was graciously pleased to command me to stay
at Balmoral, and took much interest in the Egyptian army. I visited
Lord Granville at Walmer, at his request, on my way back to Egypt, for
the question was then constantly discussed as to whether the British
Garrison could be withdrawn. I undertook to maintain order with the
eight Egyptian battalions only as far as the internal peace of the
country was concerned, but probably all the British troops would have
been withdrawn had not the events at Khartoum in the following year
enforced on us the permanent occupation.
In the summer of 1883 I was directed to ask the Turkish Pasha who had
been serving at Khartoum if he would return there as Governor; and
his observations in refusing--on Englishmen putting Turks in posts of
danger--were so unpleasant that I offered Nubar Pasha to go up myself.
This he declined, and then having made the offer, I told him I thought
the decision was wise, as I was doing good work in Cairo, where several
of the Egyptian officers knew me, and in Khartoum I should only be as
any other officer.
In the third week of November we heard rumours, afterwards confirmed,
of the annihilation of 10,000 men under Hicks Pasha, near El Obeid.
Early in the month, and just before Christmas, Osman Digna, a powerful
Slave dealer in the Eastern Sudan, routed Baker Pasha at El Teb on the
Red Sea, killing two-thirds of his Force of Constabulary, composed of
old soldiers discharged from the Army in 1882.
I was vilified in the British Press for not having sent rifles to
Suakin when they were demanded by Baker Pasha, in order that he might
arm “Friendlies,” but I had nothing to do with the decision, which was
taken by the Egyptian Government and the Consul-General in Council,
and I merely obeyed orders in sending the telegram; but in fact there
were at the time 2000 stand of rifles in store at Suakin. I took
no notice of these attacks, which had been, as I was told later by
one of my traducers who fell fighting bravely at Abu Klea, made for
Political purposes. But when Sir Stafford Northcote, in moving a vote
of censure on the Government, doubtless in perfect good faith, made
several mis-statements: (_a_) That Sir Evelyn Wood was answerable for
Hicks Pasha’s army. (_b_) That Sir Evelyn Wood refused to send the
newly raised army to Khartoum, stating that he could not do so, as the
British Government contemplated withdrawing from Egypt, and other such
erroneous allegations, I wrote a letter, through the Foreign Office,
which was published later in the Press: (_a_) That I had nothing at
the time to do with the troops in the Sudan. (_b_) That I had never
given Hicks Pasha any such information as alleged, for indeed I did not
know the intention of the Government. I further explained that my only
intervention in Sudan affairs was, at the request of Colonel Hicks, to
induce the Finance Department in Cairo to send him money; while I at
the same time, unasked, expressed to the War Minister the strongest
opinion against the contemplated advance into Kordofan, where later the
Pasha and his 10,000 men were annihilated.
The situation in the Sudan having become worse, Gordon Pasha offered
to go up to extricate the garrisons. He telegraphed decidedly that he
would not pass through Cairo, travelling to Khartoum via Suakin and
Berber, and on the 23rd January the Resident sent me to Port Said, to
induce him to go up the Nile after paying his respects to His Highness
the Khedive.
My friend Captain Briscoe, commanding the mail steamer which brought
Gordon from Brindisi, on my going on board bet me that I should fail to
get Gordon to go through Cairo; but he did not know his character as
well as I did, and Briscoe lost the bet.
Gordon had telegraphed to Colonel Evelyn Baring[262] that he wished to
have Roubi Tewhari, a blind ex-clerk sent to him, and that a certain
officer should be promoted to the rank of Colonel, and sent to him. Our
Consul-General told me to arrange it, but I exclaimed that, though I
could find the ex-clerk, I scarcely liked to ask the Khedive not only
to take the Captain out of prison, for he had been an ardent Arabist
and was still undergoing punishment, but at the same time to make him a
Colonel. His Highness, however, was good enough to release him, and we
let the question of his promotion stand over.
When I explained to Gordon that it was undesirable that he should go
to Khartoum as the Khedive’s Representative without seeing him, he at
once agreed to go to Cairo with me. During our journey in the train he
told me an interesting story.[263] Pointing to Roubi Tewhari, who sat
in the saloon carriage with us, he said: “You see that man? He was my
confidential clerk in Darfour. I trusted him implicitly, and believed
in his honesty. One day I was told on authority I could not doubt that
he had been levying fines, and receiving large sums of money--in one
case £3000, which as he alleged went into my pocket: taxed with this
wickedness, he admitted it with tears, and I said to him: “You villain,
go back to El Obeid.” Tewhari replied: “Have mercy on me; I have lost
one eye in your service, and if you send me to that hot dusty place the
other eye will suffer.” “Whether it suffers or not, you shall go there
as a punishment for your conduct.”
Gordon taking £300, in notes of £10, out of his pocket said: “This is
the only money I have in the world, and my sister found some of it
for me, but I am going to give ten of these notes to Tewhari,” and
crossing over the carriage he put the notes into the blind man’s hand.
Gordon’s Arabic, although intelligible, was not fluent, and it was not
for a considerable time that Tewhari understood his former master’s
generosity, and the value of the paper money.
We reached Cairo at 9.30, p.m., and after dinner called on the
Consul-General, with whom we sat till the early hours of the morning,
returning again after breakfast. Gordon had accepted the task of
evacuating the garrisons of the Sudan without financial aid, but
eventually agreed to receive £100,000, of which he left £60,000 at
Berber, and this I fear to some extent precipitated the tragedy enacted
a year later; for the Mudir of Berber coveted the money and played
Gordon false.
Early next day Roubi Tewhari, the blind man, sent to me an
Arabic-speaking English officer, who had been with Gordon at Khartoum
in 1874. The gist of Tewhari’s petition was as follows: “I behaved
badly to Gordon Pasha many years ago, and he banished me to El Obeid,
where I lost my remaining eye. He has now given me more money than I
can spend in my life, and I am going to Mecca, where I shall pray for
his welfare in this world and in the next, until I die. Gordon Pasha is
bent on having Zebehr sent up to Khartoum with him. Gordon’s trustful
nature will certainly undo him, and I implore everyone who loves Gordon
as I do, not to allow Zebehr to go to Khartoum while Gordon is there.
Whatever Gordon may say, do not let Zebehr go to Khartoum with Gordon.
Send Gordon, or Zebehr, but not the two at the same time.”
I do not know what influence, if any, this honest heartfelt request,
passed on by me to Sir Evelyn Baring, made on the British Cabinet, but
Tewhari’s advice coincided with that of Sir Henry Gordon, Charles’s
brother. Zebehr remained in Cairo, in spite of the continuous carping
in the Press at the decision of Government.
We spent all the next day at the Resident’s house, where Gordon and
Zebehr had animated and dramatic interviews. In 1879 a Court-Martial,
assembled by Gordon’s orders, had condemned Zebehr, who was then in
Cairo litigating with a former Governor-General, to death. As a result
of the facts brought out by the Court-Martial, Gordon confiscated
Zebehr’s property.
Now, in 1884, Zebehr accused Gordon of causing the death of his son
Suleiman, and alleged that the confiscation was equally unjust.
Gordon was in Abyssinia when Suleiman was executed, after a sentence
of a Court-Martial approved by Gessi Pasha, Governor-General of the
Sudan, in pursuance of instructions issued by Gordon, while he was
Governor-General, that if found guilty Suleiman was to be executed.
I drove Gordon after dinner to the station on the Nile. On leaving
the dining-room he said good-bye to Lady Wood, going upstairs to kiss
my children, who were in bed. As he left the house he took off his
evening-coat, and handing it to Walkinshaw, said: “I should like you
to keep this, for I shall never wear an evening-coat again.” A month
later, however, in thanking officially an officer who was returning to
Cairo, Gordon wrote: “There is not the least chance of any danger being
now incurred in Khartoum,--a place as safe as Kensington Park.”
At the Consul-General’s request I now took charge of the Sudan Bureau,
and became his Staff officer for Political affairs of the Red Sea
Littoral to Massowah, which made my work heavy. Rising at daylight, I
generally saw some military work at Abbassieh or elsewhere, and waited
on Nubar Pasha at 9 a.m., always visiting the Consul-General, and often
the General in Command of British troops, on my way to the War Office,
where I remained till about four o’clock, when I played Polo or Tennis
till night fell.
A Division of British troops under Sir Gerald Graham was sent to Suakin
in February, and, after defeating Osman Digna at El Teb and Tamai, was
recalled at the end of March, a Force of all Arms of the Egyptian Army
holding Suakin.
The former Egyptian Army had suffered continuous defeats, accompanied
either with annihilation or heavy loss, from 1875–6 when 11,000 were
destroyed in Abyssinia. I consistently[264] urged that until the
recollection of these disasters had been at least partially effaced by
a victory, the Fellaheen soldier should not be allowed to fight without
a backing of British troops. This was eventually approved, but not
until after my retirement from the Command.
Early in 1884 I began to raise a battalion of Turks, mainly enlisted
in Anatolia. They were paid five times the amount of the Fellaheen
conscripts, and promised to fight any number of the Mahdi’s soldiers.
When, however, the first Company was ordered up the Nile it mutinied,
stopping the train by firing at the engine-driver, and made off
in various directions. Major Grant,[265] 4th Hussars, who was in
command of the Cadre battalion, riding to where the train had been
held up, accompanied by one Egyptian policeman, came on seven of the
mutineers in a serai or public Rest-house. Grant dismounting outside
the enclosure, found the seven men cooking, their rifles piled in
the courtyard. As he called to them to surrender and lie down, the
ringleader fired at Grant, while the other men rushed towards their
arms. Grant shot at and wounded the ringleader and another, which so
cowed the other five that they obeyed his order to lie down, and Grant
stood over them until the Sergeant, having tied up the two horses, came
in and carried away their rifles, later assisting to bind the prisoners.
The ringleaders were tried by a general Court-Martial, presided over by
a Turkish General, assisted by English officers, and seven mutineers
were sentenced to death. I examined the cases carefully, with a view
of carrying out the sentences only in such cases as appeared to be
absolutely necessary, and at once eliminated from the condemned
soldiers a youth, seventeen years of age, whose father had fired at
Major Grant. I saw the condemned men, and was satisfied in my own mind
that one of them was practically unaccountable for his actions; and
eventually, after a consultation with the members of the Court-Martial,
decided that two only should suffer death.
Lieutenant-General Sir Frederick Stephenson,[266] knowing that all
the trained soldiers for the Egyptian Army were at Suakin, or on the
Nile, the Depot Companies in Cairo, consisting of men who had just been
conscripted, kindly offered me assistance, but I determined to make the
Egyptian recruits carry out the execution.
I asked for precedents in the Egyptian Army, and was told that at the
last Military execution, the feet of the men condemned being tied,
they were ordered to stand up at 400 yards distance, and a line of
soldiers advanced on them firing, with the shocking results that can
be readily understood. I had recently read the trial of a Neapolitan
soldier, Misdea, who was shot while sitting in a chair, and arranged
the execution on similar lines. The previous evening I sent the lad of
seventeen away to a guard-room of the British Army of Occupation, as I
did not wish him to hear the volley which was to kill his father, but,
as will be seen later, my sympathetic consideration was unnecessary.
When I rode out next morning and met the procession marching to the
place of execution, which was an incomplete barrack at Abbassieh, I was
nearly ill from nervousness, but on arriving at the actual spot, when I
had to give orders, the feeling passed off, the scene affecting me no
more than any ordinary duty. Ten Egyptian recruit soldiers being told
off for each of the condemned Turks, advanced close behind them, and at
the word of command the mutineers ceased to exist.
I had some trouble after the sentence became known, for the Prime
Minister sent for me, and said there was considerable feeling about
Turks being executed by order of Christians. I pointed out that a
Turkish General had presided over the Court-Martial, when the Minister
said: “Well, do what you like; only, do not ask me or the Khedive to
approve of it.”
A day later he called on me to say that the Persian Minister claimed
one of the condemned men, and wished to know what answer was to be
given to him. I said: “Excellency, tell him ‘Bukra’[267] (to-morrow).”
And when that morrow came I wrote a note saying that the Persian
Minister could now claim the man’s body. I was then assured that it was
a matter of no consequence.
A few hours after the execution I sent for the son of the ringleader,
and told him that his punishment had been commuted to imprisonment,
but as he was so young, and it would distress him to serve under
officers who had shot his father, I gave him £5 and told him to go back
to Anatolia. The youth reappeared three days later, and said he much
preferred to serve on; indeed, he thought less of the execution than I
did.
The mutiny of the Turks was followed by that of two battalions which
had been raised by Zebehr in the Delta for Baker Pasha, and some of
these were condemned to death. I doubted their guilty intentions,
although there was no doubt as to their overt acts, and commuted their
sentence to service in the Eastern Sudan. I visited the men at their
request a few days later, when the interpreter said: “They say, in
olden times when soldiers went away for a long time, as is to be our
case, they always had an advance of pay,--may we please have it?”
This confirmed my impression that they had very little idea of how we
regarded their conduct.