THE ALLIED OFFENSIVE IN THE SOUTH
1918
Originally destined to take part in a projected attack for the
recapture of Kemmel Hill and Village, the Division suddenly received
orders at the end of August, to the delight of all, to move southwards
at very short notice. During the 1st, 2nd and 3rd September the move
southwards was carried out by rail, the Division, less artillery,
detraining at Corbie, Heilly and Mericourt. On the 4th the Divisional
Artillery followed, and the whole Division was concentrated in the
area Heilly-Ribemont-Franvillers on the River Ancre, in G.H.Q.
Reserve. The next few days were devoted to a continuation of the
training in open warfare commenced in the Wizernes area.
The Germans, forced back in July and August from the high-water mark
of their advance in March and April, had stood on the line of the
Somme and the Peronne--Arras road. In the southern sector of the
British front the Somme defences had been turned by the brilliant
capture of Mont St. Quentin (to the north of and guarding Peronne) by
the Australian Corps. The retreating enemy had been pursued across the
Somme by the 32nd Division, which had been attached temporarily to the
Australians. This Division now became part of the newly-constituted IX
Corps (Lt.-Gen. Sir W. Braithwaite), which was to bear such a glorious
part in the concluding chapter of the War, and which consisted of 1st,
6th, 32nd and 46th Divisions.
The 32nd Division had followed the enemy without much incident up to
the large Holnon Wood, three and a half miles west of St. Quentin, and
it was there that the Division relieved it on night 13/14th
September, with the 1st Division on the left and the 34th (French)
Division on the right.
It was expected that the enemy would stand on the heights which
command St. Quentin to the west and south, but it was not known
whether their resistance would be strong or not, as they were much
disorganized.
The 1st and 6th Divisions, hand in hand with the French, were ordered
to capture this tactical line on 18th September, as a starting-point
for the attack on the Hindenburg Line, which ran just outside St.
Quentin to the canal at Bellenglise.
To the 18th Infantry Brigade was entrusted the task of securing a line
well clear of Holnon Wood for the forming-up line on the 18th, and in
doing so it first had to clear the wood and establish posts at the
edge, then push forward. The selected forming-up line included to us
Holnon Village on the right and next to the French.
On the morning of the 16th September the 11th Essex, after an
unsuccessful attempt to push forward during the night, attacked under
a barrage and advanced from the line of posts taken over a little way
inside the wood to a line of trenches just clear of the wood,
capturing in this small operation forty-six prisoners. It was now
arranged for the 1st, 6th and 34th (French) Divisions to advance
simultaneously to secure the above-mentioned starting line. On the
left the 1st Division was successful, and so were the 11th Essex, who,
held up at first by heavy shelling and machine-gun fire, persevered
throughout the day and were rewarded by finishing up in possession of
the whole of their objectives, a very creditable performance.
On the right the West Yorks had to secure Holnon Village, which lay in
a hollow commanded by Round and Manchester Hills in the area allotted
to the French, and which was itself strongly held. The French failed
in their attack, and though the West Yorks obtained part of the
village they could not clear it and establish the starting line
beyond it. The situation at the end of the 17th was therefore
unsatisfactory on the right, but it was impossible to put off the
general attack, and arrangements had to be improvised. Another
unsatisfactory feature was that Holnon Wood covered practically the
whole 2,500 yards frontage of the Division, and was so drenched with
gas shells and the tracks so bad, that both 16th and 71st Infantry
Brigades had to make a detour north and south of the wood respectively
to reach their assembly positions, and this naturally fatigued the
troops and hindered communication and supply.
Standing on the east edge of the wood, a bare glacis-like slope devoid
of cover, except for two or three shell-trap copses, stretched away
for 3,000 yards to the high ground overlooking St. Quentin. There was
no sign of life and very few trenches could be seen, though it was
known that they were there as the Fifth Army had held the position in
March 1918. It was found afterwards that the Germans had camouflaged
their trenches with thistles, which here covered the ground to a
height in many places of eighteen inches.
At the highest point about the centre of the Divisional area of attack
was a network of trenches known later as the Quadrilateral--a name of
bad omen to the 6th Division--and which, like its namesake on the
Somme, could be reinforced under cover from the back slopes of the
hill. An examination of the battlefield after the 24th September also
revealed several narrow sunken roads filled with wire. The position
was one of great natural strength, and in addition the whole of the
right was dominated by heights in the area to be attacked by the
French. Lastly, adequate time could not be given to Brigades for
reconnaissance owing to the imperative necessity of pushing on to
guard the flank of Corps farther north. Troops had not seen the ground
they had to attack over, and rain and smoke obscured the few landmarks
existing on 18th September.
On that morning the Division attacked at 5.20 a.m. with the 71st
Infantry Brigade on the right, its left directed on the Quadrilateral
and its right on Holnon and Selency.
The 16th Infantry Brigade was on the left, with its right just clear
of the Quadrilateral and its left on Fresnoy le Petit. Six tanks were
allotted to the Division, but met with various mishaps or were knocked
out, and were not of much use. The attack met with most determined
opposition at once, especially on the right, where the difficulties of
the 71st Infantry Brigade were increased by the failure of the French
to take Round and Manchester Hills.
The 2nd D.L.I., attached to this brigade to complete the clearing of
Holnon Village, accomplished this, but were driven out by shelling and
by machine gun fire from Round and Manchester Hills, losing very
heavily.
The 16th Infantry Brigade was more successful, and at one time the
York and Lancasters had nearly completed the capture of Fresnoy le
Petit, but were unable to hold it. The brigade advanced, however,
3,000 yards. Fighting was continuous throughout the day, but without
further success. The Sherwood Foresters advancing very gallantly
against the Quadrilateral were reported as being just outside it and
entrenched. It was machine gun fire from this stronghold which
prevented the right of the 16th Infantry Brigade advancing, and an
attack was therefore ordered for dawn of the 19th September, but it
was evidently anticipated by the enemy, who put down a very heavy
artillery and machine-gun barrage before the attackers left their
jumping-off positions. Fighting again continued throughout the day,
but without success, and it was evident that the enemy meant standing
his ground and that this was not a rearguard action as it had at one
time been thought. The enemy's artillery was very strong, and, with
the thick Hindenburg wire in front of it, was placed close to their
front line, and was enabled thus to do considerable execution on
our back areas.
The successes of other Divisions in the south of the British zone had
been constant and fairly easy for some time, so that the partial
success which the Division had obtained was very disappointing to all
ranks. They were much cheered, therefore, to get the following wire
from the Army Commander (General Sir H. Rawlinson):--"Please convey to
the 6th Division my congratulations and warm thanks for their success
of yesterday. Though all objectives were not attained they carried
through a difficult operation with great gallantry and determination.
I offer to all ranks my warm thanks and congratulations."
All units had heavy fighting, in which some had incurred considerable
losses, and all were tired and in want of reorganization. It was
therefore decided not to renew the attack for a few days, and to
devote the interval to a proper artillery preparation (the heavy
artillery put 1,000 shells on the Quadrilateral in one day), the
reorganization of battalions, and the construction of a jumping-off
position, in the execution of which the R.E. (Lt.-Col. H. A. L. Hall)
and the Pioneers rendered invaluable assistance. The fighting up to
this date had yielded 6 officers and 264 other ranks prisoners, and 65
machine-guns.
On the morning of the 24th September a fresh attack was launched; the
18th Infantry Brigade, to which was attached the 1st Leicestershire
Regiment, attacking on the right; the 16th Infantry Brigade on the
left. The French 36th Corps attacked with a fresh division
simultaneously to our right; the 1st Division, which had taken over
the task of the capture of Fresnoy and Gricourt, on our left. The four
tanks detailed to attack the Quadrilateral again had bad luck, one
being turned absolutely turtle by a mine field. The three battalions
of the 18th Infantry Brigade met at first with little success, the
11th Essex on the left establishing a rather precarious footing
in one face of the Quadrilateral, and the 1st West Yorkshire Regiment
getting in at one point in Douai Trench, running south from the Strong
Point. The D.L.I., attacking south of them through Holnon Village,
could make no headway. The French had during the morning captured
Round Hill and part of Manchester Hill, and came up in line with us.
The 16th Infantry Brigade fared much better, and working down from the
north was able in the course of the day to secure the northern face of
the Quadrilateral. Their four tanks were of great assistance to them
this day. Throughout the day the 18th Infantry Brigade maintained the
fight with characteristic determination, but without improving its
position very much. At 11 p.m., however, it launched the 1st
Leicestershire Regiment by moonlight in a further attack on Douai
Trench. The attack, delivered with great gallantry, was successful,
and many enemy were killed in the trench which was found to be
strongly held. In spite of the very rough handling which it had
received on the 24th the 18th Infantry Brigade stuck grimly to its
task during the 25th. Douai Trench was cleared from end to end by
hand-to-hand fighting, and patrols, admirably handled, gradually made
good the whole of the objectives allotted for the previous day's
attack. On the morning of 25th September 3 officers and 104 other
ranks surrendered near Fayet to patrols of the 2nd Y. and L. Regiment.
By midnight on the night of the 25/26th September the 16th and 18th
Infantry Brigades in co-operation had completed the capture of the
Quadrilateral, a position of such unusual natural strength that
captured German officers admitted that they had fully expected to be
able to hold it indefinitely. For this very fine performance, a
remarkable instance of grit and determination and of intelligent
initiative by regimental officers of all ranks, to whom the successful
results were entirely due, the Division received the congratulations
of the Army and Corps Commanders and G.O.C., 1st Division. The
message telephoned on behalf of the Army Commander contained the
following passage:--"He fully realises the difficulties they have had
to contend with, and admires the tenacity with which they have stuck
to it and completed their task."
The enemy's resistance now broke down, and during the 26th, 27th and
28th September patrols were able gradually to gain further ground, so
that by the time the Division was relieved by the 4th French Division
on the 29/30th, posts had been established round three sides of the
village of Fayet. Manchester Hill was finally captured by the French
on 26th September.
The captures during the period were 10 officers, 372 other ranks, 4
guns, 15 trench-mortars, and 53 machine-guns.
During the relief by the French a noteworthy incident occurred. The
2nd Brigade, R.F.A., were asked to fire a barrage to cover an advance
of French infantry at a certain hour, and did so. Just after
completion a message arrived saying that the attack had been
postponed, and would the brigade repeat the operation very shortly at
another hour which was fixed. This the brigade did, clearing to
absolutely the last shell the ammunition available on the ground and
completing the barrage at the same moment.
During the fighting in September the Division had "B" and "C"
Companies, 2nd Life Guards Machine-gun Battalion, at its disposal, and
these fine troops helped much in the machine-gun barrage, and added
confidence that any counter-attack on the right would meet with a hot
reception.
While the 6th Division had been fighting on the right of the British
Army, the 46th Division, with the Americans on their left and the 1st
Division forming a defensive flank on their right, had broken the
Hindenburg Line on 29th September by a magnificent attack. Followed
across the canal by the 32nd Division, these two divisions had
very severe fighting at Ramicourt and Sequehart and were exhausted.
The 6th Division, after four days to rest and absorb reinforcements,
was ordered to relieve them and attack on the 8th October in the
direction of the small town of Bohain. The 30th American Division was
on the right and about 2,000 yards ahead, connected to the 6th
Division by a series of posts along the railway. This curious position
entailed a very complicated creeping barrage, which, however, was
successfully put into operation on the day of the attack. On the right
was the French 42nd Division slightly in rear, having followed the
Germans through St. Quentin and met with strong resistance beyond it.
The position to be attacked consisted of high rolling downs with deep
traverse valleys, giving good cover for supports and forward guns, and
on the right a broad longitudinal valley closed by a ridge on which
stood the village of Mericourt. The French had a stiff task in front
of them, and did not propose to advance as far as the British--6,000
yards--with the result that even if they were successful our frontage,
thrown back from left to right, would be 7,500 yards, and if
unsuccessful over 10,000. Added to this their zero hour was nearly an
hour after ours, and there would be a very real danger of
counter-attack from the right. The Divisional Commander, therefore,
decided to leave the valley severely alone to start with, merely
smoking by guns and bombs from aeroplanes the Mericourt Ridge and
attacking all along the high ground on the north. As our attack and
the French attack progressed the valley was to be cleared by three
whippet tanks supported by the 1st Battalion West Yorks, lent to the
16th Infantry Brigade, while finally an attack from the high ground
against the Mericourt Ridge would be delivered with a view to cutting
off posts in the valley between the two attacks. The 139th Infantry
Brigade of the 46th Division remained in position at Sequehart,
together with two companies Life Guards Machine-gun Battalion, to
secure the right flank against counter-attack. The machine-gun
nests on the Sequehart-Mericourt road enfiladed the start line of the
6th Division, and the G.O.C., 139th Infantry Brigade (Brig-Gen. J.
Harington), was asked to capture these just before the general attack.
The 46th Divisional Pioneer Battalion (1/1st Monmouthshire Regiment)
undertook this task, and twice attacked the position but without
success, in spite of the greatest gallantry. The Commanding Officer
(Col. Jenkins) and his Adjutant were both unfortunately killed. Their
bravery, however, was well rewarded, as their action enabled the 6th
Divisional troops to work round and cut the position off, and the
enemy eventually surrendered.
The weight of artillery for the operations of the 8th October was
immense. In addition to the Divisional artillery there were the 5th
and 16th Brigades, R.H.A., 161st, 168th, 230th, 231st, 232nd Brigades,
R.F.A., and the 14th and 23rd Army Brigades, R.F.A. Only a part of
these fired the creeping barrage, the 6th Divisional Artillery, the
5th Brigade, R.H.A., and the 232nd Brigade, R.F.A., moving forward as
the infantry attack progressed to new positions, so as to support
exploitation and give protection against counter-attack. The attack
was launched at 5.30 a.m. The 16th Infantry Brigade on the right next
to the valley, and the 71st Infantry Brigade on the left next to the
Americans, both made excellent way, the former capturing the very
strong Mannikin Hill position, and the latter the formidable Doon Mill
and Doon Copse position, and making a good haul of machine-guns.
As had been anticipated the French had been held up by Bellicourt Farm
on their left, and the 16th Infantry Brigade suffered a good deal from
machine-gun fire from Cerise Wood on the farther side of the valley
and from Mannikin Wood in the valley. The three whippet tanks allotted
to the 16th Infantry Brigade were all knocked out, but the West Yorks,
to whom had been entrusted the clearing of the valley, stuck to
their work most gallantly, and in the afternoon, after three attempts,
had the satisfaction of securing Mannikin Wood, with 10 officers, 240
other ranks, and 20 machine-guns, by a final attack under an artillery
smoke barrage. To this success "B" Company, 6th Machine-gun Battalion,
contributed largely by enfilade fire.
By 3 p.m. the French announced that they had captured Bellicourt Farm,
and were advancing. The situation on the right was now completely
changed, and the 1st West Yorks, advancing up the valley, gained touch
with the French east of Fairy Wood, more than half-way to the final
objective in that area.
By nightfall Mericourt, which blocked the head of and commanded the
whole of the valley, was in our hands.
The Americans gained their final objective and continued the advance
without much opposition. In attempting to support their flank the 71st
Infantry Brigade came under the fire of field guns firing over open
sights near Joncourt Farm, and could not advance. A squadron of the
Royal Scots Greys (5th Cavalry Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Neil Haig),
attached to the Division, worked round and made a gallant attempt to
gallop the guns, but were stopped by close range gun fire. Pitch
darkness now came on, and left the Division tired but triumphant on
their final objectives. The bag of the 6th Division amounted to over
30 officers and 1,100 other ranks.
Congratulatory messages were received from the Army and Corps
Commanders as follows:--
From the Army Commander--"Will you please convey to the 6th Division
my warm thanks and hearty congratulations on their success to-day.
They have done admirable work, and I wish them all good luck for
to-morrow."
From the Corps Commander--"Well done 6th Division. So glad casualties
so light, considering what Division has accomplished."
Almost before the final objective had been captured an order was
received from the Corps for the Division to take over a portion of
the 30th American Division front on the left, hand over some ground to
46th Division on the right, and attack at dawn on the 9th behind a
barrage. Though very tired, and though it was a pitch dark night, the
71st and 16th Infantry Brigades somehow managed to carry out these
almost impossible orders, and advanced splendidly at zero hour--the
artillery putting down an accurate barrage. The attack progressed
successfully, the first objectives being gained by both brigades
without much difficulty, but the enemy was able to delay our advance
from the Railway Line, where after stiff fighting the 1st Leicesters,
by a turning movement, captured some prisoners and machine-guns. The
9th Norfolk Regiment on the left worked round by the north, and during
the night captured Bohain, where some 4,000 inhabitants were liberated,
and vast quantities of war material fell into our hands.
During this phase of the operations the 5th Cavalry Brigade was
attached to the Division, but circumstances did not allow of much
cavalry activity.
We were now in a different country to that in which the operations
since 1914 had been conducted. The country had seen no war, houses
were intact, inhabitants looking starved and downtrodden were
delighted to see the British troops. To stop our advance all roads in
Bohain had been cratered at their exits from the village, and
delay-action mines on the railways were constantly going up. As an
example, D.H.Q. was in Brancucourt Farm, in a main road which had been
cratered just outside the farm. A railway bridge just opposite had
been blown down and the line cratered. The Canadian Engineers
repairing the line had removed a great many bombs, but about three
days after the arrival of D.H.Q. a delay-action mine went off on the
railway at 7.30 p.m., and two days later again at 7 a.m. Fortunately
on both occasions no men were working on the line, and D.H.Q.
suffered no worse harm than some injuries to staff cars from falling
debris. The total captures by the Division since the 8th October now
amounted to 45 officers, 1,839 other ranks, 15 guns, 20
trench-mortars, and 266 machine-guns.
On 10th October the advance was continued--the 30th American Division
on the left, the 6th Division in the centre, and the 46th Division on
the right next to the French, who were again some distance in rear.
The 71st Infantry Brigade (1st Leicesters and 2nd Sherwood Foresters),
passing through the 9th Norfolks, gained most of its objective, which
was the high ground about 2,000 yards east of Bohain, but the 40th
Division was held up by machine-gun fire in Riqueval Wood. An
attempted advance by the 71st Infantry Brigade, assisted by two tanks,
on 11th instant was brought to a standstill by machine-gun fire, after
a small advance.
On the night of the 11/12th October the 18th Infantry Brigade, which
had been in Divisional Reserve, relieved the 71st Infantry Brigade,
and at 4.30 p.m. on the 12th October carried out a minor operation,
simultaneously with the left brigade of the 46th Division, in order to
push its left flank forward to the line of the Americans, who were
reported to be in possession of Vaux Andigny--some one and a half
miles ahead. The attack on the right failed, with about 100
casualties, owing to machine-gun fire from Regnicourt, and the 46th
Division was also held up. The left made a little ground. This attack
and a low aeroplane reconnaissance disclosed the fact that the Germans
had dug a series of new trenches on the high ground immediately in
front, and that there was a considerable amount of wire. The maps of
this area were most indifferent, and many copses existed which were
not shown. It was now evident that the enemy intended to stand on the
high ground east of Selle River and its continuation to Riqueval Wood.
Failing to make any progress by a frontal attack, the G.O.C., IX
Corps, undertook a very pretty tactical move, which produced the
attack of 17th October. The 6th and 46th Divisions were moved to
the north flank, and attacked south-east and east instead of
north-east. By this manoeuvre a great deal of enfilade fire was
brought to bear both from guns and machine-guns. The task allotted to
the 6th Division was a difficult one. It had to issue fan-wise from
the village of Vaux Andigny on a 1,500 yards front, advancing
2,500-3,000 yards to a front of 5,000 yards. The 1st Division was to
pass through it and push on towards the Sambre Canal. The attack was
to be made under a barrage of eight brigades of Field Artillery and
eighty machine-guns. The IX Corps employed on this occasion 172
60-pounders and heavy howitzers.
In the evening of 16th October Brig.-Gen. H. A. Walker, commanding
16th Infantry Brigade, which was to attack on the left the next
morning, most unfortunately lost his left arm by a shell, which blew
it off so cleanly that his wrist watch was recovered by his orderly
and was still going. Brig.-Gen. P. W. Brown, commanding 71st Infantry
Brigade, then in reserve, took command until the arrival of Brig.-Gen.
W. G. Braithwaite.
During the night 16/17th October the enemy poured gas shells into Vaux
Andigny, causing considerable casualties both to the troops forming up
just outside and to those who had to pass through a little later. Zero
was at 5.20 a.m., and the attack commenced in a dense fog, which in
the fan-shaped advance caused a good deal of loss of direction,
although the 18th Infantry Brigade on the left had laid out long
direction tapes to give the troops the initial direction.
The latter brigade was held up at the start by uncut wire, which
caused it to lose its barrage. It also encountered a good deal of
opposition on Bellevue Ridge. It was, however, carried forward by the
oncoming waves of the 1st Division, which were to pass through to a
further objective, and together the troops of the two divisions
made good the objective of the 18th Infantry Brigade. The fog was
so dense that all direction was lost, although the 11th Essex Regiment
took the unusual precaution of sending its men forward arm-in-arm.
Notwithstanding every precaution troops of the 11th Essex eventually
fetched up at Regnicourt, which was on the right of the objective
allotted to the 46th Division, who attacked on our right. Troops of
all three divisions also reached Andigny les Fermes, which was in the
objective of the 46th Division. The 16th Infantry Brigade was more
fortunate, and was assisted in maintaining its direction by the
railway, with the result that it gained its whole objective in good
time and with very little trouble. The day's captures were 26
officers, 599 other ranks, 5 trench-mortars, and 82 machine-guns.
The 1st Division having passed through, the 6th Division was now
withdrawn from the line to the neighbourhood of Bohain for a day or
two.
On the night of the 20th/21st October the Division was again put in,
relieving the 27th American Division and a part of the 25th Division
on the front from Bazuel to a short way north of Mazinghien, with a
view to the attack planned for the 23rd October. There now occurred a
sudden change in the type of country. Instead of open rolling downs,
there was a multiplicity of small fields, divided by high thick-set
hedges trained on wire which proved formidable obstacles. The enemy
had good positions for his artillery in the Bois l'Eveque, and on the
east bank of the Canal de la Sambre, protected from the danger of
being rushed by that obstacle, and it was evident that he intended to
put up a determined fight on the strong position thus afforded. The
hostile artillery fire was more than had been encountered since the
fighting about St. Quentin, and throughout the few days preceding the
attack the shelling of roads, farms and villages in our rear area and
of artillery positions was continuous. On the night of the attack the
assembly positions of the assaulting brigades were subjected to
heavy counter-preparation, including a great deal of gas-shelling,
and the assembly units suffered considerable casualties. The attack
was delivered at 1.20 a.m. on 23rd October in a dense fog; the 1st
Division being on the right and the 25th Division on the left. Three
sections of 301st American Tank Company were allotted to the Division,
and did excellent work in smashing fences and destroying machine-gun
nests, though, owing to the fog, the infantry lost touch with them
almost at once.
On the right the 18th Infantry Brigade, which attacked with the 2nd
D.L.I. on the right and the 1st West Yorkshire Regiment on the left,
had a less difficult task than the 71st Infantry Brigade, but were
delayed in crossing the gas-shelled valley in their immediate front,
and met with opposition from various farms. However, they fought their
way steadily forward during the day, and by the late afternoon their
right battalion had reached its objective and had pushed its patrols
down to the canal, and the left battalion, having reached its first
objective, was struggling forward to its second.
The 71st Infantry Brigade on the left attacked with the 9th Norfolk
Regiment and the 1st Leicestershire Regiment. Its attack soon became
disorganized in the very enclosed country, was unable to keep pace
with its barrage, lost touch with its tanks in the fog, and was soon
held up on a line not more than about 400 yards beyond that from which
it had started. Fighting continued throughout the day, and finally,
taking advantage of the progress made by the 25th Division on its
left, the 71st Infantry Brigade was able by night to reach a line
about half-way through the Bois l'Eveque.
During the night this brigade was relieved by the 16th Infantry
Brigade (Brig.-Gen. W. G. Braithwaite), which resumed the attack on
the morning of the 24th October. Opposition had by this time
decreased, and better progress was made, so that by noon the right
battalion, the 2nd York and Lancaster Regiment, held the line of
the objective laid down for the previous day's attack, and the left
battalion of the 18th Infantry Brigade had also completed the capture
of its objective. Some further progress was made during the day by the
16th Infantry Brigade.
During the period 20th to 24th October, Brig.-Gen. E. F. Delaforce,
C.R.A., 6th Division, had under his orders the Divisional Artillery of
the 3rd, 4th and 5th Australian Divisions, though the 5th Australian
Divisional Artillery was withdrawn on the eve of the attack of 24th
October. Their fire was most accurate and prompt, and gave the
attacking infantry every confidence. The 6th D.A. on this occasion was
in Corps Reserve.
During the 26th, 27th and 28th the patrols of the 16th Infantry
Brigade continued to work their way slowly forward, and the village of
Ors was evacuated of its inhabitants under the protection of patrols
of the 18th Infantry Brigade. The latter established a bridge-head
across the canal at Ors, and posts on the west side commanding the
canal on the whole brigade front.
On the 29th orders were received for the relief of the Division. In
order to be able to hand over to the relieving Division a satisfactory
position from which to launch the attack on the line of the canal, a
further small operation was planned by the 16th Infantry Brigade, and
brilliantly carried out by the 1st The Buffs on the 30th October. Two
companies attacked and captured an important farm and spur overlooking
the canal, were counter-attacked in the afternoon and turned out of
the farm, but retook it at once with the bayonet, inflicting heavy
casualties on the enemy and capturing five more machine-guns.
On the night of the 30th/31st October the relief of the Division (less
artillery) was completed, and it withdrew to billets in Fresnoy le
Grand, whence it moved some days later to Bohain.
The captures during the fighting from the 19th to the 31st October
numbered 9 officers and 431 other ranks, 13 guns (including two 5.9-in.
howitzers), 12 trench-mortars, and 61 machine-guns.
The total captures during a period of between six and seven weeks, in
which the Division had seen much stiff fighting, and had suffered over
6,000 casualties, amounted to 96 officers, 3,505 other ranks, 32 guns,
52 trench-mortars, and 527 machine-guns counted.
The infantry of the Division saw no more fighting, but its artillery
remained in till the end, finishing up in the neighbourhood of
Avesnes.
Among the many casualties which the artillery suffered must be
mentioned Major W. S. Ironside, D.S.O., M.C., commanding 112th
Battery, R.F.A., who was killed east of Le Cateau on 2nd November. He
was among the then much reduced number of those who had landed
originally with the Division in France in 1914, being then a sergeant.
Very little mention has been made of the services of the Royal
Engineers during this period. Exceptionally heavy work was thrown on
the signal sections, owing to the frequent changes of headquarters,
but they were untiring in their devotion and met each emergency with
resource. To the Field Companies fell the dangerous task of taping out
the jumping-off lines for the attacks, but they invariably achieved
this difficult task to the complete satisfaction of the
brigadier-generals and units concerned in the operations.
It is inevitable in a short History like this that the services of the
administrative branches should not receive the same notice as those of
the purely fighting portions of the Division, but the History would be
incomplete without some reference to them.
The Field Ambulances showed throughout the high devotion to duty which
has always characterized the Royal Army Medical Corps. The work of the
bearer sections during actions always elicited the admiration of the
infantry, while the tent sections were frequently under shell
fire, which, however, in no way interfered with their care of the
wounded. Both at advanced dressing stations and tent sections many of
the chaplains rendered most valuable assistance in carrying and
helping wounded men, while during trench warfare they were frequently
to be found with their men in the forward trenches.
In the action of 18th September 1918, Lt.-Col. Collins, D.S.O., and
Major German, both of the R.A.M.C., and also Father FitzGibbons, were
killed by shelling at a tent advanced dressing station.
The work of our Army Service Corps has always been the envy and
admiration of our Allies, and that of the 6th Divisional Train was up
to the highest standard of the British Army. The acknowledged
excellence of the horses and mules of the Division is a tribute to the
efficiency of the Veterinary Section and of the horsemasters attached
to the artillery, as well as to the mounted branches.
In spite of the amusing comments of "The Fancies," the life of the
Military Police was not all beer and skittles. The control of the
traffic at some of the cross-roads, favoured by the Boche heavy
gunners, was nerve-racking in ordinary times, and tenfold more so
during an action, and several awards were given to the Divisional
Military Police for gallant conduct under these conditions.
Very few officers or men served throughout with the Division. Perhaps
the two most notable were Lt.-Col. J. A. C. Forsyth, D.S.O.,
commanding 24th Brigade, R.F.A., who came out as a Captain, and
Staff-Sergt.-Major Woollard, who was Chief Clerk of the Division for
some time before mobilization.