THE SOMME
1916
At the end of July the Division was at last relieved from the Salient,
where it had suffered nearly 11,000 casualties during its thirteen
months' sojourn, and went south by train to join the Fifth Army.
The greater part of August was spent on the Ancre, on the front
opposite Beaumont-Hamel, making preparations for an attack which was
eventually abandoned for a time.
After a short period in reserve the Division was moved, between 6th
and 8th September, to join the XIV Corps, Fourth Army (Lt.-Gen. Lord
Cavan), to which corps it had for some time belonged up north. The XIV
Corps was the right corps of the British attack, and had its right on
the north bank of the Somme. In a succession of hard-fought battles
the Fourth Army (Gen. Sir H. S. Rawlinson) had pushed the Germans back
a considerable distance; units were feeling the strain badly, and
fresh troops were needed.
On 9th September a successful attack had given us Ginchy and Leuze
Wood, but the Germans were holding very strongly the high ground which
lies in the form of a horseshoe between the above-named points, and
which dominates the country for some distance to the south. The
trenches followed the shape of the spur roughly at the back end of the
horseshoe, and covered access was given to them by a sunken road
leading back to the deep valley which runs north from Combles.
At the top of the spur, just south of the railway and communicating
with the sunken road, was a four-sided trench in the form of a
parallelogram of some 300 yards by 150 yards, called by us the
Quadrilateral.
It was this strong point and the adjoining trenches which had held up
the advance of the Fourth Army on the 9th September, and it was the
first task of the 6th Division to obliterate the horseshoe and
straighten the line preparatory to a general attack on the 15th
September.
On 12th September attacks by the 56th Division on the south and the
Guards on the north reduced the neck of the horseshoe, or pocket, to
about 500 yards, but could not close it. The situation within the
horseshoe was undefined, and the exact positions of the Quadrilateral
and other trenches were not known, owing to the bad flying weather.
Even our own positions were in doubt, as almost every vestige of
roads, railways and even villages had disappeared under the continuous
bombardments.
On night 11/12th September the 71st Infantry Brigade (Brig.-Gen. J. F.
Edwards) relieved part of the Guards Division and the 16th Infantry
Brigade (Brig.-Gen. W. L. Osborn), part of the 56th Division, with
orders on the 13th September to straighten the line by capturing the
Quadrilateral. The 71st Infantry Brigade attacked with the Foresters
north of the railway and 9th Suffolk Regiment south of the railway,
while the 8th Bedford Regiment, who were close to the Quadrilateral on
the north-east of the Leuze Wood, co-operated by bombing up the trench
towards it. The artillery co-operation was weak, observation being
difficult, and though the troops advanced with the greatest gallantry
the northern attack could only make 500 yards, and the southern attack
of the 71st Infantry Brigade still less, while casualties from the
enemy artillery and machine-gun fire were very large.
A second attack at 6 p.m. the same day succeeded in bringing our line
to about 250 yards from the Strong Point, and in getting touch on the
right with the 16th Infantry Brigade.
Preparations were now made to include the Quadrilateral in the
general attack of the 15th September instead of making it a subsidiary
operation--a situation which recurred two years later almost to a day
in the attack on Holnon Village, and which had similar results.
The British objective for the 15th September was
Gueudecourt-Flers-Lesboeufs-Morval--the XIV Corps (Guards and 6th
Division) to capture the two latter. It was the first occasion on
which tanks were employed, and as far as the Division was concerned
was a failure, for of the three allotted to the 6th Division two broke
down before starting, and the third, moving off in accordance with
orders long before the infantry, had its periscope shot off, its
peep-holes blinded, was riddled by armour-piercing bullets, and had to
come back without achieving anything. This again found a parallel in
the attack on the Quadrilateral, near St. Quentin, on 18th September
1918, when the tanks were ineffective.
To facilitate the movement of the tanks a gap of about 200 yards had
been left in the creeping barrage. This gap unfortunately coincided
with the strongest point of the Quadrilateral. The barrage, moreover,
had passed over the German trenches by the time the infantry advanced;
the latter had, consequently, to attack up the glacis-like slopes
without any artillery support except the bombardment. This, owing to
the enemy's trenches not having been accurately located, was
ineffective.
The 16th Infantry Brigade attacked on a battalion front--one company
of the Bedfords bombing up the trench from Leuze Wood, and the
remainder over the open to the north against the south-west face. The
Buffs and York and Lancasters supported the attack, but in spite of
the greatest gallantry could not take the Strong Point.
The 1st Leicesters and the Norfolks, passing through the entrenched
Foresters and Suffolks, attacked the Quadrilateral from the north-west
with equal drive, but they too failed. Some ground, however, was
made, and by 10 a.m. the 16th Infantry Brigade on the south, and the
71st Infantry Brigade on the north, were digging in close to the
enemy's wire and trenches.
During the day constant reports arrived that the Guards had gained
their objectives, and that tanks and cheering men were moving through
Lesboeufs. It was not until the following morning that this report
was proved to be incorrect, and that it was Flers which had been
captured. In the meantime it appeared to the Divisional G.O.C.
(General Ross) that the prospect of a break-through on a large scale
was prejudiced solely by the repulse of the 6th Division. He therefore
ordered a night attack on the flanks of the Quadrilateral to be
executed by two battalions of the 18th Infantry Brigade (Brig.-Gen. R.
J. Bridgford). These battalions, the 2nd Durham Light Infantry and the
11th Essex, moved round after dark and attacked; the former from the
north, the latter from the south-east to the left of the 16th Infantry
Brigade. The 11th Essex lost direction, while the 2nd D.L.I. bombed
down a trench only to find that it did not lead into the Strong Point.
Except on the 6th Divisional front and at High Wood, which was
captured during the night, the whole line had advanced, and it was a
bitter blow to the Division to think that their sacrifices had been in
vain.
On the night of the 16/17th September the 18th Infantry Brigade
relieved the sorely-tried 71st Infantry Brigade, and fresh
preparations were made for an attack, on the 18th, of the
Quadrilateral, which had been strongly reinforced by the enemy through
the sunken road.
The K.S.L.I. dug themselves in with their left on the railway, so as
to assault the south-west face of the Strong Point. The weather having
cleared, the trenches were now carefully located from the air and
heavily bombarded, and on the 18th September, under both a stationary
and creeping barrage, and with the York and Lancasters bombing up
the trench from Leuze Wood, and the 18th Infantry Brigade (West Yorks
and 14th Durham Light Infantry) attacking the north-west face and the
trench running north from the Quadrilateral, this redoubtable Strong
Point was at last captured with comparatively small loss after what
must be conceded as a magnificent defence, and which had cost the
Division upwards of 3,500 casualties. Nine machine-guns and 160
unwounded prisoners were taken in the Quadrilateral and many Germans
killed.
The Quadrilateral once captured, the advance was carried forward for
1,000 yards to within half a mile of Morval and Lesboeufs. These,
which were the original objectives on the 13th September, were now to
be attacked on the 25th September. Relieved for rest on the 16th, the
Division came in again on 21st September, and dug good assembly
trenches. The most forward portion of the line taken over by the
Division consisted of 250 yards of one of the main German trenches,
which was held by the Germans on both flanks for some distance.
Fortunately we were in possession of the communication trench leading
up to it, and during the three nights after taking over considerable
excitement and amusement were caused by the occasional arrival of
German ration parties at our part of the trench, having failed to hit
off the part occupied by their own troops. Uttering many guttural
oaths these fled for their lives, speeded up by our machine and Lewis
guns. A few prisoners were captured in this way, and some valuable
information obtained. Spurred on apparently by the loss of their
rations, the Germans attacked on the 24th September both flanks of
this trench under cover of a mist, but were driven back without
reaching it, except on the extreme right. Here they entered a bombing
post, but were ejected, leaving one officer and twelve other ranks
dead and an unwounded prisoner, while our casualties were practically
nil.
The objective allotted to the Division for the 25th September was the
ground between the north end of Morval (attacked by 5th Division)
and the road which passes through the centre of Lesboeufs. At 12.35
p.m. the attack was launched--the 16th Infantry Brigade on the right
gaining the first objective with the Buffs, and the final objective
with K.S.L.I. and the Y. and L. On the left the 2nd D.L.I. and the
Essex captured the first objective, and the West Yorks and two
companies 14th D.L.I. the final objective. This was one of the most
successful battles on the Somme--thanks to good weather and
observation, a carefully arranged creeping barrage, and a sound
preliminary bombardment.
The Division captured over 500 prisoners, 6 machine-guns, and 4 heavy
trench-mortars. Tanks were not used. We here turned the tables on the
52nd Division, 26th Reserve Corps, our old opponents at Ypres, where
the ground was all in their favour and where they had proved
troublesome antagonists.
After consolidating its ground the Division was relieved by the 20th
Division on 30th September, and the long struggle began for the
possession of the high ground overlooking the Bapaume-Le Transloy
Road.
On 7th October the XIV Corps (20th and 56th Divisions) attacked
with only partial success, and the 6th Division was brought in
again on night 8/9th October for a general attack on the 12th
October. The enemy had dug a series of trenches named by us
Rainbow--Cloudy--Misty--Zenith, etc., a portion of which had been
captured by us, making a somewhat pronounced salient. All three
brigades were in the line, with one battalion in front trenches, the
71st Infantry Brigade (Brig.-Gen. E. Feetham) being in the salient,
with the 16th Infantry Brigade on the right and the 18th Infantry
Brigade on the left. The objective of the attack of the 12th October
was the line of trenches running north from Le Transloy.
At 2.5 p.m. the flank brigades attacked, but with only partial
success. The failure to make ground, which was general all along
the British front, was attributed to want of surprise, as we had
bombarded the position for two days, and always attacked in the early
afternoon. Further, the ground was very heavy and observation
extremely bad. The Germans were fresh troops, and fought well. Perhaps
more than anything it was due to the effect of their machine-gun fire.
Taught by our creeping barrage that machine-guns in the front line
were useless, the enemy had drawn them across the valley towards the
road, and caught our advance over the brow of the rise with accurate
distant machine-gun fire.
Changing the time of zero, the attack was renewed at 5.35 a.m. on the
15th October, the 18th Infantry Brigade on the left (2nd D.L.I. and
11th Essex) attempting to seize those portions of Cloudy and Mild
trenches still held by the enemy, while the Sherwood Foresters on
their right attacked some gun pits which lay about 200 yards in front
of their line. This latter attack succeeded, but with the great loss
of Colonel Hobbs, O.C. The Foresters, who died of his wounds. The left
attack made a little ground. A final attempt to push forward the line
was made on the 18th October by the 9th Norfolks, but was only
partially successful.
On 20th October the Division (less artillery) was relieved and moved
to the First Army, going into Corps Reserve of the I Corps, with
Divisional Headquarters at Bethune and the units in the town and
surrounding area.
The artillery of the Division (Brig.-Gen. E. S. Cleeve, C.R.A.) had
first come into action on the Somme on the 3rd September, supporting
the attack of the 16th Division on Guillemont. It was grouped and
re-grouped in accordance with the requirements of the situation, but
never as a whole covered the operations of the Division.
On the 9th November it was withdrawn and marched to First Army area,
where for about a month it covered the 56th Division, XI Corps, with
6th D.A.H.Q. at La Gorgue, rejoining the Division in I Corps in
December. Brig.-Gen. E. F. Delaforce replaced Brig.-Gen. Cleeve
as C.R.A. on 25th October.
The Division had taken part as a whole in three general attacks on the
Somme (15th and 25th September and 12th October), and had also carried
out subordinate operations on 13th and 18th September and 18th
October.
It had suffered casualties amounting to 277 officers and 6,640 other
ranks, and had well earned a rest.