The treatment of the Border States in the crisis of 1861 has received from
historians the same attention as Saxony, the objective point between
Prussia and Austria in the Seven Years' War. Directing special attention
to Kentucky requires some explanation. The possession of this commonwealth
was for several reasons more important than that of some other border
States. The transportation facilities afforded by the Cumberland and
Tennessee rivers furnished the key to carrying out the plan to divide the
South. The possession of the State by the Confederates was of strategic
importance for the invasion of the North too for the reason that the
Ordinance of 1787 had been so interpreted as to fix the boundary of
Kentucky on the north side of the Ohio River. It was, moreover, the native
State of Abraham Lincoln and it was important to have that commonwealth
support this untrained backwoodsman whom most statesmen considered
incapable of administering the affairs of the nation.
In the beginning, the situation was not the least encouraging to the
Unionists. The Breckenridge Democrats had carried the State in 1859 on a
platform favoring Southern rights. Their chief spokesman had become such a
defender of their faith that in 1860 he was chosen to lead the radically
proslavery party which had come to the point of so doubting the orthodoxy
of their Northern adherents as to deem it advisable to separate from
them. Unalterably in favor of the rights of the slave States, the leaders
of this persuasion had expressed themselves in terms that could not be
misunderstood.[1] One of their spokesmen Humphrey Marshall contended
that slavery is not a creature of municipal law. He believed that the
institution followed the flag. He wanted Union but only with that
equality which involved the recognition of the right of property in slaves
everywhere.[2] Speaking in the House of Representatives on January 30,
1861, John W. Stephenson, another of this faction, said on the same topic:
"Equality underlaid the whole Federal structure, and protection to persons
and property within the Federal jurisdiction, was the price of allegiance
of the States to such General Government, as delegated and prescribed in
the constitution. Wherever the American banner floated upon the seas or
land, all beneath it was entitled to the protection of the flag."[3]
On this question, their leader John C. Breckenridge, "a believer in the old
Democratic creed and a supporter of the South and her institutions,"[4]
took the same, if not higher ground. Referring to the Dred Scott decision
in a speech delivered in Ashland, Kentucky, in 1859, Breckenridge said:
"After this decision we had arrived at a point where we might reasonably
expect tranquillity and peace. The equality of rights and property of all
the states in the common Territory, having been stamped by the seal of
judicial authority, all good citizens might well acquiesce."[5] When the
Southern States seceded because of the threatened infringement of these
rights, the President of the United States, according to Breckenridge, had
no right to enlist men and no right to blockade the Southern ports, in
short, no right to wage war on these commonwealths. Lincoln had thus
overthrown constitutional government. If he was trying to preserve the
Union, he must do it in a constitutional way. Breckenridge wanted the Union
but contended that it would be no good without the Constitution.[6] To sum
up, as Southern Democrats they had helped to disrupt the Charleston
Convention, and developing into a strict Southern rights party, they had
through bolting made possible the election of Abraham Lincoln. They then
finally joined the States' rights party, which, boldly declaring the
election of Lincoln a just cause for the dissolution of the Union,
undertook to secede.[7]
With such radical leaders in control it might seem strange that, in a
State formed from an aristocratic commonwealth like Virginia and extending
into the fertile region of the Mississippi, these protagonists of States'
rights did not turn Kentucky over to the Confederacy. Exactly what part
did the rich slaveholders play during this crisis when the State was
called upon to decide the question between the North and South? What was
the position of such influential men as James B. Clay, George B. Hodge,
Cerro Gordo Williams, T. P. Porter, Roger W. Hansom, and S. B. Buckner?[8]
Other representative citizens, however, had been equally outspoken in
favor of the Union. Voicing the sentiment of the Union party, which on the
eighth of January met in Louisville to take steps to support the Federal
Government, Bell said: "Let us offer everything we can to avert the
torrent of evil, but let us always stand ready to support our rights in
the Union: the State is deeply and devotedly attached to the Union."[9]
Garrett Davis inquired: "Will you preserve the Union or rush into the
vortex of revolution under the name of secession?"[10] J. T. Boyle said in
the same convention that there could be no benefit or advantage, no civil
or political rights, no interest of any kind whatever, secured by
government in the Southern Confederacy which the people did not then enjoy
in the "blessed Union formed by our fathers." In his opinion, it was the
duty of Kentuckians "to stand by the Star Spangled Banner and cling to the
Union."[11] Some of the most influential newspapers were fearlessly
advocating the Union cause. Among others were the Frankfort _Daily
Commonwealth_, the Louisville _Courier_ and the _Democrat_.
Exactly what support these leaders of the differing factions would obtain
was determined by forces for centuries at work in that State. Southerners
who thought that, because Kentucky was a slave State it should go with the
South, had failed to take these causes into consideration. In the first
place, not every slaveholder was an ardent proslavery agitator. There were
masters who like Henry Clay considered slavery an evil and hoped to see it
abolished, but while the majority of their fellow countrymen held on to it
they did so too. Many Kentuckians, moreover, were like that restless class
of Westerners who, dissatisfied with the society based on slavery, had
taken up land beyond the mountains, where the poor man could toil up from
poverty.[12] Kentucky was the first section west of the Allegheny mountains
settled by these daring adventurers because they were there cut off from
the North by the French and from the South by the Spanish, and in Kentucky,
a section hemmed in by these foreign possessions, the settlers were less
liable to be disturbed. And even when the barrier of foreign claims had
been removed, the movement of population from the East to the West took
place along lines leading to the States later organized in the West rather
than into Kentucky. The people of Kentucky, therefore, were not radically
changed in a day by the influx of population. On the contrary, many of
them, especially the mountaineers, have not changed since the days of Boone
and Henderson. Some of them having left the uplands of the colonies because
they were handicapped by slavery, were naturally opposed to the bold claims
of that institution in 1861. They, like the Westerners, learned to look to
the General Government for the establishment of commonwealths, the building
of forts, and the maintenance of troops,[13] and, therefore, adhered to it
when it was threatened with destruction.
Another cause, moreover, was equally as potential. In Kentucky as in some
other Southern States, there had grown up a considerable number of
prosperous country towns, where resided lawyers, merchants, bankers,
teachers, and mechanics, who had little property interest in slavery, who
felt their own "intellectual superiority to the country squires and their
fox-hunting, horse-racing, quarrelsome sons, and who consequently asserted
social independence of them and social equality with them."[14] They were
hostile to the aristocratic masters, whom they generally denounced as
"oligarchs," "slavocrats," "Lords of the Lash," and "Terror Engenders."[15]
This mercantile and professional class, inspired by such men as Hinton
Rowan Helper, contemplated the removal of the Negroes and the bringing of
white laborers into the South.[16]
In view of this cleavage, it was difficult in the beginning of the struggle
to characterize the situation. There were unconditional Secessionists and
unconditional Union men. Judging from the condition then obtaining, no one
could tell exactly which way the State would go. "Sympathy, blood, and the
community of social feeling growing out of slavery," says one, "inclined
her to the South; her political faith which Clay more than any other man
had inspired her with and which Crittenden now loyally represented held her
fast to the Union."[17] Many of the people, though believing in States'
rights, did not think that the grievances of the South were such as to
justify secession. At the same time they opposed "coercion," and since a
reconstructed Union was impossible they would have solved the difficulty by
peaceful separation. Writing to Gen. McClellan June 8, 1861, Garrett Davis
said: "The sympathy for the South and the inclination to secession among
our people is much stronger in the southwestern corner of the state than
it is in any other part, and as you proceed toward the upper section of
the Ohio and our Virginia line, it gradually becomes weaker until it is
almost wholly lost.... I doubt not that two thirds of our people are
unconditionally for the Union. The timid are for it and they shrink from
convulsion and civil war, while all the bold, the reckless, and the
bankrupt are for secession."[18] This categorical distinction, however, is
hardly right. There were Kentuckians of representative families on both
sides in all parts of the State except in the extreme West.[19] A careful
study of the facts, however, leads one to the conclusion that even in the
beginning there were more Unionists than Secessionists. The Unionists,
unhappily, were not organized while the Secessionists were led by the State
officials, chief among whom was Governor Magoffin.
When the Southern States began to secede Governor Magoffin called a
special session of the State legislature, thinking that he could have a
secession convention called. He said in part: "I therefore submit to your
consideration the propriety of providing for the election of delegates to
a convention to be assembled at an early day to which shall be referred
for full and final determination the future of the Federal and interstate
relations of Kentucky." He further said: "Kentucky will not be an
indifferent observer of the force policy. The seceding States have not in
their haste and inconsiderate action our approval, but their cause is our
right and they have our sympathies. The people of Kentucky will never
stand by with folded arms while those States are struggling for their
constitutional rights and resisting oppression and being subjugated to an
anti-slavery government."[20] He believed that the idea of coercion, when
applied to great political communities, is revolting to a free people,
contrary to the spirit of our institutions, and if successful would
endanger the liberties of the people.[21] But the legislature did not
provide for such a convention. On the eleventh of February this body
adjourned. It reassembled on the twentieth of March and remained in
session until the fourth of April, but still these important matters were
not decided. Pursuant to another call of the Governor, it reassembled on
the 6th of May and sat until the twenty-fourth of May when it adjourned.
On the second of September the legislature elected in August came in, but
still the important question as to what should be done hung in the
balance. At first there came up the resolutions introduced by George W.
Ewing on the twenty-first of January, expressing regret that certain
States had furnished men and money for the coercion of the seceded
States, and requesting the Governor of Kentucky to notify such States
that should attempts be made to coerce these commonwealths, Kentucky
would join the South.[22] This resolution passed the House but did not
pass the whole legislature as so many have said. A resolution for calling
a convention to amend the Constitution of the United States was
passed.[23] Several distinguished men of Kentucky sat in this convention
which was in session from the fourth to the twenty-second of February
without accomplishing anything.
The majority of Kentuckians were then neutral. There were two classes of
neutrals, however. This was easily possible since neutrality meant one
thing to one man and a different thing to another. Each faction looked
forward to the adoption of this policy as a victory over the other. The
Unionists accepted it as the best policy, not knowing that, taking such a
position, they would aid the Confederacy. Even John J. Crittenden had
this idea. He said: "If Kentucky and the other border States should
assume this attitude, war between the two sections of the country would
be averted and the Confederate states after a few years' trial of their
experiment would return voluntarily to the Union." [24]
Neutrality was considered a necessity for another reason; namely, the
expected short duration of the war. No one believed at first that the war
would last long. Even Lincoln thought that it would be over in ninety
days. Some, therefore, felt that Kentucky would be foolish to cause blood
to be shed on her soil when the war could easily be kept out of the State
three months. This sentiment, however, must not be misunderstood as
evincing a lack of interest in the Union, for in the address declaring for
neutrality these same leaders said that the dismemberment of the Union was
no remedy for existing evils but an aggravation of them all.[25] To many
Unionists neutrality meant going slowly in the right direction. It was in
keeping with Lincoln's plan not to go so rapidly toward "coercion" in
Kentucky as he had in the other border States.
How then did the neutrality policy work out? On the twenty-ninth of
January R. T. Jacob introduced in the lower house of the legislature a
resolution declaring that the proper position of Kentucky was that of a
mediator between the sections, and that as an umpire she would remain firm
and impartial in that day of trial to their "beloved country that by
counsel and mediation she might aid in restoring peace and harmony and
brotherly love." Giving the reasons for adopting such a policy Jacob said:
"This leading sentiment of mediation was indorsed by the Union men of both
Houses of the Legislature.... Some may say, why did not the Kentucky
Legislature go for coercion? For two reasons: First, some States, it is
true had seceded from the Union, but war had not actually commenced:
second, the men at that time who would have undertaken to force coercion
upon the Legislature would have been in the hopeless minority and would
have immediately given a majority to the secessionists. It would have
ended in total destruction to the cause of the Union in the State. Those
resolutions were for two purposes. In good faith they were intended to
compromise all difference between the States, and if possible to restore
peace between sections. If that failed, they were intended to hold, if
possible, our meagre majority until the people could act and we had no
doubt that when they did speak it would be in unmistakable tones for the
preservation of the Union."[26]
No action was taken on these resolutions, but on the eleventh of February
there was passed a joint measure, entitled "Resolutions Declaring action
by the Legislature on political affairs unnecessary and inexpedient at
this time,"[27] These resolutions mentioned the great danger which
environed the Union, asked the Confederates to stay the work of secession
and protested against coercion. The last resolution favored the calling of
a convention to amend the Constitution of the United States. Significant
too for the Unionists were the last words: "It is unnecessary and
inexpedient for the Legislature to take any further action on the subject
at the present time, and as an evidence of the sincerity and good faith of
our propositions for an adjustment and our expression of devotion to the
Union and the desire for its preservation Kentucky awaits with great
solicitude the responses from her sister States."[28]
Neutrality, however, became the accepted policy of so many that it proved
to be dangerous. The Union State Committee, in drawing up on the
eighteenth of April a resolution to please all, seemingly pledged the
State to join the South. These resolutions were severely criticised by the
Unionists, especially that part which says: "What the future destiny of
Kentucky may be we cannot with certainty foresee. But if the enterprise
announced in the proclamation of the President should at any time
hereafter assume the aspect of a war for overrunning and subjugation of
the seceding States, then Kentucky ought to take her stand for the South."
[29] Many thought that this obligated Kentucky to go with the South.
Unionists of other States considered it a victory for the Confederacy.
This committee, however, stipulated this proposition to satisfy those
sympathizers with the South, who believed all the bad reports concerning
the functionaries of the Federal Government, circulated by the leaders of
the Confederacy. Hence, they said in this proposition not that Kentucky
would go with the South, but if at any time thereafter the President's
proclamation should assume the aspect of war, it would do so. They
evidently did not believe that it had or would assume such an aspect. They
were also trying to pacify those who misunderstood the issues of
"subjugation" and "coercion."[30] The relation of the States to the Union
was yet a problem to many a statesman. Many thought that the colonists
when in a state of nature came together and agreed to a compact, giving up
some of their sovereignty and retaining the other, and, therefore, had the
right to withdraw at pleasure, carrying a part of the national property
with them. Such thinkers contended too that the Union had no right to
"coerce" a seceded State. Calhoun had said that because the Union was a
compact it could be broken; on the other hand, Jackson had said that
because it was a compact it could not be broken. Now it was difficult for
Kentuckians to decide who was right. That the committee had no intention
of going with the Confederacy may be seen from the following declaration:
"Seditious leaders in the midst of us now appeal to her (Kentucky) to
furnish troops to uphold those combinations against the government of the
Union. Will she comply with this appeal? Ought she to comply with it? We
answer, no."[31]
While these things were going on, the great question of Fort Sumter was
before the people. When the fort was finally bombarded and Lincoln called
for seventy-five thousand troops Gov. Magoffin politely refused to comply.
His reply was: "I say emphatically Kentucky will furnish no troops for the
wicked purpose of subduing her sister Southern States."[32] He had already
been much moved by the large vote given the delegates to the Border States
Convention, indicating such a growth of Union sentiment that he called the
legislature together, hoping to win the day for secession by changing the
policy of the State from mediatorial to armed neutrality, resisting all
forces, whether Confederate or Federal, which might bring war into the
State. The body met on the sixteenth of May, passed a resolution of
mediatorial neutrality and approved the Governor's refusal to furnish
troops under the existing circumstances.[33] This, however, did not mean
that the legislature was in sympathy with the efforts of the Governor to
support the Southern cause. Writing to Gen. Scott, John J. Crittenden
explained it thus:
"The position of Kentucky and the relation she occupies toward the
government of the Union is not, I fear, understood at Washington. It
ought to be well understood. Very important consequences may depend
upon it and upon her proper treatment. Unfortunately for us our
Governor does not sympathize with Kentucky in respect to secession.
His opinions and feelings incline him strongly to the side of the
South. His answer to the requisition for troops was in terms hasty
and unbecoming and does not correspond with the usual and gentlemanly
courtesy. But while she regretted the language of his answer,
Kentucky acquiesced in his declining to furnish the troops called
for, and she did so not because she loved the Union less but she
feared that if she had parted with those troops and sent them to
serve in your ranks, she would have been overwhelmed by secessionists
at home, and severed from the Union. And it was to preserve
substantially and ultimately our connection with the Union that
induced us to acquiesce in the partial infraction of it by our
Governor's refusal of the troops required. This was the most
prevailing and general motive. To this may be added the strong
indisposition of our people to a civil war with the South, and the
apprehended consequences of a civil war within our state and among
our people.... I think Kentucky's excuse a good one and that under
all the circumstances of a complicated case she is rendering better
service in her present position than she could by becoming an active
party in the contest."[34]
The fact is that secession had little chance in Kentucky after public
opinion found expression. Neutrality early became the order of the day.
The elections of 1861 were significant in that they gave the people a
chance to express their will. It should be borne in mind that the
legislature of 1859 was elected when the question of union or disunion was
not before the people. Now in 1861 they had to elect members to the Border
State Convention, a new legislature, and congressmen to represent Kentucky
at the special session called by President Lincoln. In all these
elections, Unionists won. Some historians like Smith and Shaler[35] seem
to think that the State had pledged itself to remain unconditionally
neutral, that these elections had no particular bearing on the situation
and that if a "sovereignty convention" had been called, secession would
have won. These writers do not seem to see that the people of Kentucky,
although nominally neutral, desired to remain with the Union. Doubtless a
better statement is that, although the election of 1861 showed that a
large majority of the people were in favor of the Union, the Union leaders
did not show so in the early part of the year and neutrality was adopted
not as an end but as a means that triumph over the enemies of the Union
might finally be assured.[36] We easily see now that there was not much
danger of secession, but the Unionists could not see it so well at that
time. Smith and Shaler doubtless exaggerate the situation, for what danger
of secession could there have been when the people had elected the Union
candidates for the Border State Convention to be convened at Frankfort on
May 27, when they sent nine Unionists out of the ten congressmen to
represent them in the special session of Congress, and when on the 5th of
the following August, after the battle of Bull Run, they elected to the
State Legislature 103 Unionists out of 141 members.[37] The calling of a
convention then would have made little difference, if the people had
chosen a majority of Unionists to represent them in other bodies. How can
one conclude then that they would have elected seceders to represent them
in a "sovereignty convention"? Hodge states that the sympathizers with the
Confederacy did not contest to any considerable extent the elections of
August, 1861, and consequently the supporters of the Federal Government
were in the ascendency in the next legislature. He seems to indicate that
the Unionists used fraud, but the records show that the Secessionists,
regarding it as a lost cause, in many cases withdrew their candidates.
Evidently these elections showed not only that secession was impossible
but that neutrality could not last.[38]
After this sentiment began to change. Men boldly took decisive positions.
The unwieldy neutrality party then divided into three parts: those who
went to the Confederate lines to aid the Southern cause; those who openly
declared themselves in favor of the Union; and those sympathizers with the
South, who although in favor of the seceding States, seeing that their
cause was hopeless, advocated peaceful separation and finally, when that
failed, a compromise peace between the two sections.[39] The Union party,
though unalterably opposed to the abolitionists and not primarily attached
to the Union because of antagonism to slavery, gradually acquiesced in the
policy of the Federal Government with respect to that institution. This
party first reached the position that Negroes taken from the Confederates
could with propriety be disposed of as contraband of war and many of its
adherents grew more favorable to the policy of general emancipation.
It was soon evident that war could not long be kept out of the State. As
early as April, 1861, troops for service in the Confederacy were organized
in Kentucky. This movement was somewhat accelerated by an act of the
legislature providing that the arms supplied to the troops should not
be used against either section and that the State companies as well as
the Home Guards should take the same oath as the officers requiring
fidelity to the Constitution.[40] At this point many Kentuckians of
proslavery tendencies were forced out of their natural position and
driven into the Confederate ranks. Among these was S. B. Buckner, who
went South to command about ten thousand secessionists, recruited under
the leadership of Colonels Roger W. Hanson, Lloyd Tilghman, and W. D.
Lannon at Camp Boone.[41]
The Governor refused to furnish Lincoln troops but he was in touch with
the Confederacy, doing all he could to equip soldiers for its service,[42]
though not exactly openly, as that would have been sufficient excuse for
the Unionists who desired to help the Union. The Unionists who saw all of
this going on desired to arm and organize their forces but they were
handicapped in that the commander of the State guard was a Secessionist
and care had been taken to hold the military forces for the South. In
consequence of this difficulty Lincoln was secretly appealed to for arms,
which were shipped to cities on the Ohio River for secret distribution
among the Unionists of Kentucky as the opportunity would permit.[43] The
Secessionists had referred to these guns as the first so-called violation
of neutrality. The Unionists defended themselves on the ground that since
the Governor and his whole machine were about in the ranks of the
Confederates they were justified in doing almost anything to defend the
State. Shaler says that the action on both sides was almost simultaneous
and that the actual infringement of the neutrality proclamation issued by
the Governor was due to the action of Polk and Zollicoffer and the
simultaneous invasion of the State some hundreds of miles apart shows that
the rupture of the neutrality of Kentucky was deliberately planned by the
Confederate authorities.[44]
The invasion by Polk in September produced great excitement. The
legislature was then in session and passed a resolution that the invaders
be expelled, and that the Governor call out the military force of the
State and place the same under the command of Gen. Thomas L. Crittenden.
The resolutions were vetoed by the Governor but passed by a vote of two
thirds.[45] The desired proclamation was issued and soon sufficient men to
form forty regiments answered the call.[46] Making further response to the
invasion of the State by the Confederates, the legislature ordered that
the United States flag be raised over the capitol at Frankfort, and by a
resolution which "affirmed" distinctly, though not directly, the doctrine
of States' rights placed Kentucky in political and military association
with the North.[47]