The facts as to the participation of Negroes in the American Revolution
have received the attention of several writers. Yet not one of them has
made a scientific presentation of the facts which they have discovered.
These historians have failed to consider the bearing of the status of the
free Negro during the colonial period, the meaning of the Revolution to the
Negro, and what the service of the Negro soldiers first enlisted effected
in changing the attitude of the people toward the blacks throughout the
original thirteen colonies.
To a person who has lived in the nineteenth or twentieth century it would
seem incredible that Negroes, the majority of whom were then slaves, should
have been allowed to fight in the Continental Army. The layman here may
forget that during the eighteenth century slavery was a patriarchal
institution rather than the economic plantation system as it developed
after the multiplication of mechanical appliances, which brought about the
world-wide industrial revolution. During the eighteenth century a number of
slaves brought closely into contact with their masters were gradually
enlightened and later emancipated. Such freedmen, in the absence of any
laws to the contrary, exercised political rights,[1] among which was that
of bearing arms. Negroes served not only in the American Revolution, but in
every war of consequence during the colonial period. There were masters who
sent slaves to the front to do menial labor and to fight in the places of
their owners. Then there were slaves who, finding it easier to take
occasional chances with bullets than to bear the lash, ran away from their
masters and served as privateers or enlisted as freemen.[2] The newspapers
of the colonial period often mentioned these facts in their advertisements
of fugitive slaves. In 1760 a master had considerable difficulty with a
slave who escaped from New England into New Jersey, where he said he would
enlist in the provincial service.[3] Advertising for his mulatto servant,
who was brought up in Rhode Island, James Richardson of Stonington said
that the fugitive had served as a soldier the previous summer.[4] A few
free Negroes found their way into the colonial militia along with white
soldiers. This passed, of course, not without some opposition, as in the
case of Massachusetts. In 1656 that colony excluded Negroes and Indians
from the militia, and according to Governor Bradstreet's report to the
Board of Trade in 1680 and subsequent action taken by that colony in 1775
and 1776, it adhered to this policy.[5]
Favorable as this condition of Negroes during the colonial period seemed,
the situation became still more desirable during the Revolution itself.
This upheaval was social as well as political. Aristocracy was suddenly
humiliated and the man in the common walks of life found himself in power,
grappling with problems which he had long desired to solve. Sprung from the
indentured servant poor white class, the new rulers had more sympathy for
the man farthest down. The slaves, therefore, received more consideration.
In the heat of the excitement of war the system lost almost all of its
rigor, the slave codes in some cases falling into desuetude. The contest
for liberty was in the mouths of some orators of the Revolution the
cause of the blacks as well as that of the whites, and the natural rights
of the former were openly discussed in urging the independence of the
United States. When men like Laurens, Henry, Hamilton and Otis spoke for
the rights of the American colonies, they were not silent on the duty
of the American people toward their slaves.[6] In 1774 a patriot in the
Provincial Congress of Massachusetts spoke of the "propriety, that while we
are attempting to free ourselves from slavery, our present embarrassments,
and preserve ourselves from slavery, that we also take into consideration
the state and circumstances of the Negro slaves in this province."[7]
When the Revolution came the Negro was actually in the army before the
question of his enlistment could be raised by those who had not yet been
won to the cause of universal freedom. Feeling the same patriotism which
the white man experienced, the Negro bared his breast to the bullet and
gave his life as a sacrifice for the liberty of his country. According to
Bancroft, "the roll of the army of Cambridge had from its first formation
borne the names of men of color." "Free Negroes," said he, "stood in the
ranks by the side of white men. In the beginning of the war they had
entered the provincial army; the first general order which was issued by
Ward had required a return, among other things, of the complexion of the
soldiers; and black men, like others, were retained in the service after
the troops were adopted by the continent."[8]
Before the various officials had had time to decide whether or not the
Negro should be enlisted, many had numbered themselves among the first
to spill their blood in behalf of American liberty. Peter Salem had
distinguished himself at Bunker Hill by killing Major Pitcairn,[9] a
number of other Negroes under the command of Major Samuel Lawrence had
heroically imperilled their lives and rescued him when he had advanced so
far beyond his troops that he was about to be surrounded and taken
prisoner,[10] and Salem Poor of Colonel Frye's regiment had acquitted
himself with such honor in the battle of Charlestown that fourteen American
officers commended him to the Continental Congress for his valor.[11] But
great as were the services rendered by these patriots of color, the
increase in the number of blacks in the Continental Army gave rise to
vexatious questions. There were those who, influenced by the theories which
had made the Revolution possible, hailed with joy the advent of the Negro
in the role of the defender of his country, which they believed owed him
freedom and opportunity. Some, having the idea that the Negro was a savage,
too stupid to be employed in fighting the battles of freemen, seriously
objected to his enlistment. Others were fearful of the result from setting
the example of employing an uncivilized people to fight the British, who
would then have an excuse not only for enlisting Negroes[12] but also the
Indians. A still larger number felt that the question of arming the slaves
would simply reduce itself to one of deciding whether or not the colonies
should permit the British to beat them playing their own game.[13]
In the beginning, however, those who believed the Negroes should be
excluded from the army triumphed. Massachusetts officially took a stand
against the enlistment of slaves. The Committee of Safety, of which John
Hancock and Joseph Ward were members, reported in May, 1775, to the
Provincial Congress the opinion that as the contest then between Great
Britain and her colonies respected the liberties and privileges of the
latter, that the admission of any persons but freemen as soldiers would be
inconsistent with the principles supported and would reflect dishonor on
the colony.[14] They urged that no slaves be admitted into the army under
any consideration whatever. No action was taken. This was not seemingly
directed at the enlistment of free Negroes; but it must have had some
effect, for in July of the same year, when Washington took command of the
army at Cambridge, there were issued from his headquarters to recruiting
officers instructions prohibiting the enlistment of any Negro, any person
not native of this country, unless such person had a wife and a family and
was a settled resident.[15]
This matter became one of such concern that the officials of the
Continental Army had to give it more serious consideration. Communications
relative thereto directed to the Continental Congress provoked a debate in
that body in September, 1775. On the occasion of drafting a letter to
Washington, reported by a committee consisting of Lynch, Lee and Adams, to
whom several of his communications had been referred, Rutledge, of South
Carolina, moved that the commander-in-chief be instructed to discharge from
the army all Negroes, whether slave or free.[16] It seems that Rutledge had
the support of the Southern delegates, but failed to secure a majority vote
in favor of this radical proposition.
The matter was not yet settled, however. On the eighth of the following
month there was held a council of war consisting of Washington, Ward, Lee,
Putnam, Thomas, Spencer, Heath, Sullivan, Greene and Gates, to consider the
question whether or not it would be advisable to enlist Negroes in the new
army or "whether there be any distinction between such as are slaves and
those who are free." It was unanimously agreed to reject all slaves and by
a large majority to refuse Negroes altogether.[17] Upon considering ten
days later the question of devising a method of renovating the army,
however, the question of enlisting Negroes came up again before a Committee
of Conference. The leaders in this council were Benjamin Franklin, Benjamin
Harrison, Thomas Lynch, the Deputy Governors of Connecticut and Rhode
Island, and the Committee of Council of Massachusetts Bay. They were asked
the question whether Negroes should be excluded from the new enlistment,
especially such as were slaves. This council also agreed that Negroes
should be rejected altogether.[18] Accordingly, the general orders from
Washington, dated November 12, 1775, declared that neither Negroes, boys
unable to bear arms, nor old men unfit to endure fatigues of the campaign
should be enlisted.
The men who had taken this position had acted blindly. They had failed to
consider the various complications which might arise as a result of the
refusal to admit Negroes to the army. What would the Negroes think when
they saw their offering thrown away from the altar of their country? Were
the Revolutionary fathers so stupid as to think that the British would
adopt the same policy? They could not have believed that the situation
could be so easily cleared. Before the Revolution was well on its way
the delegates from Georgia to the Continental Congress had already
experienced certain fears as to the safety of Georgia and South Carolina.
They believed that if one thousand regular troops should land in Georgia
under a commander with adequate supplies and he should proclaim freedom
to all loyal Negroes, twenty thousand of them would join the British in a
fortnight. It was to them a matter of much concern that the Negroes of
these provinces had such a wonderful art of communicating intelligence
among themselves as to convey information several hundred miles in a week
or in a fortnight.[19] The colonists, too, could not ignore the bold
attempt of Lord Dunmore, the dethroned governor of Virginia, who issued
a proclamation of freedom to all slaves who would fight for the king,
endeavored to raise a black regiment among them, and actually used a
number of Negroes in the battle at Kemp's Landing, where they behaved like
well-seasoned soldiers, pursuing and capturing one of the attacking
companies.[20] Referring thereafter to Lord Dunmore as an arch-traitor who
should be instantly crushed, George Washington said: "But that which
renders the measure indispensably necessary is the Negroes, if he gets
formidable numbers of them, will be tempted to join" him.
Subsequent developments showed that these misgivings were justified. In
July, 1776, General Greene learned on Long Island that the British were
about to organize in that vicinity a regiment of Negroes aggregating
200.[22] Taking as a pretext the enrollment of Negroes in the Continental
Army, Sir Henry Clinton proclaimed from Philipsburgh in 1779 that all
Negroes taken in arms or upon any military duty should be purchased from
the captors for the public service, and that every Negro who would desert
the "Rebel Standard" should have full security to follow within the
British lines any occupation which he might think proper.[23] In 1781
General Greene reported to Washington from North Carolina that the British
there had undertaken to embody immediately two regiments of Negroes.[24]
They were operating just as aggressively farther South. "It has been
computed by good judges," says Ramsey, "that between the years 1775 and
1783 the State of South Carolina lost 25,000 Negroes,[25] that is, one
fifth of all the slaves, and a little more than half as many as its entire
white population. At the evacuation of Charleston 241 Negroes and their
families were taken off to St. Lucia in one transport, the Scimitar."[26]
Yet in Georgia it is believed that the loss of Negroes was much greater,
probably three fourths or seven eighths of all in the State. There the
British were more successful in organizing and making use of Negroes. One
third of the 600 men by whom Fort Cornwallis was garrisoned at the siege
of Augusta were Negroes. So effective were some of these Negroes trained
by the British in Georgia that a corps of fugitive slaves calling
themselves the "King of England's Soldiers," so harassed the people on
both sides of the Savannah River, even after the Revolution, that it was
feared that a general insurrection of the slaves there would follow as a
result of this most dangerous and best disciplined band of marauders that
ever infested its borders.[27]
The leaders of the Revolution, therefore, quickly receded from their
radical position of excluding Negroes from the army. Informed that the
free Negroes who had served in the ranks in New England were sorely
displeased at their exclusion from the service, and fearing that they
might join the enemy, Washington departed, late in 1775, from the
established policy of the staff and gave the recruiting officers leave to
accept such Negroes, promising to lay the matter before the Continental
Congress, which he did not doubt would approve it.[28] Upon the receipt of
this communication the matter was referred to a committee composed of
Wythe, Adams and Wilson, who recommended that free Negroes who had served
faithfully in the army at Cambridge might be reenlisted but no others.[29]
In taking action on such communications thereafter the Continental
Congress followed the policy of leaving the matter to the various States,
which were then jealously mindful of their rights.
Sane leaders generally approved the enlistment of black troops. General
Thomas thought so well of the proposition that he wrote John Adams in
1775, expressing his surprise that any prejudice against it should
exist.[30] Samuel Hopkins said in 1776 that something should be speedily
done with respect to the slaves to prevent their turning against the
Americans. He was of the opinion that the way to counteract the tendency
of the Negroes to join the British was not to restrain them by force and
severity but by public acts to set the slaves free and encourage them to
labor and take arms in defense of the American cause.[31] Interested in
favor of the Negroes both by "the dictates of humanity and true policy,"
Hamilton urged that slaves be given their freedom with the swords to
secure their fidelity, animate their courage, and influence those
remaining in bondage by opening a door to their emancipation.[32] General
Greene emphatically urged that blacks be armed, believing that they would
make good soldiers.[33] Thinking that the slaves might be put to a much
better use than being given as a bounty to induce white men to enlist,
James Madison suggested that the slaves be liberated and armed.[34] "It
would certainly be consonant to the principles of liberty," said he,
"which ought never to be lost sight of in a contest for liberty." John
Laurens, of South Carolina, was among the first to see the wisdom of this
plan, directed the attention of his coworkers to it, and when authorized
by the Continental Congress, proceeded to his native State, wishing that
he had the persuasive power of a Demosthenes to make his fellow citizens
accept this proposition.[35] In 1779 Laurens said: "I would advance those
who are unjustly deprived of the rights of mankind to a state which would
be a proper gradation between abject slavery and perfect liberty, and
besides I am persuaded that if I could obtain authority for the purpose,
I would have a corps of such men trained, uniformly clad, equipped and
ready in every respect to act at the opening of the next campaign."
All of the colonies thereafter tended to look more favorably upon the
enlistment of colored troops. Free Negroes enlisted in Virginia and so
many slaves deserted their masters for the army that the State enacted in
1777 a law providing that no Negro should be enlisted unless he had a
certificate of freedom.[36] That commonwealth, however, soon took another
step toward greater recognition of the rights of the Negroes who desired
to be free to help maintain the honor of the State. With the promise
of freedom for military service many slaves were sent to the army as
substitutes for freemen. The effort of inhuman masters to force such
Negroes back into slavery at the close of their service at the front
actuated the liberal legislators of that commonwealth to pass the Act of
Emancipation, proclaiming freedom to all Negroes who had thus enlisted
and served their term faithfully, and empowered them to sue _in forma
pauperis_, should they thereafter be unlawfully held in bondage.[37]
In the course of time there arose an urgent need for the Negro in the
army. The army reached the point when almost all sorts of soldiers were
acceptable. In 1778 General Varnum induced General Washington to send
certain officers from Valley Forge to Rhode Island to enlist a battalion
of Negroes to fill the depleted ranks of that State.[38] Setting forth in
the preamble that "history affords us frequent precedents of the wisest,
freest and bravest nations having liberated their slaves and enlisted
them as soldiers to fight in defense of their country," the Rhode Island
Assembly resolved to raise a regiment of slaves, who were to be freed upon
their enlistment, their owners to be paid by the State according to the
valuation of a committee. Further light was thrown upon this action in the
statement of Governor Cooke, who in reporting the action of the Assembly
to Washington boasted that liberty was given to every effective slave to
don the uniform and that upon his passing muster he became absolutely
free and entitled to all the wages, bounties and encouragements given to
any other soldier.[39]
The State of New Hampshire enlisted Negroes and gave to those who served
three years the same bounty offered others. This bounty was turned over to
their masters as the price of the slaves in return for which their owners
issued bills of sale and certificates of freedom.[40] In this way slavery
practically passed out in New Hampshire. This affair did not proceed so
smoothly as this in Massachusetts. In 1778 that legislature had a committee
report in favor of raising a regiment of mulattoes and Negroes. This action
was taken as a result upon receiving an urgent letter from Thomas Kench, a
member of an artillery regiment serving on Castle Island. Kench referred to
the fact that there were divers of Negroes in the battalions mixed with
white men, but he thought that the blacks would have a better esprit de
corps should they be organized in companies by themselves. But the feeling
that slaves should not fight the battles of freemen and a confusion of the
question of enlistment with that of emancipation for which Massachusetts
was not then prepared,[41] led to a heated debate in the Massachusetts
Council and finally to blows in the coffee houses in lower Boston. In
such an excited state of affairs no further action was taken. Finding
recruiting difficult it is said that Connecticut undertook to raise a
colored regiment[42] and in 1781 New York, offering the usual land bounty
which would go to the masters to purchase the slaves, promised freedom to
all slaves who would enlist for the time of three years.[43] Maryland
provided in 1780 that each unit of £16,000 of property should furnish one
recruit who might be either a freeman or a slave, and in 1781 resolved to
raise 750 Negroes to be incorporated with the other troops.[44]
Farther South the enlistment of Negroes had met with obstacles. The best
provision the Southern legislatures had been able to make was to provide
in addition to the allotment of money and land that a person offering to
fight for the country should have "one sound Negro"[45] or a "healthy
sound Negro"[46] as the laws provided in Virginia and South Carolina
respectively. Threatened with invasion in 1779, however, the Southern
States were finally compelled to consider this matter more seriously.[47]
The Continental Army had been called upon to cope with the situation but
had no force available for service in those parts. The three battalions
of North Carolina troops, then on duty in the South, consisted of drafts
from the militia for nine months, which would expire before the end of
the campaign. What were they to do then when this militia, which could
not be uniformly kept up, should grow impatient with the service? Writing
from the headquarters of the army at this time, Alexander Hamilton in
discussing the advisability of this plan doubtless voiced the sentiment
of the staff. He thought that Colonel Laurens's plan for raising three or
four battalions of emancipated Negroes was the most rational one that
could be adopted in that state of Southern affairs. Hamilton foresaw the
opposition from prejudice and self-interest, but insisted that if the
Americans did not make such a use of the Negroes, the British would.
The movement received further impetus when special envoys from South
Carolina headed by Huger appeared before the Continental Congress on March
29, 1779, to impress upon that body the necessity of doing something to
relieve the Southern colonies. South Carolina, they reported, was suffering
from an exposed condition in that the number of slaves being larger than
that of the whites, she was unable to effect anything for its defense with
the natives, because of the large number necessary to remain at home to
prevent insurrections among the Negroes and their desertion to the enemy.
These representatives, therefore, suggested that there might be raised
among the Negroes in that State a force "which would not only be formidable
to the enemy from their numbers and the discipline of which they would
readily admit but would also lessen the danger from revolts and desertions
by detaching the most vigorous and enterprising from among the Negroes." At
the same time the Committee expressed the opinion that a matter of such
vital interest to the two States concerned should be referred to their
legislative bodies to judge as to the expediency of taking this step, and
that if these commonwealths found it satisfactory that the United States
should defray the expenses.
Congress passed a resolution complying with these recommendations.[48]
Laurens, the father of the movement, was made a lieutenant-colonel and
he went immediately home to urge upon South Carolina the expediency of
adopting this plan. There Laurens met determined opposition from the
majority of the aristocrats who set themselves against "a measure of so
threatening aspect and so offensive to that republican pride, which
disdains to commit the defence of the country to servile bands or share
with a color to which the idea of inferiority is inseparably connected,
the profession of arms, and that approximation of condition which must
exist between the regular soldier and the militiaman." It was to no
purpose too that Laurens renewed his efforts at a later period. He
mustered all of his energy to impress upon the Legislature the need of
taking this action but finally found himself outvoted, having only reason
on his side and "being opposed by a triple-headed monster that shed the
baneful influence of avarice, prejudice, and pusillanimity in all our
assemblies." "It was some consolation to me, however," said he, "to find
that philosophy and truth had made some little progress since my last
effort, as I obtained twice as many suffrages as before."
Hearing of the outcome, Washington wrote him that he was not at all
astonished at it, as that spirit of freedom, which at the commencement
of the Revolution would have sacrificed everything to the attainment of
this object, had long since subsided, and every selfish passion had taken
its place. "It is not the public but the private interest," said he,
"which influences the generality of mankind, nor can Americans any longer
boast an exception. Under these circumstances it would have been rather
surprising if you had succeeded."[49] It is difficult, however, to
determine exactly what Washington's attitude was. Two days after Hamilton
wrote Jay about raising colored troops in South Carolina, the elder
Laurens wrote Washington: "Had we arms for three thousand such black men
as I could select in Carolina, I should have no doubt of success in
driving the British out of Georgia, and subduing East Florida before the
end of July." To this Washington answered: "The policy of our arming
slaves is in my opinion a moot point, unless the enemy set the example.
For, should we begin to form Battalions of them, I have not the smallest
doubt, if the war is to be prosecuted, of their following us in it, and
justifying the measure upon our own ground. The contest then must be who
can arm fastest, and where are our arms? Besides I am not clear that a
discrimination will not render slavery more irksome to those who remain
in it. Most of the good and evil things in this life are judged by
comparison; and I fear a comparison in this case will be productive of
much discontent in those, who are held in servitude. But, as this is a
subject that has never employed much of my thoughts, these are no more
than the first crude Ideas that have struck me upon ye occasion."[50]
What then resulted from the agitation and discussion? The reader naturally
wants to know how many Negroes were actually engaged in the Continental
Army. Here we find ourselves at sea. We have any amount of evidence that
the number of Negroes engaged became considerable, but exact figures are
for several reasons lacking. In the first place, free Negroes rarely
served in separate battalions. They marched side by side with the white
soldier, and in most cases, according to the War Department, even after
making an extended research as to the names, organizations, and numbers,
the results would be that little can be obtained from the records to show
exactly what soldiers were white and what were colored.[51] Moreover the
first official efforts to keep the Negroes out of the army must not
be regarded as having stopped such enlistments. As there was not any
formal system of recruiting, black men continued to enlist "under various
laws and sometimes under no law, and in defiance of law." The records of
every one of the original thirteen States show that each had colored
troops. A Hessian officer observed in 1777 that "the Negro can take the
field instead of his master; and, therefore, no regiment is to be seen
in which there are not negroes in abundance, and among them there are
able-bodied, strong and brave fellows."[52] "Here too," said he, "there
are many families of free negroes who live in good homes, have property
and live just like the rest of the inhabitants." In 1777 Alexander
Scammell, Adjutant-General, made the following report as to the number
and placement of the Negroes in the Continental Army: